Feral Jundi

Monday, September 27, 2010

Leadership: The Next Petraeus–What Makes A Visionary Commander?

“One day you will take a fork in the road, and you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go one way, you can be somebody. You will have to make your compromises and … turn your back on your friends, but you will be a member of the club, and you will get promoted and get good assignments. Or you can go the other way, and you can do something, something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. … You may not get promoted, and you may not get good assignments, and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors, but you won’t have to compromise yourself. … In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you have to make a decision: to be or to do.”

-Col. John Boyd

*****

     As I read through this I was thinking ‘What makes a visionary PMC/PSC CEO?’ You really don’t hear much about that kind of thing in our industry.  Although there is plenty of good stuff to learn from the military community, and that is why I wanted to post this.

     I also had that famous quote running through my head ‘to be, or to do…’ from the mighty Col. John Boyd. One of the points of this article is that the military has a hard time producing leaders that are there ‘to do’ the job, primarily because the system really doesn’t lend itself for that.  It is more restrained and not very flexible.  Everyone has a specific career track, with boxes that must be checked off. God help you if you draw outside the lines in this world, or dare to take a different path.

     The other point made was that of life experiences and preparation for the real world of being in the high command. That these guys are having to not only be masters of the combat arms and strategy, but must also be the ultimate ‘everyman’.  They could be working with civilians, talking with Rolling Stone reporters, hanging out with Presidents that could care less about winning wars and more about politics, working with disaster relief organizations in disaster zones, trying to manage a massive civilian contractor force and ‘building snowmobiles’ on a daily basis just to win the numerous political wars, as well as the real wars. Being a general these days is no joke.

     I would also apply the same standard to today’s CEO of PMC’s and PSC’s.  This is an incredibly fast paced and technological world we live in. In order to stay competitive, a company and it’s leaders must always stay ahead of the game and their competitors. At least in our industry, CEO’s either do well and keep the company profitable, or fail miserably and be kicked to the road.  The free market is what produces our ‘visionary commanders’.

     Good article and check it out. –Matt

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The next Petraeus

What makes a visionary commander, and why the military isn’t producing more of them

By Renny McPherson

September 26, 2010

President Obama recently demoted General David Petraeus, the man who led the turnaround in Iraq and is widely acknowledged to be the most effective military officer of his generation.

In June, the president needed a new commander to lead the war effort in Afghanistan, after General Stanley McChrystal spoke too openly with a Rolling Stone reporter and was forced to resign. And, while few may realize this, when Petraeus was appointed to take over in Afghanistan, he was replacing a subordinate. Petraeus may yet be hailed for saving the day. But he also got a new boss and moved one step down the chain of command.

How does this happen to the best our military has to offer? Why was there no other general to take the job?

The short answer is that the US military has failed to produce enough leaders like Petraeus–the kind of broad-minded, flexible strategic thinkers needed to lead today’s most difficult missions. And a large contributor to this failure is the military’s inflexible system of promotion, which can actively discourage young officers from getting the mind-expanding, challenging experiences that could turn them into potent generals.

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Jundism: ‘Have The Courage To Do What Is Right’– Security Contractor Shane Schmidt Rest In Peace

     I wanted to post this story as an example to us all.  ‘Have the courage to do what is right’ is a Jundism concept that I have hit on before here on the blog, and Shane Schmidt is a prime example of what this means.

     For circumstances like this when a co-worker or leader has crossed the line, it is your responsibility and moral obligation to do what is right and turn that bastard in. If you don’t, who will?  And if you don’t, then these heathens will take you, your company, and your customer down with them and everyone in the company and industry suffers.

     Do not listen to those in your company who are weak minded and lack that moral standard to do what is right. Listen to your heart and listen to your soul and do what you have to do. That is all.

     Bravo to Shane Schmidt (and Charles Sheppard) and Semper Fi. –Matt

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Shane Schmidt

Shane Schmidt, shown in Iraq, and others with Triple Canopy said a colleague fired unprovoked into an occupied taxi and pickup truck. (Courtesy Of Shane Schmidt)

Sued U.S. defense contractor in Iraq

By Emma BrownFriday, September 24, 2010

Shane Schmidt, a private security guard in Iraq who raised questions about lax government oversight of U.S. defense contractors when he accused his boss of randomly shooting at, and perhaps killing, civilians in Baghdad, died Sept. 19 at a hospital in Marshfield, Wis. He was 33.

