Feral Jundi

Friday, August 6, 2010

Building Snowmobiles: Using Economic Theory To Predict Enemy Strategy?

“It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Karl Von Clauswitz

“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” – Sun Tzu

     First off, I want to mention that this post is the product of one of my reader’s ‘a ha’ moments.  What really makes this cool is that this reader is a fan of the ‘building snowmobiles’ posts on FJ and this was him putting together these random pieces and creating something out of all of it.  He had attended a college course years back that covered economic theory, he is well read on the war and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he had read Feral Jundi and knew how fun analysis and synthesis can be, and then finally stumbled on some recent news about the war and Taliban strategy, and put it all together. And this is me trying to assemble the thing based on his instructions, and I am thoroughly enjoying myself.

     Simply put, this is about using economic theory as a potential tool to predict enemy strategies, so you can defeat those strategies.  Because like Sun Tzu says, it ‘is of supreme importance to attack the enemy’s strategy’. Of course I am not going to go all out and say you can predict with 100 percent certainty what your enemy will do. Still, the closer you can get the better, and these are potential tools you can use for predictive analysis.

    In this exercise, we will use Afghanistan and the current war against the Taliban there. At this time, we are also using a counter-insurgency strategy.  The Taliban are considered the insurgents in this case, and they too are using a insurgency type strategy.  Both strategies are heavily influenced by gaining the support of the population. Famous counter-insurgent David Galula had this to say about counterinsurgency:

The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population Galula proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency:

1.The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.

2.Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.

3.Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

4.Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.

Galula contends that:

A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. … A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. … In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. 

   I wanted to put this out there first as one of the main definitions of COIN, so we have somewhere to start.(most strategies are population-centric)  In this war, we are basically fighting for the support of the people, and you could easily say that this is politics with guns.  You could also say that both sides of this conflict are selling to the population that they are a better idea and friend than the other guy.  The Taliban use their methods to achieve population support, and we use ours. In other words, we are in the business of politics in this war. We are trying to win votes or popularity, and like politicians, we are finding all and any way to win as many votes as possible.

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Monday, July 19, 2010

Publications: CRS-DoD Contractors In Iraq And Afghanistan: Background And Analysis, July 2010

     The 2010 QDR, which runs almost 130 pages, contains little discussion on the role contractors play in military operations. The QDR has a seven page section on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, including a list of ten priorities for improvement. However, the word “contractor” does not appear once in the discussion, despite the fact that contractors make up more that 50% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, including more than 13,000 armed contractors. Some analysts argue that DOD missed an opportunity to address the issue in the most recent QDR.

*****  

     I like posting these, just because they are running records of where contractors stand in this war.  But what I really like about this publication is that Mr. Schwartz has taken aim at the folks who wrote up the QDR.

     The reason why I like that, is because I have been screaming on this blog as long as I can remember that contractors must be included into the discussion on strategy for these wars.  Especially when we account for over half of the manpower in these conflicts (and probably for future conflicts).

     It still amazes me that today’s strategists and war planners do not adequately cover this stuff.  If you read the QDR, it’s like we don’t even exist.  And yet we have thousands of expats, third country nationals, and local nationals, all interacting with today’s populations and militaries in today’s wars. We are also dying and paying our toll in blood for this war–yet nothing is really mentioned about us when it comes to strategy.

     Mr. Schwartz also took the time to cut and paste some key components of today’s COIN strategy out of some manuals, and how contractors should and could intermix with that strategy.  The bottom line is that if contractors are interacting with the populations of these war zones, then they ‘must’ be aligned within the strategies of COIN. We must be on the same sheet of music as the militaries are, or we will continue to inadvertently cause problems.

     Now for a couple of critiques.  In the beginning of this publication, Mr. Schwartz actually mentioned the use of contractors during the Revolutionary War, but he made no mention of the use of privateers or of Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the US Constitution.

