Feral Jundi

Wednesday, April 11, 2012

Syria: In Syria, Send In The Mercenaries, By J. Michael Barrett

This perked me up, just because Syria is the new ‘Libya’ when it comes to any kind of western involvement. But involvement is a lot more precarious in this case, and the folks we would be supporting are questionable. And like the piece below mentioned, we tend to arm and train folks that end up turning against us down the line. So the author below presents the alternative, or using mercenaries, as opposed to arming rebels and forever losing control of the weapons we throw at the problem.

What makes this article so interesting to me, is the author. This guy is not some yahoo. He is the CEO of Diligent Innovations and a former ‘Director of Strategy for the White House Homeland Security Council(Feb.-Oct., 2007) , Intelligence Officer for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Senior Analyst for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff‘ . You might also recognize him from all of the interviews he has done on the various cable news shows.

Not only that, but he is a Wikistrat expert. Wikistrat has quite the pool of experts and to be one of them, you have to have some game in the beltway. Some of his fellow Wikistrat experts include such names as John Robb of Global Guerrillas, Dr. Ann Marie-Slaughter (R2P), Dr. Thomas PM Barnett (Sys Admin), Professor Allison Stanger, and the list goes on….

So back to this deal in Syria. I would be curious if this concept of using mercenaries instead of arming folks has been mulled around at Wikistrat?  Or if Michael has actually given this some serious thought on how this would work?

Or it could be just a piece that raises an idea for those to either support or strike down based on it’s merits. From a technical point of view, I guess a company could be called upon to perform offensive operations.  MPRI definitely helped in the planning and strategy for Croatia during the Balkans crisis. Executive Outcomes was contracted to fight and win wars both in Sierra Leone and Angola. So technically, a company or companies could provide this service. (the author mentioned The Flying Tigers, and he gets kudos for that!)

In Libya, contractors and mercenaries were used on both sides of the conflict, and they are still there. Hell, contractors were calling in targets for the air campaign and individuals were joining the rebel army. Here is a quote from Simon Mann about Libya.

In the Libyan revolution further lines of demarcation – between government forces and PMC forces – became more blurred. From Tripoli it has been reported that UK ex-Special Forces were used, in some places, instead of regular troops. This came about because of the uncontrolled and the ‘everywhere’ presence of war correspondents, accredited and otherwise. Their prying eyes made the covert deployment of SAS and SBS troops difficult.

Even so, the need for trained laser designator operators to bring in air dropped laser bombs, with as much precision as possible, had to be met. Therefore designator kits were supplied to ex- UK SF contractors. These were men whose salaries were being paid for by the oil companies, for oil field site security. They were already in country, already on contract.

Even for Syria, there have been reports of contractor involvement. During the whole STRATFOR data breach deal, emails detailed that SCG International has been involved with helping the opposition in Syria.

So I guess my point is that the waters are being tested for how best to approach Syria. Do we do nothing and allow a brutal regime to murder their own people? Do we arm and train the opposition, with the possibility that some day those weapons and training might be used against the west?  Or do we send in mercenaries because sending troops is something a war weary west is not that interested in or willing to pay for?  Or maybe we do nothing at all, and watch a massacre take place. Not a lot of easy answers.

One thing is for sure. If Syria falls, then jihadists would be able to capitalize on the situation.  If weapons and munitions are captured or liberated during the course of the revolution (much like what happened in Libya), they will find their way into other wars and terrorist operations.

Jihadists will also find their way into the politics of Syria, much like how the Muslim Brotherhood gained political market share in Egypt. So basically we would see extremists replace a dictator. The question here is can the west win over a rebel group and gain influence by assisting them, or will we be demonized despite our actions and contributions, just because of the islamic extremist influence within that revolution?  Can we compete in that kind of environment and should we be involved?

Might I also add that Saudi Arabia and GCC nations are getting involved and adding money to the pot. Upper level leadership in the US are getting involved and pushing to do something in Syria. Of course Russia is sending folks to support Assad, and China is showing their support for Assad as well. So things are happening and who knows how this will turn out.

