Feral Jundi

Monday, November 7, 2011

Building Snowmobiles: Recursive Incentive Mechanism For War, Business, And Crime Fighting

Filed under: Building Snowmobiles — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:01 PM

It has been awhile since I last did one of these posts. I think this one is a good one and it definitely got my mental juices flowing. In the past, I have talked about Offense Industry and how bounties are a great way to fire up an industry that profits from the destruction of a specific enemy. Well for this deal, the folks at DARPA and MIT came up with a type of bounty system that takes the whole concept to the next level.

Basically what DARPA did was to set up a contest that revolved around time critical social mobilization. The idea here is that they would have these ten red weather balloons located all over the country, and the team that was able to find all ten (or the most) balloons the fastest won. DARPA wanted to see how fast something could be found.

Now why would DARPA be interested in this?  Well if you are a student of warfare and a reader of this blog, you would remember the New Rules of War post. The second rule listed by John Arquilla was ‘finding matters more than flanking’.

Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking.
Ever since Theban general Epaminondas overloaded his army’s left wing to strike at the Spartan right almost 2,400 years ago at Leuctra, hitting the enemy in the flank has been the most reliable maneuver in warfare. Flank attacks can be seen in Frederick the Great’s famous “oblique order” in his 18th-century battles, in Erwin Rommel’s repeated “right hooks” around the British in North Africa in 1941, and in Norman Schwarzkopf’s famous “left hook” around the Iraqis in 1991. Flanking has quite a pedigree.
Flanking also formed a basis for the march up Mesopotamia by U.S. forces in 2003. But something odd happened this time. In the words of military historian John Keegan, the large Iraqi army of more than 400,000 troops just “melted away.” There were no great battles of encirclement and only a handful of firefights along the way to Baghdad. Instead, Iraqis largely waited until their country was overrun and then mounted an insurgency based on tip-and-run attacks and bombings.
Thus did war cease to be driven by mass-on-mass confrontation, but rather by a hider-finder dynamic. In a world of networked war, armies will have to redesign how they fight, keeping in mind that the enemy of the future will have to be found before it can be fought. To some extent this occurred in the Vietnam War, but that was a conflict during which the enemy obligingly (and quite regularly) massed its forces in major offensives: held off in 1965, defeated in 1968 and 1972, and finally winning in 1975.
In Iraq, there weren’t mass assaults, but a new type of irregular warfare in which a series of small attacks no longer signaled buildup toward a major battle. This is the path being taken by the Taliban in Afghanistan and is clearly the concept of global operations used by al Qaeda.
At the same time, the U.S. military has shown it can adapt to such a fight. Indeed, when it finally improved its position in Iraq, the change was driven by a vastly enhanced ability to find the enemy. The physical network of small outposts was linked to and enlivened by a social network of tribal fighters willing to work with U.S. forces. These elements, taken together, shone a light on al Qaeda in Iraq, and in the glare of this illumination the militants were easy prey for the small percentage of coalition forces actually waging the campaign against them.
Think of this as a new role for the military. Traditionally, they’ve seen themselves largely as a “shooting organization”; in this era, they will also have to become a “sensory organization.”
This approach can surely work in Afghanistan as well as it has in Iraq — and in counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere — so long as the key emphasis is placed on creating the system needed for “finding.” In some places, friendly tribal elements might be less important than technological means, most notably in cyberspace, al Qaeda’s “virtual safe haven.”
As war shifts from flanking to finding, the hope is that instead of exhausting one’s military in massive expeditions against elusive foes, success can be achieved with a small, networked corps of “finders.” So a conflict like the war on terror is not “led” by some great power; rather, many participate in it, with each adding a piece to the mosaic that forms an accurate picture of enemy strength and dispositions.
This second shift — to finding — has the potential to greatly empower those “many and small” units made necessary by Rule 1. All that is left is to think through the operational concept that will guide them.

So as you can see, finding an enemy that hides amongst the population is crucial if you want to kill or capture him. It is also difficult for just one person to find an enemy, or enemy network. But if you can create a network of people to find one person or an enemy network, then that is gold.  It also lends itself to the concept of ‘it takes a network‘, to defeat a network.

