According to this FBO solicitation, G4S is the only company that can provide these services in the time frame needed. It is also worth $50 million. The reason? Here is a clip from the FBO posting.
Due to the Government shutdown and migrant caravan situation on the southwest border, G4S is the only vendor that can provide these transportation and transportation guard services beginning on March 4, 2019.
I guess the other obvious point here is that government is once again turning to private industry to save the day. lol The Border Patrol is not getting paid, and that could be problematic if you have a caravan coming in that requires a lot of manpower. Or worse, the chances of CBP guys getting bribed could increase as this shutdown continues.
Another area to watch is the TSA. They are having issues with keeping folks in positions because they are not getting paid as well. Yet again, there are calls for private industry to come in and take over so airports do not have to suffer again through either poor government services, or payroll problems that stem from a divided congress and government shutdown.
Back to G4S though. They have a large security presence in the world and in the US and they have already been doing these Transportation Officer contracts with Homeland Security (that photo up top is from 2010). Just go to Indeed and read all the reviews. Also, if you go to their career website, they are offering quite a few of these positions with bonuses added.
I should note that the FBO solicitation says this about what they need G4S to do. So it is not just TO’s but actual security services. Maybe actual border patrol duties are next? Especially as the shutdown goes into uncharted territory as the longest one in US history.
Under the authority of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302-2 Unusual and Compelling Urgency, CBP requires a sole source FFP type contract with G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. (DUNS 001903723) for vehicle security transportation and medical/facility security guard services for the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) along the southwest border of the United States.
On the issue of the border, keep your eyes on the companies tasked with building structures, and the security they will need to accomplish the task. Back in the day, SBI Net was all the rage for border security, and EODT (which is now Janus Global) was one of the security providers.
Finally, there is a surge element to this. Basically when manpower is needed yesterday, they are using contractors to fill that need. We have this migrant caravan coming from the south that could have thousands of people in it. There have already been several of these caravans that attempted to cross last year, and this current one is about 10,000 plus people. Mostly from Honduras. –Matt
Under the authority of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302-2 Unusual and Compelling Urgency, CBP requires a sole source FFP type contract with G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. (DUNS 001903723) for vehicle security transportation and medical/facility security guard services for the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) along the southwest border of the United States. USBP is a component of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP. The contract will have a base ordering period of 6 months (March 4, 2019 through September 3, 2019), with one 3-month option (September 4, 2019 through December 3, 2019). The total estimated valkue is approximately $50,000,000 for a base period of 6 months and a 3-month option period. Due to the Government shutdown and migrant caravan situation on the southwest border, G4S is the only vendor that can provide these transportation and transportation guard services beginning on March 4, 2019. This acquisition is only needed to provide CBP continuity of essential services while CBP executes the re- compete. Only G4S has the trained, certified and prepared Transport Officers (TOs) to cover all routes crossing state/sector lines. These same TOs can be used for unusual circumstances, such as surge for issues such as caravans and similar that requires crossing state/sector lines. No other vender can immediately provide the necessary transportation and facility/medical guard services that cover nine sectors which is CBP’s real and urgent need. CBP is currently planning a long term contract/BPA among GSA schedule 84 Category 246 54 holders for this requirement. That solicitation has not been released yet. As part of that process, CBP performed extensive market research to determine the current capability of GSA Schedule holders. While several large businesses have the long term capability of performing CBP’s transportation services, only G4S has the current capability to continue to provide the services effective March 4th 2019.
FBO solicitation here.
Man, for a first post coming back home, this one is a tough one to write about. My heart goes out to the friends and family of those that were killed, and this is a difficult time for the G4S family. This is the second attack on G4S folks (March of this year) and this kind of thing can definitely impact the morale of folks on the ground and especially during the holidays.
With that said, I wanted to write about this and give folks a chance to correct the record or add to the story. There is no AAR on this incident and everything I have on it is from open source or from folks on Facebook that have brought forth information. So with any of this stuff I have posted, please feel free to comment below to correct the record.
My other intent is for other security folks to use this for research and learn from it. The value of incidents like this is that other folks that are performing similar type duties elsewhere in the world, can learn from what happened in incidents like this.
The attack happened November 27, 2018 at 0630 PM. This is from Tolo. For timing and cause, the Taliban said it was in retaliation for an air strike that killed some civilians. It was also timed right after a conference in Geneva where President Ghani spoke of appointing a team to seek a peace deal which would take five years to implement. There have been numerous attacks recently, and in my view, they are a sign that the Taliban wants leverage in the ongoing peace talks.