     It’s odd to me that he wouldn’t, because our use of privateers is actually a fantastic example of using contractors during times of war to achieve a strategic goal.  Our privateer industry is what we had as a continental navy at that time. The damage they inflicted onto the enemy’s logistics, as well as the capture of enemy weapons and munitions were very significant components of that war. Not to mention the massive infusion of wealth into our young country from all of the commerce raiding done by this government licensed privateer force. And the Letter of Marque in the US Constitution is proof of that existence between private industry and government for ‘offensive’ operations against an enemy.  How’s that for ‘inherently governmental’? lol

     The only other critique that is missing is a combination of DoS’s and other’s numbers into a report like this. I know the DoD doesn’t want to mix with those ‘others’, but it gets kind of old for us to continue to see separate reports all the time. I say combine all of them to save a little money and time, and let’s see every last contractor be counted.  I would also like to see the deaths and injuries of all, and get that stuff on one nice (and complete) report for everyone to analyze and reference. Something to think about for all of you analysts out there who keep throwing this stuff together. –Matt

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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis 

Moshe Schwartz

Specialist in Defense Acquisition

July 2, 2010

Summary

The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies upon contractors to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD workforce that has 19% more contractor personnel (207,600) than uniformed personnel (175,000). Contractors make up 54% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan. The critical role contractors play in supporting such military operations and the billions of dollars spent by DOD on these services requires operational forces to effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believethat poor contract management has also played a role in abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Monday, June 28, 2010

Strategy: Secrets From Inside The Obama War Room

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:01 PM

     I know this is a little old, but it is totally relevant to today’s discussion about the future of Afghanistan.  As you read through this story, you come to understand why McChrystal or any other military leader in this war might be frustrated.  I said this before, and I will say this again.  There is not a general out there that thinks that declaring a withdrawal date is a good idea in the context of winning wars.  This administration is set on July 2011, and General Petraeus has made his promises to that administration that he could finish this in that time frame. It is a promise he will have to break in my view.

     Most of all, the Taliban love this date, and it is a countdown to their victory. The enemy will certainly pour it on as this date gets closer, and I just don’t see how this is helpful for any kind of plans with Afghanistan. Or the Taliban will just sit and wait, and then pour it on as soon as we leave. It just makes no strategic sense.

     Petraeus has a lot of work to do in turning around the war. There is alleviating the fears that Karzai has with this date, there is letting our troops fight the way they see fit and allowing them to win battles, there is dealing with Pakistan and ensuring they continue their fight, there is the training of the ANA and police so they can take control of the country, and all of this is dependent on changing that stupid date for withdrawal. Or Petraeus can keep his promise of defeat and go down with the ship. Only time will tell, and the clock is ticking. –Matt

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Secrets From Inside the Obama War Room

by Jonathan Alter

May 15, 2010

The first of 10 “AFPAK” meetings came on Sept. 13, when the president gathered 16 advisers in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House. This was to be the most methodical national-security decision in a generation. Deputy national-security adviser Tom Donilon had commissioned research that backed up an astonishing historical truth: neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War featured any key meetings where all the issues and assumptions were discussed by policymakers. In both cases the United States was sucked into war inch by inch.

The Obama administration was determined to change that. “For the past eight years, whatever the military asked for, they got,” Obama explained later. “My job was to slow things down.” The president had something precious in modern crisis management: time. “I had to put up with the ‘dithering’ arguments from Dick Cheney or others,” Obama said. “But as long as I wasn’t shaken by the political chatter, I had the time to work through all these issues and ask a bunch of tough questions and force people to sharpen their pencils until we arrived at the best possible solution.”

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Friday, June 25, 2010

Somalia: Al Shabab Is Gaining Strength, TFG Corruption Causes Soldier Defections

Filed under: Africa,Al Qaeda,Somalia,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:34 PM

     Boy, this isn’t a pretty picture.  I have mentioned in the past on why it is important to ‘pay your soldiers’ if you want them to stick around, and this is a prime example of how important that is. Al Shabab has made some moves lately that have increased their size and hold on territory.  Not good for the TFG, and not good for the west.

     I also wanted to mention that Petraeus was the one that signed off on US military covert operations in Somalia. So if we have guys there right now, then a really excellent thing they could do to stop the bleeding is to gain a foothold on the payment and management of these Somali troops.  We spent the money to train them in Ethiopia, we can certainly watch over the payment of their services in Somalia. I compare this to our handling of the HTN contracts in Afghanistan that are causing so many headaches.  We must insure there is adult supervision with this stuff.

     Or, we should just allow the TFG to crumble, and let Al Shabab to take over….  Because as it stands right now, Al Shabab has momentum and they are closing in fast.  And as they conquer and absorb these other Islamic extremist groups, the people will see this strength and bow down to this Islamic force.  How could they not, if the TFG can’t even do the simple task of paying their troops? (and that’s after we gave them the money to pay their troops with) This is basic Governance 101.

