“There is no doubt about it — the people of Oruzgan love Matiullah!” said Fareed Ayel, one of Mr. Matiullah’s officers on the route. “The government people are not honest.”
Like many of Mr. Matiullah’s men, Mr. Ayel quit the police to join his militia, which paid him a better salary.
Indeed, many people in Tirin Kot praise Mr. Matiullah for the toughness of his fighters and for keeping the road open. Mr. Matiullah claims to have lost more than 100 men fighting the Taliban. Recently, he and several of his fighters followed an American Special Forces unit to Geezab, where the Taliban had been expelled after six years.
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I have to say, I am conflicted with this one. Dexter brings some very compelling points to the table, and I think in this one I will lean on the side of ‘devil’s advocate’. Is Matiullah a warlord or Al Capone type, or is he the CEO of a respected company who is actually doing a better job of taking care of the people than the government? I seem to remember that Al Capone was famous for hearts and minds operations with soup kitchens etc. Or is this a case of a little jealousy and competition between government and private industry, like with the US Postal Service versus Fedex?
In this case, I wouldn’t call Matiullah an enemy of the state. In this war against the Taliban, Matiullah’s men are fighting and dying for our side and that to me makes him less of an Al Capone type. He is a businessman, and his business is security. He has also lost over a hundred men in defense of NATO convoys, and Matiullah is employing thousands of Afghans with his businesses.
Just look at his actions. In order to command over these roads with his security teams, he has to go up against the same enemy forces that the coalition has to. And because he has the manpower and logistical ability, he can effectively canvass entire roads to keep them safe for convoys. This so-called warlord, is winning over the people of these districts, so he can successfully deliver these goods for NATO and the coalition. If you get the support of the people by becoming the source of income of the people, then you have effectively created a system that will support your business goals. If protecting the road and these NATO goods is the business, then that is what the local populations will be a part of. Not only that, but he is the guy providing 15,000 jobs to the locals, and he is paying a better salary than the government!
My point is, and I keep bringing this up over and over and over again. You must pay more than your competitors, if you want to attract the best. You must also treat your people better than your competitors treat theirs. Of course police and army officials are going to leave to join Matiullah’s PMC, if in fact he is paying more or treating them better. And if the people respect that PMC and what it has done, then that makes the decision to join that much easier. War and business are a lot alike in this regard.
We are also seeing this in places like Somalia, where Al Shabab is paying more than the TFG government. And if Al Shabab or any other group has the respect of the people or is even tolerable, then the choice to ‘jump contract’ is quite easy. Soldiers and police have to feed their families. More importantly, they have to choose the winning side or face the consequences of being associated with the losing team.(death and imprisonment for self and family come to mind)
I also see where Dexter is going with this article. Of course we want the government to be the top dog in our modern western way of thinking. But it is kind of hypocritical for the US to point this fact out, when we are using over a quarter million contractors in this war. Or if we were to really put some context on this, the US used thousands of privateers during our early wars, and certainly there was no real monopoly on the use of force during that time. Hell, we even implemented the Second Amendment in our constitution which allowed citizens the right to ‘keep and bare arms.’ Not to mention Article 1, Section 8 which allows our congress to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. The US is a prime example of why Max Weber’s definition of the state is flawed. There is certainly not a monopoly on the use of force in the US, and my gun locker filled with rifles and pistols is proof positive of that. The key to Afghanistan’s future is how can they co-op with guys like Matiullah and keep him on the right side of the war.
The Aghan government is looking at Matiullah in the wrong light. Instead, they should be studying what he is doing and try to learn from it. But by all means do not demonize him or force him to cross over to the enemy’s side. If anything, his business should be a source of inspiration. After all, his contractors are dying in defense of NATO convoys and not Taliban convoys. With that kind of sacrifice, the government should be embracing Matiullah, and at the same time trying to figure out how to win over the local populations like he has done. If Matiullah is violating any laws or paying off the Taliban, then of course that should be pursued and he should face the consequence. But he should not be demonized or persecuted for running a profitable and legitimate business that employs thousands of people.
Now if the Afghan government wanted to out do Matiullah, a good first step is to pay more than him. The second step is to out do Matiullah in protecting and serving the local population. It is the same with the war against the Taliban. The government must prove to the local populations that they are a better idea. –Matt
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With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire
By DEXTER FILKINS
June 5, 2010
TIRIN KOT, Afghanistan — The most powerful man in this arid stretch of southern Afghanistan is not the provincial governor, nor the police chief, nor even the commander of the Afghan Army.
It is Matiullah Khan, the head of a private army that earns millions of dollars guarding NATO supply convoys and fights Taliban insurgents alongside American Special Forces.
In little more than two years, Mr. Matiullah, an illiterate former highway patrol commander, has grown stronger than the government of Oruzgan Province, not only supplanting its role in providing security but usurping its other functions, his rivals say, like appointing public employees and doling out government largess. His fighters run missions with American Special Forces officers, and when Afghan officials have confronted him, he has either rebuffed them or had them removed.
“Oruzgan used to be the worst place in Afghanistan, and now it’s the safest,” Mr. Matiullah said in an interview in his compound here, where supplicants gather each day to pay homage and seek money and help. “What should we do? The officials are cowards and thieves.”
Mr. Matiullah is one of several semiofficial warlords who have emerged across Afghanistan in recent months, as American and NATO officers try to bolster — and sometimes even supplant — ineffective regular Afghan forces in their battle against the Taliban insurgency.
In some cases, these strongmen have restored order, though at the price of undermining the very institutions Americans are seeking to build: government structures like police forces and provincial administrations that one day are supposed to be strong enough to allow the Americans and other troops to leave.
In other places around the country, Afghan gunmen have come to the fore as the heads of private security companies or as militia commanders, independent of any government control. In these cases, the warlords not only have risen from anarchy but have helped to spread it.