I also think bounty systems, if done correctly, can involve a large portion of the population in the fight or whatever task. It stands to reason that a nation that can fully tap into the people power it has, as opposed to only depending upon select agencies or it’s limited law enforcement resources, will have way more capability when it comes to the task of ‘finding’ someone or something.

There are also examples of private industry and government using bounties or similar incentive mechanisms to find solutions to problems.  The X Prize Foundation is just one example of this kind of incentivizing process. They have held contests for all sorts of amazing deals, and definitely read through their wiki I posted to check those out.

But back to the title of this post and what I wanted to get too. This DARPA competition drew in 50 teams from all over the nation, but it was the MIT team that won the contest. My intent with this post is to highlight their winning strategy and explore other possible uses for their strategy. To basically chalk this one up as a new bounty type system that companies and government could use to great advantage.

What the MIT team did was to create a bounty system that not only paid those that found the balloon, but also paid those that helped in the finding process. And that payment system was flexible, based on how many folks were involved, and how much money was available for the process or was desired to spend. MIT used what is called ‘Recursive Incentive Mechanism’ or RIM, and they blew away the competition with this method.

Here is a description of what they did:

Only MIT’s team found all 10 balloons. To get the recruiting ball rolling, the researchers sent a link for the team’s website to a few friends and several bloggers about 36 hours before the contest began.
Portions of the $40,000 winner’s prize were promised to everyone who contributed to the search. A maximum of $4,000 was allocated to finders of each balloon — $2,000 to the first person to send in the correct balloon location, $1,000 to the person who invited the balloon finder onto the team, $500 to whomever recruited the inviter, and so on.
Participants received about $33,000 for their efforts.
The number of Twitter messages mentioning the MIT team rose substantially the day before the contest and remained elevated until the competition ended, a sign that the reward strategy worked, Pentland says.

It kind of looks like a pyramid scheme of sorts? lol But the power that comes with this, is the involvement of social networks in the finding of something or someone, all with the lure of making some money and spreading the wealth amongst your network. And what is cool, is that this bounty system benefits different types of folks.

You might be really good at recruiting ‘finders’, so of course this system will benefit you. You might be extremely active on Facebook, Twitter, a blog, and whatever, and have a massive network in place to tap into for spreading the word (hence why I post the bounty stuff on the blog from time to time). On Facebook, I could totally see stuff like this spreading like wildfire. So you could be the guy that made money from just spreading the news. Or you could be the one that actually found the balloon, and score that way. All of these actions helped to form an efficient ‘finding system’ that won the contest.

It is the speed at which all of this happened, which is amazing to me and something to ponder.

For war, the way I could see this being used is to create a more efficient bounty hunting system. Either to find enemy combatants, or to find recruits for the war effort. And as the rest of the world continues to be inundated with cell phones, and now smart phones, the ability to really reach out to them, and have them communicate back is there. An effective RIM could be the key to getting people sending in tips, or involving their personal networks for ‘finding’ the enemy, or getting new recruits for a military in need of man power.

For business, and especially our industry, I could see this being used for head hunting. Meaning if a company is looking for a specific type of unique individual, with a certain amount of qualifications and experience, then a recruiter using RIM might be able to find that individual and in a very fast and efficient way. They could also use the formula that Alex Pentland and his team created so that they only spend the amount of money they are willing to use for the finding operation.

A company could also use RIM for finding innovations or even new business.  Especially in today’s economy, and especially with how dangerous the world has become. In other words, a company can incentivize social networks to accomplish their goals.

Finally, for crime fighting, I think it would be interesting to see the Rewards For Justice program utilize RIM. The current bounty system is old and only focuses on the individual tipster. Perhaps RIM could help to fire up that program, and get more of the population involved in finding criminals.  Crime Stoppers could turn to such a system as well, because they too use a very simple bounty system that only caters to individuals.

