Feral Jundi

Friday, August 6, 2010

Building Snowmobiles: Using Economic Theory To Predict Enemy Strategy?

“It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Karl Von Clauswitz

“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” – Sun Tzu

     First off, I want to mention that this post is the product of one of my reader’s ‘a ha’ moments.  What really makes this cool is that this reader is a fan of the ‘building snowmobiles’ posts on FJ and this was him putting together these random pieces and creating something out of all of it.  He had attended a college course years back that covered economic theory, he is well read on the war and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he had read Feral Jundi and knew how fun analysis and synthesis can be, and then finally stumbled on some recent news about the war and Taliban strategy, and put it all together. And this is me trying to assemble the thing based on his instructions, and I am thoroughly enjoying myself.

     Simply put, this is about using economic theory as a potential tool to predict enemy strategies, so you can defeat those strategies.  Because like Sun Tzu says, it ‘is of supreme importance to attack the enemy’s strategy’. Of course I am not going to go all out and say you can predict with 100 percent certainty what your enemy will do. Still, the closer you can get the better, and these are potential tools you can use for predictive analysis.

    In this exercise, we will use Afghanistan and the current war against the Taliban there. At this time, we are also using a counter-insurgency strategy.  The Taliban are considered the insurgents in this case, and they too are using a insurgency type strategy.  Both strategies are heavily influenced by gaining the support of the population. Famous counter-insurgent David Galula had this to say about counterinsurgency:

The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population Galula proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency:

1.The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.

2.Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.

3.Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

4.Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.

Galula contends that:

A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. … A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. … In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. 

   I wanted to put this out there first as one of the main definitions of COIN, so we have somewhere to start.(most strategies are population-centric)  In this war, we are basically fighting for the support of the people, and you could easily say that this is politics with guns.  You could also say that both sides of this conflict are selling to the population that they are a better idea and friend than the other guy.  The Taliban use their methods to achieve population support, and we use ours. In other words, we are in the business of politics in this war. We are trying to win votes or popularity, and like politicians, we are finding all and any way to win as many votes as possible.

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Sunday, June 6, 2010

Publications: Tribal Engagement–The Jirga And The Shura, By Major Jim Gant And William ‘Mac’ McCallister

     Excellent little paper on the nuances of calling for and attending a Jirga or Shura.  I put this up on the blog because contractors attend these meetings all the time, as well as the military.  That means we can hurt the war effort or help the war effort, all based on how we conduct ourselves at these kinds of meetings. Do you want to be the guy or the company that completely pisses off a region or village because you did not know how these meetings worked?

     My intention here is to get individual contractors thinking about this stuff, and try to apply some of these lessons learned to their own processes out there.  That is Kaizen and that is what is required of any company or individual that claims to have a learning organization or claims to be a student of warfare. Check it out and let me know what you think.

     Also, if you go to this link at Small Wars Journal, you can follow along in the conversation and talk with the authors about the subject. Enjoy. –Matt

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Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shuraby Major Jim Gant and William “Mac” McCallister

According to NATO’s military chief of intelligence in Afghanistan, the Taliban now maintain shadow governors in thirty-three out of thirty-four provinces. While we like to see the world in black and white, the complexities of relationships and alliances in the village and valley make it anything but a straightforward contest between two parties. The U.S. strategy of stripping away Taliban loyalists is not easy in a very complex socio-political landscape. This landscape includes different types of traditional authority, local rivalries and the various configurations of social power in each village and valley.

The rubber of U.S. strategy meets the road in the village assembly. It is in the local assemblies where Coalition Forces speak directly with the local inhabitants and indirectly with the shadow governors of the Taliban. Identifying ahead of time the familial, sectarian, security, economic and political alliances represented in a given village or valley assembly will assist in identifying how these alliances might influence group decisions. We must also contemplate, identify and differentiate between two very different village assemblies: the jirga and shura.

*****

Major Jim Gant is currently assigned to the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (AFPAK Hands) Program as a Tribal Engagement Advisor. AFPAK Hands is designed to develop cadres of officers (and civilians) from each of the military’s services who agree to three to five year tours to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. He will be returning to Afghanistan in the near future.

William “Mac” McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror.

Download the paper here.

Link to Small Wars Journal post and discussion here.

Saturday, April 17, 2010

Afghanistan: Taliban Targets U.S. Contractors Working On Projects In Afghanistan

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 5:44 AM

   Rest in peace to all those contractors who have fallen at the hands of the Taliban.  My heart goes out to the friends and families of these heroes.

