Feral Jundi

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Industry Talk: Cerberus Agrees To Acquire DynCorp In $1.5 Billion Deal

   “Private-equity firms are focusing on defense service providers rather than hardware makers, making a calculation that military demand for services will hold up better than hardware in the years ahead,” Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute….

***** 

   This is a big deal.  When a company like Cerberus pulls the trigger on purchasing DynCorp, along with previous purchases of IAP Worldwide Services, Tier 1 Group and Radia Holdings, I tend to take notice.  Cerberus is reading the tea leaves of defense and positioning themselves to own the companies that will matter in the future.  To me, this signifies that defense services, as opposed to defense hardware makers, is the new ‘big sexy’ in defense.

   It also tells me that Cerberus is doing their homework.  I have never been contacted by their people, but I am sure they have been reading through all the strategy papers and forward looking stuff that is produced by all the think tanks to come to their conclusions.  Plus they have two long and expensive wars to study along with the GWOT.  They have made their determinations about the future of defense, and these chess moves say a lot.  This is a recognition of the fact that contractors are a strategic necessity for our future wars, and now investors are catching on.

   The other point on this is DynCorp’s current owner Robert McKeon (Veritas Capital) made a lot of money on this deal. Very impressive return on investment if you ask me. –Matt

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Bill Ballhaus Talks About DynCorp Acquisition

April 12th, 2010

by John Adams

Bill Ballhaus, an ExecutiveBiz 2009 Person to Watch and CEO of security giant DynCorp (NYSE: DCP) shared his thoughts on his firm being purchased by Cerberus for the cool sum of $1.5 billion.

“I believe that under this partnership with Cerberus, DynCorp International will be able to build on our extensive heritage and successful performance to continue to achieve our growth objectives.” He added, “this transaction is a major milestone for DynCorp International’s continued leadership in serving our customers and supporting U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.”

Link to quote here.

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Cerberus Agrees to Acquire DynCorp in $1 Billion Deal

April 12, 2010

By Emily Thornton and Gopal Ratnam

April 12 (Bloomberg) — Cerberus Capital Management LP, the private-equity firm whose takeover of Chrysler Corp. ended in bankruptcy, agreed to buy defense contractor DynCorp International Inc. for about $1 billion.

Cerberus, run by Steve Feinberg, will pay $17.55 a share, Falls Church, Virginia-based DynCorp said today in a statement. The price is 49 percent more than DynCorp’s closing share price on the New York Stock Exchange on April 9. The deal, expected to close in the third or fourth quarter, is valued at $1.5 billion including the assumption of debt.

DynCorp, which helps train Iraqi police and supports the U.S.’s operation of military bases, is at least the fifth government-services investment that Cerberus has made since 2000, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Cerberus owns government contractors including IAP Worldwide Services Inc., Tier 1 Group and Radia Holdings Inc.

“Private-equity firms are focusing on defense service providers rather than hardware makers, making a calculation that military demand for services will hold up better than hardware in the years ahead,” Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute, a public policy research group in Arlington, Virginia, said in a telephone interview.

DynCorp rose 48 percent, the most since its initial public offering four years ago, to $17.41 at 4:02 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.

(more…)

Sunday, April 4, 2010

Afghanistan: Afghan Marksmanship Is A Fable, Bring Back The Jezailchis

     One day, after a few hours of fighting in which the Taliban had not yet hit any Marines, a corporal from Second Platoon stood upright, exposing himself above the waist and looking over a wall as bullets flew high overhead. He didn’t flinch. “What’s everybody ducking for?” he said. He cupped his hand to his mouth and shouted an expletive-laden taunt at the Taliban gunmen shooting from concealment on the opposite side of a field. The editors would never allow the corporal’s words to be printed here. But they amounted to this: You guys can’t shoot.

*****

    Thanks to Doug for bringing this to my attention. Man, did the Italian Carabinieri just show up the DynCorp police instructors or what? lol Training folks requires patience and a profound understanding of the fundamentals.  Good on the Italians for correcting the issue.  But it also highlights the importance of standardizing this contract, so you don’t have companies or even the military doing whatever they want.