Mr. Schmidt, a Haymarket resident who was visiting family in Wisconsin, was crossing a road near Marshfield just after midnight when he was struck by a vehicle. He was taken to a nearby hospital, where he died, according to a news release from the local sheriff’s department. The incident was under investigation.

Mr. Schmidt was a Marine Corps sniper who served two tours in Afghanistan before taking a job in 2004 with Triple Canopy, a Herndon-based company and one of the largest defense contractors working with the U.S. military in Iraq.

For $500 a day, he provided protection for American bases and visiting military personnel and contractors.

On July 8, 2006, the former Marine was one of four Triple Canopy employees traveling in an armored sport-utility vehicle to the Baghdad airport.

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Tuesday, September 21, 2010

Publications: Innovation In War–COIN Operations In Anbar And Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007

 The standing operating procedure (SOP) for the unit typically focused on: (1) Planning and establishing the COP; (2) Ensuring route security so each outpost could be kept resupplied; (3) Clearing operations after the COP had been stood up to clear IEDs and find weapons caches; and (4) Census patrols to follow after the clearing operations to consolidate the position and gradually work its way into the human terrain of the area – the real target of MacFarland’s campaign. 

*****

     This is an excellent paper that discusses some of the key innovations of the war.  The main theme that I am getting from all of this, is intelligence, intelligence, and intelligence.(jundism hint)

     If you notice in the publication, there are some themes that keep getting repeated.  The importance of networks or fusion is one of them.  To bring together different groups of experts, and have them contribute to actionable intelligence. And feeding these fusion groups requires interaction with the terrain, population and the enemy.

    Hence why COPS or combat outposts are so important.  It allows a unit to insert itself into the heart of a population/insurgency center and get as much information as they can via census patrols, sensors, raids, attacks against and by the enemy, etc. All of this is fed into a searchable database that can be cross referenced and searched by other units and organizations, and future deploying units and organizations. In other words, all actions and collected information is fed into the machine.

    I also liked the reference to ‘continuous improvement’. Too bad the author didn’t use the term Kaizen in the paper though. I also saw hints of ‘learning organization’, which is also an incredibly important concept for developing winning TTPs and strategies. Because once you have all of this great information and experience, you have to build a snowmobile out of it so you can win the fight. A rigid organization that doesn’t seek feedback internally and externally, work together and with others, or doesn’t innovate, will not succeed.

    Now here are my ideas to further the concepts into our industry.  Right now we are witnessing the African Union stumbling along in Somalia and trying to gain a foothold.  My thoughts on the whole thing is that you could take a PMC that was composed of former military leaders familiar with these concepts, and help the AU to organize accordingly. Or AFRICOM could send a leadership team in there to help organize the effort.  Either way, I see no reason why the AU forces could not replicate this strategy in Mogadishu right now.

    I also think that PMC’s could learn a lot from these types of strategies. PMC’s have had to set up remote sites that are very similar to ‘COPS in a box’. The CMC projects are a prime example. But what was missing with those operations was deliberate census patrols or the other means of intelligence collection that the Marines and Army could use.

    The way human intelligence was collected for these projects was often through the process of hiring and working around locals for guard positions and general labor projects. You learn all sorts of things about the locals when you work around them all day, day in and day out.

    Imagine though that if PMC’s actually did census patrols as part of the contract? Or planted sensors in abandoned buildings in their area? That data could not only be useful to that PMC, or future replacement PMC’s, but could also be added to a much larger database that the military could use? A PMC remote site and the routes they travel daily could be an excellent source of intelligence for the military units of that area, but unless that PMC is brought into that fusion process, it will simply be another lost chance at crucial data collection.

     It would also be nice if PMC’s could take advantage of that fusion process as well, and access the COPLINK or whatever database that is established locally. It could save lives and win wars, but it also requires both the military and civilian equivalents to talk and work with each other. Stuff to think about as we continue the fight and learn new ways of doing our thing in this war. –Matt

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Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007

James A. Russella

August 2010

To cite this Article: Russell, James A. ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33:4, 595 – 624

Abstract

This article analyzes operations by three battalions conducting counterinsurgency, or COIN, operations in Iraq over the period from July 2005 through March 2007: the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1-7) along the Iraq-Syrian border in the first half of 2006; the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment (1-37) battalion operating in south-central Ramadi in the fall of 2006; and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, or 2-1, operating in eastern Mosul in 2005-06. The empirical evidence presented in these cases suggest that, contrary to popular perceptions, the units successfully innovated in war – a process largely executed organically within the units themselves. Innovation is defined here as the development of new organizational capacities not initially present when the units deployed into the theater. The evidence presented in these cases suggests that the innovation process enabled these units to successfully transition from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations to organizations that developed an array of new organizational capacities for full-spectrum combat operations. The units in this study developed these new capacitites largely on their own initiative.

