Feral Jundi

Monday, August 9, 2010

Iraq: Al Qaeda In Iraq Offers Cash To Lure Back Sahwa Fighters

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:45 AM

    Nowadays, the government pays the salaries of its estimated 650,000-strong police and army on time, including the estimated 20,000 Sahwa fighters who have been assimilated into the security forces.

    But the remaining fighters on the government payroll go without their checks, in some cases for as long as three months. The government cites lack of funds or bureaucratic snags for the delays.

    Another Sahwa complaint is that the government detained scores of its leaders on terrorism charges last year. Although most detainees were released — often because of U.S. pressure — the arrests were seen as a humiliation. 

*****

     You know, I don’t blame these guys for being pissed off.  These were the saviors of the surge, the Sons of Iraq, the Anbar Awakening!  But then we go and allow Iraq to screw it all up and treat these guys like dirt.  Yet again, the market of force dictates.  If you don’t pay your people as much or more than your competitor in pay or benefits, or treat them poorly, then you will lose that contractor/soldier to your competitor who understands these very simple business principles.

     Now there is always the idea that Sahwa guys are using this as a means of leverage. Nothing like a so called ‘statement’ from AQ that they are trying to lure people away with better salary, to put a little fire under Iraq’s ass about paying these guys.  But I tend to go with the option that it is true, and that AQ is recognizing a deficiency within the Iraqi government and trying to exploit it. (go figure)

     There is another reason why we should pay attention to this.  I don’t care what anyone says. If AQ is even able to get a hundred guys back on their team, that is 100 booger eaters we will have to deal with as the war transitions into this new phase.  That means more mortar and rocket attacks, more IED’s, more assassinations, and everything else you can think of that AQ loves to do at their parties.

     The other thing to remember is all of these Sahwa fighters know exactly what the Iraqi military is capable of now. There has been plenty of time for them to observe and feel this stuff out as guards.  They also wouldn’t have the US to worry about because of this congressionally mandated troop presence in Iraq of 50,000 folks.  All AQ has to do is put the word out and pay the Sahwa tribes a decent wage, and tell them how cool they are with a couple of ‘hey buddy, we will be your friends.. wink, wink’.

     Not only that, but these Sahwa fighters are also dealing with the Plomo O Plata Effect as well.  AQ has certainly been assassinating these guys, and providing plenty of plomo or ‘lead’ for the tribes to think about. Pffft. –Matt

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Al-Qaida in Iraq offers cash to lure former allies

By HAMZA HENDAWI

August 7th, 2010

BAGHDAD — Al-Qaida in Iraq has begun offering cash to lure back former Sunni allies angry over the government’s failure to give them jobs and pay their salaries on time, according to Sunni tribesmen and Iraqi officials.

The recruitment drive adds to worries that the terror network is attempting a comeback after the deaths of its two top leaders in April and is taking advantage of a summer of uncertainty. The political stalemate in Baghdad is entering its sixth month after inconclusive elections, just as the U.S. military is rapidly drawing down its forces.

Al-Qaida’s strategy is to provoke the Shiite majority into launching revenge attacks — a development that could re-ignite open warfare, split the Iraqi security forces along sectarian lines and cement al-Qaida’s leadership role among Sunnis.

But if the extremists are unable to win back their former Sunni allies, it would be difficult for them to rebound as a significant threat — though al-Qaida could continue to be a deadly nuisance for years to come.

Al-Qaida’s overtures in recent weeks are notable because its militants have killed hundreds of former allies over the past two years, setting off blood vendettas between the Sunni extremist group and others in the Iraqi Sunni community. Many former insurgents also disliked al-Qaida’s imposition of a strict interpretation of Islam in areas under its control.

But tribesmen said the need for cash to feed their families is pushing some lower-ranking former al-Qaida in Iraq members to rejoin the terror group — and that al-Qaida’s presence is growing in Anbar province west of the capital.

“The government must help us counter the resurrection of al-Qaida in Anbar,” warned Mahmoud Shaker, an influential tribesman from the province’s Habbaniyah district.

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Thursday, August 5, 2010

Logistics: DoD Continues Undeclared War Against Private Sector Sustainment, By Daniel Goure, Ph.D.

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Iraq,Logistics — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:36 AM

     This was a quick blog post by the author, but definitely interesting. I was really curious about this concept called a ‘whispering campaign’? Check it out. –Matt

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DoD Continues Undeclared War Against Private Sector Sustainment

Daniel Goure, Ph.D.

