Feral Jundi

Wednesday, August 24, 2011

Books: Castles, Battles, And Bombs–How Economics Explains Military History, By Jurgen Brauer And Hubert Van Tuyll

Filed under: Books,Italy — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 5:03 PM

This is a great little book and I highly recommend it just for the chapter 3, ‘The Renaissance, 1300-1600–The Case of the Condottieri and the Military Labor Market’. What makes this book so cool is that it describes the history of the Condottieri from the point of view of economics. Stuff like principal agent problem and asymmetric information are the areas that this book goes into, and I found it to be fascinating.

The book also talked about today’s PMCs and how they are being used, or misused. The authors even gave some kudos to Executive Outcomes for being an effective PMC versus the UN during the Sierra Leone war.

But back to the Condottieri or Italian contractors/mercenaries. (Condottieri were the mercenary captains and also contractors in general) This is very interesting material, because the authors discussed the incentives of these mercenaries back then that helped to alleviate the principal agent problem. They used things like bonuses, or the individuals were allowed to ransom and loot as part of the contract. (back then, this was a standard feature of warfare of all armies)

Probably the one thing that piqued my interest the most is the use of bonding agreements within the contracts. I have talked about bonds in the past or how these could be effective tools for getting companies to do what you need them to do, and this book talked a little bit about how bonds were used in the past.

Specifically, the authors mentioned a lecturer named Daniel Waley whom examined twenty Italian mercenary contracts that had been preserved from the late 13th century. There were 11 contracts from Bologna, 5 from Siena, 1 from Florence, 2 from Piedmont, and one from the March of Ancona. All of them were issued between 1253 and 1301, with fifteen of them after 1290.

All of the contracts had these elements in common:

1. Number of men to be hired.
2. Type of force. (cavalry, infantry, etc.)
3. Number of horses to be supplied.
4. Values of the horses. (minimum and maximum)
5. The mendum or compensation for horses injured or killed.
6. Provisions for arms and equipment.
7. Length of contract. (usually 3 or 6 months)
8. Contract renewal option.
9. Payment for travel to place of engagement.
10. The rate of pay and pay period. (usually once every two months)
11. The pay differentials among various grades of hired men. (commanders, cavalry, infantry, crossbowmen)
12. The division of prisoners, ransom, and booty.
13. The secure release if the hired men were themselves taken prisoner.
14. Bonus pay. (retention of booty, double pay for battle days)
15. Jurisdiction, default and penalty clauses.
16. Dispute Resolution within the hired band.
17. Loyalty clause.
18. A performance bond. (6 of the 11 Bolognese contracts had bonds guaranteeing good behavior)

As you can see, the contracts were pretty involved back then. The book mentioned that contracts used to run about 4,000 words, but later contracts shortened up a bit and ran about 1,000 to 3,000 words. The authors pointed out that the hiring states began to develop regulations that helped to make contracts more formulaic, and thus easier to write. It is easier to point to laws and regulations of that state, as opposed to make provisions that cover ‘everything’ within in a contract.

What is interesting is that this is exactly what has happened with today’s companies. There were really not enough regulations on the use of companies in the beginning days of Iraq or Afghanistan, and so contracts really had not control features.(we also had problems because of this) Now, the contracts are a lot better, just because of the amount of scrutiny that has been applied to the companies and the government. I have seen a dramatic increase in regulations, and we will probably continue to see this evolution take place.

The performance bond is interesting to me. I mentioned this in my post about Reflex Responses that they had a performance bond in their contract with the UAE, and that is smart. Early American privateers had to be bonded in order to receive a Letter of Marque as well. Of course the bond survives in other industries, and it is just one tool of many to provide incentive in the principal agent problem–or to get folks to do what you want them to do.

The other thing that this book talked about is modum stipendii and modum societatis. Or basically contracting with an individual versus contracting with the leaders of mercenary companies. Contracting with individuals was problematic, because each had their own set of intentions. But hiring a group with a leader that motivates them and keeps them together, is far more dependable and easier to manage.

Of course with today’s companies, this is how it works. The US government rarely contracts with individuals, and it is far more easier and efficient to contract with DynCorp and have them provide the bodies. But this also got me thinking about how companies recruit.

I have thought about this concept in the past, as far as hiring groups of individuals for companies. If a company could hire a squad or platoon of contractors, where all of them fought together in their old unit or company, and they had a leader for bargaining purposes, then a company could gain advantage of having a team that has unit experience, integrity and cohesion. This is an issue that I have seen out there, and it would be interesting to see companies try this out. Because to me, a unit with experience, integrity and cohesion is extremely valuable to a company for the offense and defense.