The method of attack was pretty simple. The suicide bomber drove a water tanker packed with explosives to the gate, outside of the G4S compound in Pul-e-Charkhil, in Kabul’s Police District 9 area. They also call this the Anjuman base and it has other stuff nearby like the Green Village. Once the bomb was detonated and the front gate guards manning the entry control point were taken out, an assault force stormed the compound. The blast was big, and TOLO showed the damage in this video.
This assault force was apparently armed with ‘small arms and rockets‘, so I assume AK’s and RPG’s. No word if they had explosive vests and I have no better information than that.
They fought their way in, sent everyone running to bunkers, and were met by the responding quick reaction force. So all together, there were five attackers- one suicide truck driver that died in the blast, and four assaulters that entered the compound by foot.
For time frame, this attack lasted 10 hours from when the assault started. So this was an all night affair, and a pretty extensive clearing operation. One security guard told TOLO news that one of the attackers was alive until early Thursday morning. According to the local Afghan police chief in charge of the district there, this is the break down of casualties.
Col. Bismillah Taban, the police of chief of the district where the attack happened, said six Afghans and a British citizen were killed in the attack, and 27 others — 11 Nepalese, 11 Afghans, and 5 British — were wounded. Most of the casualties came from the initial blast, he said.
Col. Taban said the last of the four attackers were killed nearly 10 hours after the assault begun, just before dawn.
“The police were moving slow because there was a hostage situation inside, where the staff of the firm were stuck in bunkers,” he said. “We rescued 330 people from inside.”
G4S made a statement about the incident and listed casualty figures on their Facebook page. Feel free to go there to show your condolences or seek answers to any questions. They said five of their employees were killed, and 32 were injured.
One of the individuals that was killed in the counter attack was 33 year old Luke Griffin. He was a British citizen from the Rainhill, Merseyside area, and had worked for the company for 8 years. He had done time in Iraq and Afghanistan as a contractor and in the military. Luke had served in the 16th Regiment Royal Artillery in Afghanistan when he was in the military. Apparently he was with one of the PSD teams that G4S runs in Afghanistan, and responded to this incident as part of a quick reaction force. He is a father of one child, a son, and husband of Helen Morris.
Colleagues of Luke mentioned that there are many people alive today because of his actions. If anyone else would like to further fill in the details of what happened to Luke, or of the efforts of his quick reaction force, please fill free to contact me or write below in the comments section. This will be on Facebook as well. The other folks that were killed were his fellow Afghans, and I would like to hear about their actions as well. My intent is to make sure their story is heard and it is correct. Here is a quote from the Sun.
A suicide car bomber detonated a huge device at the gate of the Anjuman base near the city’s airport before heavily armed fighters swarmed inside.
But they were pushed back in brave defensive action spearheaded by British security teams.
Luke – a veteran infantryman who saw action in the Iraq and Afghan campaigns – is understood to have been cut down after grabbing his weapon and dashing into the firefight.
Five other British G4S staff were wounded in the battle – including one with blast injuries to his face and another with shrapnel wounds to his arm and hand.
Dad-of-one Luke, from Rainhill, Merseyside but originally from Tunbridge Wells, Kent, was a member of one of the four G4S “quick reaction teams” securing the sprawling base.
My other thought here was the loss of Nepalese and Afghans. The Nepalese lost a quite a few folks in a 2016 attack, and the Afghans as a whole have lost many at the service of private companies in this war. Their sacrifice, like any contractor in this war, must not be forgotten.
In the company statement, numerous groups came to help out with security and medical support. No mention of specific groups, other than police were involved with clearing operations. I have to think that the surviving security forces were involved with clearing operations, as well as partner NATO nations. Possibly special operations folks, that type of thing. There were apparently 230 to 330 hostages on the compound that required rescuing, according to various reports. They hid in safe rooms and/or bunkers, and probably stood by while the police and adjacent forces cleared. Like the security guard mentioned at TOLO, there was one last guy that was killed in the morning, so that means he could have been killing and wounding folks all through the night.
No word on aviation support, but I have to imagine something showed up to help out. If anyone has anything to add for that, please feel free to comment.
As for commentary, incidents like this highlight the difficulty of securing a compound near a main road. Typically you want stand off distance between your ECP and any kind of access. You want folks to be able to survive a blast like this, so that at least they can counter a ground assault. In this case, the entire ECP defense team was probably wiped out or wounded and the assaulters made entry. Which brings up the the next point–quick reaction forces.
