Feral Jundi

Sunday, November 14, 2010

History: The Gunner And The U-Boat, By Hugh Perkins

     To the victor the spoils. There was an immediate cash gratuity to be shared among Inverlyon’s reservist crew members. All hands were also eligible for Admiralty bounty money, but that would not be forthcoming until April 1923*. Gunner Jehan was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, a well-deserved accolade for a surprisingly successful action in which a lot of nerve, nine rounds of 3-pounder and a few dozen rounds of small arms ammunition sank a U-boat. The Admiralty also singled out the actions and steadiness of the gun’s crew and Skipper Philip’s attempt to rescue the German submariner.

     This is a great little story about a Q-ship versus a U-boat during World War One. It would take a lot of nerve for the captain of a scamp (see below) to take on a submarine. Especially the type that had sunk so many British and Allied vessels during that war.

    The concept of the Q-ship was developed during this war and it was referenced here on the blog as a possible strategy to use against today’s pirates. Imagine a bunch of modern day yachts, cruising around the gulf with some Barrett’s and RPG’s just looking for trouble? lol

    I also wanted to highlight how this Q-ship crew was used for warfare. They were all brought into the Royal Navy auxiliary as volunteers, and they were paid with ‘immediate cash gratuity’ and with Admiralty (Navy command) bounties for every German U-boat crew member killed. (£5 per crewman on a submarine) Hmmm, paying bounties for killing the enemy–now that doesn’t get much attention for that war.

    The really funny part about this story was the fact that after this little sailboat sank the U-boat, the submarine actually got hung up in the fishing net they had been pulling behind them. Talk about a big fish? lol

     Boy, if any movie folks out there are looking for a cool story, this would make for a great short film. It truly is a modern day version of David and Goliath and high seas bounty hunting. –Matt

 

This is what a ‘smack’ would have looked like during that time.

The Gunner and the U-Boat

September 2008

By Hugh Perkins

A lone gunner on a small trawler dueled a German U-boat to the finish in a David and Goliath-type contest

The story of the U-boat war against Allied merchant shipping during The Great War is one of enormous tragedy, incredible human suffering, sacrifice and bravery, Destruction of lives and ships on such a massive scale and by such an unusual means had never before happened in the history of the seafaring world. Once the potential inherent in the U-boats had been tested, the German Admiral staff did its utmost to isolate Great Britain from outside support, first with a U-boat blockade of the British Isles and later, through the wholesale destruction of her sea-borne trade on the high seas far from war-torn Europe. The German objective was to bring Britannia to her knees through starvation thus putting an end to the war on German terms. They came alarmingly close to succeeding.

During 1915, when the U-boat force began its first concerted campaign and shipping losses started to rise, the Royal Navy found itself completely unprepared to deal with the submersible marauders. Both the Admiralty and the mercantile community cast about for solutions to the problem.

Convoy, a defensive tactic that had been employed with success in sailing ship days, was not favored by either group. The Admiralty did not have the escort ships and the steamship captains did not want to give up their independence. Other means of protecting the merchant fleet were sought.

The first countermeasure to be tried was the containment of the U-boats using mine fields, nets and patrols. This was continued throughout the course of the war and ultimately mines destroyed more U-boats than any other single means. Another idea, and that best liked by the mercantile community, was to arm merchant ships so that by a combination of speed, maneuvering and gunfire they could fight it out with their adversaries.

This worked fairly well for the large, fast, modern ships when the U-boat cooperated by surfacing first, and many a steamer was actually saved by these tactics. Mounting a gun on a merchantman, however, had its drawbacks for it gave the U-boat captain the excuse he needed to sink the ship without warning. For the multitude of slow steamers, older ships and sailing vessels there was no real safety and they paid heavily. The best that could be done was to provide them with wireless sets so that ships in distress could at least call for help within the limited range of the early instruments.

Another solution was the creation of the now-famous Q-ships, an assortment of converted merchant vessels and small warships built to resemble merchant ships, manned by Naval crews and armed with concealed guns, depth charges and even torpedo tubes. These ships plied the trade routes like any other innocent merchantmen, sometimes under neutral colors, in the hopes of being challenged by German submarines, much like bait in a mobile trap. When a U-boat’s periscope was sighted, or one surfaced nearby and ordered them to heave-to, a “panic party” dressed as merchant seamen would tumble into the lifeboats and abandon ship while the gun crews stayed under cover at their hidden guns. Once the U-boat came within easy range, the white ensign was run up, the shields were dropped and the guns opened fire to destroy the submarine before it could dive out of danger.