The book also defined a time period where Italian cities switched from hiring individuals to hiring units. They started using the term Lance or lancea in contracts which was a unit of 3 men. Perhaps this might be a feature of modern contracts? It would be far easier to find Lances who all knew each other and fought together in let’s say the Marines. The survival of such teams would be higher, and their effectiveness on the battlefield would be better because that unit experience/cohesion/integrity element was already there. (that’s if you have a good leader leading these lances)

The other deal that was interesting to me is the pay for the common mercenary back then. They did not make a lot of money, and it was the mercenary captains that became wealthy. These grunts would make the same amount as day-laborers for stuff like construction. The book said they averaged 9 florins a day, from between 1321 and 1368. It sounds like rates continued to fall as time passed, and the basic grunt definitely took it in the shorts. They also had tons of pay issues, like late pay, not getting paid or receiving forged money! lol And we talk about pay problems these days?

But like with any military or PMC, past or present, if you screw with the soldier’s pay, they tend to get pissed off. Or they just leave. Countries like Iraq or Somalia have experienced what happens when you don’t pay soldiers or police, and security is highly dependent upon making sure guys are getting paid on time and the amount that was agreed upon.

These old mercenaries also sold their equipment to make enough money to get by between contracts, and life for a soldier was tough back then. As a result of this low salary, contractors tended to gravitate to contracts with the most stability and longevity. If you have a family to feed and bills to pay, then this becomes understandable in today’s realm. (I have seen contractors leave contracting to be soldiers again, and I have seen soldiers leave the military to be contractors. Which might indicate equilibrium of a sorts?)

The other thing I wanted to touch on about the book is they do go into offense industry a little bit. Contractors were paid bonuses for all sorts of things, like for storming a castle, acts of bravery, or for bounties. Anything to give an incentive. They also offered pensions to contractors that were loyal, something Sir John Hawkwood depended on greatly towards the end of his career. (the lesson here is save your pennies!)

Well, that is all I will get into with the book. Check it out in the Jundi Gear Store, and I have provided some links below for your convenience. –Matt

The third chapter of the book on Google Books here.

Book Description
Publication Date: May 1, 2008

Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

“In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant’s campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II.

“This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare.”—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

Monday, July 4, 2011

History: Von Steuben’s Continentals

Filed under: Film,History — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:47 PM

In honor of this year’s 4th of July or Independence Day, I wanted to point to a very significant part of that victory and history during the Revolutionary War. A document like the Declaration of Independence is nice and all, but it takes brute force and actually winning in order to make that Independence a reality. For that, I choose to celebrate the leaders and warriors, who got us to that point that made independence a reality.

I want to emphasize how important ‘organized violence’ was to the success of the Continental Army. Thanks to General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben and his focus on organizing and training the Continental Army, we could field an army that could compete with the British on the field of battle. He was able to give Washington an effective and organized army to use.  Such an army gives leaders the kind of confidence they need to implement more effective strategies as well.

That we also used a Prussian officer/ mercenary that was contracted by the Continental Army to train and organize their ragtag military is significant as well. An equal comparison would be Sir John Hawkwood and his significance to the defense of the Venetians in 14th century Italy. Or how American Mickey Marcus helped to stand up the Israeli Defense Force in their early days.  Steuben had brought with him a method forged in the battles of Europe, and literally ‘wrote the book’ on war fighting for the Continental Army.

We also had a massive naval effort that included the Continental Navy and Privateers, all hammering away on British logistics. All of these public/private actions, along with a dedicated leadership, helped to bring about victory.

The quality of the film below is a little rough, but still is a great reminder of how significant General Steuben was to the war effort. Below I have posted a clip of the film, and here is an entry from wikipedia about Friederich Wilhelm von Steuben’s training program. Pretty cool. –Matt

Training program

Steuben’s training technique was to create a “model company”, a group of 120 chosen men who in turn successively trained other personnel at Regimental and Brigade levels. Steuben’s eccentric personality greatly enhanced his mystique. He trained the soldiers, who at this point were greatly lacking in proper clothing themselves, in full military dress uniform, swearing and yelling at them up and down in German and French. When that was no longer successful, he recruited Captain Benjamin Walker, his French-speaking aide, to curse at them for him in English. Steuben introduced a system of progressive training, beginning with the school of the soldier, with and without arms, and going through the school of the regiment. This corrected the previous policy of simply assigning personnel to regiments. Each company commander was made responsible for the training of new men, but actual instruction was done by selected sergeants, the best obtainable.

