Changing this situation requires physically securing the major mines and wresting them away from the control of armed groups. This is an urgent priority, but has thus far been ignored by the UN and other actors.
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Ok, this one pisses me off. All of these ‘Save Africa’ organizations, or anti-conflict mineral groups are pretty idealistic, but lack any kind of realistic solutions. Most seem like they are more concerned with raising money to maintain their salaries and organization size, as opposed to promoting any kind of real solutions.
I took a snippet of a paper written by the Enough Project, which supposedly is the answer to the Congo’s conflict mineral problem. I thought it was interesting when they started talking about actually ‘securing’ strategic mines, so I thought I would expand upon that. Securing anything requires taking something from someone, and that requires organized violence and offensive capability.
How do these guys expect to secure anything, with the kind of force they are talking about? MONUC is the solution? Pffft. Obviously the folks at the Enough Project have way more faith in the UN’s mission in the Congo than I do, and that is scary.
Now if we wanted to get serious about securing mines, and especially if those mines are controlled by rebel groups, then it is going to take some capable folks who can do a job like that.
Ideally it would be a professional army that would take this task on. But if anyone has been following the news these days, all the professional armies out there are kind of busy right now. That whole global war on terror thing is really sucking up the man power if you know what I mean. Plus, I just don’t see anyone jumping up and down, ready to lend their ultra kick ass troops to the UN to do anything.
Which brings us to the next possible solution, and that is the private military company. A company like Executive Outcomes is a prime example of the type of PMC I am talking about. If the UN or the Enough Project really wanted a mine secured, and wanted to dry up the financing for these rebel groups, then it could be contracted out, and the task would be accomplished. This is not conjecture, this is not pie in the sky dreaming, this is reality. Executive Outcomes actually did secure mines when they were in existence, and in some of the worst areas of Africa, and they were quite good at it.
I also like to bring up this concept of responsibility to protect, or R2P, my favorite ‘save Africa’ quote. Born from the ashes of the Rwanda genocide, R2P was the West’s way of saying never again. Whatever……
Guess what, the war in the Congo is the deadliest war since WW 2, and over five million people have been killed there. What happened to responsibility to protect? If we have the means to stop something like this, and it is blatantly obvious that there is a viable solution, then we are not doing everything in our power to stop it. We are thus allowing a crime against humanity to happen, and on an epic scale. Responsibility to protect should instead be responsibility to do nothing while millions of people are killed.
So for the folks at the Enough Project, good luck with your hollow strategy. I am sure it will get you a few donations from some guilt ridden grandma in Michigan with a big fat diamond ring. Better yet, I am sure it will get you invited at a few of those pity parties in hollywood. –Matt
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A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals-Strategy Paper
From the Enough Project
2) Identify and secure strategic mines
The U.N. Group of Experts has documented how armed groups on all sides of the conflict, including the Congolese military, profit from resource exploitation and threaten the local population. They control mines, tax commerce, and prey upon civilians involved in the trade. State mining inspectors are intimidated or co-opted by armed groups and are incapable of reigning in these activities. While MONUC’s mandate has recently been broadened to monitor illicit resource flows, it will take a much more concerted international investment to truly change the security calculus in the mineral-rich areas.
Changing this situation requires physically securing the major mines and wresting them away from the control of armed groups. This is an urgent priority, but has thus far been ignored by the UN and other actors. The recent joint Congo-Rwanda military operation—ostensibly against the FDLR, though direct engagements with the FLDR were infrequent—removal of CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda, and incorporation of CNDP into the local political and military authorities in North Kivu has jolted the status quo. A mutually acceptable security context around the mineral trade in eastern Congo is a critical component of a lasting détente between Kinshasa and Kigali, and the international community has an opportunity in the wake of recent events to support solutions that benefit ordinary Congolese.
Different strategies must be employed for armed groups with diverse origins and agendas. Former CNDP, Mai Mai groups, and non-integrated army brigades may be best dealt with via security sector reform. These efforts are unlikely to completely demilitarize the mining sector in the short-run, but have the best prospects of shifting the status quo toward fostering legitimate trade in the medium-term. In contrast, operations against the FDLR will require much more military strength in a concentrated effort to weaken the FDLR leadership, deny them access to minerals wealth, encourage defections, and protect civilians from reprisals.
In the short-term, poorly planned action by ill-disciplined Congolese forces incapable of protecting civilians or actually holding FDLR territory will only compound already dire circumstances in Congo. But the identification of strategic mining sites can begin now. MONUC should collaborate with the government of Congo in identifying key mining sites under the control of armed groups. Such efforts should not focus on any one militia, but instead should be selected based on size, proximity to transit routes, and the ability of MONUC or trained and vetted Congolese forces to maintain their security.
Securing critical mining sites
There are hundreds of mines controlled by gunpoint in eastern Congo. But these following mines are particularly key to armed groups:
• Bisie Mine, Walikale District, North Kivu: Produces the lion’s share of tin ore in North Kivu. Recently shifted hands from the non-integrated 85th Brigade of the Congolese Army—a de facto Mai Mai militia—to an integrated brigade under the command of a CNDP commander, Colonel Manzi. It is unclear whether the new soldiers are physically present in the mines, but they are already active at checkpoints and are taxing miners.
• Lueshe Pyrochlore Mine, Rutshuru District, North Kivu: Now under the control of the Congolese Army and CNDP. One of the few industrial mining sites in the Kivus, produces Niobium, which is closely related to Tantalum. One of the sites most immediately conducive to start-up of industrial operations.
• Bisembe, Mwenga Territory, South Kivu: Mines around Mwenga are controlled militarily and economically by the FDLR, who have established a mini-state in this region of South Kivu. Securing this area will require significant efforts to sever the FDLR’s military and administrative control, and should only be considered with ample planning, including provisions to protect civilians.
Other important mining areas include the Misisi gold mine in Fizi, South Kivu, tin, tantalum and gold mines in Ziralo, Kalehe South Kivu and the gold mines around Ksugho in North Kivu’s Lubero territory.
Properly integrated Congolese security forces—supported by MONUC and international military observers—should secure these mining sites and the transit routes associated with their trading chains, including select airfields, ports, and border crossings. To the maximum extent possible, this should be carried out via negotiation and with positive incentives for commanders willing to relinquish their hold over these sites and enter into DDR programs. Such initiatives will require a far more robust approach than prior Congolese demobilization programs, which have wound up providing cover for continued coercive minerals exploitation without reducing its militarization. With thorough vetting to screen for human rights abusers, and following a significant training process, the rank-and-file from armed groups should become eligible for integration into security services. Together with a strengthened MONUC, such a force could provide the immediate physical security necessary to regulate the trade in minerals, from these specific mines to markets to export points in eastern Congo. This approach must be grounded in a more comprehensive and coherent effort to support broad security sector reform in Congo.
From the Enough Project
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December 11, 2009
The UN has concluded that the primary problem with violence in eastern Congo is the illegal trade in illegal trade in valuable minerals. For example, Hutu rebel militias control the mining of cassiterite. While the major source is Bolivia, Congo contains large deposits. Cassiterite is a component of tin ore and is used increasingly in electronics. It sells for over nine dollars a pound (nearly $20 per kilogram). The Hutu warlords have established an informal, and illegal, network that mines and transports the cassiterite from eastern Congo to Uganda and Burundi, and eventually the United Arab Emirates, where its enters the world market. This network also supports the mining and smuggling of coltan and wolframite. This trade is similar to the one that supports, or supported, rebel movements in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Ivory coast. The valuable commodity there was diamonds. The illegal trade in Sierra Leone and Liberia have largely been shut down.