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

Even as Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Carter conduct civilized exchanges with leaders of defense industry, the undeclared war by the Department of Defense (DoD) on the private sector continues. This war has focused particularly on the role of private companies in providing logistics and sustainment for U.S. forces. It has not only been overt with contracts being cancelled and work once done by private contractors dragged back into the government depot system, but it also includes a “whispering campaign” in which the cost effectiveness of private contractor logistics providers is questioned. Senior DoD logistics and sustainment officials routinely make comments in public meetings or to media outlets critical of the private sector and its need for profits. DoD executives have repeatedly asserted that contractor logistics support (CLS) and performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts are too expensive and that the government could do the same work for less.

These kinds of assertions fly in the face of available evidence. Data available to DoD officials clearly demonstrates that private sector support is generally less costly than the same work done by the organic or government sustainment system. The Air Force’s own data shows that the average annual cost growth for aircraft programs supported solely from the organic industrial base was greater than that for aircraft programs under either PBL or CLS arrangements. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has identified a set of PBL contracts which collectively have saved the government more than $1.5 billion.

PBLs have a proven record of providing high availability rates as well as delivering year over year cost savings greater than the 2-3 percent productivity goals of the OSD efficiency initiative. This is supported by the OSD Product Support Assessment Team’s report on PBLs. For example, Boeing’s C-17 Global Support Program provides for one of the lowest DPFH (dollars per flight hour) platforms in the USAF inventory. Comparing FY04 costs to FY09 costs, U.S. Air Force data shows the GSP program has reduced C-17 DPFH by 28 percent over that period. The C-17 GSP 28 percent reduction was achieved while maintaining the best mission capable rates in airlift (84-85 percent).

It should be noted also that DoD is almost totally dependent on private contractors for its logistics and sustainment. For example, a recent article in Government Executive recounted the extraordinary efforts of “defense logisticians” in maintaining the flow of weapons, fuel and supplies to our forces in Afghanistan. According to a senior DoD official quoted in the article, “We are meeting a 1.1 million gallons a day demand for fuel for the U.S. and coalition forces while feeding 435,000 meals a day to U.S. service personnel and civilians on the ground.” Except for a brief reference to the use of commercial routes to get supplies into Afghanistan from the north, the article fails to note that all the supply routes, from the south and north, are run by private companies such as Maersk Line Limited and APL. Defense logisticians know this and respect the work of private logistics providers. Unfortunately, this article helps to perpetuate the myth that the government is providing the logistics for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(more…)

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

Call To Action: Vehicle Decals And Licenses In Iraq

Filed under: Call To Action,Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 10:26 PM

     Hey folks, get the word out on this.  If you are having problems getting your vehicles credentialed for work in Iraq, then tell your company that traveling outside the wire is a no go.  The reason for that is if you are pulled over by the Iraqis and you do not have that stuff, you could get in some trouble.  The kind of trouble that could get you arrested or heavily fined by the Iraqis.  This is especially important now that Iraq is kind of in limbo with the government crap right now, and the police and military might not feel like playing nice with contractors.

     Hopefully in the case of DynCorp, they will get this squared away before they force their teams to travel without those credentials.  If any other contractors are running into the same issues with their company, or have any input, I am all ears. Bravo to this contractor who contacted Marc Ambinder and got the word out about this.  As the war winds down, and the military pulls out, these types of things will be more common and very important to hash out.  Definitely demand that your company does the right thing out there.

     This also goes to the US government and their relationship with Iraq.  This is some basic diplomatic stuff here.  I realize that we are trying to get the Iraqis to take charge of their country and get responsible, but we also have a responsibility to our contractor force. To do all we can to protect them from these Iraqi growing pains is in our best interest.  After all, contractors are putting their lives on the line in defense of government property and personnel–I would think that would count for something?-Matt

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Contractors Pressured to Perform in Iraq Without Valid Credentials

August 4, 2010

By Marc Ambinder

The United States is rapidly drawing down troops in Iraq, and contractors are picking up the slack. DynCorp International, in particular, employs hundreds of ex-soldiers and cops to act as bodyguards and shepherds for State Department personnel across the country. The company also trains Iraqi police forces.

DynCorp is under intense pressure to perform without blemish. Private security companies and their employees are under scrutiny from both the U.S. and Iraqi governments more than ever before because of a string of incidents. Within the military, soldiers who quit to join these companies are derided as “mercs.” The culture among DynCorp’s ranks is similar to that of elite military units — what happens out there stays out there. It’s dangerous. Contractors get killed and injured with regularity. The pay is OK — it starts at $90,000 a year — and the working conditions — living in tents, eating MREs — are harsh. State Department officials have told me that the U.S. is generally pleased with DynCorp’s performance so far … but DynCorp is pretty much the only company that can do what State needs it to do.

