This is a great presentation and very powerful. Also, the TED crowd gave the good General a standing ovation at the end!
The other thing that I noticed was the ideas he talked about, totally mesh well with Jundism. Learn from your people or ‘learning organizations’, and listen to your people or ‘get feedback’. Even the ‘shared reality’ concept was an issue that the General discussed as a difficulty with command in the modern age. Very cool and check it out. –Matt
After the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy and his advisors reflected on their mistakes and created a new process for group discussion and decision making to prevent future groupthink and promote diverse perspectives. Here, Professor Roberto introduces the concept of developing a decision-making process. -From the Lecture ‘Deciding How To Decide’
This is a great lecture series that a friend of mine hooked me up with, and I highly recommend it. It was engaging and thought provoking, and there were so many cool ideas to take away from this if you are looking for leadership guidance. As I listened to it, there were many Jundism concepts that kept popping up in various forms and examples.
The particular lecture that I will highlight in this post is the ‘deciding how to decide’ portion. I took notice, because this method of decision making was born out of the highest levels of leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion failure. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an embarrassing mistake that resulted from poor decision making at the top. Or what the professor referred to as ‘group think’ (being surrounded by ‘yes men’ and folks unwilling to question the group or leadership out of fear of being wrong or just assuming everyone else is right)
The Cuban Missile Crisis was an extreme test of wills, and required the best possible strategy that would prevent the US and the Soviet Union wiping each other out with nuclear weapons. President Kennedy devised a system of decision making that would produce the best product or solution possible, that was not a victim of group think. He used a system of subgroups that would develop solutions independently, then those groups would exchange their solutions with the other groups and critique.
A second set of devils advocates or eyes would also review the solutions, and further nitpick the possible solutions until the best idea was standing. So this solution was hammered out of truly honest debate, and any influences that would cause people to not speak up was eliminated. I thought it was an ingenious way of problem solving, and especially during crisis. (be sure to listen to the series to get the specifics on how to set up this system) The situation with North Korea bombing South Korea, and the US and China reaction to it is a prime example of modern day critical decision making with high stakes involved. How President Obama decides, will really be based more on deciding how to decide first, so that the solution he gets is strategically sound and not at all influenced by group think.
Military leaders and CEO’s can learn from this as well. Leaders should strive hard to have honest debate about strategy and it takes listening to your people, and being open to ideas to get there. It also requires breaking down those walls that limit honest debate, and really being aware of group think and it’s dangers. Check out the series to learn more, and let me know what you think. Also check out Professor Roberto’s blog if you want to follow his ideas or contact him. –Matt
THE ART OF CRITICAL DECISION MAKING
Genre: Audio or video CourseLength: Twenty-four, thirty-minute lecturesTeacher: Prof. Michael Roberto, Bryant UniversityPublisher: The Teaching Company
By Tom Alderman
July 23, 2009
Following the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy asked former President Eisenhower to the White House to seek the old soldier’s counsel. The new president wanted to know what he could learn from the whole sorry mess. Instead of the expected military hoo-hah, Ike wanted to know how the decision was made to go ahead with the Cuban invasion? How did the president gather advice from his advisors? Not a surprising question considering the five-star general led a contentious military coalition during World War II, not because of his martial skills, but because of his extraordinary leadership abilities which included understanding the core ingredient in all critical decision making: whether you’re launching a D-Day invasion, a career, a product or service, HOW you decide is more important than WHAT you decide. The process you use determines a successful outcome and if that process is not clear and effective, you’re going down.
A senior level review of the misconduct allegations against AGNA personnel, combined with AGNA’s history of contract compliance de?ciencies, led DS, AQM, and Embassy Kabul to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Government to compete a new contract. In light of recent legislation, the KESF contract has been combined with the Baghdad Embassy Security Force and Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS II) contracts into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. The new WPS contract is a multi-award, inde?nite delivery, inde?nite quantity (IDIQ) contract that will be awarded on a best value basis. Individual requirements, such as the KESF, will be awarded as task orders under the base WPS contract. The current KESF contract with AGNA expired on June 30, 2010, but performance has been extended until the end of December 2010 to allow for the completion of the acquisition process for the new WPS contract and KESF task order and to provide for an orderly transition to the next provider. -From the Bureau of DS Comments in Report
What I wanted to do here is give the former contractors and managers of Armorgroup North America a chance to voice their opinion of the latest report. My inbox is filled with numerous emails from former employees and managers of AGNA, all wanting to tell their side of story. Partly because Congress, State or the IG really could care less about the little guy on the ground, and partly because the report is sloppy. So call this a rebuttal from the little guy.