Interesting stuff, and I think it is a concept worth researching. Also, if you look further into Alex Pentland’s research on ‘reality mining‘, you will see why they were able to come up with the winning system. They were leagues ahead of their peers when it came to understanding the human dynamic, and they knew it. Here is the quote that I liked:

“It was trivial for us to slap together the balloon thing,” says the 58-year-old Pentland. That’s because other groups’ tactics were based on guesswork, he argues. His were based on lessons learned through data-mining research. “We won because we understood the science of incentivizing people to cooperate.”
Since 1998 Pentland has been engaged in an unusual blend of sociology and data mining that he calls “reality mining.” His researchers place sensors that he’s dubbed “sociometers” around hundreds of subjects’ necks and install tracking software into their cellphones, capturing the movements of every individual in a group, whom he or she interacts with, even body language and the tone of his or her voice. Then they mine the resulting reams of data to identify facts as elusive as which member of the group is most productive, who is the group’s real manager or who tends to dominate conversations.
“Data mining is about finding patterns in digital stuff. I’m more interested specifically in finding patterns in humans,” says Pentland, who has a Ph.D. in artificial intelligence and psychology from MIT. “I’m taking data mining out into the real world.”

Very cool and I look forward to your thoughts on RIM? Don’t ask me to interpret the math of the thing though. lol Just read through the paper and if you can understand the proofs, then good on you. All I know is that RIM won the contest, and that is what is most important to this discussion. I also think that Pentland could probably come up with a custom tailored system for war, business, or crime fighting, and perhaps some kind of modified RIM is what he would come up with. Either way, this is the go to guy for Offense Industry. –Matt

 

Alex Pentland, balloon hunter and MIT 'reality miner'.

 

Digital bounty hunters unleashed
Online pay strategy quickly coordinates cross-country balloon posse
By Bruce Bower
November 19th, 2011
These days, bounty hunters aren’t deputized, they’re digitized: Online crowd-sourcing strategies to induce masses of people to solve a task, such as locating far-flung items or alleviating world hunger, work best when financial incentives impel participants to enlist friends and acquaintances in the effort, a new study concludes.
In a competition to find 10 red weather balloons placed across the United States, a team of MIT researchers used online social media and a simple reward system to recruit balloon-searchers in the 36 hours preceding the contest. Their pay-based strategy garnered them 4,400 volunteers who located all the balloons in a contest-winning eight hours, 52 minutes.
“Our incentive system offers monetary rewards, but perhaps more importantly it builds social capital between you and the people you recruit, who get an opportunity to participate in something interesting,” says MIT computer scientist Alex Pentland. This strategy could boost the effectiveness of humanitarian and marketing campaigns, Pentland and colleagues conclude in the Oct. 28 Science.

(more…)

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Building Snowmobiles: For Total War And Netwar, You Need Both A ‘Defense Industry’ And An ‘Offense Industry’

Filed under: Building Snowmobiles,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:13 PM

Total war is a war in which a belligerent engages in the complete mobilization of all their available resources and population.
In the mid-19th Century, “total war” was identified by scholars as a separate class of warfare. In a total war, there is less differentiation between combatants and civilians than in other conflicts, and sometimes no such differentiation at all, as nearly every human resource, civilians and soldiers alike, can be considered to be part of the belligerent effort. -General Ludendorff, Clausewitz, General Lemay

Netwar is a term developed by RAND researchers John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt to describe an emergent form of low intensity conflict, crime, and activism waged by social networked actors. Typical netwar actors might include transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, activist groups, and social movements that employ decentralized, flexible network structures.-wikipedia

Very cool and this was by far the most interesting article I have read about netwar or networks in this current war.  Bravo to General McChrystal for writing this and sharing. It is food for thought, and I highly recommend reading this thing.

Probably what really jumped out at me after reading this, is that mimicry strategy is what McChrystal is talking about here.  Funny how this pattern continues to repeat itself in war fighting.  It also really complements what John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt talked about with Netwar. But most importantly, McChrystal and the authors of this concept both agreed that the best way to defeat a network, is with a network.

Now this is where I want to add my little angle to the whole concept.  I personally think that the US military is not nimble enough or organized properly to act like a network. Even these leaders and strategists mentioned have agreed on that point. Sure, maybe some of the special forces units within the military might be able to accomplish this, but will there be enough SF teams to keep up with all the cartels, pirates, terrorists, and cyber-hackers?

What about the police, both federal and state?  With transnational terrorists, criminal organizations etc., are there enough law enforcement to keep up with the deluge? In both the military and police examples, I do not think that they can match the size, spread and scope of today’s miscreants.  An example is the drug war against the cartels. It is overwhelming the Mexican government, and the US is not doing that great of a job either, despite all the efforts of law enforcement.