But one member of an elite unit, a former Army Ranger who asked not to be identified, is concerned that DynCorp and the U.S. government are cutting corners unnecessarily.

(more…)

Monday, August 2, 2010

Industry Talk: Use Of Force And Riot Control For Contractors

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Iraq,Law Enforcement,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:56 AM

     What I wanted to do here is go over a very tough problem for contractors, that really has not been addressed by the industry or today’s war planners. The latest incident in Kabul serves as an example of a real problem out there, and that is what happens when contractors are the victims of riots? Worse yet, what happens when they are the targets of ‘agents provocateurs’ in war zones, who are trying to create riots as a way to attack contractors or the military? Because these guys in Kabul could have ended up like the Blackwater contractors who were burned and hanged on a bridge in Fallujah Iraq.

     So with this post, I wanted to find out what contractors could do in these kinds of situations. I decided to put up a section of a FM manual on how the military deals with riots, but as you can see, there is nothing in these FM manuals on what contractors can or should do in such situations. I don’t even know of any civilian schools that train contractors to deal with such a threat, and especially for small teams in one or two vehicle motorcades.

     With a quick search, I did come across an article about Xe having CS gas in Iraq, and the outrage and shock that caused. But of course, the only reason why they would have such a thing is so that they could have something other than bullets to disperse a crowd with. As it stands now, if contractors are not allowed to use non-lethal munitions like CS gas or whatever, then of course contractors will be put in a position of either A. standing there and die by the hands of a violent crowd or C. shoot their weapons in self defense. A stone can kill a man, and especially when a hundred stones are thrown at that man. Shooting your weapon to defend self or others, is a main theme of the Rules for the Use of Force, but of course it would be far better if there was a way to not use that weapon. If using CS gas to disperse that violent crowd could be the non-lethal ‘B.” solution in this incident, then to me that is logical. And yet contractors are not allowed to have this stuff, or it is ‘shocking’ if they have it?

     The other question this brings up is what are the appropriate riot control or just riot survival tactics for a small team that is entrapped or involved in a similar situation as the guys in Kabul were? For that, I urge contractors and companies alike to war game the appropriate response to such a thing, and figure out what works for you in your neighborhood. Talk it up with the local military forces and get some suggestions from them if you are stumped. Find those in your team who have law enforcement or military police backgrounds who might have experience in riot control and figure out the best SOP’s. Because no one has yet to write a chapter in the FM manuals or give out any kind of guidance to this massive contractor force operating outside the wire in Iraq and Afghanistan.

     I also think this is of strategic importance, because it would be far better if contractors were implementing SOPs for dealing with crowds that did not endanger the various regional strategies, or overall COIN strategy in the war. Something to think about, and I would like to hear what you guys think. –Matt

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FM 3-19.40 Appendix B

Use of Force and Riot Control Measures

The I/R facility commander provides guidance to all MP guard forces in the appropriate use of force to protect internees and internment facilities and to control unruly and rebellious internee populations. This includes establishing uniform procedures that govern the use of force, weapons, and restraining devices. He ensures that a QRF is organized and trained to respond to disturbances inside and outside the facility—whether prisoners are creating a disturbance or there is a Level I threat against the facility. Supporting MP units train squad- to platoon-sized QRFs and squad-sized elements for extraction and apprehension teams. (See FM 19-15 for more information on civil disturbances.)

USE OF FORCE

B-1. When force is necessary, use it according to the priorities of force and limit it to the minimum degree necessary. (See AR 190-14 for the use of deadly force.) The application of any or all of the priorities of force, or the application of a higher numbered priority without first employing a lower numbered one, depends on and will be consistent with the situation encountered. Per AR 190-47, the priorities of force are—

• First: Verbal persuasion.

• Second: Show of force.

• Third: Chemical aerosol irritant projectors (subject to local and HN restrictions).

• Fourth: Use of physical force (other than weapons fire).

• Fifth: Presentation of deadly force.

• Sixth: Deadly force.

B-2. The I/R commander coordinates with the higher echelon commander and the SJA. He designates representatives who are authorized to direct the use of firearms and riot control agents during riots or disturbances. He includes the rules for using these means in appropriate plans, orders, SOPs, and instructions. He specifies the types of weapons to be used, which are not limited to shotguns and pistols for guarding prisoners.