At least, that was the idea. Sometimes it worked very well, sometimes not. Occasionally the Uboat would torpedo the Q-ship without ever revealing herself. On a number of occasions, better armed German submarines stood-off and shelled the Q-ship either forcing her to open fire prematurely to save herself or reducing the “trapship” to a sinking condition before she could bring her guns into action. There were some very lively actions between decoy ships and submarines with casualties aplenty on both sides.

Q-ships came in all shapes and sizes but one of the earliest, and most humble, must have been the converted fishing vessel known as His Majesty’s Armed Smack Inverlyon. She was based at Lowestoft on the Suffolk coast. Like dozens of her ilk, Inverlyon was a bluff-bowed, flushdecked, two-masted, fore-and-aft rigged, little vessel sporting a stubby bowsprit. She had no engine and relied entirely on a suit of patched, broom, canvas sails and the skill of her crew for mobility. For armament, Inverlyon was fitted with a single 3pounder (47mm) quick-firer, a popgun by anybody’s standards but about all that could be carried in such a small vessel.

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Friday, November 12, 2010

Maritime Security: Somali Piracy Getting Worse Despite The Efforts Of Worldwide Navies

     Man, this is not a very good report card about the effectiveness of the current strategy. It also shows to me that the pirates are getting better at what they are doing, and they are also increasing their reach.

     Not to mention the scalability of the whole thing. If an operation costs $ 30,000, and a pirate has fetched millions of dollars in ransom in the past, then with each ransom, they can dramatically scale up the amount of operations. This increases the odds of success. The numbers below speak for themselves.

     Now on to the solutions. There are two things that have to happen that the world community just does not have the will to do, or the spine to promote, in order to stop this. They have to effectively deal with the problems in Somalia on land, and shipping must have a viable means to protect itself on the high seas. In my book, ‘viable means’ is defined as armed security on every boat.

     Along with those armed security professionals, must also come the legal mechanism necessary to allow this force to do what it needs to do.  Here on the blog I continue to promote how countries could provide such a legal mechanism through the granting of the Letter of Marque (LoM). I have also posted numerous legal treatments on the subject here on the blog with the hopes that folks will start thinking about the concept.

     The other area of interest for me is that as pirates become more asset rich, the possibilities of seizing their assets on the high seas or somehow taking what they stole, increases. With a LoM system right now, there is nothing of value that the pirates have because they have such low operating costs.  So the LoM would only serve as a legal framework for PSC’s to protect vessels.

     But as ship owners continue to pay ransoms and pirates begin to upgrade to more valuable ships and hardware, I could see a day where a privateer might benefit from the seizure of a prize like this.

     A privateer might also be able to benefit by retrieving that ransom money somehow. Either on the high seas right after the exchange, or if they were able to get on land and take it from the pirate. My thoughts on the matter is that if there is any mechanism at all for allowing companies to legally take from the pirates, then now you would have a competitive strategy to counter the current piracy business model. Pirates profit by taking from the weak, and privateers would profit by taking from the pirates.

     I estimate that a system such as this would eradicate piracy pretty effectively. Just think of the size and scope of such a thing? The entire world and all of it’s private naval industries, armed with licenses to take from pirates, versus a few hundred Somali pirates off the coast of Africa or where ever they want to exist. Out of that process we would see some really innovative and effective pirate hunters, and that is the kind of thing that would put the fear of god into these thugs. I would imagine that some of the best pirate hunters, would be former Somali pirates themselves. Or who knows who would rise to the top in such an environment?

     And if a value was assigned to Somali pirates in the form of bounties, then that would really create the profit motive needed to fuel such an anti-pirate industry. Call it a clash of industries or privateers versus pirates. And get this, today’s shipping companies are creating an asset rich pirate by continuing to pay these ransoms. Until then though, an LoM would probably be most effective as a legal mechanism used to help defend private shipping. –Matt

Somalia Pirates’ Success Rate Rises, Stunting East Africa Economies

By Bill Varner

Nov 2, 2010

The international naval presence off the coast of Somalia is failing to reduce the success rate of pirates whose attacks on commercial ships are stunting the economies of East Africa, the United Nations said.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported to the Security Council that 37 of 164 attacks on ships operating off the coast of Somalia succeeded in the first nine months of this year. That 22.6 percent rate of successful hijackings compares with 17.1 percent, of 193 attempts, for the same period in 2009.