In the war against these folks like Al Qaeda, pirates or the cartels, I have doubts that there are enough military, police or intelligence assets to keep up with the formation of all of these networks. And the simple fact that Osama Bin Laden is still free to move around in this big world of ours, indicates to me a problem. When trying to locate a needle in the haystack, the more folks you have participating in that process, the higher the chance of finding the thing or person you are looking for. Many hands make light work, so to speak.

So what is missing is scalability of the current netwar that governments are waging against these viruses of society. What I propose is that what is missing is an equally decentralized and flexible network that can compete with the growth of these non-state actors and their enterprises.  What I think is missing in this war, is a licensed and regulated market that profits from our enemy’s destruction. One created to promote netwar (or whatever works). That last part is crucial.

I have talked about the concept of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal in the past, and of how important privateers were to early America.  I have also highlighted what makes the drug cartels or modern day pirate industries so strong–and that is the drive of monetary gain or profit.  With terrorists, their profit is a different currency that is spiritually based. A suicide bomber profits from their act, because they are told and belive that they have secured a better life in heaven (or whatever place they go). Everyone does what they do, because of personal gain.  It could be monetary gain, spiritual gain, political gain, etc.  The point being is that this gain or profit, is what fuels their enterprise.  In order to defeat that enterprise, you need an enterprise that is equal in size and scope and vitality.

I believe that a purely government venture is a half measure. The full measure of war against these non-state actors, is to include private industry in the process of destroying these folks. Today’s private industry is not used in this way, and the resistance against such a thing indicates the ego and naivety of today’s war planners and law enforcement leaders. No one likes to admit that they are overwhelmed and they certainly do not want to compete with private industry.

It’s kind of like how the Postal Service viewed companies like Fedex or UPS in the beginning. But of course the government postal system and private industry are still in existence today, and they co-exist just fine. If anything, they learn from each other and the competition drives innovation in each group. If you go into a Post Office today, they look and feel like a Fedex or UPS store, and their prices and even customer service are comparable.

Now to apply this example to the war effort, imagine a company like Dyncorp capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden? I mean after Gary Faulkner did his thing in Pakistan, all types of feathers were ruffled, and everyone in government, military and the media were all balking at the idea of an individual without any government guidance going after OBL? Talk about ego…. I think most Americans, and most of the world wouldn’t care who nabbed this guy or how it was done–just that he was captured or killed–end of story.

And this is the point I am trying to convey.  I think a private company or individual could be quite effective in this war, if given the license and legal authority to do so by their government. But what is most important to this relationship between private industry and government, is that once given the approval, a company can organize, hire the talented people, find the most suitable ideas for the task, purchase the best equipment and weapons, and create a winning strategy to gain profit.  That is a very powerful concept.  Those companies that are not innovative or are hard working, will not succeed.  But those companies that get it, and have the flexibility needed to do what they got to do, will be rewarded by profit, and that profit will drive that engine of innovation for the fight.

Not only that, but once successful companies come onto the scene–whether small or large, then others will copy what they are doing.  Pure mimicry strategy, but at the business/war fighting level.  You see the same pattern with today’s pirates, cartels, and terrorists. They too use mimicry strategy, and copy the models of operation that give them the most profit and reward.  Money or spiritual reward is what fuels the engines of these industries, and as a result, they are unstoppable. Piracy and the drug trade are prime examples, and following the rules of mimicry strategy, it would take an industry to stop these industries. Or at least keep up, because in the end, not only do you want to copy what they are doing, but add one or two things to the model of operation that gives you the edge.

Now for those that are reading this and saying, ‘what happens if these privateer companies, turn into pirates’? Funny, that is exactly the argument that the US government used after they wanted to get rid of the privateer concept and develop a fully functional navy.  The war planners used all sorts of excuses to get rid of the competition of private industry.

Of course there were privateers back then that went on to be pirates, but to me, this very small percentage of possible outcomes of this industry, are far outweighed by the positives of using private industry in this way.  I would also suggest that out of the thousands of security contractors that have cycled in and out of today’s security contracting industry, that a few might have gone on to commit crimes back home and abroad–but that is the 1 percent of 1 percent. To me, I have yet to see this ‘privateer to pirate’ phenomenon that folks continue to use as an argument against private security.

