Feral Jundi

Friday, October 8, 2010

Publications: Inquiry Into The Role And Oversight Of Private Security Contractors In Afghanistan

Sasc Psc Report 20101007

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Publications: Breaking Ranks–Dissent And The Military Professional, By Andrew Milburn

Should dissent be founded on the right action or the right effect? A third of the MCWAR officers surveyed argued that in the face of a moral dilemma, the military professional should focus on the effect desired: mitigation of the immoral order, rather than the conscience- salving but possibly ineffectual act of resignation. These officers advocated an indirect approach: addressing higher authority, leaking the story to trusted journalists or politicians, and dragging their feet in execution— “slow rolling” in military parlance. “What else can I do?” asked one officer rhetorically. “My only option is to conduct covert actions to reduce the risks of misfortune and of American casualties.”18 This approach is certainly not without precedent. As one Army colonel commented in response to the survey, “The most (commonly) used form of disobeying an order I’ve seen is slow-rolling.”19 This option does have some prima facie appeal, combining its own moral logic with a pragmatic focus on effects.

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     Thanks to Paul from Facebook for bringing this to my attention.  This paper is actually causing quite a stir amongst the military crowd, and is certainly thought provoking. It also is relevant considering the General McChrystal firing a couple months back.

     What struck me as extremely interesting, is the conclusion and the preferred method of dissent with today’s command. That would be covert dissent, because it allows the commander to stay in their position of power and continue to protect their people and others.

     Commanders have a choice when they have decided that an order is immoral. They could be overt or covert with their protest. If they are overt, they would be fired or have to resign, but their message would be loud and clear. This is a symbolic stance, and can be successful if used properly.  The problem with that one though, is their men would still be a victim of that order because the replacement leadership would probably be selected for it’s ability to carry out the order and not question the higher command. You would hope that the symbolic open protest would stop the activity, but what if it doesn’t? Now you are no longer in the loop to stop the source of this terrible and life threatening decision making.

     Or an officer can stay in that position, yet covertly protest the order using a number of methods. You can fight it from within. Slow rolling or ‘dragging your feet’ was mentioned as the most commonly used way to disobey an order. Other methods were to leak the immoral or unethical order to the press or appealing to higher authorities. With these methods, an officer can stay in command, achieve the goal of commanding and protecting their troops, while at the same time disobeying the order. In other words, to stay in their position of power and dissent covertly is preferred.

     Now if I was to compare this to the private industry, there are similar themes. On the blog I have talked about some of this stuff under the category of Jundism. ‘Have the courage to do what is right’ is one of those topics that I have touched on. I have also discussed ways in which managers or contractors can report wrong doing within the company. You can be an overt whistleblower, or you can dissent covertly.  My thoughts on it are to dissent covertly, use whatever strategy you can to protect self and others, and leave the company as soon as you can find another gig. With this last method, you can also educate your subordinates to do the same and as a manager you can protect them until they too can leave. Just leave and don’t waste your time and life on a pathetic company. With this method, the company will either suffer massive attrition, damage to their reputation and a loss of money. Or if they care to be competitive in today’s market, they will learn that ‘taking care of your people’ is pretty darn important.

     The only time I advocate open protest is when lives are needlessly put at risk because of a company policy, and time is of the essence. You must protect yourself and others, and do it the smartest way possible. But I also realize that the situation dictates.

     Another point to bring up for those of you that have an interest in monitoring companies.  Probably one of the best indicators of the quality and health of a company, is to review how many folks have resigned or were fired. Those companies with high attrition rates are usually the ones that do a terrible job of taking care of their people. Or to review those companies with numerous defaults on contracts.

     I have even heard of guards organizing and striking, and that would be another area to investigate. Or better yet, guards collectively jumping contract, and crossing over to another company.  That way they maintain work and their team cohesion,  and they overtly hurt the company by costing them money (training, transport, etc.) or causing a default on contract.

     But these contractors can also become blacklisted by said company with both of these incidents. A contractor’s reputation might be negatively impacted by an action like this as well. So with that said, a contractor really has to be smart as to the best course of action.