    I cut that one little piece of reportage out of this first article posted below, just to get the ball rolling for this post.  Marksmanship is something contractors are teaching to Afghans, Iraqis, Ugandans, Nepalese, you name it, and there are so many issues that come up when trying to teach this life saving and essential skill to the troops.  For this post, I will highlight the Afghan issues and present the six points that Mr. Chiver’s mentioned in his excellent reportage on this topic. I am not saying these apply to all forces being trained, but for Afghanistan, this is what has been identified.  So with that said, let’s get started.

   In a prior post, I mentioned the concept of the Jezailchis Scouts (JS).  Or basically create a scout/sniper force in Afghanistan that would pride itself as being the premier Afghan tracking and killing/capture force. Something along the lines as the Selous Scouts.  A force that all Afghans would look up to and highly respect.  This force would be the go to guys for hunting humans up in the mountains, and they would have great utility (pseudo operations, sniper operations, scouting, snatch and grab, etc.).  Marksmanship and the ability to track and survive on their own, would be the hallmarks of this crew.  It would also draw from that fabled history of the Afghan being a good marksman, hence the Jezailchi reference in the name of the group.

   But as the reader will find out, Afghans on both sides of the conflict, suck at marksmanship.  Mr. Chivers boiled it down to the six areas that are contributing factors to poor marksmanship on the side of the Taliban (but could easily apply to Afghan Army or Police forces)

   Here they are.

   1. Limited knowledge of marksmanship fundamentals.

   2. A frequent reliance on automatic fire from assault rifles.

   3. The poor condition of many of those rifles.

   4. Old and mismatched ammunition that is also in poor condition.

   5. Widespread eye problems and uncorrected vision.

  6. Difficulties faced by a scattered force in organizing quality training.

   The second Chiver’s article also mentioned what happens when a enemy force can’t shoot–they adapt.  In this case, AK 47’s were used to cause reactions in patrols.  Meaning, if an ambushing force fires the weapons and the patrol of Marines runs to the closest protection that happens to be pre-rigged with IED’s, then that ambushing force could command detonate and kill the Marines that way.  So the enemy knows it sucks when it comes to shooting, so they just use the weapon as a catalyst to get our forces into traps or to delay our forces.  Nothing new, and this is a tactic used over and over again in the history of warfare.

   But going back to the marksmanship thing, I personally think that this is a weakness that would should be exploiting.  We exploit it by creating some good ol fashion kick ass Afghan shooters, coupled with Coalition snipers and marksmanship mentors. We also have the coalition bring in weapon systems that can reach out and touch someone, and has optics. I continue to read reports that this last part is happening, and that is good.  We should be picking these guys off from across the canyons or at distances that the Taliban cannot engage at.

   That brings up the other point of the article.  The two weapons systems that the Taliban are able to actually hit people with, are the PKMs and sniper rifles (with trained snipers using them).  The PKMs makes sense, because a machine gunner can adjust fire easily, and concentrate fire better and at distance.  It is the only weapon system that suits the capabilities and limitations of the kind of fighters using it. (please refer to the six points up top)

   Now for the Afghan Army and Police, there are a few things we could do to bring them up to speed quickly.  Giving them eyeglasses would be a start. lol  Also, some accountability must be shown for the quality and functionality of all weapons and ammo issued.

   Some ideas off the top of my head would be to modify the AK or the issued M-16 to only shoot semi-auto.  It would force these guys to shoot one shot at a time, as opposed to the spray and pray technique.  The other thing that could be done, is to put reflex sites on these weapons–stuff that is AK tough and does not require batteries. That way, you have a weapon that is Fisher Price simple for the Afghans to use, and they won’t be able to use it like a fire hose. If the weapon is better suited to the user, then the other aspect of teaching marksmanship fundamentals will go a lot easier. There should also be an effort to cull the best of the best from these groups, and get them in marksmanship focused group like the JS or whatever special forces that has been created.