Most have served honorably, and most do not sell their services to criminal organizations. Of course there are few, and of course there are also corrupt cops or unethical and immoral military folks that do crimes as well.  Criminal acts and bad behavior are things that happen in all organizations.  And even during the Revolutionary War, most privateers went back home to be fishermen or work in shipping. Piracy was a crime that attracted criminals, pure and simple, and to classify all privateers as criminal because of the acts of a few, is dumb.

So going back to the Letter of Marque and Reprisal, which happens to be a law that the US congress has the right to use, would be just one way of licensing and regulating this private industry designed to destroy our enemies. If that is too unsettling to the powers that be, then modify the ITAR and issue license that way. I would also require companies to be bonded, and I would reopen Prize Courts so that asset seizures could be another way that companies could profit from the destruction of our enemies.

Another argument that I continue to hear against the concept, is that the Hague forbids privateering and the issuing of Letters of Marque and Reprisal.  In my view, it is not the Hague that stops us from doing this–it is a lack of political will and courage to toss out old and outdated treaties and do what is most important.  That is to win the war that is of national interest, and of the interest of the people. If winning wars is the priority, and the current war has a virus in the form of networks, then in order to compete with such networks will require an equal amount of networks–plus whatever innovation/edge.

Finally, there is another point I wanted to make, and that is today’s ‘Defense Industry’ profits off of creating weapons and equipment for the war effort, or providing defensive or logistics services in the war zones. In terms of war fighting, all companies benefit from the war continuing, and there is not a market mechanism in place to put a stop to that process. Winning a war stops that process though.

To me, what makes better sense is to create an ‘Offense Industry’, which is purely focused on destroying the enemy as quickly and as efficiently as possible, and essentially working itself out of a job. I compare it to the commercial hunting of the Buffalo in the wild west–when there was no more buffalo left (or enemy), the hunters worked themselves out of a job.  What fuels a ‘Defense Industry’ is war, and what fuels an ‘Offense Industry’ is the destruction of an enemy.  Or at least that is the goal when you create, regulate and license an ‘Offense Industry’.

Also, it should be the goal of politicians and war planners to win the war as quickly as possible, once a war has been deemed necessary to fight.  As time drags on, the enemy will learn how to compete against you, because they too have learning organizations and continuous improvement as part of their plan.  To me, if winning a war is a priority, then it should also be a priority to send everything you got at the problem to finish it as soon as possible.

The current war is coming up on the ten year point, and I have yet to see Osama Bin Laden’s head on a pike. Nor have I seen any ‘Closing Business’ signs in front of cartel businesses in Latin America. Nor have I seen today’s pirates whimpering back to their countries because piracy sucks. And we are definitely not seeing today’s lone wolf hackers or state sponsored cyber criminals receiving any threats that would give them pause. Total war (and netwar) require the strategic use of all available manpower of a nation, and/or world effort, and that requires both a vibrant Defense Industry and a well regulated and licensed Offense Industry among the fielded armies in this endeavor. Or we can continue to depend upon the few and the overwhelmed to win these wars. –Matt


It Takes a Network
The new frontline of modern warfare.
March/April 2011
BY STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL
From the outset of my command in Afghanistan, two or three times each week, accompanied by a few aides and often my Afghan counterparts, I would leave the International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul and travel across Afghanistan — from critical cities like Kandahar to the most remote outposts in violent border regions. Ideally, we left early, traveling light and small, normally using a combination of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, to meet with Afghans and their leaders and to connect with our troops on the ground: Brits and Marines rolling back the enemy in Helmand, Afghan National Army troops training in Mazar-e-Sharif, French Foreign Legionnaires patrolling in Kapisa. (more…)

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

Strategy: Suicide Assaulters, Swarming, And Toyotas–The Taliban And The New Rules Of War

Filed under: Afghanistan,Al Qaeda,Strategy,Tactical Thought Process — Tags: , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:56 AM

Rule 1: “Many and Small” Beats “Few and Large.”

Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking.

Rule 3: Swarming Is the New Surging.

*****

   This latest suicide assaulter attack in Afghanistan is important to look at and study, and this post is dedicated to ‘knowing your enemy’.  Tim over at Free Range International just posted an excellent run down of this latest attack in Nimroz at the governor’s compound, and Bill Roggio over at Long Wars Journal has some excellent stuff on this incident as well. I highly advise reading Tim’s post, because it comes with pictures and diagrams of the assault, along with Tim’s commentary on the whole thing.