    With that whole blacklist thing, I will have to do a separate post.  You can get blacklisted or put on a ‘do not hire’ list for all sorts of reasons and it is another reason why dissent must really be thought through before you take action. Good stuff and definitely some ‘to be, or to do‘ related ideas. –Matt

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Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional

By Andrew R. Milburn

Click here to download the PDF

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. Milburn, USMC, is assigned to Special Operations Command, Europe, Future Operations (J3).

There are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order. In supporting this assertion, I discuss where the tipping point lies between the military officer’s customary obligation to obey and his moral obligation to dissent. This topic defies black-and-white specificity but is nevertheless fundamental to an understanding of the military professional’s role in the execution of policy. It involves complex issues—among them, the question of balance between strategy and policy, and between military leaders and their civilian masters.

Any member of the military has a commonly understood obligation to disobey an illegal order; such cases are not controversial and therefore do not fall within the purview of this article. Instead, the focus is on orders that present military professionals with moral dilemmas, decisions wherein the needs of the institution appear to weigh on both sides of the equation. Whether the issuer of the order is a superior officer or a civilian leader, the same principles apply. However, because issues at the strategic level of decisionmaking have greater consequences and raise wider issues, I focus on dissent at this level.

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Tuesday, September 21, 2010

Publications: Innovation In War–COIN Operations In Anbar And Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007

 The standing operating procedure (SOP) for the unit typically focused on: (1) Planning and establishing the COP; (2) Ensuring route security so each outpost could be kept resupplied; (3) Clearing operations after the COP had been stood up to clear IEDs and find weapons caches; and (4) Census patrols to follow after the clearing operations to consolidate the position and gradually work its way into the human terrain of the area – the real target of MacFarland’s campaign. 

*****

     This is an excellent paper that discusses some of the key innovations of the war.  The main theme that I am getting from all of this, is intelligence, intelligence, and intelligence.(jundism hint)

     If you notice in the publication, there are some themes that keep getting repeated.  The importance of networks or fusion is one of them.  To bring together different groups of experts, and have them contribute to actionable intelligence. And feeding these fusion groups requires interaction with the terrain, population and the enemy.

    Hence why COPS or combat outposts are so important.  It allows a unit to insert itself into the heart of a population/insurgency center and get as much information as they can via census patrols, sensors, raids, attacks against and by the enemy, etc. All of this is fed into a searchable database that can be cross referenced and searched by other units and organizations, and future deploying units and organizations. In other words, all actions and collected information is fed into the machine.

    I also liked the reference to ‘continuous improvement’. Too bad the author didn’t use the term Kaizen in the paper though. I also saw hints of ‘learning organization’, which is also an incredibly important concept for developing winning TTPs and strategies. Because once you have all of this great information and experience, you have to build a snowmobile out of it so you can win the fight. A rigid organization that doesn’t seek feedback internally and externally, work together and with others, or doesn’t innovate, will not succeed.

    Now here are my ideas to further the concepts into our industry.  Right now we are witnessing the African Union stumbling along in Somalia and trying to gain a foothold.  My thoughts on the whole thing is that you could take a PMC that was composed of former military leaders familiar with these concepts, and help the AU to organize accordingly. Or AFRICOM could send a leadership team in there to help organize the effort.  Either way, I see no reason why the AU forces could not replicate this strategy in Mogadishu right now.

    I also think that PMC’s could learn a lot from these types of strategies. PMC’s have had to set up remote sites that are very similar to ‘COPS in a box’. The CMC projects are a prime example. But what was missing with those operations was deliberate census patrols or the other means of intelligence collection that the Marines and Army could use.

    The way human intelligence was collected for these projects was often through the process of hiring and working around locals for guard positions and general labor projects. You learn all sorts of things about the locals when you work around them all day, day in and day out.

    Imagine though that if PMC’s actually did census patrols as part of the contract? Or planted sensors in abandoned buildings in their area? That data could not only be useful to that PMC, or future replacement PMC’s, but could also be added to a much larger database that the military could use? A PMC remote site and the routes they travel daily could be an excellent source of intelligence for the military units of that area, but unless that PMC is brought into that fusion process, it will simply be another lost chance at crucial data collection.