These days, if you cannot move the compound to someplace where you have stand off distance, then focus needs to be on really building up the blast walls/defenses and ensuring the quick reaction force is actually a ‘quick’ reaction force. Can it react within seconds and minutes of an incident? Often times, jihadists and assaulters that the Taliban use, are armed with small arms and explosive vests. They are literally fighting their way into pockets of human concentration and quickly. Think Dining Facilities, bunkers, class rooms, etc. Anything that will give them a high concentration of humans, so that they could shoot them or detonate their vest and kill them. So it is imperative to have a means of stopping such a force before they reach these zones.
Drilling and training both the security force and those that you are protecting is essential. From what it looks like, folks ran to bunkers and designated safe zones. The goal is to get them into places that will give them cover and allow them to survive an assault like this until the clearing forces can do their job. But time is everything, and with these types of attacks, the assaulters have the advantage. They could kick off their attack with a big boom like this, and everyone is dazed and there is chaos everywhere–which assaulters will take advantage of. Or the attack is kicked off from the inside– like the typical green on blue attacks. It could be both, and the goal is violence of action to create the maximum amount of shock to the nervous systems of their targets and to inflict the most amount of damage and death. So response via a quick reaction team is critical to these types of deals and preparing the occupants and facility is equally critical.
Medical is another area to focus on. As police and security are trying to clear, it might be impossible for medical folks to get into a specific area to treat injured. So ensuring security/clients have some kind of medical training to handle injuries until forces get to them is very important. Tourniquet training, and other basics is advisable. We are talking about blast wounds and gunshot wounds.
Communications can be crap during a deal like this. Most basic coms that companies use, shut down when overloaded with a ton of traffic. Repeaters cannot handle everyone trying to talk on the same net, or folks overwhelm the channels. So a simple thing like a communications plan, that includes primary and secondary and tertiary means of communication needs to be worked out so that it can account for this type of scenario. I am sure folks were using WhatsApp or cellphones or whatever they had, in order to communicate during the incident. No word on what coms were like for this deal, but it is definitely something that is a factor.
Clearing operations is very dangerous and very difficult. Does G4S train their guys for that? I don’t know, nor will I speculate. The thing to be aware of is that one bullet can go through multiple pods or trailers that you see on sites like this. Whatever safe room or bunker you designate, you need to keep this in mind and make sure it is actually protective. That and coordinating with the responding and adjacent forces can be a nightmare. Training and drills are key to making sure everyone is aware of what is involved with this stuff. I do not know if anyone was harmed during the actual clearing operations. Remember, they didn’t get the last attacker until the following morning, and so that is a long night of slow and detailed clearing of the compound. Clearing forces get tired, or spooked, and the possibility of shooting an innocent person is there.
Finally, it is often incidents like this that really show the strengths and weaknesses of whatever plan the company had. I would highly recommend that G4S do an extensive after action report on what happened, and conclude with some lessons learned. That document could then be used in future training, and an effort should be made to bring in any of the survivors of the incident to talk to the class about it. It is much more impactful to have those that were there explain the who, what, where, when and why of the whole thing. It has value because it could save lives in future incidents. Unfortunately, most companies do not do this and they do not share that information with the outside world if they do. More than likely because of possible liability reasons or lack of leadership pushing the issue and making it a priority.
As a security contractor and student of my profession, I always like to promote the idea that we should all take the time to learn from these types of incidents. Read the available after action reviews, wikis, open source reports, blogs, forums, etc. to get a better picture of what happened. Know your enemy, and know yourself as they say. Reach out to those that were there and ask them about it if you can. It is amazing what little details come up in conversation that were not mentioned in reports. I also study video footage, because most jihadists love to post their work. Most importantly, apply Kaizen or continuous improvement to your defense. Todays enemies are constantly evolving and seeking new ways of attack. We need to be constantly staying one step ahead of them and operating within their decision making cycle to win that fight. –Matt
Edit: 12/22/2018 Tim Lynch of Free Range International fame is now writing over at a website called The Freq Media and his series is called the Afghanistan Weekly. He wrote an in-depth post about this attack and the history of security work in Kabul. Check it out here.
G4S said it was looking at oil and gas based prospects in countries like Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and South Sudan, where a huge oil pipeline could be built through Kenya to a port there in order to bypass bitter disputes with neighbouring Sudan. High potential mining opportunities are also in countries such as Botswana, Ghana, Namibia and Tanzania. The company expects to move into Ethiopia, Libya, Somaliland and South Sudan in the next year…-Interview
…To reduce its reliance on Khartoum, the South Sudanese government has announced a 2,000 km pipeline, at a cost of $3bn, through Kenya to its port of Lamu. G4S is one of the companies vying to help secure this vital source of South Sudanese revenue… -separate source–see below
I had picked up on this project through some stories I was reading in regards to the future of this industry. That the companies are looking for business in resource rich Africa, and much of that business revolves around energy related projects.