   Finally, marksmanship could be promoted in Afghan society once again.  Competitions could be held, cash or goats could be issued as prizes, and competent Afghan shooters could be identified and approached for recruitment into the JS or Army. Hunters could be rewarded for meat collected, or hide or whatever, and they could be approached as well.  Hunters throughout the world are all the same, and I am sure there are plenty in Afghanistan who are very good at it and enjoy the sport.  You just have to develop an outlet to attract these guys.  Even in the Army and Police, I am sure there are those who could really shine with marksmanship if they had an outlet for such a thing. Especially if marksmanship billets paid more–you would definitely increase the interest in such a thing. Stuff to think about, and thanks to Mr. Chivers for some excellent information on the matter. –Matt

Edit: 04/11/2020 Here is the next article Mr. Chivers wrote about Afghan Army and Police marksmanship. Awesome.

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Jezail

The Gang That Couldn’t Shoot Straight

Six billion dollars later, the Afghan National Police can’t begin to do their jobs right—never mind relieve American forces.

By T. Christian Miller, Mark Hosenball, and Ron Moreau

Mar 29, 2010

(Only a portion of the article is posted, and follow the link to read the entire thing)

At Kabul’s police training center, a team of 35 Italian carabinieri recently arrived to supplement DynCorp’s efforts. Before the Italians showed up at the end of January for a one-year tour, the recruits were posting miserable scores on the firing range. But the Italians soon discovered that poor marksmanship wasn’t the only reason: the sights of the AK-47 and M-16 rifles the recruits were using were badly out of line. “We zeroed all their weapons,” says Lt. Rolando Tommasini. “It’s a very important thing, but no one had done this in the past. I don’t know why.”

The Italians also had a different way of teaching the recruits to shoot. DynCorp’s instructors started their firearms training with 20-round clips at 50 meters; the recruits couldn’t be sure at first if they were even hitting the target. Instead the carabinieri started them off with just three bullets each and a target only seven meters away. The recruits would shoot, check the target, and be issued three more rounds. When they began gaining confidence, the distance was gradually increased to 15, then 30, and then 50 meters. On a recent day on the firing range only one of 73 recruits failed the shooting test. The Italians say that’s a huge improvement…..

Story here.

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Afghan Marksmen — Forget the Fables

By C.J. CHIVERS

March 26, 2010

The recent Marine operations in and near Marja brought into sharp relief a fact that contradicts much of what people think they know about the Afghan war. It is this: Forget the fables. The current ranks of Afghan fighters are crowded with poor marksmen.

This simple statement is at odds with an oft-repeated legend of modern conflict, in which Afghan men are described, in clichés and accounts from yesteryear, as natural gunmen and accomplished shots. Everyone who has even faintly followed the history of war in Central Asia has heard the tales of Afghan men whose familiarity with firearms is such a part of their life experience that they can pick up most any weapon and immediately put it to effective work. The most exaggerated accounts are cartoonish, including tales of Afghan riflemen whose bullets can strike a lone sapling (I’ve even heard “blade of grass”) a hilltop away.Without getting into an argument with the ghost of Rudyard Kipling, who was one of the early voices popularizing the wonders of Afghan riflery, an update is in order. This is because the sum of these descriptions does not match what is commonly observed in firefights today. These days, the opposite is more often the case. Poor marksmanship, even abysmally poor marksmanship, is a consistent trait among Afghan men. The description applies to Taliban and Afghan government units alike.

Over the years that Tyler Hicks and I have worked in Afghanistan’s remote and hostile corners, we have been alongside Afghan, American and European infantrymen in many firefights and ambushes. These fights have involved a wide set of tactical circumstances, ranges, elevations, and light and weather conditions. Some skirmishes were brief and simple. Others were long and complex, involving as many as a few hundred fighters on both sides. One result has been consistent. We have almost always observed that a large proportion of Afghan fire, both incoming and outgoing, is undisciplined and errant, often wildly so. Afghans, like most anyone else with a modicum of exposure to infantry weapons, might be able to figure out how to make any firearm fire. But hitting what they are aiming at, assuming they are aiming at all? That’s another matter.