It is also important to bring up this responsibility to protect deal as well. If the west feels it has an obligation to intervene–to stop a massacre, then something more than talk needs to happen. It takes action and the will to make it happen, and it also requires a realistic look at what we want to accomplish strategically in the region. Sending troops is a bridge too far for a war weary, cash strapped, and politically paranoid/sensitive west, and maybe contractors paid by GCC donors is the ticket? I will keep a look out for further industry involvement in Syria and this one will be interesting to follow. –Matt

 

 

In Syria, send in the mercenaries
J. Michael Barrett
April 10, 2012
The world community, including the United States, is at a crossroads about the right steps to forcefully prevent the further slaughter of civilians in Syria. There are many good reasons to intervene — to stop the death, detention and probable torture of any number of innocents; to support the democratic right of people to consent to rule by a freely elected government; and to avoid a repeat of the U.S. inaction that allowed Iran’s dictatorship to prevail in 2009.
There are just as many reasons not to intervene — the sovereignty of nations; the moral hazard of providing U.S. troops where our national interest does not dictate; and the uncertainty about those we would be helping take power. All the while, do-nothing diplomatic talks and easily ignored cease-fires continue to fail because the talking doesn’t change the facts on the ground.
But is there another way — something more effective than merely clamoring for calm, but less direct than intervening militarily or arming and training the rebels?
In fact, there is. Throughout the ages, the answer to such situations has been to raise an army for hire and send in the mercenaries. This was done throughout the great power struggles of the first and second millennia across the globe, and in more recent decades across Africa. Libya’s Gadhafi tried to use mercenaries to defend his regime just last year. We also placed many guns-for-hire in Iraq and Afghanistan, provided by the likes of Triple Canopy and the company formerly known as Blackwater.
Perhaps the most relevant example here is the World War II American Volunteers Group, better known as the “Flying Tigers.” Prior to Pearl Harbor, when America was not yet party to World War II, these combat pilots’ actions were known but not officially endorsed by the White House under President Franklin Roosevelt. They were pure mercenaries, pilots who resigned their U.S. military commissions to serve in a foreign air force for high pay — some received $600 a month in 1941 dollars and with the promise of $500 more for every Japanese plane they shot down.
The pay-for-service model suited the needs of the day. It allowed skilled fighters to side-step the moral and legal hazard of sending uniformed U.S. troops, whose duty is to uphold the Constitution by fighting our enemies, not to intervene in missions that lack a direct national security rationale.
One potential roadblock of note is the Neutrality Act of 1794, a centuries-old congressional effort to ensure the then-fledgling U.S. was not dragged into wars by citizens acting as mercenaries in conflicts where the United States was not engaged. However, this law, rarely enforced, reflects outdated thinking about the modality and nature of declarations of war. It also treats violations as a misdemeanor. If the imperative to save lives is so strong, Congress or President Obama could surely find a path around it, including a waiver or other injunction. Beyond that, the government’s only role would be to work behind the scenes to have Saudi Arabia and other interested nations pick up the tab, much as they did during the process of countering the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Given the perceived imperative to intervene in Syria, but the countervailing duty to respect state sovereignty and the lack of United Nations sanction (due to perpetual vetoes by China and Russia), mercenaries might well be the best prescription, Neutrality Act or no. They would allow the U.S. to avoid arming the locals directly, about whose character and intent we know little.
This would not resolve the underlying question of who comes to power after the regime falls, but it would allow for a humane defense of the Syrian population without committing America officially or putting American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines at risk.
J. Michael Barrett, the CEO of Diligent Innovations, is a former Director of Strategy for the White House Homeland Security Council and a former Naval Intelligence Officer.
Link to post here.
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J.Michael Barrett
Mike is a national security expert and noted author with an extensive background in defense policy, military intelligence, and support to US counter-terrorism operations. His extensive national security credentials include serving as the Director of Strategy for the White House Homeland Security Council, Intelligence Officer for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Senior Analyst for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb.-Oct., 2007).
Mike has been interviewed on television and radio by ABC, The Canadian Broadcast Company, Fox News, FRONTLINE, MSNBC, NBC, NPR, The New York Metro News, New York Sun, and The Washington Post. He also is the co-author of two books on security and counter-terrorism (including a New York Times Best Seller) and has authored more than a dozen journal and opinion-editorial articles.

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Tuesday, April 10, 2012

Libya: Ukraine Seeks Libya ‘Mercenaries’ Release

Filed under: Libya,Ukraine — Tags: , , , — Matt @ 2:17 PM

Very interesting. So are these guys mercenaries or just oil workers? If anyone has anything to add to this story, feel free to do so in the comments. –Matt

 