      I guess what I am saying is that Al Shabab, and in a larger sense Al Qaeda, is on the verge of a ‘win’ in Somalia. Can we afford this, and especially with what is going on in Afghanistan, or with the victory we are claiming in Iraq? Momentum is quite a thing, and if you give an enemy ground, they will now have something to promote their effectiveness with.  Hell, if we want to give General McChrystal a way to redeem himself, I say let the ‘industrial death machine of Iraq’ have a go in Somalia? Don’t put him charge of AFRICOM, but definitely put him in charge of some kind of project he can focus his talents on. Somalia needs that kind of talent and attention, or we will lose it. –Matt

Furious Soldiers storm Villa Somalia

Hizbul-Islam vanishing into Al-Shabab

U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast

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From Strategy Page

June 25, 2010

The Transitional Government (TG) is negotiating with Hizbul Islam. This Islamic radical group is the smaller rival of al Shabaab, and less radical. The more radical members of Hizbul Islam are defecting to al Shabaab, so it makes sense that the less radical ones would try to cut a deal with the TG. Otherwise, an even smaller Hizbul Islam could be crushed by al Shabaab. Meanwhile, the TG is itself threatened with fragmentation as many members of the government strive to rearrange the deal that determines which clans get how many seats in the parliament. Somalis have a hard time compromising, and prefer to fight, which is the main reason the country is such a mess. Corruption is the other big problem. This was seen recently when hundreds of government soldiers, trained by foreign instructors, demonstrated at the presidential palace for back pay. The money had been stolen by government officials, who consider a government job as a license to steal. Donor nations have a hard time convincing officials that effective government cannot survive such attitudes.

Story here.

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Hizbul-Islam vanishing into Al-Shabab

Saturday 19 June 2010

Somaliweyn – Mohammed Omar Hussein

The warriors of Hizbul-Islam one of the adversary Islamist functions in Somalia are in their hundreds joining Al-Shabab another Islamist function in Somalia, which is also extra superior than Hizbul-Islam according the areas which each group is controlling and in terms of fighters as well.

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Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Strategy: Rolling Stone’s ‘Runaway General’ Article And The Poker Game Called Afghanistan

     So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word “victory” when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge.-The last sentences of this article, (and the narrative that Rolling Stone wants the reader to accept)

*****

     This is an interesting article in many ways.  To me, I look at it from several points of view that might provide an explanation for such a thing.  I look at the article as a big commentary on the poker game called Afghanistan, with a table of politicians, a president and his administration, civilian leaders, the enemy, Karzai, the media, and General McChrystal. Each player has their own strategy in this game, and each player has a plan to win.  The stakes are political survival, the direction of the war, and the narrative in the history books and everyone is fighting for public support and opinion. So what is each player’s strategy and goals in this game?

     Well, let’s break it down.  The first up is Rolling Stone.  For them the pot in this poker game is a sensational story and a further narrative of the war as being lost.  That COIN sucks and General McChrystal is a ‘Runaway General’, or uncontrollable. Any way they can show a division between all the crucial leadership running the war, is good for their goal of ending the war. Rolling Stone is also a supporter of the Obama administration, but they also do not support the war in Afghanistan.  So to them, showing a failed war and putting all the blame on an out of control general helps to insulate their guy in office.  To show support for the administration, while at the same time protesting the war by making it the product of that insane guy in charge called General McChrystal.

     The next player to discuss is the President and all of his men.  They need a win in Afghanistan, but they have also painted themselves into a corner with the July 2011 date for withdrawal.  They did this to appease their political base, and this date and the coming election is going to effect all of their decision making on the wartime strategy there.  There is also historical context, and Obama does not want this to be his Vietnam.  No standing President wants that, and every President looks at a war under their watch as how it will look in the history books. So the coming election and history are the two factors pressing this administration.  Not to mention that he also has the economy and the BP spill in the Gulf as two negatives.  He needs a win in one or two of these areas, because coming into re-election with all of those ‘losers’ will definitely hurt him.

     Then there is the civilian leadership like Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. Of course there would be friction between him and McChrystal, and especially after McChrystal was his subordinate at one point, and especially after he was not chosen as the viceroy in Afghanistan.  Plus DoD gets way more money than DoS when it comes to budget and resources, and you have that clash.  But there is one part of this story that clued me into the history narrative of this war. When Eikenberry leaked the cable to the New York Times about how pathetic Karzai and the war strategy was, this was a way to seal their place in history books as a ‘I told you so’.  McChrystal and gang referred to it as Eikenberry ‘covering his flank for the history books’.  Anyone see the pattern here?