This particular email was from a former manager at AGNA, whose identity I will refer to as ‘former manager’. I would hope that this would have some significance to those that are reading this, and that what he has to say pretty much conflicts with what the IG is reporting. Specifically that the weapons issue pointed out in the report was lacking some key points, and that the IG violated the range rules during their inspection.
I might also add that there is nothing in the report that discusses how AGNA came to be contracted in the first place. The Commission on Wartime Contracting came out with an excellent and damning report about how Lowest Priced, Technically Acceptable contracting is what created the environment that forced State to contract with the lowest bidder.
It is also interesting to me that Danielle Brian of POGO still asserts that LPTA is a legitimate contracting mechanism for security contracting in war zones, when there has been several reports presented that have identified the horrific secondary affects of this type of contracting in war-zones.
Best Value contracting would have given State more choice and flexibility in the matter, and they could have gone with the best company for the job and not with the cheapest or technically acceptable. It would not have been a race to the bottom, but a race to the best value company for the job.
Furthermore, why is POGO so silent about the TWISS program, another example of the failure of LPTA? (did I mention that companies are now considering Sierra Leone contractors as guards because they are cheaper than Ugandans?) I know POGO reads the blog and I have directed everyone that has complained to me, to go to POGO and voice their concern. I would like to think that POGO would actually listen to what the guys on the ground have to say about such things?
Or why is the Army using LPTA for FOB security in Afghanistan, when the CWC is so opposed to it? I posted a ton of contracts flying that were all LPTA, and here we are trying to convince Karzai to not ban PSC companies. With LPTA, we are giving him more ammunition by putting our lowest bidders, ‘junior varsity squads’ out there. Pffft.
The other thing that pisses me off about LPTA, is that the troops see the direct result of this on the FOBs. How would you feel if you were being protected by the lowest bidder? It is a simple question, that pisses off most when they come to the conclusion that they don’t like it. Especially if their base has been attacked, like what has happened frequently in Afghanistan.
LPTA doesn’t work for picking a doctor to cure your sick mother, and it doesn’t work for picking a company to protect your people in a war zone. LPTA is great for picking a company to rake your leaves though. lol You get what you pay for, and that is the lesson I got out of the reports.
Thats not to say that State or AGNA doesn’t share any fault here, but Congress must take more blame, and all because they insisted on lowballing the security for Embassy protection in the first place.
Finally, this post is about the guys on the ground who were contracted to operate in this environment. They are the ones that take on the task of trying to make this mess work. No one signs on to a contract to do bad. They sign on so they can be employed and pay their bills/feed their family at home. They sign on because they care about participating in the war. They are also sacrificing by being away from family, or facing death and injury in war-zones–and all for their country and for the war effort. We should support them, not hate them.
Most guys whom have done the contracting thing for awhile have also worked for numerous companies. A contractor could have worked for Xe, Custer Battles, Erinys, Aegis, AGNA etc., and that is not abnormal nor does that mean the contractor is a bad guy. They are going where the work is so they can continue to earn a living and serve in the war. I am sure when EODT takes over this contract in Kabul, AGNA guys will be ‘switching t-shirts’ and transition under the management of this new company.
I want to make sure that Congress, State, AGNA, and now EODT knows that these men need leaders who can manage a ‘properly funded, staffed, and equipped’ contract at all levels. These men are not the bad guys, and they deserve the best management we can give them.
This work force will move mountains for you, if you actually apply a little Jundism to your management principles as well. Know your stuff, have the courage to do what is right, and take care of your people. Trust, but verify. Lead by example. Lead from the front. Your people will support what they help to create. Obtain feedback gold. Create a learning organization and gain a shared reality. Continuous improvement and customer service and satisfaction. Have fun. All of this stuff is important, and all of it should be geared towards results and getting the job done. –Matt
From Former Manager at AGNA
“Sorry I cannot be more forthcoming with dates and witnesses, most have left. A number of the team in Kabul are upset as great progress has been made and this is rarely acknowledged, we just get the old issues regurgitated and inaccurate reporting. No organisation, or individual, is perfect and mistakes will be made, but, this report is poor and has an impact on individuals and corporations. How can organizations be expected to work with the IG if they produce sloppy reports, it is counter productive. Instead of working on ways to improve the contracting process and performance; it erodes it – people do not put things in writing, everyone tries to cover their backs all the time, every decision takes a long time/ or make poor ones, as people try to assess what an inspector or congressman (who has to be re-elected every two years) might say three years from now and with 20/20 hindsight.”