“Piracy in the region has had an immense impact on the economies of East Africa and also the wider world,” Ban said in his report. “International trade routes are threatened and goods in the region as well as Somalia are becoming more expensive. This is made worst by the bleak state of the global economy.”

The pirates concentrate on the Gulf of Aden, a chokepoint leading to the Suez Canal that is used by 30,000 ships a year carrying about one-tenth of world trade. Attacks have spread to the Indian Ocean, as much as 1,000 miles from shore.

The rate of successful hijackings increased even with the presence of warships from the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 25 other nations including the U.S., China, India, Iran and Japan. Commercial ships are using defensive measures such as netting, wire, electric fences and fire hoses to prevent boarding.

More Sophisticated Weapons

Ban said the pirates have countered with more sophisticated weaponry and use of “action groups” consisting of a large command boat towing attack skiffs.

“I am afraid that the problem will not only be with us for a long time to come, but also has the potential to become worse unless both Somalis and the international community address its root causes,” Ban said. “There is an urgent need to combine vital sea-based and judicial counter-piracy initiatives.”

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Monday, November 8, 2010

Publications: Corsairs In The Crosshairs–A Strategic Plan To Eliminate Modern Day Piracy, By Alexandra Schwartz

Corsairs in the Crosshairs: A Strategic Plan To Eliminate Modern Day Piracy, By Alexandra Schwartz

Letter Of Marque: A Review Of Corsairs In the Crosshairs

     This note proposes that the solution to the rapidly escalating problem of piracy is for the U.S. government to issue the license equivalent of historical letters of marque to private actors, thereby granting them increased legal immunity and political approval to use force to protect private vessels against piracy.  Letters of marque were legal commissions granted by Congress to private citizens granting them cover to engage enemies of the country.  At the same time, it is important for the U.S. to regulate the forces that they sanction and this note will discuss the current state of such regulation. The legal background of authority to address pirates, emanating from customary, international, and municipal law demonstrates that, despite some potential hurdles, this proposed solution is a legally valid and efficient option. -Alexandra Schwartz from Corsairs in the Crosshairs

     David Isenberg was the one that found this gem of a paper and a big hat tip to him. As you can see in the post above, I have also downloaded a copy into Scribd so you can read the whole thing. This post will be dedicated to some of the highlights of the paper that jumped out at me.

    Specifically, I really liked the various legal mechanisms that Alexandra dug up and I learned some new stuff. If you are interested in the legal side of privatized anti-piracy operations, then this paper is for you.

     There are a few areas that I wanted to put up for the reader to check out and note. One is the 1819 US Law titled ‘Resistance of Pirates by Merchant Vessels’.  Like with the Letter of Marque, this little guy exists in the books as a vigorous means of defense that even involves capture if need be. Here it is:

     The commander and crew of any merchant vessel of the United States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any armed vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation in amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the same; and may also retake any vessel so owned which may have been captured by the commander or crew of any such armed vessel, and send the same into any port of the United States. -33 U.S.C. § 383 (2000)

     The next area was in regards to the Declaration of Paris. Alexandra only confirms exactly what I have been repeating here. That the US did not sign the DoP, and that we even signed laws at that time that further enforced our right as a nation to issue LoM’s. She mentioned this law, and I had never heard of it before. Check it out:

     Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in all domestic and foreign wars the President of the United States is authorized to issue to private armed vessels of the United States, commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal in such forms as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, and make all needful rules and regulations for the government and conduct thereof, and for the adjudication That the authority conferred by this act shall cease and terminatethree years from the passage of this act. -An Act concerning Letters of Marque Prizes, and Prize Goods, ch. LXXXV, 12 Stat. 758 (1863) (This act was passed on Mar. 3, 1863, and provided that the authority it conferred would “cease and terminate” three years after its passage). 

     Alexandra also covers some of the particulars of a modern version of a Letter of Marque, and draws from a certain publication written by Robert P. DeWitte called ‘Let Privateers Marque Terrorism: A Proposal for a Reawakening’. So I will have to further research what he has to offer and get that up on blog as well. Check it out and let me know what you think. –Matt

Link to Scribd Publication here.