     It would also be nice if PMC’s could take advantage of that fusion process as well, and access the COPLINK or whatever database that is established locally. It could save lives and win wars, but it also requires both the military and civilian equivalents to talk and work with each other. Stuff to think about as we continue the fight and learn new ways of doing our thing in this war. –Matt

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Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007

James A. Russella

August 2010

To cite this Article: Russell, James A. ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33:4, 595 – 624

Abstract

This article analyzes operations by three battalions conducting counterinsurgency, or COIN, operations in Iraq over the period from July 2005 through March 2007: the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1-7) along the Iraq-Syrian border in the first half of 2006; the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment (1-37) battalion operating in south-central Ramadi in the fall of 2006; and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, or 2-1, operating in eastern Mosul in 2005-06. The empirical evidence presented in these cases suggest that, contrary to popular perceptions, the units successfully innovated in war – a process largely executed organically within the units themselves. Innovation is defined here as the development of new organizational capacities not initially present when the units deployed into the theater. The evidence presented in these cases suggests that the innovation process enabled these units to successfully transition from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations to organizations that developed an array of new organizational capacities for full-spectrum combat operations. The units in this study developed these new capacitites largely on their own initiative.

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Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Publications: The Use Of Pseudo-Operations In The AFPAK Theater, By Dr Ronald Holt

     Awesome stuff and these are the topics I really dig discussing.  The more we talk about this concept, the more people can start looking at the pieces and make a ‘snowmobile’ out of it. What I really like about this paper is that it talks specifically about Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will help us to focus the discussion and make it more relevant. Especially check out the comments section at Small Wars Journal for this topic. –Matt

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The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theaterby Ronald Holt

September 15, 2010

Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre

What would be the effect if we had small integrated groups of former Taliban and US Special Operators working together, masquerading as Taliban, living off the villagers as the Taliban do, and feeding USSOCOM actionable HUMINT?

This short paper is designed to be a “thought-piece” with the purpose of stimulating “out of the box” ideas. Pseudo Operations involve recruiting and training ex-insurgents to operate as insurgents and produce intelligence, cause enemy casualties, and create distrust between the local population and the insurgents. Such on the ground intelligence gives a deeper picture of enemy intentions, infiltration routes and support amongst the local population. Real- time intelligence can lay the groundwork for successful direct actions missions. Sometimes pseudo-operators will disguise themselves as members of adjacent countries’ military in order to operate in enemy sanctuaries. In this paper I will argue that Pseudo-Ops might be of use given the current situation in AFPAK and particularly in southern Afghanistan and in areas of Pakistan such as North Waziristan or even Baluchistan.

Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre

Dr. Ronald Holt is a tenured Professor of Anthropology and Fulbright Scholar. He was the senior social scientist for Human Terrain Team AF-1 at FOB Salerno Afghanistan in 2008. Dr. Holt has done fieldwork in several Islamic countries and with Native American tribes.

Link to post at Small Wars Journal here.

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Publications: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance

     Here it is.  Feel free to pass this around or go to the links below, and pass that around.  Lots of good commonsense stuff in there.  My only point to make with this publication is that prime contractors should definitely use this document as well, just so that we are all playing off the same sheet of music. –Matt

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COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A

For the Commanders, Contracting Personnel, Military Personnel, and Civilians of NATO ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan

SUBJECT: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting GuidanceDownload Official Release

The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represents both an opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government’s and ISAF’s campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.

In view of these points, contracting has to be “Commander’s business.” Indeed, I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract spending and understand who benefits from it. We must use intelligence to inform our contracting and ensure those with whom we contract work for the best interests of the Afghan people. We must be better buyers and buy from better people. Consistent with NATO and national contracting laws and regulations, we must:

Understand the role of contracting in COIN. Purchases we make for construction, goods, and services can bolster economic growth, stability, and Afghan goodwill toward their government and ISAF. Contracts with Afghan firms that procure Afghan goods and services generate employment and assist in the development of a sustainable economy. However, if we contract with powerbrokers who exclude those outside their narrow patronage networks or are perceived as funneling resources to one community at the expense of another, the effect on Afghan perceptions and our mission will be negative. Thus, we must incorporate COIN Contracting topics into training for Commanders.

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