This particular project grabbed my attention, just because of how ambitious it is and how involved the security for it would be. Because once this is up and running, all aspects of LAPSSET will be a big target for criminals and terrorists. Especially the 2000 km of pipeline they plan on building.
So this should require the services of multiple PMSC’s to help in all aspects of securing this thing. I also imagine that some kind of oil police apparatus will have to be established, which will then require training facilities with instructors. We will see how it goes, and if any readers have any other details about this massive project, feel free to comment below. –Matt
Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor
The Lamu Port and Lamu Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) aka The Lamu corridor is a transport and infrastructure project in Kenya that when complete will be the country’s second transport corridor. Kenya’s other transport corridor is the Mombasa port and Mombasa – Uganda transport corridor that passes through Nairobi and much of the Northern Rift.
The project will involve the following components:
-A port at Manda Bay
-Standard gauge railway line to Juba (capital of South Sudan)
-Road network
-Oil pipelines (Southern Sudan and Ethiopia)
-Oil refinery at Bargoni
-Three Airports
-Three resort cities (Lamu, Isiolo and Lake Turkana shores)
The project was initially conceived in 1975 but never took off due to various reasons. The project was later revived and included in Kenya’s Vision 2030. LAPSSET cost was estimated to cost $ 16 Billion in 2009. Recent estimates arrived after studies now put the cost of the project at between US $ 22 Billion and US $ 23 Billion.
The timeline of the project is not clear including when it started and when it should be finished. Some projects like the Isiolo-Merille projects began in 2007. At the peak of the project, between 2013 and 2018, it is expected that the Kenyan government will be spending about 6% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product or 16% of its annual budget on the project. The project is in turn expected to contribute an additional 3% increase in Kenya’s GDP by 2020.
Key towns in the project are Lamu & Isiolo in Kenya, Juba in Southern Sudan and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia.
Wikipedia for LAPSSET here.
—————————————————————- Lamu port project launched for South Sudan and Ethiopia
March 02, 2012
There have been protests against the port by some environmentalists and residents of Lamu island
Construction has begun on a $23bn (£14.5bn) port project and oil refinery in south-eastern Kenya’s coastal Lamu region near war-torn Somalia’s border.
An oil pipeline, railway and motorway will also be built linking Lamu to South Sudan and Ethiopia.
Newly independent South Sudan plans to use Lamu as its main oil export outlet.
A BBC reporter says security concerns for the project may explain the presence of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops in Somalia aiming to pacify the region.
‘Biggest African project’
Kenya’s leader Mwai Kibaki launched the project along with his South Sudanese and Ethiopian counterparts, Salva Kiir and Meles Zenawi respectively.
“I have no doubt that this day will go down in history as one of the defining moments – when we made a major stride to connect our people to the many socio-economic opportunities that lie ahead,” AFP news agency quotes Mr Kibaki as saying at the inauguration ceremony.
Known as Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (Lapsset), it is expected to be completed within four years with initial costs coming from the three governments and plans to attract international investment.
Steven Ikuwa, the administrator in charge of Lapsset, told the BBC the scale of the plans was huge.
“I am proud to say this is one of the biggest projects that we are carrying out in Africa.”
The BBC’s Noel Mwakugu in Lamu says there are worries about the impact of the project on Lamu district, which is one of East Africa’s most beautiful and relatively unspoiled environments along the Indian Ocean and includes a cultural heritage site on Lamu Island.
“Lamu is a living heritage. Already Unesco has declared Lamu a World Heritage Site – as an endangered site,” Mualimu Badi from the Save Lamu group told the BBC.
“If 500,000 people come to work as workers, we stand to lose that status.”
Mr Badi also said local residents fear they would be made homeless by the project as most people in the area are unable to prove their right to live in their homes.
In response to these complaints, Mr Kibaki has announced that residents will be issued with land title deeds and his administration will provide training for 1,000 young people to prepare for future opportunities presented by the port.
Oil export alternatives
Our correspondent says Lamu’s 32-berth port will be five times larger than Kenya’s only other Indian Ocean port, Mombasa – which has been struggling to serve the needs of landlocked countries to the south and west of Kenya.
Wow, another hit to G4S and WSI. Look folks, I hate writing about these things because I truly want companies to be successful and be shining examples of what is good in this industry. But not everyone can be the Swiss Guards of the industry, and there will always be companies that ‘just don’t get it’.