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Industry Talk: BLISS Could Be State’s New LOGCAP, And More Clarification About WPPS

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:02 AM

     Thanks to David Isenberg for posting this on his blog and bringing it to everyone’s attention.  I think this is some interesting information that came out of this letter between Richard Verma and Sen. Claire McCaskill. If in fact BLISS becomes the new LOGCAP for DoS, this could be a pretty sizable contract.  That’s ‘if’ they cannot bring State under the current LOGCAP.  We will see how it goes.

     But what I thought was most interesting in this letter was the clarification as to the fact that contractors will be operating this war equipment that DoD will be loaning to State. That is great, and it will be cool to see Blackhawks and MRAPs rolling out into the skies and roads of Iraq under the control of contractors.  I wonder if they will paint this equipment a different color? Like DoS blue/white/yellow? lol

    Also, will these MRAPS or Blackhawks be stripped of all the life saving electronics and communications stuff that our troops were able to use for the survival of their units?  Probably not, but who knows.  Today’s military hardware has a lot of useful stuff in it that could really come in handy for the contractors that have to operate it.

     One thing that is missing in this letter, is a question and response about the 14 security related functions that State identified, that might have to be done by contractors.  Stuff like EOD or counter mortar/rocket team operations. Or QRF/rescue stuff or other military type activities.  I say this because I have yet to see any answers as to how the DoS will treat contractors if they actually had to fire their weapons and kill enemy combatants while doing any of these 14 security related functions.  Or worse yet, what about firefights that unintentionally ended up in the deaths of civilians? Because the enemy loves to attack from population centers with the hopes of creating such an incident.

     Like I have said before, we might want the war to be over in Iraq, but the enemy could care less about our wishes. If anything, with a limited military presence and an Iraqi government and security forces still trying to establish itself, a lot can happen during the transition and drawdown. DoS must understand that the enemy has learned much from the propaganda value of such incidents like the Nisour Square incident. If they can recreate such an incident again they will gain much, and DoS and the US mission in Iraq will suffer yet again from the consequences.

     There are still many questions that come to mind, and that is will DoS support their contractors if involved in a firefight that accidently resulted in civilian deaths, or will they treat the contractor as if they were criminals?  Worse yet, will they hand these individuals over to the Iraqis, or will they insure these men are afforded the same protections and rights that the military or even diplomats would have received in similar situations? Will DoS implement rules for the use of force that are realistic and give contractors the best chance of success for the defense of personnel and property? Or will DoS even allow the proper weapons and tactics required for an effective defense (that could include borderline offensive operations), or even rescues? Stuff to think about and it will be interesting to see how this turns out. –Matt

Edit: 08/02/2011- Hat tip to Ms. Sparky on this news. Supposedly KBR was chosen for this. Check the comment below for the entire post.

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On July 9, 2010 this letter was sent to Sen. Claire McCaskill, from Richard D. Verma, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at DoS. (I posed the first question and answer, and the 5th question and answer. Follow the link to read the rest)

*****

1. Will private security contractors, including contractors under the State Department’s Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract, be operating the requested equipment, vehicles, and aircraft?

     The Department of State (DOS) does not presently maintain a cadre of qualified drivers/operators for some requested equipment, such as MRAPS, and, as such, would need to supplement current skill sets within its WPPS contract to ensure operational capability. If/when DoD provides the requested equipment, the Department will modify the relevant contracts to require that the equipment be operated and maintained by contractor personnel in accordance with manufacturer, DoD, or other applicable standards. Contract modifications will also require that contractor personnel possess the necessary qualifications and complete the requisite training to properly operate and maintain the equipment. An aircraft provided to the Department will be incorporated into an existing Department aviation support contract.

5. If the State Department’s request to use LOGCAP is denied, how does the Department plan to ensure that the next contract for life support services is as transparent, competitive, and accountable as possible?

     Should the LOGCAP [Logistics Civil Augmentation Program] be unavailable, the Department will follow Federal Acquisition Regulation competitive procedures in any separate procurement action. Due to long-acquisition lead-time involved, the Department has already initiated action to develop a competitive solicitation for the base life support requirements should it be unable to remain under the LOGCAP program. This solicitation is referred to as the Baghdad Life Support Services acquisition, or BLISS contract. If necessary, the Department could issue a Request for Proposals for the BLISS contract in a very short time.

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Baghdad Life Support Services

Solicitation Number: SAQMMA10I0009

Agency: U.S. Department of State

Office: Office of Logistics Management

Location: Acquisition Management

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