Another program developed by Steuben was camp sanitation. He established standards of sanitation and camp layouts that would still be standard a century and a half later. There had previously been no set arrangement of tents and huts. Men relieved themselves where they wished and when an animal died, it was stripped of its meat and the rest was left to rot where it lay. Steuben laid out a plan to have rows for command, officers and enlisted men. Kitchens and latrines were on opposite sides of the camp, with latrines on the downhill side. There was the familiar arrangement of company and regimental streets.

Perhaps Steuben’s biggest contribution to the American Revolution was training in the use of the bayonet. Since the Battle of Bunker Hill, Americans had been mainly dependent upon using their ammunition to win battles. Throughout the early course of the war, Americans used the bayonet mostly as a cooking skewer or tool rather than as a fighting instrument. Steuben’s introduction of effective bayonet charges became crucial. In the Battle of Stony Point, American soldiers attacked with unloaded muskets and won the battle solely on Steuben’s bayonet training.

The first results of Steuben’s training were in evidence at the Battle of Barren Hill, 20 May 1778 and then again at the Battle of Monmouth in June 1778. Steuben, by then serving in Washington’s Headquarters, was the first to determine the enemy was heading for Monmouth. Washington recommended appointment of Steuben as Inspector General on April 30; Congress approved it on May 5. During the winter of 1778-1779, Steuben prepared Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, commonly known as the “Blue Book.” Its basis was the training plan he had devised at Valley Forge.

 

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

History: A Closer Look At The Life Of Sir John Hawkwood

Filed under: History,Quotes — Tags: , , , — Matt @ 2:40 PM

“God take away your alms. For as you live by charity, so do I by war, and to me it is as genuine a vocation as yours.”
– Sir John Hawkwood,
upon being greeted by two friars with the words, “God give you peace.”

So with this post, I wanted to highlight a quote from The Prince below that is of significance. Machiavelli used John Hawkwood as an example of ‘one who did not conquer’ or desired to conquer Florence. To me, this pointed out a key element to Hawkwood’s success. That he identified a niche in the market of force back then that made his services and company stand out.

Hawkwood was an extremely successful captain back then, and his services were highly sought after. But what is most interesting to me is this guy was a foreigner in Italy at the time. And yet he was so successful and so respected that he had the name of Giovanni Acuto given to him, awarded land, made commander of forces, citizenship offered, a pension– and get this, he was buried with state honors in the Duomo! Not bad for a foreigner and the son of an Essex tanner?

His last days as a commander of forces in Florence, are what the people remembered, just because he was so crucial to the defense of that city against Milanese expansion. But the war that impressed me, that was supposedly one of the most famous wars of that time period, was the Battle of Castagnaro. Here is a snippet from wikipedia:

Battle of Castagnaro
The Battle of Castagnaro was fought on March 11, 1387 at Castagnaro (today’s Veneto, northern Italy) between Verona and Padua. It is one of the most famous battles of the Italian condottieri age.
The army of Verona was led by Giovanni Ordelaffi and Ostasio II da Polenta, while the victorious Paduans were commanded by John Hawkwood (Giovanni Acuto) and Francesco Novello da Carrara, the son of Francesco I, lord of Padua.
Castagnaro is hailed as Sir John Hawkwood’s greatest victory. Following a Fabian-like strategy, Hawkwood goaded the Veronese into attacking him on a field of his own choosing, by laying waste to the Veronese lands nearby.
Drawing his forces up on the far side of a canal, and anchoring his right flank on a patch of woods, Hawkwood waited until the Veronese had committed to attacking across a ford of fascines piled up in the canal. Once so occupied, Hawkwood sprang his trap.
Hawkwood had left a copy of his standard behind his forces, then had led his cavalry into the woods to his right. At a given signal – supposedly, a flaming arrow – the copy of his standard dropped, and Hawkwood’s cavalry burst from the woods on the Veronese left, with his real standard in front. At the point of impact, Hawkwood is said to have cast his commander’s baton into the Veronese ranks and ordered his men to retrieve it for him.
Per Trease, it is said that Hawkwoods battle cry that day was a grim play on the Paduan war-cry of Carro! – in Hawkwood’s rendition, it became Carne! (“Flesh!”).