(more…)

Friday, March 26, 2010

Aviation: DynCorp Flies AU Peacekeepers To Somalia

Filed under: Aviation,Somalia — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 12:35 AM

     “The military stalemate is less a reflection of opposition strength than of the weakness of the Transitional Federal Government. Despite infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt,” the report stated. “The government owes its survival to the small African Union peace support operation, AMISOM, rather than to its own troops.” 

*****

   Bravo to DynCorp for contributing to the survival of the TFG, and I am sure NATO is happy as well.  As you can see with the article, Uganda is very important to the AU mission and without these forces, Mogadishu would fall into the hands of extremists.

   On the other hand, we are yet again supporting a weak government in their fight against determined islamic extremists.  When are we going to pick a winner for once, or back a government that has a spine and the ability to make things happen out there?  Because now we are in a position where the AU will probably be doing all of the fighting to protect the TFG in Mogadishu, because the government military forces are so disorganized and pathetic. Nor is there any concerted effort to really protect or win over the people, and that is how the extremists win.

   Let’s look at this another way.  We are fighting the same kind of fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The West has the most modern military in the world, with all of these resources at it’s disposal, and we are still going at it after all of these years.  It is only the last couple years where we have really started to kick in the whole COIN emphasis on operations, and retool for that fight.

    Now look at Somalia, with it’s lack of a strong government or organized army. It is at a severe disadvantage when combating an islamic extremist enemy who is using the same tactics and strategy as it’s partner networks throughout the world. I know we have this aversion to ‘Americanizing’ the war in Somalia.  But if you look at all the pieces, you kind of wonder if Somalia even has a chance? And to a larger extent, are we ready for Somalia to be conquered by the enemy and deal with the propaganda value of such a victory? –Matt

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U.S. contractor flies AU peacekeepers to Somalia

State department says U.S. has no plans to increase military’s role

By John VandiverMarch 23, 2010

STUTTGART, Germany — U.S.-contracted flights, working under the NATO banner, ferried some 1,700 Ugandan troops into Mogadishu, Somalia, last week in response to an African Union request for transportation support, alliance officials said in a news release.

The troop movements were made as government officials in the Somali capital are preparing to launch a military offensive to reclaim parts of the city from al-Shabaab — an extremist group with al-Qaida links.

The airlift, which ran from March 5 through March 16, was conducted by the U.S.-contracted DynCorp International. In addition to shuttling troops into Somalia, the airlift also flew 850 Ugandan troops out of Mogadishu, NATO said.

Tensions have been on the rise in Mogadishu as the fragile Somali transitional government has been unable to turn the tide against Islamic extremist groups that seek to seize control of the country and impose a harsh form of Sharia law. And as AU forces dig in for the upcoming fight, a March 10 report by the U.N. Monitoring Group of Somalia raises questions about whether Somalia’s weak security forces and dysfunctional government are capable of achieving any significant gains.

(more…)

Monday, March 15, 2010

Industry Talk: GAO Sides With DynCorp, The Dutch Are Leaving And Afghan Training Time Is Reduced..Hmmm?

   This is funny. If you take a step back and look at all the pieces–Xe, DynCorp and others are fighting for a chunk of a training contract that is vital to the war effort. But then the government decides to cut the already condensed training schedule from 8 weeks to 6 weeks.  All I know, is that for the next review that the IG does of this training program, it should be well documented that the government set up this contract for failure.

    How can they possibly expect a quality product with this kind of training program? All I know is that whatever companies get involved with this contract, they are going to be earning every penny of their contract. And the Coalition in Afghanistan should do a little more to support this industry in the media, seeing how we are ‘coming to the rescue’ it seems. All I know is that I certainly hope the industry can pull this off, and I will be cheering them on.

