Feral Jundi

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

Maritime Security: Asian Shipowner Forum– Use Armed Security, Go After Pirates On Land, Designate Pirates As Terrorists!

Another association expressing their displeasure with the whole piracy thing…  What strikes me here is the language being used by this group, and other similar shipping groups. Everyone is frustrated and angry, and they want action.

Worse yet, with certain threats to oil stability and the change of leadership in countries located near key waterways, I predict even more problems for shipping.  Imagine Libya or Yemen completely collapsing, and turning the Gulf of Aden and neighboring water ways a free for all for pirates based in those countries?  And with the price of oil increasing, along with the demand increasing, any shipping companies tasked with transporting that black gold will really want that stuff to be protected.

Now this brings me to a thought that has crossed my mind several times.  The scope and scale of piracy is too large for governments alone to handle.  To me, the only way to really scale up the war against this problem, is to bring in private industry and open the flood gates. To license private industry to do what they have to do to protect these vessels or to go after these thugs and join in the fight. That would require a loosening on the nation-state’s grasp on the monopoly of the use of force, a nullification of treaties and agreements that prohibit such things as the Letter of Marque–yet still allows for the regulation and licensing of effective practices, and the political will to deal with such problems from a pragmatic point of view.

This is also a stark reminder that netwar is a reality, and it is kicking the ass of the slow and inefficient governments. Both John Arquilla and General McChrystal talked about restructuring the military (or parts) to be more responsive to these networks. That in order to defeat a network, you need a network–and a whole bunch of them.  I don’t see it happening with today’s slow and inefficient government sponsored militaries and navies. To me, the one group that can match the ‘decentralized and flexible network structures’ of these actors (pirates, terrorists, cartels), is an industry that profits from the destruction of these folks.

It would also be a self destroying industry, because once there is no more enemy, the industry dries up, and the few folks that continue on to be pirates or criminals, could then be destroyed by all the governments and their might. Hell, governments would use that very industry to destroy itself.  That is how early privateering was dealt with when it had these rogue elements, and that is how it would work today. But of course you see this in any industry.  A computer specialist decides to be an illegal hacker and steal money is one example. A soldier in a war, decides to go home and apply his skills to armored car robberies. A politician goes corrupt in order to make financial gains. There will always be that one percent of one percent of any profession that uses it’s skills and experience for criminal ventures–and that will never change.

But back to the concept. If copying networks like Al Qaeda/Cartels/Piracy (mimicry strategy) is appropriate and works, then private industry will quickly adapt that structure to it’s business model and use it to gain market share.  They will use that, or whatever netwar structure to defeat the enemy, and profit from the venture. They will not only go after the enemy, but compete against other companies and individuals who are doing the same thing–and that competition is what will fuel innovation. It works like that in every industry out there, and it will work violently well in this endeavor. Or at least in my humble opinion.

The ‘profit’ will include the destruction of a reviled enemy, the collection of a bounty, the seizure of an asset, or the collection of money for services rendered.  The more profit motive there is, the better, and it is a system that works. All government needs to do is maintain the machine through regulation and licensing. It worked with our usage of licensed privateers against the British during the Revolutionary War, it is working for the current Somali pirates who are raping the world with their piracy/business model, it worked for Claire Chennault and his Flying Tigers (who collected bounties for every enemy plane shot down), and the Cartel drug war business model works so well that it is defeating both the US and Mexican governments and making war against one another at the same time! Something to think about…. Or we can get continue to think that only governments can win wars and solve problems? –Matt

ASF airs outrage at rising attacks on ships
April 5, 2011
The Safe Navigation and Environment Committee (SNEC) of the Asian Shipowners’ Forum (ASF) has expressed outrage at the increasing number of attacks on their ships and the brutality shown by Somali pirates.
“The current situation, where a handful of pirates can hold the world’s economy hostage, is completely unacceptable as responsible owners and managers, we must take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and wellbeing of our seafarers,” said Mr. S. S. Teo, SNEC Chairman in a recent meeting of the Asian shipowners’ associations held in Singapore. (more…)

Letter Of Marque: Ben Franklin’s ‘Privateer’ Fleet

This is a great documentary. What I thought was interesting is that Ben Franklin used privateers as a way to get British prisoners, in order to do a prisoner exchange with Britain for American prisoners. But because he did not provide incentive for the privateers to keep prisoners and deliver them or hold them, that the privateers just let them go. So I put the blame on Ben for not posting a bounty for prisoners captured, or at least some payment system that would motivate his privateers to capture and hold these prisoners.

Also, he poorly vetted the privateers he gave commissions too. I mean Ben really stumbled through this first effort of privateering. Although I am glad that the practice was improved upon and later turned into a key element of the Revolutionary War. It was private industry that targeted the logistics and commerce of the British, and basically made the American venture for Britain very costly.  Sun Tzu would refer to this as attacking weakness with strength, and British commerce and logistics was ravaged by American privateers.