From IG Report In Regards To The Firing Range
AGNA does not adequately maintain training records. AGNA firearms instructors failed to sufficiently instruct guards to help correct firing errors. Instructors also qualified guards who did not achieve the minimum qualifying score at the firing range.
From Former Manager at AGNA
“There are other areas that need to be looked at – such as the statement that AGNA fails to conduct weapon training properly – how can they make this a key finding from a visit to one range? The same range the inspector is removed from the firing line by a former ranger chief instructor for moving in front of the firing line. The same inspector who, in front of the project manager, grabbed an M4 from a guard to check the serial number, not checking the weapon status/ clearing it and muzzle sweeping personnel in the process – we would be disciplined for handling a weapon in this way. How can they say AGNA put guards on post who failed the weapons qual, without checking the source documentation? (which they found difficult to navigate but did not ask the training staff to assist them in finding). Have you looked at the equation they used with regard to rifle quals? It makes no sense to me and I believe the two personnel they say failed actually had passed if you looked at the source document, not the spreadsheet where results are collated. They say guards were on post for 8 months without training, yet they interviewed some of these guards, I would imagine that they should have asked them if they had undergone training and when? If they were trained prior to standing post (which they were) then it is an issue of maintenance of records, which is still a problem to be highlighted and resolved, but does not effect the security of the Embassy.”
From IG Report In Regards To Weapons
AGNA’s current control of U.S. Government-furnished property is generally satisfactory, but AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished weapons that have been missing since 2007. Additionally, from July 2007 until September 2009, AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons to train guards when contractor-furnished weapons were required by its contract. OIG calculates that AGNA’s loss and misuse of these U.S. Government-furnished weapons cost the government $431,000.
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OIG found that AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished assault ri?es of a lot of 116 that was to be returned to the U.S. Government in July 2007 under a contract modi?cation. OIG found one missing assault ri?e of this lot under a desk in an AGNA of?ce. The photo on the right in Figure 3 shows the assault ri?e as found under the desk. DS was able to locate an addition 14 weapons that had been transferred to other State Department of?ces and US Government agencies. Neither AGNA nor DS could provide documentation verifying the return or location of the remaining 101 assault ri?es. OIG calculates this assault ri?e lot is worth approximately $50,000.
According to correspondence between the Department and AGNA management, from July 2007 until September 2009, AGNA did not provide a suf?cient number of contractor-furnished weapons to the KESF guards. Instead, AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons for training, although the contract required contractor-furnished weapons (U.S. Government-furnished weapons are to be used for guard duty). AGNA and the Department negotiated a ?nancial settlement in which AGNA was to reimburse the U.S. Government $381,000 for the use of these weapons. However, OIG reviewed invoices and found that AGNA has not yet reimbursed the Department. DS of? cials con?rmed that AGNA has yet to reimburse the Department.
From Former Manager at AGNA
“The original contract and mod 1 contained 116 soviet block weapons that were used on the previous contract, before the Govt supplied US weapons. As these weapons were not going to be used on the program DoS moved them to their own storage unit prior to 1 July 2007 (when AGNA took responsibility for the contract). Consequently these weapons were never part of the equipment handover and AGNA did not sign for them on handover. Because of this the contract was modified in mid July 2007 reflecting this. How can AGNA provide handover documentation for items they were never responsible for? It seems as if the IG assumed AGNA was responsible because the contract mod was mid July, but that is a poor assumption, and the IG was informed of the situation by DS.”