   What I also want to mention is that it sounds like what these contractors are doing, is a threat to the Taliban.  That is awesome!  These USAID implementing partners are the ones going around and dishing out the money and projects that make the government look good, and keep potential Taliban fighters busy with work.  I say double the size of the program if this is the effect it has, and give these guys what they need for success.

   I also want to highlight all the Afghan guards that have perished in the defense of these folks.  Just read all the incidents below and it is filled with Afghan security contractor KIA’s.  Perhaps it is time to supplement the security for these implementing partners with some expat security, just to make sure that security is being properly done?  Or dress up some military folks to look like civilians, and have them soup up the security for these guys?  The point is, if this current aid strategy is a threat to the Taliban, then maybe we should work a little harder on providing proper security for it? Or maybe these Afghan security forces are sufficient? Tim would probably have something to say about it. –Matt

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Taliban targets U.S. contractors working on projects in Afghanistan

By Joshua PartlowSaturday, April 17, 2010

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — The Taliban has begun regularly targeting U.S. government contractors in southern Afghanistan, stepping up use of a tactic that is rattling participating firms and could undermine development projects intended to stem the insurgency, according to U.S. officials.

Within the past month, there have been at least five attacks in Helmand and Kandahar provinces against employees of U.S. Agency for International Development contractors who are running agricultural projects, building roads, maintaining power plants and working with local officials.

The USAID “implementing partners,” as they are known, employ mainly Afghans, who are overseen by foreigners. The companies’ role is becoming increasingly important as more aid money floods into southern Afghanistan as part of a dual effort to generate goodwill and bolster the Kabul government.

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Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Afghanistan: So As NATO Falters Or Members Leave, Will Contractors Pick Up The Slack?

   So here is one that you won’t hear discussed out there.  What happens when NATO falters or members leave unexpectedly, as the war drags on?  Each country in NATO has it’s own set of politics back home, and like most countries, they can get into a position where support for operations overseas just diminishes.  Call it the economy, or media/activist groups, unexpected rise in war deaths, natural disasters, Black Swan events, etc.  An example would be the Dutch, and their sudden switch-a-roo/’I am out of here’ move in Afghanistan.  I didn’t see that one coming, but that is exactly what I am talking about.  So who is next in NATO?  And most of all, who will take up their slack, if the war effort depends upon those troops?

   Well for one, my pick is contractors. Mostly because we are the fastest means of filling that vacuum, and we do the least at disrupting the mechanics of the war machine.  Especially if the Dutch were tasked with training or menial/defensive operations.  Or the coalition can play the game where they rob Peter, to pay Paul, and shift forces from one vital mission, to fill another vital mission.  Kind of like with the Georgian conflict with Russia, and how those Georgian troops had to leave Iraq immediately to respond to a crisis in their homeland.  The US military had to scramble to backfill, and problems like this cause vacuums in all sorts of places in the war machine. Especially if contractors are already doing the menial jobs out there–meaning troops are already filling vital positions in the war.  So you take troops from one effort, and move them to another– it has an impact on the machine.

   I also say contractors are a good choice for this ‘vacuum plug’ when it comes to non-offensive operations.  If that member nation was tasked with training, convoy operations, PSD or static security, then contractors could easily be called upon to fill that vacuum so the rest of the war machine continues to function properly.  Hell, I could put a call out on this blog for a small army, have them vetted, tell them to bring their own kit, secure weapons/vehicles/living quarters/ID cards/licenses and deploy them into Afghanistan to fill those PSD/convoy/static positions quicker than you can say ‘Eric Cartman’.  People would be amazed at how quickly security contractors could be spun up, and especially if a company has the resources to do a quick spin up. (and most companies do)

   Of course it would be ideal to use military forces to fill these instant voids, and in most cases they do. But my question is how could they possible act as fast as a private company, or how could this not impact another vital mission they are performing?  Now the military can do stuff like divert troops from one country, to the other, or do an early deployment for a incoming unit, but yet again, this is taking from one vital mission, to fill another.  To me, it makes more sense to not disrupt that harmony of planning, and just contract a company to step in. Especially for the defensive operational stuff. (military replacement is the only option for offensive related ops at this time)

   Using contractors can even buy military planners some time to actually assemble a military team to fill in that hole.  Another way to look at it, is that we are the 50 mph tape for a hole in the fuel line, so that we can get the car back home.  Then at home, we can replace the fuel line.  It does not make sense, to disable the brakes and use a chunk of brake line to repair the fuel line.  Or you could use a vacuum line to repair the fuel line, but yet again, the engine will not run correctly– if at all.