Ukraine seeks Libya ‘mercenaries’ release
10 April 2012
Ukraine has said it is doing all it can to secure the extradition from Libya of 19 of its citizens accused of being pro-Gaddafi mercenaries.
The group, which also includes three Belarusians and two Russians, was formally charged on Monday, eight months after they were detained.
The 24 accused insist they were working as oil industry contractors.
One of the Russians has told the BBC that their release could already have been secured through diplomacy.
In a phone interview, Aleksandr Shadrov, 59, told the BBC Russian Service that they had all been in Libya purely to service oil rigging equipment and that a good lawyer would “easily refute the case”.
They deny the charges of preparing land-to-air missile launchers to shoot down planes taking part in the Nato-led mission to protect Libyan civilians.
The Russian embassy in Libya has told the BBC that it is doing all it can to secure the release of its citizens. Belarus says its three citizens had signed contracts to operate civil facilities in Libya and it is co-ordinating its efforts with the Russian and Ukrainian embassies.
The Ukrainian authorities said negotiations between Kiev and the Libyan authorities were already under way. A spokesman for the Ukrainian foreign ministry said a possible extradition of its 19 citizens was on the table, even though the two countries had no formal treaty.

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Thursday, November 17, 2011

Industry Talk: Picking Sides In Libya–A Cautionary Tale

Libya has been a very interesting conflict to follow. From the battle field tactics and strategies of the rebels, to the involvement of the world in trying to help things. We also witnessed R2P becoming a reality, as a means for intervening.

Probably the most interesting aspect of this conflict though is the involvement of foreign volunteers, mercenaries, and security contractors. Of course all three of these classifications have cross overs into one another, and the politics of the conflict have made things even more fuzzier. lol

Either way, I thought I would touch on a key aspect of warfare, in the history of wars, and that is picking the right side in a conflict to work for. Because if you choose wrong, you could very well end up getting executed or imprisoned for life. You could also have your reputation destroyed because of your involvement in a non-sanctioned activity.  If you choose correctly, you could end up being pretty wealthy, or at least have work with a new government.

The thing to remember about picking sides though is that like with stock picking, you need to remove emotion from choosing your sides. You must be pragmatic in your choice, and be willing to accept the reality of your client, if they have gone bad or have become a wanted man to the country you reside in.

Meaning, several years back, Gaddafi was actually an ally of sorts, and the west was doing business with the guy. He was also anti-Al Qaeda, and was certainly taking them to task in Libya.

But then the Arab Spring happened, and all of those years of being a brutal dictator caught up with Gaddafi and the people spoke. The West also took a hint from other countries falling due to this middle eastern revolt, and decided it was best to switch sides and support the people against Gaddafi.  And of course the West also had some bad history with Gaddafi back in the eighties, so it was easy to switch gears and label the guy public enemy number 1.

So what am I getting at here?  Well below I have found numerous individuals and groups highlighted by the media as foreign volunteers, mercenaries, and security contractors in this war. Each individual or groups all had their reasons for picking their side in the conflict, and all of them either benefited or paid the price for that choice. At one time, their relationship with Gaddafi’s regime was a non-issue or even supported. And then one day, that relationship becomes a ‘no go’ and Gaddafi is the bad guy.

The point I wanted to make is that if you plan on entering a conflict like this, you must get educated on the history of the players, know the laws, and know exactly who the good guys are and who the bad guys are, based on what country you are from.

For example, in the US we had several individuals who just volunteered to fight with the rebels. How is this not mercenary? But because the US switched loyalties from Gaddafi’s camp to the rebels, then anyone who fought for the rebels was ‘good to go’. You were not a mercenary in this case, and instead you were a ‘foreign volunteer’ fighting the good fight.

And yet in the US and western media, there was an incredible amount of heart ache and protest about Gaddafi using mercenaries. To Gaddafi and his supporters, these were foreign volunteers or security contractors. Hell, a couple of years back, the west would have called them foreign volunteers and security contractors, helping out an ally. The winds of change…..

Logic being though is that if you wanted to enter this market, and you are a citizen of the west, then now you know what side of the conflict you are on (or should be on). Join Gaddafi, and you are a bad guy mercenary. Join the rebels, and you are a good guy foreign volunteer or security contractor. And doom on you if you haven’t been following the news and doing your research to figure what side your country is on, and what is the current status of the governments and rebels/insurgents in a conflict.

