Thursday, April 29, 2010
Saturday, July 4, 2009
Afghanistan: Could PMC’s Be Used in the ‘Hold’ Phase of This New Strategy?
John Nagl, a counterinsurgency expert who was appointed last week to the defence policy board at the Pentagon, said: “We do not have enough troops to hold what we have cleared in Helmand. The additional American troops are a help, but they are insufficient.
“We have more fighting in Afghanistan in front of us than we have fighting behind us, full stop. This is going to be a harder fight than Iraq. Afghanistan needs [to create its own] national army of 250,000 to enable the allies to depart.”
At present the Afghan national army has about 92,000 troops, while the police force numbers 83,000. More US troops are needed to fill the gap, but first they would have to be diverted from Iraq.
Ok, I know this post is going to tweak a few people out there, because it is just ‘too crazy’ or ridiculous. How could we possibly use PMC’s or PSC’s to ‘hold’ villages?
Well, it’s easy, we first rework what PMC’s can or cannot do in the war (like give them the necessary tools and authorization to defend villages and AO’s) and we open the flood gates of contracts for such a thing. Then we insure the necessary architecture is in place to insure that the company in place is in fact doing good things and following the contract for that village. But none of this is new in the realm of how we set these things up, we just have to do it.
Here is another way to look at this. Take a good look at what the ‘holding’ troops are actually doing in these villages, and logically look at what jobs a company could conceivably perform during that holding operation. Contractors have been used in the defense on US bases, in disaster zones, and for protecting remote civilian camps in places like Iraq, the next progression to me, is using contractors to defend villages. If our goal is to protect people in Afghanistan from the Taliban, and we do not have enough troops to do that, then why not use contractors?
Sunday, March 1, 2009
Publications: Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) by Fick, Kilcullen, Nagl, Singh
If you care about the direction we are taking in the war, then I highly recommend reading this report. The authors should give you a clue as to how important this thing is. If President Obama was smart, he would read this report as well, and not have some staffer spoon feed it to him. –Matt
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Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan (and Pakistan)Publication Type: Policy Brief
Publication Date: 01/22/2009
Author(s): Nathaniel C. Fick, David Kilcullen, John A. Nagl, Vikram J. Singh
January 2009 – In 2009, the Obama administration will attempt to deliver on campaign promises to change the Afghan war’s trajectory. In April, the Strasbourg NATO summit will determine the alliance’s role in shaping the future of the country and the region. By the fall, Afghans will have voted for their president for only the second time since 2001, an event which may irrevocably set the country’s course. By the end of this summer’s fighting season, the war in Afghanistan will not yet be won, but it could well be lost.
After seven years and the deaths of more than a thousand American and coalition troops, there is still no consensus on whether the future of Afghanistan matters to the United States and Europe, or on what can realistically be achieved there. Afghanistan does matter. A stable Afghanistan is necessary to defeat Al Qaeda and to further stability in South and Central Asia. Understanding the war in Afghanistan, maintaining domestic and international support for it, and prosecuting it well requires three things: a clear articulation of U.S. interests in Afghanistan, a concise definition of what the coalition seeks to achieve there, and a detailed strategy to guide the effort.
U.S. interests in Afghanistan may be summarized as “two no’s”: there must be no sanctuary for terrorists with global reach in Afghanistan, and there must be no broader regional meltdown. Securing these objectives requires helping the Afghans to build a sustainable system of governance that can adequately ensure security for the Afghan people—the “yes” upon which a successful exit strategy depends.
Read the Rest of the Paper Here
Sunday, February 1, 2009
Afghanistan: The Yellow, by Tim Lynch
So I have been hanging out the last couple of days over at Tim’s blog, Free Range International, and talking about the concept of hybrid remote camps in Afghanistan. It’s a very simple concept–use civilians to support these smaller outposts to free up the military to do their thing. Tim’s point was that contractors could totally defend a camp and assist in reconstruction efforts, all while being close to and working with the local populations in these camps for the long term. And because we are limited with troops, adding more contractors to the equation, if done right, could certainly be a force multiplier. Tim brought up a UN civilian contractor/ Special Forces hybrid remote camp in his post, and I brought up the various camp defense scenarios in Iraq with Blackwater in Najaf and Triple Canopy in Al Kut. The best point I brought up, in my opinion, were the remote camps that were completely supplied, operated and defended by civilians with the CMC (Coalition Munitions Clearance) program in Iraq.