   Now to wrap this up.(pun intended-lol)  The point of it all is that when I hear guys like Senator Levin slam private contractors in one hearing, and then in another quote, he whines about NATO not having enough troops to do the training in Afghanistan, I have to think that politically speaking he is saying one thing, but realistically speaking he has to know that contractors are vital to the war effort.  Because as more NATO folks leave, do to political turmoil, the economy, or some Black Swan event back home, contractors are gonna be as vital to the war machine tool box, as a roll of 50mph tape. –Matt

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50 mph tape

The ever handy roll of 50mph tape. 

More Military Trainers Needed in Afghanistan

Coalition forces pressed to fill gap in trainers needed to help growing Afghan Army and Police forces

Al Pessin

09 March 2010

The U.S. Navy admiral who commands all NATO forces worldwide says he and the alliance secretary general are pressing each member to fulfill a specific part of the shortfall in military trainers in Afghanistan.  The admiral spoke at a U.S. Senate hearing, where senior members from both parties criticized NATO allies for the shortage.Admiral James Stavridis gave the Senate Armed Services Committee specific numbers.  He said the NATO-run command in Afghanistan needed 1,278 trainers for the growing Afghan Army and Police forces, but it has so far received only 541 – a shortfall of 737.”It is absolutely correct to say that NATO has fallen short in providing these vital trainers.  What we are doing about it is taking further steps in terms of contacting each of the nations individually and going one-by-one through the precise requirement for each of the nations in terms of where they could most effectively fill in the trainer mix,” Stavridis said.The shortage of trainers comes at a time when Afghan Army recruiting is sharply up, due in part to a significant salary increase the Kabul government implemented late last year.The committee chairman, Democrat Carl Levin, said the training commander in Afghanistan told him some of the Afghan recruits cannot enter the army immediately due to the lack of trainers.”That is totally unacceptable, almost unbelievable to me, that we can not get NATO allies to carry out that kind of commitment, which is not the most dangerous.  There is obviously danger anywhere, but compared to being in combat it falls well short of that,” Levin said.

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Saturday, December 19, 2009

Military News: Georgia And The War In Afghanistan, By Mikheil Saakashvili

   This is actually pretty interesting.  This is a thousand troops that the Marines can use to do all sorts of violent things with, and with no limitations.  But the most interesting aspect is Georgia wants in NATO, and this is kind of a double sided insurance policy.

   On one side, a move like this will help to up the level of combat effectiveness of the Georgian military.  Marines are already training Georgians in their country, and they were doing that even before Georgia’s quick war with Russia.  I think a move like this is smart, because now the Georgians will have combat veterans that could make life for an invading force a little more painful if not damn near impossible.

   The other side of this is Mikheil is also trying to earn his country’s admission into NATO, so that Russia would think twice before invading again.  The question I have, is if Russia would actually care if Georgia was a NATO member or not?  Because I think Russia will do whatever they want, despite what club Georgia is a member of.

   Now if I was Mikheil, I would develop an asymmetric warfare capability big time.  Keep working on this other diplomatic stuff, but if these guys want to make life miserable for an invading force again, they need to start thinking more like Hezbollah and less like some kind of a conventional army. Get some combat time, learn from the enemy in Afghanistan, and apply those lessons to defending Georgia.  The Marines will definitely help them to get there, and help them with the asymmetric stuff as well. –Matt

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Georgia and the War in Afghanistan

December 19, 2009

Why the young democracy is sending nearly 1,000 troops to the war effort.

By MIKHEIL SAAKASHVILI

Following President Obama’s speech on our common mission in Afghanistan, NATO members and other countries pledged about 7,000 additional troops. My country committed just under 1,000, which makes Georgia the highest per-capita troop contributor to the war effort.

Some might be surprised that a small country not yet in NATO—and partly occupied by more than 10,000 hostile Russian troops—would make this commitment to an Allied mission abroad. Let me explain why it makes perfect sense.

As President Obama pointed out, the threat of violent extremism endangers all nations that subscribe to the principles of liberal democracy. Those principles made America the target on 9/11. Spain was hit on March 11, 2004, and Britain on July 7, 2005. Any of our countries could be next.

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