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Saturday, August 28, 2010

Legal News: Judge Denies Defendants AGNA/Wackenhut’s Motions To Dismiss False Claims Act Whistleblower Lawsuit For Kabul Fiasco

According to Debra S. Katz, counsel for Mr. Gordon, “this is an important victory for conscientious employees, like Mr. Gordon, who blow the whistle on fraudulent practices by defense contractors and wind up then paying the ultimate price.  The court’s decision today makes clear that such employees can bring federal claims under the False Claims Act to obtain redress.”

*****

     Excellent news for Mr. Gordon and for his attorney Debra Katz. This legal battle has been raging for awhile, and I wanted to make sure this got attention again. The Kabul Fiasco definitely needed to be addressed and dealt with from a legal standpoint.  It is a message to other companies that doing things right is the only way, or you will pay a price.

     It is also a message to those contractors out there that are put in the unfortunate position that Mr. Gordon was in. That there is hope, and your efforts will pay off. –Matt

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Federal Judge Denies Defendants ArmorGroup’s and Wackenhut’s Motions to Dismiss False Claims Act Whistleblower Lawsuit Involving Fraudulent Practices at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul

August 27, 2010

Judge James Cacheris of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has denied Defendants ArmorGroup North America (“AGNA”), ArmorGroup International, Wackenhut Services, Inc., and Cornelius Medley’s motions to dismiss whistleblower James Gordon’s lawsuit brought under the False Claims Act.

On September 9, 2009, Mr. Gordon, former Director of Operations of AGNA, filed a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit under the False Claims Act in United States District Court for the District of Columbia, charging that ArmorGroup management retaliated against him for whistleblowing, internally and to the United States Department of State (“DoS”), about illegalities committed by ArmorGroup in the performance of AGNA’s contracts with the United States to provide security services at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan and at the U.S. Naval base in Bahrain.

The Complaint charges that during Mr. Gordon’s seven-month tenure as Director of Operations, he investigated, attempted to stop, and reported to DoS a myriad of serious violations committed by ArmorGroup, including:

Severely understaffing the guard force necessary to protect the U.S. Embassy;

Allowing AGNA managers and employees to frequent brothels notorious for housing trafficked women in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act;

Endangering the safety of the guard force during transport to and from the Embassy by attempting to substitute company-owned subpar, refurbished vehicles from Iraq rather than purchasing armored escort vehicles as promised to DoS;

Knowingly using funds to procure cheap counterfeit goods from a company in Lebanon owned by the wife of AGNA’s Logistics Manager; and

Engaging in practices to maximize profit from the contract with reckless disregard for the safety and security of the guard force, the U.S. Embassy, and its personnel.

(more…)

Friday, June 18, 2010

Jundism: War Zone Corruption Allegations Up Sharply

     In Iraq, investigators have opened 67 fraud cases this year, compared with 69 for all of 2009, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). In Afghanistan, it’s 42 cases this year vs. four last year.

     Stuart Bowen, who heads SIGIR, says more tipsters are coming forward. “Some of these people have come back to the States, so they’re out of the threat zone,” he says. “Perhaps what they saw is gnawing at their conscience.” 

*****

     To me, this is great news.  It indicates to me that there is finally a connection between the guy on the ground and the folks tasked with investigating this stuff. That means guys and gals are talking and sending in tips because ‘they have the courage to do what is right‘ and the IG is acting on it. So bravo to you folks out there that are sticking it to these shady people and companies that think they can get away with this stuff.

     It also indicates that there are finally more investigators out there to actually investigate these tips.(contractors have been submitting stuff for awhile now) Although the government and tax payers would have been better served if they would have focused on this in the beginning of the war. Arguably, things would have been less screwed up if they had this manpower in the first place and it is a shame it has gone on this long like it has. The lesson to me, is you must have the necessary manpower and sound leadership in place to expand and contract with the dollars/stuff/people going in and out of war zones. Flexible and scaleable oversight is crucial. This kind of oversight is necessary not only for ensuring the tax payer gets a good value for their money, but that the actions of contractors or military folks does not negatively impact the war time strategy with their actions.