It is also important to point out Hawkwood’s secrets to success.  He certainly was acute or a student of warfare, and he identified the niche he needed to not only be marketable, but dominate. He also had a sense of humor, as stated with that last sentence in the quote.  Here is another quote from wikipedia:

However part of the White Company’s reputation was built upon the fact that Sir John’s men were far less likely to desert dangerous situations than other mercenaries and Hawkwood soon grew much richer than many other condottiere.

This quote tells me a lot. It says that he focused on taking care of his people.  The only way you can keep guys from deserting like this, is that they must have trusted Hawkwood and that he paid well. He had the top company to work for back then, and when you have a good company, you gain loyalty and develop unit cohesion. Success breeds success, as they say. I would compare it to a company like Apple or Google, and how these companies attract the best of the best, and keep them around because they pay well and the leadership/culture is awesome. Not to mention that these folks also believe in the product or service being sold.

Finally, I wanted to end this with the quote up top that also sheds some light into the mindset of Hawkwood. I do not classify this as an indication of Hawkwood’s religious beliefs or intentions, but more an indication as to his life’s focus. That he was a student of warfare, and a student of the market of force he worked in.  That he understood the Italian way of the condottiere, and mastered it.-Matt


Sir John Hawkwood is on the right side.

The Prince
by Nicolo Machiavelli
CHAPTER XII
How Many Kinds Of Soldiery There Are, And Concerning Mercenaries
…And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto, and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his discretion.

—————————————————————-

The Condottiere

“A condottiere (plural condottieri) was the holder of a military condotta (plural condotte), or contract, for the raising and leadership of troops.  While condotte were being issued by Italian cities and states as early as the second half of the twelve hundreds as a means of recruiting a part of their armies, it was only in the later years of the thirteen hundreds that such contracts became the main method of raising armies in Italy.  The companies, often made up largely of foreigners (many of whom had been left “unemployed” by the temporary cessation of the Hundred Years War around the time of the Black Death in 1348), which dominated Italian warfare for much of the thirteen hundreds, were normally employed under contract, but they were surprisingly democratic in their organization, and the contracts with employing states were signed by representative groups of leaders.  By about 1370 individual military commanders had largely gained control of the companies and had become the sole contractors for their services.  From this moment onwards the vast majority of condottieri were Italians and they dominated the military scene in Italy throughout the fourteen hundreds.
The nuclei of the companies which condottieri contracted to provide were normally kept permanently in being and augmented for specific contracts and campaigns by recruitment of additional rank and file. The condottiere, therefore, was invariably a man of substance possessing estates and permanent income which enabled him to maintain his principal followers between contracts and recruit rapidly from amongst his own tenants and dependants. These socio-economic conditions were of more importance than military reputation in dictating the size of the contract which a condottiere could obtain, and hence his prestige and reputation. Many of the leading condottieri were either independent princes like the Gonzaga lords of Mantua or the Este lords of Ferrara, or were members of extensive landowning families like the Orsini or Dal Verme.
The main strength of the condottiere company lay in its ‘lances’, a term which describes not only the main weapon of heavily armed cavalrymen but also the group of attendants who supported them.  However, during the fourteen hundreds, condottieri began to take an increasing interest in infantry as an essential support to their cavalry, and a number of leading captains also possessed some artillery.  While it would be wrong to see a willingness to experiment and innovate as an outstanding characteristic of the condottieri, there were among them some major military personalities.  Men like Francesco Sforza, Bartolomeo Colleoni and Federico da Montefeltro had European reputations in the mid-fourteen hundreds, and in the Wars of Italy many of the most successful leaders of the French and Spanish armies in Italy were Italian condottieri.
Undoubtedly the contract system of service tended to breed a sort of military individualism which weakened the cohesion of a large army, but in fact by the fourteen hundreds the system did not mean that condottieri changed their employment with every contract.  The Italian states were among the first in Europe to develop permanent armies, and most Italian condottieri settled into a pattern of routine renewals of increasingly long-term contracts with one or other of the states.  There remained the exceptional figures whose reputations, and whose control of what amounted to large private armies, prompted political ambitions and made them targets of increasingly tempting offers from potential employers.  But at this level the condotta took on some of the characteristics of a diplomatic alliance, and a switch of allegiance has to be seen in terms of international politics rather than individual infidelity.  In formal terms the condotta system and the role of the condottiere as a leader of cavalry survived throughout the fifteen hundreds.  But the declining importance of cavalry in war and the growing political domination of France and Spain in Italy meant an end to their political role and a decline in social prestige.”
Source:  The Thames and Hudson Dictionary of the Italian Renaissance

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