Feral Jundi

Sunday, June 6, 2010

Publications: Tribal Engagement–The Jirga And The Shura, By Major Jim Gant And William ‘Mac’ McCallister

     Excellent little paper on the nuances of calling for and attending a Jirga or Shura.  I put this up on the blog because contractors attend these meetings all the time, as well as the military.  That means we can hurt the war effort or help the war effort, all based on how we conduct ourselves at these kinds of meetings. Do you want to be the guy or the company that completely pisses off a region or village because you did not know how these meetings worked?

     My intention here is to get individual contractors thinking about this stuff, and try to apply some of these lessons learned to their own processes out there.  That is Kaizen and that is what is required of any company or individual that claims to have a learning organization or claims to be a student of warfare. Check it out and let me know what you think.

     Also, if you go to this link at Small Wars Journal, you can follow along in the conversation and talk with the authors about the subject. Enjoy. –Matt

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Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shuraby Major Jim Gant and William “Mac” McCallister

According to NATO’s military chief of intelligence in Afghanistan, the Taliban now maintain shadow governors in thirty-three out of thirty-four provinces. While we like to see the world in black and white, the complexities of relationships and alliances in the village and valley make it anything but a straightforward contest between two parties. The U.S. strategy of stripping away Taliban loyalists is not easy in a very complex socio-political landscape. This landscape includes different types of traditional authority, local rivalries and the various configurations of social power in each village and valley.

The rubber of U.S. strategy meets the road in the village assembly. It is in the local assemblies where Coalition Forces speak directly with the local inhabitants and indirectly with the shadow governors of the Taliban. Identifying ahead of time the familial, sectarian, security, economic and political alliances represented in a given village or valley assembly will assist in identifying how these alliances might influence group decisions. We must also contemplate, identify and differentiate between two very different village assemblies: the jirga and shura.

*****

Major Jim Gant is currently assigned to the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (AFPAK Hands) Program as a Tribal Engagement Advisor. AFPAK Hands is designed to develop cadres of officers (and civilians) from each of the military’s services who agree to three to five year tours to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. He will be returning to Afghanistan in the near future.

William “Mac” McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror.

Download the paper here.

Link to Small Wars Journal post and discussion here.

Thursday, June 3, 2010

Iraq: Winning The Sniper War In Iraq

Filed under: Iraq,Military News — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 2:48 PM

     The most dangerous enemy snipers proved to be the insurgents who mimicked the Washington, D.C.-area snipers who terrorized our nation’s capital in 2002 by firing from the concealment of a car. Cruising the streets of Baghdad, Mosul and other towns, these mobile sniper teams sought G.I.s manning roadside checkpoints, fixed security posts and sitting in armored vehicle cupolas. As quickly as they fired, the insurgent riflemen disappeared into urban traffic. Some sniping vehicles carried extra license plates, phony taxi markings and secret compartments for stowing a sniper rifle. Insurgent Web sites boasted that quick reaction forces arrived too late to catch them.

     Because al-Qaeda paid the gunmen up to $5,000 per kill, the mobile snipers documented their engagements on videotape, the spotter serving as both observer and videographer.

***** 

   This is a fantastic article, and kind of rare. The sniper guru talks about insurgent tactics and how we stopped them. If you would like to further expand your knowledge on how our guys did it, Plaster added a whole new chapter in his book dedicated to the current war.  Not only is he famous for his books and lectures on sniping, but he is also a veteran of MACV SOG during the Vietnam War and certainly a living legend.

   Why is this significant?  To me, SOG was probably the most daring and most innovative unit to come out of the Vietnam War, and I put them right on par with the Selous Scouts. Both units had to be masters of their environment and of their task, because both had to operate behind enemy lines.  They also had to operate in other countries, which made the advent of getting caught even more dangerous and extremely embarrassing to their home countries. I look at the Pakistan problem in today’s war as the same dilemma.

    Al Qaeda has no problem exploiting the borders of sovereign nations, and that is how they are able to survive and grow.  It is an aspect of this war that will most certainly have to be fought by covert warriors for a very long time, and in some very dangerous places.

   But back to this article.  Mr. Plaster mentioned one thing that caught my eye.  Al Qaeda introduced free market warfare into their strategy, and the end result was some pretty dangerous and innovative sniper teams.  Please note the quote up top. –Matt

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Winning the Sniper War in Iraq

A war within a war.

By Maj. John L. Plaster, USAR (Ret.)

As an American military convoy rumbled along a dusty street in Habbaniyah, Iraq, 50 miles west of Baghdad, a silver van eased to the curb. Preoccupied with operating their heavy trucks, the U.S. Marine drivers didn’t notice the van and its civilian occupants.

Fortunately the convoy was overwatched by guardian angels: a Marine sniper and his spotter atop a nearby roof. Alerted by his spotter, the Marine marksman shifted his 10X optic to the silver van—and discovered the driver videotaping the convoy while his passenger raised a scoped rifle! As one, the Marine sniper and his spotter fired, shooting dead the cameraman and his sniping partner. By itself this was a dramatic accomplishment, but there was more: Pried from the dead terrorist’s hands was a Marine-issue M40A3 sniper rifle—taken from a Marine sniper killed by insurgents in August 2005. It was now back where it belonged.