But I also think it is important to not reward incompetence and poor management. That we need to be reminded what the consequence of poor leadership is from time to time, hence why I post this stuff. So either G4S and WSI learns from this and makes corrections to the way they do business, or they will continue to lose contracts and money. And we should all learn from this, and ensure we are doing everything we can to continuously improve our contract and providing the necessary service that our clients need and demand. Especially if your client is asking you to protect nuclear materials…..yikes.
Every one of these incidents over the years usually involved one of two things. Either poorly constructed/poorly funded contracts, or poor leadership/management tasked with running these contracts. Sometimes poor leaders are the result of a lack of funding for salaries–you pay peanuts, you get monkies. Or sometimes even with a substantial salary, a poor leader is chosen because of a poor vetting process, which is even worse. That a company has no idea what a good leader is, or they just don’t care.
It is also amazing to me that companies make millions of dollars on contracts like this, but they put minimal effort if any into finding good leaders or training up good leaders or putting together policies that grow good leaders within the company. It is an investment that is essential, and glaringly obvious, and yet PMSC’s continue to screw this up.
I mean McDonalds and it’s Hamburger University does a better job of training and growing leaders within their organization than most of today’s PMSC’s. lol And now G4S, the largest security company in the world, is learning this lesson in a very direct and financially painful way. –Matt
US nuclear site ends security contract following nun’s break-in
Sat, Sep 29 2012
By Timothy Gardner
The U.S. government’s “Fort Knox” of weapons-grade uranium storage has ended a contract with a unit of an international security firm two months after an 82-year-old nun and other nuclear activists broke into the site.
The managing contractor at the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, site, B&W Y-12, a unit of Babcock & Wilcox Co, said late on Friday it will terminate the contract with WSI Oak Ridge on Oct. 1. WSI is owned by security firm G4S, which was at the center of a dispute over security at this year’s London Olympic Games.
The move came after the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an Energy Department agency, sent a letter on Friday to B&W Y-12 President Charles Spencer saying it had “grave concerns” about his company and WSI providing security at Y-12, the nation’s only site for storing and processing weapons-grade uranium.
The letter recommended that B&W terminate the subcontract with WSI and work with it to take over security operations after the July 28 break-in.
The hits keep coming on G4S…. Wackenhut is a G4S owned company and are currently guarding this nuclear plant in Tennessee. Over the years, this particular contract has had some issues. For example, guards falling asleep on the job–which is particularly troubling when talking about securing a nuclear facility.
But this incident is not cool at all. This is what guards get paid for, their bread and butter, and that is to prevent folks from compromising the security of the facility they are guarding. How embarrassing, and especially since these protesters included an 82 year old nun in their force? lol Just imagine if these protesters were terrorists, and this embarrassing act would have instead turned into a major national security incident.
I have also heard from former guards on this contract that DoE and the government is partly responsible as well. That funding for security upgrades has been turned down because of budget issues. That and the government more than likely went with the lowest bidder for this contract. Although I am not privy to how it was determined that WSI got the contract, or what the contracting mechanism was. My guess would be LPTA or lowest bidder which is standard for the government and how they do business.
The other point here is that the government must do more to get a better value for the money spent. To actually act like a consumer who wants the best service they can get, and acts accordingly when they do not get the service that the contract stipulates. To fire companies who do poorly and replace them with companies that actually care about doing a good job. It is the strength of private industry, and yet government does a horrible job of taking advantage of this.
Perhaps we can also learn a few things from Bruce Power security, and the contracts that they have put together there? Who knows, and I am sure WSI is doing all they can for damage control and getting this contract squared away. –Matt
New security leaders at Tenn nuclear weapons plant; protesters broke into high-security area
August 8, 2012
The security contractor at a Tennessee plant that stores the nation’s supply of weapons-grade uranium has replaced its general manager almost two weeks after three protesters, including an 82-year-old nun, got into a high-security area.
Security firm WSI Oak Ridge confirmed to the Knoxville News Sentinel Wednesday that Steven C. Hafner is taking over the position from Lee Brooks.
Protesters on July 28 were found hanging banners in the dark, singing and offering to break bread with the security guards at Y-12 Oak Ridge National Security Complex in Knoxville. An affidavit said that before security guards apprehended them, they spray-painted the building with protest slogans and threw blood on it. They were arrested and officials say all nuclear materials are safe.
Afterward, security contractor WSI said it was looking at its procedures and it removed Brooks and Y-12 Protective Force director Gary Brandon from their posts. WSI named John Garrity to replace Brandon. Brooks and Brandon are awaiting reassignments by G4S Government Solutions, the parent company of WSI.
The newspaper reported that the halt to nuclear operations at the plant was still in effect. The plant originally said the stand-down was expected to be lifted by this week and that security personnel would undergo training and refresher instruction.
