One of the problems I have with this paper is that a government should embrace the power of private enterprise and the free markets, and find ways of using these security companies to only help in their war time strategy. This paper operates on the assumption that the state has to have a monopoly on force in the first place, and I don’t think this is correct. It seems that CNAS has recognized that we shouldn’t assume this either, and I think the ISW should reconsider this point of the paper. The state should not be afraid to use private security, and instead should be thankful that a company would even serve in this capacity for the state.
Now how they serve the state is dependent upon the contract/war strategy and how much effort the government puts into ensuring they get a good deal. You have to care if you want a good service, and caring means monitoring, regulating, and enforcing, or what I like to refer to as a ‘trust, but verify’ attitude. It is a lesson that the US must learn(or any country for that matter), and it is a lesson that the Afghan government must learn, if in fact they want to take advantage of the strengths of private industry(wealth building, innovation, employment, etc.) and be a player on the world stage.
Check out the paper and let me know what you think. –Matt
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Consolidating Private Security Companies in Southern Afghanistan
May 28, 2010
By Kimberly Kagan and Carl Forsberg
This backgrounder outlines the complex relationship between private security companies and ISAF in southern Afghanistan.
Introduction
Dozens of Private Security Companies (PSCs) operate in Kandahar city and province, frequently doubling as the militias of local powerbrokers. These armed groups also operate on a contractual basis to provide security for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and private, Afghan companies. Because PSCs are under the control of powerful individuals, rather than the Afghan National Security Forces, they compete with state security forces and interfere with a government monopoly on the use of force. There is growing pressure from ISAF and within the Afghan government to reform and regulate these companies. Major General Nick Carter, the commander of Regional Command-South (RC-S), recently briefed that ISAF was developing a strategy to regulate PSCs as part of the Kandahar Operations unfolding in summer 2010.1
If not properly structured, however, the regulation of these PSCs in Kandahar may reinforce the existing power structures, strengthen the hand of local powerbrokers such as Ahmed Wali Karzai, and further weaken the ANSF. An initiative underway to consolidate the security companies in southern Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate the problems caused by PSCs, rather than reducing their influence.
Download the publication here.
Link to webpage here.