What we are exploring with this idea, is how do you get the most bang for your buck in this war, and how do you make your combat troops more lethal and efficient? Our point in the discussion was using contractors to free up the war fighters even more, to get them out into the populations centers and do good things–like kill the enemy or protect and serve the local populations.
Civilians can set up man the defense, they can run camp services, they can run logistics operations to supply the camp, they can fix stuff, and do all the menial tasks that take troops away from the fight. We have already been doing this in Iraq, and to some degree in Afghanistan, but what we are talking about are the small combat outposts that are posted near the villages that we are trying to protect, do road construction and infrastructure projects for, and generally reduce the commute distance between the military and local populations. Tim was making the point that military units come and go, and the continuity of the operation is hindered. If there was a civilian component that was always there, and always manning the operation, that the local populations could recognize and constantly work with, then that would be good. All the military has to do is just keep moving in and out of these camps, and focus on bad guys, we can stay and ensure that the promises we made to the villages are being kept and constantly being worked on until finished.
Thursday, January 15, 2009
Afghanistan: Thoughts on Counter-insurgency from Fick, Nagl and Petraeus
I was very excited to read this article, and I first came across it on Michael Yon’s blog. It seems like he liked it to, and the comments section was pretty cool to read as well. There are two points of the article that I want to highlight, and point out to the readership. The first point deals with manpower issues, and the second deals with communications with the local populations.
Fick and Nagl point out this tidbit:
2-3. Counterinsurgency strategy suggests that victory requires 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents. Current troop strength in Afghanistan, including Afghan forces, are about a third of that level. The stark alternatives are to deploy more troops or to change the mission.
If you look at this statement, you see that manpower is a definite issue in the counter-insurgency effort. Private industry will be, and has been the force multiplier in Afghanistan. We are already seeing contracts pick up for base and FOB security over there, and I only see us playing more of a role in Afghanistan in the future. This is the ‘long war’ as Petraeus states, and some very interesting opportunities could present themselves for private industry as this war continues. If the government can optimize their contract management capabilities, I see good things for the industry there.
The way I see it, in order to get the troops out in the field living, working with, and protecting the Afghani populations, then it will take an army of support services nearby for them to continue that process. That is where we come in, and we are all certainly up for that job. I am not just talking support services for the big bases, I am talking about the smaller FOB’s and Combat Outposts. I know that some that are reading this are thinking, what the hell are you talking about Matt? There is no way we could ever do those kinds of contracts, you might say.
All I have to say, is never say never. Providing services at these smaller outposts are feasible, and we can provide that service. If the military wants to get that ratio of 25 troops to every 1000 civilians, then they are going to have to start thinking ‘outside of the box’ and get creative with manpower uses. In my opinion, we could be an asset in this counter-insurgency war.
The second point brought up in this article was from Petraeus himself:
FP: Tell me where you see lessons from Iraq that might not apply in Afghanistan, and things that you will export.DP: We cannot just take the tactics, techniques, and procedures that worked in Iraq and employ them in Afghanistan. How, for example, do you communicate with the Afghan people? The answer: very differently than the way you communicate with the Iraqi people, given the much lower number of televisions and a rate of illiteracy in the Afghan provinces that runs as high as 70 to 80 percent. Outside Kabul and other big Afghan cities, Afghans don’t watch much television; they don’t have televisions. In Iraq, one flies over fairly remote areas and still sees satellite dishes on many roofs. In Afghanistan, you not only won’t see satellite dishes; you also won’t see electrical lines, and you may not even find a radio. Moreover, you can’t achieve the same effect with leaflets or local newspapers because many Afghans can’t read them. So, how do you communicate with them? The answer is, through tribal elders, via hand-crank radios receiving transmissions from local radio stations, through shura councils, and so on.