   As you can see, these guys are following a path that John Arquilla and others have laid out with the ‘new rules of war’. They are continuing to use this same type of attack, just because it is so hard to defend against and it causes so much chaos and confusion.  The only thing working against the enemy is their ability to be organized and plan this stuff better.  But some attacks have been successful, and they are learning. What I wanted to do in this post is match up what the enemy is doing with these three new rules I listed up top, and discuss their effectiveness.

     Multiple assaulters armed with AK’s and suicide vests, are the many and small.  Plus, with the suicide vest and AK, the assaulter has multiple options for killing.  They can fight their way into concentrations of enemies, and blow up when close enough (finding). The human bomb can also identify specific targets, and detonate just close enough to kill them. They can also use their suicide vest to clear obstacles so other assaulters can punch in and shoot at people or detonate(swarming).  But as Tim has pointed out in his post about the subject, these latest assaulters were not that organized or effective.  My guess is that they were poorly trained and prepared for the mission at hand, which is a good thing for us. And of course they are poor shots, as Tim and others have pointed out, which is also a good thing.

   But the next angle of this attack is the idea of using Toyota pickups and swarming, in order to arrive on target and overwhelm the defenders.  This is exactly how the Taliban was operating and it deserves closer inspection.  Tim mentioned in his write up that large vehicles really cannot move around in Nimroz, just because of the small streets and power lines all over the place.  You either have to have a small truck, motorcycle, or be walking in order to get around in places like this.  And as the Toyota Horde paper pointed out, small pickups can be a tactical advantage for attackers who are swarming or preparing a battlefield for the defense. They are cheap, you can use many of them, and they are great for all types of utilitarian activities for hybrid warfare.  The Taliban continue to use these small pickup in places that MRAPs cannot go, and they can also use those pickups or motorcycles to outrun our large lumbering vehicles and forces.  They can also blend in with the local population, because they all use pickups.

   Further more, small pickups are essential for swarming operations.  If you want to get a truck load of assaulters into position, and not cause too much attention, the pickup is perfect because it is low profile (meaning there are many of these in the attack area).  Or they could use taxis, cop cars and ambulances as delivery vehicles.  The key here is just getting into position so the assaulters can pour out and attack the target from multiple angles.  Small vehicles that blend in are the perfect tool for delivery in this case.

   What further adds to the attack, chaos, and blending in factor, is assaulters wearing police or soldier uniforms.  These types of attacks can be extremely confusing, and they work great for the assaulter.  They can also do secondary attacks as the real police and military show up, and it is all about blending into that chaotic environment to create as much chaos as possible.  That is another reason why it is essential for defenders to get to know the local police and army stations really well, so they can recognize who should be on scene and shouldn’t.  Still, this is very tough to defend against, and the enemy knows this.  ‘Finding’ in this case, is extremely critical if we want to succeed in the defense, because combatants that look like cops or soldiers could be causing a whole slew of problems.

   The swarming attack, coupled with the population camouflage I mentioned, is one of those deals that works well because it confuses the defender and brings a whole lot of chaos in a short period of time.  And with assaulters that double as human breachers that blow apart gates (with their bodies strapped with bombs), the swarming attack becomes even more feasible and more lethal.  It just takes really good planning and rehearsal for the enemy to accomplish the mission.

   Finally, I want to give solutions to countering these types of attacks.  The one thing that really screws up planning for these attacks, is the unexpected.  Being random and doing things that no one expected, is definitely one way to counter these types of attacks.  Also having excellent SOP’s to cover these types of swarming attacks is highly advisable, along with drilling over and over again to get proficient.  To also war game all and any scenarios in your head, and talking it up with your fellow guards is another way to keep sharp.  You should have answers in your head for all types of scenarios.  Red teams are great tools to find out how an enemy might attack a facility, and those red teams should do all they can to mimic what the enemy is doing today.