So with that said, I wanted to post a few notable individuals and groups in this conflict that ‘picked sides’. You might agree with their choice, and you might not. But they made their choice based on money, loyalty, or principal–or some combination of all of these. This is nothing new in the history of conflict, but it is interesting to watch it play out in real time and on a world stage. Every aspect of these conflicts are recorded, filmed and talked about, and that is what makes this a unique deal to study and observe. –Matt

 

The Ontario man who helped Muammar Gaddafi’s son flee Libya
Stewart Bell
Oct 29, 2011
A private security contractor and former soldier from Canada has admitted he helped Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s son Saadi flee Libya last month as Tripoli was falling to anti-Gaddafi rebels.
Gary Peters is president of Can/Aus Security & Investigations International Inc. in Cambridge, Ont. He is also Saadi Gaddafi’s longtime bodyguard and admitted he was part of a team that drove the late dictator’s third son across Libya’s southern border to Niger.
The convoy was ambushed after it had crossed back into Libya and Mr. Peters was shot. He returned to Toronto’s Pearson airport in September, bleeding heavily from an untreated bullet wound to his left shoulder.
“I got hurt over there so I come back,” he said when approached this week by a National Post reporter. He said he had been providing security to members of the Gaddafi family since 2004 and had continued to do so throughout the NATO campaign against the dictator. He worked mostly for Saadi but said he had also briefly guarded Col. Gaddafi’s sons Saif al-Islam and Hannibal.

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Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Industry Talk: Swiss Government Proposes Ban On Mercenary Firms, Except For The Swiss Guard?

Filed under: Industry Talk,Switzerland — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 11:16 AM

The irony here is that the Swiss are famous for fielding one of the best and longest standing mercenary armies in the history of the business. Matter of fact, remnants of that force is still operating today, and they are called the Swiss Guard. Did I mention that this group is protecting the Pope at the Vatican? lol Although the Swiss Guard is now referred to as just a branch of the Swiss military, it still has historical significance. So I take it the Swiss will be pulling this force from duty at the Vatican after they implement their ban on mercenaries?

The other thing that must be mentioned is that Swiss flagged vessels will need security if they plan on continuing to do business out there. The kind of laws they should be focused on are the ones that will get armed security on boats, and give them the legal authority to do what they need to do to protect Swiss vessels. It’s either that, or Swiss ship owners will get a flag of convenience and go somewhere else in order to get security on their boats. –Matt

 

 

Swiss government proposes ban on mercenary firms, tighter rules for private security companies
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
Switzerland wants to banish mercenary firms and tighten the rules for private security companies based in the country in a bid to safeguard its tradition of neutrality, the government said Wednesday.
A draft bill submitted to parliament would ban Swiss-based companies from direct participation in armed conflicts abroad, and from recruiting or training mercenaries in Switzerland.
The proposal, which lawmakers have until the end of January to consider, also requires private security companies to report their activities to Swiss authorities, and to abide by an international code of conduct.

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Wednesday, August 24, 2011

Books: Castles, Battles, And Bombs–How Economics Explains Military History, By Jurgen Brauer And Hubert Van Tuyll

This is a great little book and I highly recommend it just for the chapter 3, ‘The Renaissance, 1300-1600–The Case of the Condottieri and the Military Labor Market’. What makes this book so cool is that it describes the history of the Condottieri from the point of view of economics. Stuff like principal agent problem and asymmetric information are the areas that this book goes into, and I found it to be fascinating.

The book also talked about today’s PMCs and how they are being used, or misused. The authors even gave some kudos to Executive Outcomes for being an effective PMC versus the UN during the Sierra Leone war.

But back to the Condottieri or Italian contractors/mercenaries. (Condottieri were the mercenary captains and also contractors in general) This is very interesting material, because the authors discussed the incentives of these mercenaries back then that helped to alleviate the principal agent problem. They used things like bonuses, or the individuals were allowed to ransom and loot as part of the contract. (back then, this was a standard feature of warfare of all armies)

Probably the one thing that piqued my interest the most is the use of bonding agreements within the contracts. I have talked about bonds in the past or how these could be effective tools for getting companies to do what you need them to do, and this book talked a little bit about how bonds were used in the past.

Specifically, the authors mentioned a lecturer named Daniel Waley whom examined twenty Italian mercenary contracts that had been preserved from the late 13th century. There were 11 contracts from Bologna, 5 from Siena, 1 from Florence, 2 from Piedmont, and one from the March of Ancona. All of them were issued between 1253 and 1301, with fifteen of them after 1290.