Edit: 11/09/2010- I wanted to add this one little piece for everyone to check out as well. The author here claimed the Spain and Britain both did not abide by the Declaration of Paris. I had never heard of Britain’s use of Prize Courts and paying prize money to folks to attack the enemy during WW 2. I am definitely trying to find out more about this.

Quote from Corsairs in the Crosshairs:

Moreover, even if one were to argue that the Declaration of Paris has become customary law, it is important to observe that many countries that signed it have continued the practice of issuing letters of marque in the modern era.

See Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 353 (1971) (“Even after Spain, in 1908, had acceded to the Declaration of Paris of 1856 which outlawed privateering in naval war between parties to the treaty, the opinion was advanced that it is perfectly possible under general international law to issue letters of marque.”). The British navy utilized prize money to reward those who fought for them in World War II, with the British Prize Court in London awarding about $40 million dollars. Id. at 354. 

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Maritime Security: Anti-piracy Measures For Sale In Hamburg, Germany

     A recent survey of 110 German shipping companies by PWC (formerly PriceWaterhouse Coopers) found that 12 used private security agencies in some capacity. Ruetten believes this is not nearly enough, and that too many companies rely on improvised defense measures like strapping mannequins to strategic positions on deck to make a ship look like it is being guarded. 

     I found this article over at Deutsche Welle. It gave a good run down of the German maritime security market and how they view PSC’s in the Gulf of Aden. The quote up top was really interesting, but as per usual, they have some folks here giving some very bad advice about the realities of the high seas.

    Max Johns, spokesman for the Association of German Ship-owners is wrong on one of his points he brought up as well. The private security team he is referring to, was not armed and had no means of protecting themselves or the boat other than with the pathetic less than lethal crap they had. So his point that PSC’s are a bad idea because they are not dependable is wrong.

     Unarmed PSC’s are a bad idea, and I am sure if these folks had a means to defend themselves and the crew, the outcome would have been far different. It is dorks like this spokesman who continue to promote this myth that less than lethal is an appropriate defense against pirates armed with RPG’s, PKM’s and AK 47’s. It is this same myth that creates this mindset that companies should just roll the dice, or pay the ransom if their vessel is taken. Meanwhile, every ransom paid just increases the size of the piracy problem. It is a simple equation–paying ransoms fuels piracy.

     And those PSC companies that continue to tell shipping companies that being unarmed in those waters is a good idea, are equally to blame. It’s as if you are selling a company on the idea that you can magically protect them without using lethal force.  Your strategies might work for some cases, but they will not cover the instances where a pirate force actually understands how to defeat your less than lethal measures (like using binoculars to tell if you have mannequins on the deck) and/or evasive maneuvers (ransom money allows investments in faster boats).

     Just wait until pirates start coming aboard with cutting torches or shaped charges to open the doors of safe rooms or bridges/engineer rooms? Or when they start contracting captains and crews that know how to command these ships? The pirate is not dumb and they are learning and evolving as their industry is fueled by the profits gained by ransoms.

     The point is, losing control of your ship is ‘losing control of your ship’. Having armed and competent security on a ship will at least give the crew and captain a fighting chance. Having a strong defense is also a crucial element in taking care of your people, which I would certainly hope a captain or the owner of a company would actually care about?

    As for the German company IBS mentioned, I haven’t a clue as to who they are or what they are all about. If any of my German readers have anything to add, feel free to comment below. –Matt

Anti-piracy measures for sale in Hamburg

By Ben Knight

October 25, 2010

The hijacking of two ships over the weekend highlights the difficulties Western navies face combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Many shipping lines are turning to private security firms for protection.

When it comes to global shipping, there is no avoiding the Gulf of Aden, which leads between the failed state of Somalia and Yemen – a nation security analysts describe as at-risk. These waters carry a significant share of the world’s wealth, including 11 percent of the world’s seaborne oil.

The 25,000 cargo ships that pass through the Gulf of Aden every year are tempting targets for heavily armed groups in Somalia, who claim overfishing by foreign vessels has robbed them of their livelihoods.

Earlier this year the International Maritime Bureau warned that attacks on merchant shipping are on the rise. European defense officials say Somali pirates are currently holding 20 ships and more than 400 crew for ransom off the Horn of Africa.

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