     That last part I cannot stress enough.  With today’s 24/7 media, the internet, blogs, cameras in smart phones, social media, etc., it is almost impossible to operate out of the public’s view. That means when a company screws up or does something it should not have done, the whole world ends up finding out about it.  And then whatever program and strategy that company was a part of in the war, is now threatened by that company who chose the wrong path. That is unacceptable in my view.

     Plus, I just love seeing shady companies/managers/individuals who screw over their fellow contractors or the government, get the heat. So keep sending in those tips to the IG, because what you have to say matters. It is an easy way to keep a company honest and on their toes. And maybe, just maybe, companies will actually start listening to their people and taking care of these problems or wrongdoing before they make their way to Youtube or the desk of the IG.

     Now one tip that I would like to present to the IG, if any of those guys are listening, is that you should also make an effort to connect with the ‘non-english’ writing, or computer illiterate contractors.  An Iraqi or Afghani contractor should have the means of connecting with you, because those folks see all sorts of wrong doings within their companies. The hordes of TCN’s from all over the world who are working on the bases, are in the same boat as well, and there should be an effort to reach out to them.  Perhaps a multi-language tip submit program involving anonymous call ins could be implemented there, because speaking a grievance would probably be better than them writing it.  Plus they could do it anonymously from the convenience of their phone. Interpreters could then translate the message and investigators can go from there.

     Also, there needs to be some pressure on the companies involved with TWISS.  I am getting lots of emails from expats and Ugandans about how screwed up that program is. And because this is an LPTA (lowest price, technically acceptable) program, the companies have all been racing to the bottom to out bid the other guy.  As a result, you have the lowest paid expats in the industry supervising poorly vetted Ugandans or whatever TCN group, and that dynamic does not promote a well running machine.  If anything, expats could care less about doing a good job, and those individuals only look at the job as a stepping stone to go onto something else. Most contractors involved with TWISS that I have talked with couldn’t wait to get out of that contract.

     LPTA does not work, it is a race to the bottom, and eventually LPTA is going to hurt the wartime strategy. The vetting of TCN guard forces like Ugandans is poor as well, and I place the blame on companies who are more concerned with cutting costs to outbid the other guy. They will say things like ‘that was the job of the training company we use in Uganda, and we had no part in that’ or ‘well company X in Uganda said they were good to go’.  Pffft. Meanwhile they man posts in Iraq with folks who are ill or cannot shoot a weapon or whatever, all because the vetting process is ‘technically acceptable’ and ‘lowest cost’. And why would US companies spend the money on this if they didn’t have to?

     It is a ‘race to the bottom’, and the government thinks this is a good idea. Wait until a poorly supervised or poorly vetted Ugandan kills some civilian or soldier, or fails at performing the duties of their post? That is not to say that there are not squared away expats or Ugandans in this program. But it is the program itself and the contracting vehicle that supports it, lends itself to such a screwed up set of circumstances. If the IG wanted a program to investigate, TWISS and the pathetic results of LPTA would be a good one to focus on. –Matt

Edit: 06/21/2010 -Doug Wethington from DCIS just responded in the comments below, and I wanted to put his information in an edit. Here is the important part:

I can also tell you we activity seek “non-English” sources of information for the reasons you site. We know these folks have valuable information and we try diligently to get the word out that we are interested in hearing what they have to say. I welcome any suggestions that will assist us with those efforts. We also welcome email tips, in whatever language, to:   icctf@iraq.centcom.mil

Forgot to add, the only phone number we currently have where a recording could be left and tranlation accomplished is the Defense hotline at 800-424-9098. I will take your suggestion and see if we can get a dedicated line with a recorder to receive complaints in country. Thanks for the advise.v/r

Douglas Wethington, Regional Director of Investigations, DCIS

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War zone corruption allegations up sharply 

By Aamer Madhani

June 17, 2010

WASHINGTON — The U.S. government, which is pressing Iraqi and Afghan leaders to get tough on internal corruption, is doing the same in its ranks.

Cases of suspected fraud and other wrongdoing by U.S. troops and contractors overseeing reconstruction and relief projects in Iraq and Afghanistan are up dramatically.

James Burch, the Defense Department’s deputy inspector general for investigations, says his agency is investigating 223 cases — 18% more than a year ago.

Investigators have charged an Army officer with pocketing cash meant to pay Iraqi civilian militiamen, contractors offering an Army officer $1 million for the inside track on a road project in Afghanistan, and three contractors for an alleged conspiracy to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of fuel from a U.S. base in Baghdad.

Army Maj. John Cockerham was sentenced in December to 17½ years in prison for accepting $9 million in bribes for contracts to sell water and other supplies to the U.S. military.

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