“From what I understand DoS then gave AGNA some of the weapons (7 or so) to use for identification training (they were generally kept on the training/ briefing room in full view), but they were demilitarized (welded bolt, soldered and bent barrel etc). One of these weapons is the one seen in the photograph in the report. Other weapons were sent to the US for use at DS facilites and the rest were disposed of, although I do not know how. Most of the people involved in this are DoS personnel who oversaw the program handover. Those from AGNA have since left the company. However, with all the scrutiny on this program you would think that DoS would have mentioned AGNA ‘losing’ 100+ weapons before now…”
Comments from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Report
A senior level review of the misconduct allegations against AGNA personnel, combined with AGNA’s history of contract compliance de?ciencies, led DS, AQM, and Embassy Kabul to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Government to compete a new contract. In light of recent legislation, the KESF contract has been combined with the Baghdad Embassy Security Force and Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS II) contracts into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. The new WPS contract is a multi-award, inde?nite delivery, inde?nite quantity (IDIQ) contract that will be awarded on a best value basis. Individual requirements, such as the KESF, will be awarded as task orders under the base WPS contract. The current KESF contract with AGNA expired on June 30, 2010, but performance has been extended until the end of December 2010 to allow for the completion of the acquisition process for the new WPS contract and KESF task order and to provide for an orderly transition to the next provider.
Link to report here.
Imagine a company with a new board of directors, charged with entering complex markets while managing rapid growth, both organic and through M&A. This company is struggling to hit its performance targets. It has been hemorrhaging money and hasn’t turned a profit in over eight years. Needless to say, shareholders are upset. How would most senior management teams handle these problems? In today’s competitive business space, chances are they would go outside the organization for highly skilled, industry knowledgeable, impartial consultants to work with them to solve strategic-level inefficiencies.
Now consider that this troubled company is actually NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF (the “Coalition”) faces real business problems in Afghanistan and are pressured by a global audience to make significant progress by the end of 2010. The Coalition is at a tipping point and should use every resource available to improve their bottom line — promote stability and support security sector reforms throughout Afghanistan. Who are they bringing in to help them expand, operate efficiently, measure success, and develop a unified strategy?- HBR Blog, Consultants: Help Wanted In Afghanistan
*****
I have thoroughly enjoyed this series at Harvard Business Review. The military needs this kind of perspective, because just like business can learn from the military, the military can certainly learn from business. Especially in the realm of getting results. Because lets face it, a military can be highly advanced and well equipped all day long, but if it cannot produce the desired results or win, then what good is it?
In the past I have touched on this idea that private industry has the power of failure that drives it. But when the US Army fails, who fires them? What will replace the the Army if it fails? So in essence, today’s military branches must succeed and they must tap into any and all ways of getting the desired results they are seeking in a war.
Back to this post though. This is about what private industry can learn from military leadership, and I always like reading about these lessons learned. It is always fun to see what professionals in other industries are surprised at or intrigued with in today’s military. They too are trying to get results and win their business wars, so this kind of article is an outcome of their learning organization. And Harvard Business Review is quite the learning organization.
Below I posted all the executive summaries. But if you follow the blog link and website link, you will find other related materials. So definitely take your time and read through everything. I thought it was cool that Admiral Thad Allen was a big fan of Peter Senge and his books. Books like The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, which has themes that you see echoed in other military thinker’s and business folk’s publications. John Nagl mentions ‘learning organization’ in his books, and I have talked about that stuff here on the blog in the past. It is also a Jundism. Check it out and let me know what you think. –Matt
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Harvard Business Review
Leadership Lessons From The Military
November 2010
Executive Summaries
Extreme Negotiations
Jeff Weiss, Aram Donigian, and Jonathan Hughes
CEOs and other senior executives must make countless complex, high-stakes deals across functional areas and divisions, with alliance partners and critical suppliers, and with customers and regulators. The pressure of such negotiations may make them feel a lot like U.S. military officers in an Afghan village, fending off enemy fire while trying to win trust and get intelligence from the local populace.
Should dissent be founded on the right action or the right effect? A third of the MCWAR officers surveyed argued that in the face of a moral dilemma, the military professional should focus on the effect desired: mitigation of the immoral order, rather than the conscience- salving but possibly ineffectual act of resignation. These officers advocated an indirect approach: addressing higher authority, leaking the story to trusted journalists or politicians, and dragging their feet in execution— “slow rolling” in military parlance. “What else can I do?” asked one officer rhetorically. “My only option is to conduct covert actions to reduce the risks of misfortune and of American casualties.”18 This approach is certainly not without precedent. As one Army colonel commented in response to the survey, “The most (commonly) used form of disobeying an order I’ve seen is slow-rolling.”19 This option does have some prima facie appeal, combining its own moral logic with a pragmatic focus on effects.