    Which makes me wonder.  Is this an outcome of the Dutch leaving, and is this an example of contractors ‘picking up the slack‘?  Boy, if it is, I think the Obama Administration, and the war planners, should do a little more to show their thanks to this industry.  Politically and militarily speaking, we are absolutely vital to the war effort right now.  Especially if any other NATO folks decide to bail out last minute. –Matt

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GAO blocks contract to firm formerly known as Blackwater to train Afghan police

By Joby WarrickTuesday, March 16, 2010

Federal auditors on Monday put a stop to Army plans to award a $1 billion training program for Afghan police officers to the company formerly known as Blackwater, concluding that other companies were unfairly excluded from bidding on the job.

The decision by the Government Accountability Office leaves unclear who will oversee training of the struggling Afghan National Police, a poorly equipped, 90,000-strong paramilitary force that will inherit the task of preserving order in the country after NATO troops depart.

GAO officials upheld a protest by DynCorp International Inc., which currently conducts training for Afghan police under a State Department contract. DynCorp lawyers argued that the company should have been allowed to submit bids when management of the training program passed from State to the Army. Instead, Pentagon officials allowed the training program to be attached to an existing Defense contract that supports counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan.

Xe Services, the new name of Blackwater, was poised to win one portion of a much larger group of contracts, shared among five corporations, that could earn the companies more than $15 billion over five years.

(more…)

Friday, March 12, 2010

Industry Talk: How To Strengthen The Afghan National Police, By DynCorp CEO William Ballhaus

     All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. –Sun Tzu

*****

   This battle is getting interesting now.  You see, DynCorp realizes that if they can apply more pressure to public opinion about this by engaging with the media, then maybe Congress might step in and halt this action do to the negative attention on all of this.

    I also noticed that a few media groups are really pushing congress and the public on the issue of disbarring Xe from the current list do to the latest stuff in Afghanistan. Strategically speaking, DynCorp benefits from this latest media attack on Xe, but you won’t hear DynCorp talking about that.

   Now what could possibly be happening though is some low grade corporate espionage and/or smear campaigns.  What I mean by that, is that companies can benefit from the downfall of their competition, and they will do what they can to help that process along. To maintain a moral and righteous stance, they would do what they can to feed that process on the sly.

     A prime example of this, is when a contractor is fired from one company, and then goes on to work for a competitor of that company.  That individual now knows a lot about the inner workings of his former company, and probably knows some dirt as well.  The temptation for that individual to feed their current company corporate office with information that could potentially hurt their former company, is great. Then a few anonymous tips to some Juicebox Commandos and bam, you have now just struck a blow against your competitor. This is yet again, another reason to treat your contractors right and not play games with them.  The non-disclosure agreement is not a ‘100 percent insurance policy’ solution against that type of thing.

   I also would not doubt that there are corporate moles in place at a few of the companies.  You see this in other industries, and I could totally see that happening with ours.  The competition for these contracts is extreme, and the temptation for companies to do this is great.  Plus, most of the companies are filled with guys who specialize in that kind of thing with their prior military, police, private investigator or ‘other’ career.  The amount of money on the line with these contracts is huge and everyone is seeking an edge in the market.

   And to clarify so I don’t get some corporate lawyer knocking on my door, I am not at all saying that DynCorp or anyone in this industry is participating in this kind of activity. I just bring this stuff up, because the potential is always there. Especially when you see it happening in other high dollar, high stakes industries. –Matt

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How to Strengthen the Afghan National Police

March 11, 2010

To the Editor:

Your March 6 editorial “ ‘If You Bring In the Cops’ ”) rightly makes the case that Afghanistan’s future lies in the ability to successfully connect the Afghan people to their government. To that end, the question of how to strengthen the Afghan National Police is correctly front and center.

As the responsibility for police training transitions to sole Pentagon control, the consequences of the choice of contract to support this effort deserve examination. The proposed Army contracting vehicle, which was originally established for technology procurement, will have the net effect of restricting the potential choice to two, or possibly only one, provider for future training.

As the former commander of the Afghan National Security Forces training mission recently testified, this crucial mission will require experienced government contractors. It is critical that concerns about the current procurement approach, lack of adequate competition and resulting choice of contractor do not undermine confidence in the training.

(more…)

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