What is also interesting is that with this bad experience, Ben made the conclusion that he did not like using privateers. Personally, I just think he didn’t have a clue on how to use them. Because if you look at the history of privateer usage in the War of 1812, congress used a bounty system to secure prisoners that privateers would have captured–all so they could do a prisoner exchange. In other words, America created a better offense industry using better rules and incentive. –Matt

 

Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Letter Of Marque: War Of 1812 Privateers Website

     Now this is a cool resource for those of you out there that are researching the LoM and it’s possible uses for modern times.  The War of 1812 provides many examples of how this concept was used by all sides, and how involved private industry really was during that war. The legal references mentioned in the Prize Court section are very good as well.

     What is interesting here is the culmination of hundreds of years of admiralty courts and privateering present in the conduct of all sides. The legal mechanisms, the regulations, the codes of conduct for privateers, the tactics–all of it evolved over time and presented itself in this war.  I often wonder how modern technology and legal processes could have contributed to this type of naval warfare? Or better yet, what would privateering and the LoM look like if it never went out of style? Check it out and let me know what you think. –Matt

War of 1812: Privateers

The War of 1812 saw the apogee of privateering; with the activities of American privateers greatly adding to the offensive capability of the United States.The information available on the privateers and letters of marque is far greater than generally realized, with much material held in the uk at www.nationalarchives.gov.uk

This site aims to make this information, particularly on American POWs, more widely available.

This sites aim is to provide research sources for the study of privateering during the War of 1812.

Much of the data was gathered as part of a project for the, late, Institute of Maritime Studies , University of St. Andrews with most of the material coming from the National Archives at Kew, London.

May 2010…update:

Two works are currently in progress:

The indexing of Lloyd’s List for the period 1812-1814; as yet 1812 completed that has generated 26,000 entries.

Indexing of the Registers of letters of marque against France 1793-1815:

The period 1803-1815, Adm 7/649, is now available.

this will give every British armed merchant ship which operated during this period and the name of the master.

Further as a new Letter of marque had to be issued with each change of master, it will give an indication of a master’s career over this period to which voyage information can be found through Lloyd’s List.

Link to website here.

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

Maritime Security: More Information About Yemen’s ‘Rent-A-Navy’

     Tariq said Yemen’s navy and coast guard agree to the escorts only if they already have patrols planned in the areas where shippers are asking for the guards. The navy and coast guard turn down “more than half” of the escort requests that his company forwards from shippers because the duties of Yemen’s national defense require them elsewhere, he said.

     Government officials in Yemen ”will not risk jeopardizing their relationship with supporting countries just for this,” Tariq insisted, in a reference to any qualms the United States and other donor countries might have. 

     Well, this is not really a new story, but still pretty interesting to read about. I also have to critique the loose use of the word ‘privateer’ in the title below. There is nothing private about this venture and this is the government of Yemen selling the services of their navy to shipping companies. This is certainly not privateering by any definition.

     Also, the Tanzanian Navy was contracted out to protect a Maersk ship, so the statement below about Yemen being the only country to do this is wrong. Here is the story I posted awhile back about the matter.

     But that does bring up an interesting thought. If Yemen is so strapped for cash and they are willing to rent out their navy, then maybe they might actually contemplate granting Letters of Marque to private industry? It is a shame they have to turn down all of those requests by the shipping industry.

     Yemen could stand to make some money off implementing a LoM system. They could take 10 percent (or whatever amount) of the fee paid to private companies by shipping or insurance companies, to do this kind of escort service. In turn, Yemen could grant a LoM to these companies and give them the legal backing to protect these vessels.

     Or better yet, if Yemen set up a good ol’ fashion ‘Prize Court’, then companies could take captured vessels and hardware back to these courts and gain legal ownership of those goods.(with Yemen taking their cut of course)

     Although like I have mentioned before, these thugs really don’t carry a lot of valuable things on them when they do these attacks. But you never know?  With all of these multi-million dollar ransoms being paid out, it wouldn’t surprise me to see some of these pirates buzzing around in Cigarette Boats or Yachts and wearing gold chains around their necks.

     These companies could even bring back captured pirates and have the legal system in Yemen deal with these guys–especially if there was incentive for Yemen to hold these pirates.  The international community continues to look for countries that would be willing to prosecute and imprison pirates, and Yemen would work. It definitely sounds like we have an interest in doing business in Yemen for the war effort, and this could be one part of that.-Matt

The Privateers of Yemen

Starved for revenue and riddled with corruption, the Yemeni navy and coast guard have adopted a novel fundraising strategy: guns for hire.