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Thanks to Paul from Facebook for bringing this to my attention. This paper is actually causing quite a stir amongst the military crowd, and is certainly thought provoking. It also is relevant considering the General McChrystal firing a couple months back.
What struck me as extremely interesting, is the conclusion and the preferred method of dissent with today’s command. That would be covert dissent, because it allows the commander to stay in their position of power and continue to protect their people and others.
Commanders have a choice when they have decided that an order is immoral. They could be overt or covert with their protest. If they are overt, they would be fired or have to resign, but their message would be loud and clear. This is a symbolic stance, and can be successful if used properly. The problem with that one though, is their men would still be a victim of that order because the replacement leadership would probably be selected for it’s ability to carry out the order and not question the higher command. You would hope that the symbolic open protest would stop the activity, but what if it doesn’t? Now you are no longer in the loop to stop the source of this terrible and life threatening decision making.
Or an officer can stay in that position, yet covertly protest the order using a number of methods. You can fight it from within. Slow rolling or ‘dragging your feet’ was mentioned as the most commonly used way to disobey an order. Other methods were to leak the immoral or unethical order to the press or appealing to higher authorities. With these methods, an officer can stay in command, achieve the goal of commanding and protecting their troops, while at the same time disobeying the order. In other words, to stay in their position of power and dissent covertly is preferred.
Now if I was to compare this to the private industry, there are similar themes. On the blog I have talked about some of this stuff under the category of Jundism. ‘Have the courage to do what is right’ is one of those topics that I have touched on. I have also discussed ways in which managers or contractors can report wrong doing within the company. You can be an overt whistleblower, or you can dissent covertly. My thoughts on it are to dissent covertly, use whatever strategy you can to protect self and others, and leave the company as soon as you can find another gig. With this last method, you can also educate your subordinates to do the same and as a manager you can protect them until they too can leave. Just leave and don’t waste your time and life on a pathetic company. With this method, the company will either suffer massive attrition, damage to their reputation and a loss of money. Or if they care to be competitive in today’s market, they will learn that ‘taking care of your people’ is pretty darn important.
The only time I advocate open protest is when lives are needlessly put at risk because of a company policy, and time is of the essence. You must protect yourself and others, and do it the smartest way possible. But I also realize that the situation dictates.
Another point to bring up for those of you that have an interest in monitoring companies. Probably one of the best indicators of the quality and health of a company, is to review how many folks have resigned or were fired. Those companies with high attrition rates are usually the ones that do a terrible job of taking care of their people. Or to review those companies with numerous defaults on contracts.
I have even heard of guards organizing and striking, and that would be another area to investigate. Or better yet, guards collectively jumping contract, and crossing over to another company. That way they maintain work and their team cohesion, and they overtly hurt the company by costing them money (training, transport, etc.) or causing a default on contract.
But these contractors can also become blacklisted by said company with both of these incidents. A contractor’s reputation might be negatively impacted by an action like this as well. So with that said, a contractor really has to be smart as to the best course of action.
With that whole blacklist thing, I will have to do a separate post. You can get blacklisted or put on a ‘do not hire’ list for all sorts of reasons and it is another reason why dissent must really be thought through before you take action. Good stuff and definitely some ‘to be, or to do‘ related ideas. –Matt
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Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional
By Andrew R. Milburn
Click here to download the PDF
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. Milburn, USMC, is assigned to Special Operations Command, Europe, Future Operations (J3).
There are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order. In supporting this assertion, I discuss where the tipping point lies between the military officer’s customary obligation to obey and his moral obligation to dissent. This topic defies black-and-white specificity but is nevertheless fundamental to an understanding of the military professional’s role in the execution of policy. It involves complex issues—among them, the question of balance between strategy and policy, and between military leaders and their civilian masters.
Any member of the military has a commonly understood obligation to disobey an illegal order; such cases are not controversial and therefore do not fall within the purview of this article. Instead, the focus is on orders that present military professionals with moral dilemmas, decisions wherein the needs of the institution appear to weigh on both sides of the equation. Whether the issuer of the order is a superior officer or a civilian leader, the same principles apply. However, because issues at the strategic level of decisionmaking have greater consequences and raise wider issues, I focus on dissent at this level.
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