All of the contracts had these elements in common:

1. Number of men to be hired.
2. Type of force. (cavalry, infantry, etc.)
3. Number of horses to be supplied.
4. Values of the horses. (minimum and maximum)
5. The mendum or compensation for horses injured or killed.
6. Provisions for arms and equipment.
7. Length of contract. (usually 3 or 6 months)
8. Contract renewal option.
9. Payment for travel to place of engagement.
10. The rate of pay and pay period. (usually once every two months)
11. The pay differentials among various grades of hired men. (commanders, cavalry, infantry, crossbowmen)
12. The division of prisoners, ransom, and booty.
13. The secure release if the hired men were themselves taken prisoner.
14. Bonus pay. (retention of booty, double pay for battle days)
15. Jurisdiction, default and penalty clauses.
16. Dispute Resolution within the hired band.
17. Loyalty clause.
18. A performance bond. (6 of the 11 Bolognese contracts had bonds guaranteeing good behavior)

As you can see, the contracts were pretty involved back then. The book mentioned that contracts used to run about 4,000 words, but later contracts shortened up a bit and ran about 1,000 to 3,000 words. The authors pointed out that the hiring states began to develop regulations that helped to make contracts more formulaic, and thus easier to write. It is easier to point to laws and regulations of that state, as opposed to make provisions that cover ‘everything’ within in a contract.

What is interesting is that this is exactly what has happened with today’s companies. There were really not enough regulations on the use of companies in the beginning days of Iraq or Afghanistan, and so contracts really had not control features.(we also had problems because of this) Now, the contracts are a lot better, just because of the amount of scrutiny that has been applied to the companies and the government. I have seen a dramatic increase in regulations, and we will probably continue to see this evolution take place.

The performance bond is interesting to me. I mentioned this in my post about Reflex Responses that they had a performance bond in their contract with the UAE, and that is smart. Early American privateers had to be bonded in order to receive a Letter of Marque as well. Of course the bond survives in other industries, and it is just one tool of many to provide incentive in the principal agent problem–or to get folks to do what you want them to do.

The other thing that this book talked about is modum stipendii and modum societatis. Or basically contracting with an individual versus contracting with the leaders of mercenary companies. Contracting with individuals was problematic, because each had their own set of intentions. But hiring a group with a leader that motivates them and keeps them together, is far more dependable and easier to manage.

Of course with today’s companies, this is how it works. The US government rarely contracts with individuals, and it is far more easier and efficient to contract with DynCorp and have them provide the bodies. But this also got me thinking about how companies recruit.

I have thought about this concept in the past, as far as hiring groups of individuals for companies. If a company could hire a squad or platoon of contractors, where all of them fought together in their old unit or company, and they had a leader for bargaining purposes, then a company could gain advantage of having a team that has unit experience, integrity and cohesion. This is an issue that I have seen out there, and it would be interesting to see companies try this out. Because to me, a unit with experience, integrity and cohesion is extremely valuable to a company for the offense and defense.

The book also defined a time period where Italian cities switched from hiring individuals to hiring units. They started using the term Lance or lancea in contracts which was a unit of 3 men. Perhaps this might be a feature of modern contracts? It would be far easier to find Lances who all knew each other and fought together in let’s say the Marines. The survival of such teams would be higher, and their effectiveness on the battlefield would be better because that unit experience/cohesion/integrity element was already there. (that’s if you have a good leader leading these lances)

The other deal that was interesting to me is the pay for the common mercenary back then. They did not make a lot of money, and it was the mercenary captains that became wealthy. These grunts would make the same amount as day-laborers for stuff like construction. The book said they averaged 9 florins a day, from between 1321 and 1368. It sounds like rates continued to fall as time passed, and the basic grunt definitely took it in the shorts. They also had tons of pay issues, like late pay, not getting paid or receiving forged money! lol And we talk about pay problems these days?

But like with any military or PMC, past or present, if you screw with the soldier’s pay, they tend to get pissed off. Or they just leave. Countries like Iraq or Somalia have experienced what happens when you don’t pay soldiers or police, and security is highly dependent upon making sure guys are getting paid on time and the amount that was agreed upon.

These old mercenaries also sold their equipment to make enough money to get by between contracts, and life for a soldier was tough back then. As a result of this low salary, contractors tended to gravitate to contracts with the most stability and longevity. If you have a family to feed and bills to pay, then this becomes understandable in today’s realm. (I have seen contractors leave contracting to be soldiers again, and I have seen soldiers leave the military to be contractors. Which might indicate equilibrium of a sorts?)

The other thing I wanted to touch on about the book is they do go into offense industry a little bit. Contractors were paid bonuses for all sorts of things, like for storming a castle, acts of bravery, or for bounties. Anything to give an incentive. They also offered pensions to contractors that were loyal, something Sir John Hawkwood depended on greatly towards the end of his career. (the lesson here is save your pennies!)

Well, that is all I will get into with the book. Check it out in the Jundi Gear Store, and I have provided some links below for your convenience. –Matt

The third chapter of the book on Google Books here.

Book Description
Publication Date: May 1, 2008

Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

“In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant’s campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II.

“This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare.”—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

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