By Ellen Knickmeyer

November 17, 2010

Yemen’s leaders are pushing the United States to increase its military aid roughly 40-fold for their country to fight al Qaeda — but Yemen isn’t just relying on aid to generate cash from the international security threats burgeoning on its lands and seas.

For more than a year, Yemen’s financially pragmatic civilian and military officials have been contracting with at least one maritime-security broker to hire out commissioned Yemeni warships and active-duty and armed Yemeni coast guard and navy sailors as private escorts for merchant ships and oil tankers crossing the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden. The cost for Yemen’s escort service: up to $55,000 per ship, per trip.

Guaranteeing “the ultimate protection for your vessel and crew,” the website of Gulf of Aden Group Transits, Yemen’s London-based broker, offers shippers “a dedicated escort by a heavily armored 37.5 meter Yemen Navy Austal patrol boat” and ”six serving Yemen military or coast guard personnel to embark and protect your vessel.”

The fee apparently also guarantees shippers a degree of immunity regarding any ensuing battles at sea: “Any action taken by the teams or vessels provided … is fully authorized by the Yemeni Government,” says the website of Lotus Maritime Security, the Yemeni company that claims to serve as a liaison between the London-based broker, the Yemeni government and military, and shippers.

(more…)

Monday, November 8, 2010

Letter Of Marque: A Review Of Corsairs In the Crosshairs

     This note proposes that the solution to the rapidly escalating problem of piracy is for the U.S. government to issue the license equivalent of historical letters of marque to private actors, thereby granting them increased legal immunity and political approval to use force to protect private vessels against piracy.  Letters of marque were legal commissions granted by Congress to private citizens granting them cover to engage enemies of the country.  At the same time, it is important for the U.S. to regulate the forces that they sanction and this note will discuss the current state of such regulation. The legal background of authority to address pirates, emanating from customary, international, and municipal law demonstrates that, despite some potential hurdles, this proposed solution is a legally valid and efficient option. -Alexandra Schwartz from Corsairs in the Crosshairs

     David Isenberg was the one that found this gem of a paper and a big hat tip to him. As you can see in the post above, I have also downloaded a copy into Scribd so you can read the whole thing. This post will be dedicated to some of the highlights of the paper that jumped out at me.

    Specifically, I really liked the various legal mechanisms that Alexandra dug up and I learned some new stuff. If you are interested in the legal side of privatized anti-piracy operations, then this paper is for you.

     There are a few areas that I wanted to put up for the reader to check out and note. One is the 1819 US Law titled ‘Resistance of Pirates by Merchant Vessels’.  Like with the Letter of Marque, this little guy exists in the books as a vigorous means of defense that even involves capture if need be. Here it is:

     The commander and crew of any merchant vessel of the United States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any armed vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation in amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the same; and may also retake any vessel so owned which may have been captured by the commander or crew of any such armed vessel, and send the same into any port of the United States. -33 U.S.C. § 383 (2000)

     The next area was in regards to the Declaration of Paris. Alexandra only confirms exactly what I have been repeating here. That the US did not sign the DoP, and that we even signed laws at that time that further enforced our right as a nation to issue LoM’s. She mentioned this law, and I had never heard of it before. Check it out:

     Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in all domestic and foreign wars the President of the United States is authorized to issue to private armed vessels of the United States, commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal in such forms as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, and make all needful rules and regulations for the government and conduct thereof, and for the adjudication That the authority conferred by this act shall cease and terminatethree years from the passage of this act. -An Act concerning Letters of Marque Prizes, and Prize Goods, ch. LXXXV, 12 Stat. 758 (1863) (This act was passed on Mar. 3, 1863, and provided that the authority it conferred would “cease and terminate” three years after its passage). 

     Alexandra also covers some of the particulars of a modern version of a Letter of Marque, and draws from a certain publication written by Robert P. DeWitte called ‘Let Privateers Marque Terrorism: A Proposal for a Reawakening’. So I will have to further research what he has to offer and get that up on blog as well. Check it out and let me know what you think. –Matt

Link to Scribd Publication here.

Edit: 11/09/2010- I wanted to add this one little piece for everyone to check out as well. The author here claimed the Spain and Britain both did not abide by the Declaration of Paris. I had never heard of Britain’s use of Prize Courts and paying prize money to folks to attack the enemy during WW 2. I am definitely trying to find out more about this.

Quote from Corsairs in the Crosshairs:

Moreover, even if one were to argue that the Declaration of Paris has become customary law, it is important to observe that many countries that signed it have continued the practice of issuing letters of marque in the modern era.

See Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 353 (1971) (“Even after Spain, in 1908, had acceded to the Declaration of Paris of 1856 which outlawed privateering in naval war between parties to the treaty, the opinion was advanced that it is perfectly possible under general international law to issue letters of marque.”). The British navy utilized prize money to reward those who fought for them in World War II, with the British Prize Court in London awarding about $40 million dollars. Id. at 354. 

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