    For simmunitions developers out there, maybe building a paintball suicide vest for red teams would be a good product to sell? (it could already be out there for sale?)  Red teams could simulate fighting their way into your position, and detonate the suicide vest as part of the assault.  We have to start thinking about enemy assaulters as dual weapon systems–they shoot, fight their way in, and are seeking human pockets or obstacles to blow up. We also have to expect that suicide vests will also have plates in them, in order to make the assaulter tougher to kill.  The plates also help to focus the blast outward, and further turn the assaulter into a human claymore. Stuff to think about, and our enemy’s tactics and strategy are definitely evolving–Joker eat your heart out. –Matt

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Taliban hits government compound

May 05, 2010

At least eight attempted suicide bombers have been killed during a gun battle with police in southwestern Afghanistan, the interior ministry said.

Ministry officials said at least two Afghan policemen were also killed and five others wounded before the fighting ended in Nimroz province on Wednesday.

One witness said a female local council member was also killed in the attack.

Musa Rasooli, a senior police official in Nimroz, said the fighters were targeting the provincial governor’s compound and had entered the governor’s office.

He said two suicide bombers had blown themselves up outside the compound.

‘Taliban responsible’

The interior ministry said the fighters had also targeted civilian buildings in Zaranj, the provincial capital.

“A group of terrorists attacked some civilian and government buildings this morning in Zaranj,” Zemarai Bashary, an interior ministry spokesman, said.

(more…)

Saturday, March 6, 2010

Strategy: The New Rules Of War, By John Arquilla

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 1:19 PM

   Just a heads up, John was one of Rumsfeld’s advisors. lol  But he does bring up some good points to think about, and I wanted to put them out there for the FJ readership to analyze. Here is a quick run down of the rules the author came up with:

   Rule 1: “Many and Small” Beats “Few and Large.”

   Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking.

   Rule 3: Swarming Is the New Surging.

   I guess the common theme of it all, is getting smaller and more mobile, in order to defeat a smaller and more mobile enemy. I just wonder if today’s militaries are even capable of this kind of flexibility? Because if we haven’t been able to get there yet, then when will we?

   Better yet, if you are reading this and would like an interesting thought to ponder, here it is.  How could a PMC use this information against an enemy it was tasked with destroying? The interesting angle with PMC’s is that the company with the better strategy and tactics, will win.  So if these new rules of warfare are sound, then they could be applied by an army or PMC for today’s battles, and they should come out victorious. Right?

   Or are these concepts really that radical, and just a rehash of older strategy?  I tend to go with this position, and today’s strategists have a tendency to just repackage old themes. The proof in the pudding is for John Arquilla to apply his rules in a war game in which the opposition is let’s say some player taking the side of Al Qaeda.   Either way, it is food for thought, and I would like to hear what you guys think. –Matt

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The New Rules of War

The visionary who first saw the age of “netwar” coming warns that the U.S. military is getting it wrong all over again. Here’s his plan to make conflict cheaper, smaller, and smarter.

BY JOHN ARQUILLA

 MARCH/APRIL 2010

Every day, the U.S. military spends $1.75 billion, much of it on big ships, big guns, and big battalions that are not only not needed to win the wars of the present, but are sure to be the wrong approach to waging the wars of the future.

In this, the ninth year of the first great conflict between nations and networks, America’s armed forces have failed, as militaries so often do, to adapt sufficiently to changed conditions, finding out the hard way that their enemies often remain a step ahead. The U.S. military floundered for years in Iraq, then proved itself unable to grasp the point, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that old-school surges of ground troops do not offer enduring solutions to new-style conflicts with networked adversaries.

So it has almost always been. Given the high stakes and dangers they routinely face, militaries are inevitably reluctant to change. During World War I, the armies on the Western Front in 1915 were fighting in much the same manner as those at Waterloo in 1815, attacking in close-packed formations — despite the emergence of the machine gun and high-explosive artillery. Millions were slaughtered, year after bloody year, for a few yards of churned-up mud. It is no surprise that historian Alan Clark titled his study of the high command during this conflict The Donkeys.

Even the implications of maturing tanks, planes, and the radio waves that linked them were only partially understood by the next generation of military men. Just as their predecessors failed to grasp the lethal nature of firepower, their successors missed the rise of mechanized maneuver — save for the Germans, who figured out that blitzkrieg was possible and won some grand early victories. They would have gone on winning, but for poor high-level strategic choices such as invading Russia and declaring war on the United States. In the end, the Nazis were not so much outfought as gang-tackled.

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