I have talked a couple of times on FJ about the importance of being able to communicate with the local populations. That mobile phones, to me, are a useful tool for communicating with the local populations. Ideally, we want to be talking with everyone face to face–to be out in the populations and be a show of force. But it is hard to be everywhere all the time, and mobile phones are one way for the population to communicate with you, if they have problems or want to report Taliban in their village. The phone will also assist in commerce and the exchange of ideas between peoples. There are many benefits to the mobile phone.
The radio station concept, along with hand crank radio is cool, and that is pretty specific on the General’s part. Petraeus should have also added one more component to the communications plan, and that is mobile phones. They are so cheap, so plentiful, and so easy to get up and operating. With those three elements, you have the ability to crowd source your populations and you can empower them. You can also inspire, inform, and entertain them with these tools. Like I said, face to face contact is vital along with the show of presence with patrols, but the constant ability to communicate via phone will also help in relations with that population. And because everyone can talk, and press a few buttons, and plug in a solar charger, I think the populations will learn quick on how to use these things. In the cities, phones are very popular, and I think with a little push, we can get them out into the hills no problem.
Even the cell towers can be a tool in counter-insurgency. If a population loves their phone, because they have seen the benefits, then they will protect that freedom. The cell tower could be a representation of that freedom, and tribal leaders could stand to make some money and gain some local support, but protecting and standing up these things. The towers should also be part of the protection plan of the coalition as well. But if the Taliban do take down the towers some how, then what would the local reaction be to that? I think it would be pretty negative. I have also posted several stories about the Taliban attacking towers, and I think they are recognizing the threat of these things as well.
In closing, the most common theme I keep hearing about Afghanistan, is that we have been there this long, and yet the people still have no electricity/roads/schools and they are still worried about the Taliban. Our programs must include protecting the populations, and winning them over by actually making good on our promises. We should also be working hard on ‘teaching them to fish’, as opposed to just giving them the fish. Business and a healthy economy is so important to rebuilding a country. Iraq has oil, and that is what will help them to rebuild their country. What does Afghanistan have? The optimist in me says that the Afghani’s may not have oil, but they have human power, and if organized and supported properly, can certainly do good things. Security, good roads, sufficient electricity, and schools will go a long way towards supporting that process. –Matt
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Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition
By Nathaniel C. Fick, John A. Nagl
January/February 2009
Two years ago, a controversial military manual rewrote U.S. strategy in Iraq. Now, the doctrine’s simple, powerful—even radical—tenets must be applied to the far different and neglected conflict in Afghanistan. Plus, David Petraeus talks to FP about how to win a losing war.
For the past five years, the fight in Afghanistan has been hobbled by strategic drift, conflicting tactics, and too few troops. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, got it right when he bluntly told the U.S. Congress in 2007, “In Iraq, we do what we must.” Of America’s other war, he said, “In Afghanistan, we do what we can.”
It is time this neglect is replaced with a more creative and aggressive strategy. U.S. Central Command, which oversees operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is now headed by Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency strategy widely credited with pulling Iraq from the abyss. Many believe that, under Petraeus’s direction, Afghanistan can similarly pull back from the brink of failure.
Two years ago, General Petraeus oversaw the creation of a new counterinsurgency field manual for the U.S. military. Its release marked a definitive break with a losing strategy in Iraq and reflected a creeping realization in Washington: To avoid repeating the mistakes of the Vietnam War, the U.S. military would have to relearn and institutionalize that conflict’s key lessons. At the time, the doctrine the manual laid out was enormously controversial, both inside and outside the Pentagon. It remains so today. Its key tenets are simple, but radical: Focus on protecting civilians over killing the enemy. Assume greater risk. Use minimum, not maximum force.