The Habbaniyah engagement was a limited but significant milestone in this unnoticed war-within-a-war, a quiet triumph of skill and courage, strategy and technology, which yielded a victory as great as that of British snipers who wrested domination of the World War I trenches from Germany’s snipers in 1915.

(more…)

Friday, May 28, 2010

Publications: Contractor Support Of U.S. Operations In USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, And Afghanistan-As Of May 2010

   Boy, if these guys wanted to do something really smart, they would publish this stuff on Scribd.  Then guys like me could put the report up on the blog and folks can quickly scan through it here.  Or make your graphics into JPEGs or something. Help me, to help you get the word out is all.

   So with this report, there was really no surprises.  Increases of contractors in Afghanistan, and a slight decrease in contractors in Iraq. That and we are still at a quarter million strong overseas, and that is pretty impressive given all the talk about trying to get rid of us.(not to mention the contractors with other agencies/departments) It looks to me like we are still pretty important to the war effort, regardless of whatever party in control at the White House.

    One thing to point out is this number does not include contractors working for other agencies. That number is probably pretty big as well.  Now if they can only keep track of how many of us have died or have been wounded in the war. Because as it stands, that effort has been pathetic and entirely disrespectful to the those that gave all.

     Also, check out the rest of the publication by following the links below if you want.  They mention the typical stuff they have promised to do year after year, when it comes to regulating contractors. Talk is cheap, and I sometimes wonder if government purposely wants to do a poor job or purposely chooses not to do the very things they keep saying they need to do? You have plenty of reports, plenty of studies, plenty of expert testimony and recommendations as to what needs to happen.  Now do it and quit talking about it. Pffffft. –Matt

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Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan-as of May 2010

This update reports DoD contractor personnel numbers in theater and outlines DoD efforts to improve management of contractors accompanying U.S. forces.  It covers DoD contractor personnel deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Ending 2nd quarter FY 2010, USCENTCOM reported approximately 250,335 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR.

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Monday, May 24, 2010

Bounties: How The Taliban And Al Qaeda Use Bounties In The War

Filed under: Afghanistan,Al Qaeda,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 10:16 AM

     “We can’t lie to our commanders: they can check to see if there was a fight in that area. We get money if we capture equipment too. A gun can fetch $1,000 [£690],” said a commander from Khost province who controls about 60 fighters.

The money usually reaches commanders via the traditional hawala transfer system found in many Muslim countries. They then share it among their men and sometimes celebrate with a feast.

     “It’s a lot of money for us. We don’t care if we kill foreigners: their blood allows us to feed our families and the more we kill, the more we weaken them. Of course we are going to celebrate this,” said a commander from Ghazni province.

*****

     This post is about what the enemy is doing to create an industry out of killing us. This is a disgusting topic to go over, but I still think it is important to study what the enemy is doing and learn from it. ‘Know your enemy’ is what I am all about, and this is what I am attempting to do here.

     So let’s talk about this. I guess the big difference between our bounty system, and their bounty system, is that they actually want people to either kill or capture folks and that there are no legal restrictions for that process. It is the purest form of a free market based killing mechanism.

     The west though are the only ones in this fight putting restrictions on how the bounty system is to be used, and in turn making the bounty system ineffective in my opinion. We have a 50 million dollar bounty on Usama Bin Laden’s head, but the only way to collect on it is that you can only give information on his whereabouts. A company or individual could not go after UBL and kill or capture him because the west abhors such things. It infringes on this so-called monopoly on the use of force that the we love to embrace, and meanwhile our enemies are mocking us.

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Friday, May 14, 2010

Iraq: Private Security To Be Used At Australian Embassy

   I am pretty sure that the only groups allowed to bid on this, will be Australian companies.  I could be wrong, but that is usually the case for stuff like this.  So this will be interesting to see who gets the contract and hopefully I will be able to get the job ad up for my Australian readership.

   By the way, it is always funny to see reporters attempt to inject their personal bias into the body of their work.  Calling private security guards at this embassy a bunch of mercenaries, is like calling a hair stylist a prostitute. lol (No offense to hair stylists, and no offense to private security officers….) –Matt

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Mercenaries to guard embassy

BY PHILIP DORLING

13 May, 2010

International mercenaries will take over security of Australia’s embassy in Baghdad as Australia’s residual military commitment in Iraq is wound down over the next two to three years.

Tuesday’s federal budget included the provision of $61.6 million over three years to continue security measures for the Australian embassy and staff in Baghdad $33 million is allocated to be spent in 2010-11 and $26.8 million in the following year.

According to budget papers the funding ”will enable the transition of responsibility for key elements of security from the Australian Defence Force to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade” which will contract a private military company to provide security for the Australian embassy in Baghdad.

Working under Operation Kruger, about 65 defence force personnel provide security and support for the Australian embassy and its staff in Iraq.

(more…)

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