     The politicians mentioned in the article all have the same goal as the President, and that is political survival.  To understand the mind of a politician, all you have to do is think in terms of votes and re-election.  Whatever it takes to stay in office and rally their base.  So the anti-war politicians whose base is anti-war, only benefit if the war strategy fails.  The pro-war politicians whose base is pro-war, only benefit if the war strategy works.  That is the two sides of this political battle, and each side will latch on to anything that will give them an advantage with rallying their base. As it stands now, Obama has declared the war in Afghanistan as the ‘Just War’, so I imagine that the anti-war politicians really don’t see Obama as a tool to use for rallying their base.  But if they can split Obama from his ‘just war’ view, and get him to not support the war effort or accept that it is lost, then they would benefit.  That is their prize, and going back to the Rolling Stone prize, you can see who benefits from whom.

     The pro-war politicians will rally around the general that will insure success.  They need a winner to rally around.  So if they supported McChrystal and now an article like this is circulating a perception that he is out of control, or worse yet, helps to create a divide between all parties involved, then they will not benefit.  You need a team who has a unified command and a unity of effort, and this article gives the impression that this is not happening.  There is also the issue of Article 88 which prohibits officers from using ‘contemptuous words’ about the president and his staff. Pro-war politicians at this point look at this story as a threat to their chosen winner, and ultimately a threat to winning the war.  But the narrative of the story points to a divided team, and these pro-war politicians need to address this in order appease their base.

     The pro-war politicians could do two things.  They could rally around the general, and especially if the administration and others accept his apology (and not fire him), or they could call for his head and get someone new in there that will work better as a team. In other words, if the General is looked at as the guy who is stronger than the President after the dust settles, because he thumbed his nose at him and his staff and they have not fired him, then he might be a guy they could rally around.  Especially coming into election, and especially if the President is not popular in the polls. But they also need a guy that can seal the deal, and they really need a guy that the troops on the ground support.  Because most of the base of pro-war politicians, are military and military families who all care about winning this thing.

     Karzai is at the table as well, and success to him is just hanging on to power and collecting as much money as he can from the war effort.  He will support anyone that will continue his good deal, and McChrystal is the guy–kind of.  Or at least that is the arrangement that the general has set up.  The general is working with Karzai and doing what is necessary to control him and work with him. Kind of like a SF operator working with a village chief.  He has to, because there is no alternative. Karzai also knows that if the Taliban come into power, he is out, so if he wants to survive politically and even physically, he needs a strong general and western partner to insure that survival.

     The Taliban are also at this table, and their strategy is simple. Keep terrorizing the population/government and just survive long enough to make it to this withdrawal date of July 2011. This date is all they need to win, because all they have to do is pour it on while everyone leaves. And as long as the people perceive the west as weak and unable to defeat the Taliban, they will give in to the Taliban.

     Finally there is General McChrystal.  Personally, I think this article was a way to test the political resolve of those at the top.  If they fired him, then McChrystal can fade away from the war and not be attached to it’s ‘perceived’ demise.  The whole ‘history book effect’ comes into play here as well.

     If they accept his apology and keep the guy where he is at, then that means they are saying ‘we did not like what you said, but we need a win in this war’. It is the same reasoning for contracting with Xe for security work–they might not like them, but they are the best, and for wars, you need the best of the best to win. So in essence, McChrystal was probing the defenses of these leaders at the ‘poker table’, to see what their position is on his command and the strategy.(calling their bluff or trying to determine their cards in the game) If you look at his history in war and life, you can see that this is exactly how he operates. He is testing them. Because an acceptance of the general’s apology, is also an acceptance of the fact that he ‘is the best man’ for the job.  The general needs that acceptance in order to go after what he really needs for a victory in Afghanistan, and that is time.

     I really think all of this boils down to one thing, and that is that stupid withdrawal date of July 2011. If COIN takes as long as most of the experts claim it takes, then attaching a time frame to the current strategy is stupid.  The general knows this, and this was a huge debate with the Iraq war. During that time, it was debated furiously during the presidential debates and between the pro-war and anti-war crowds. With Iraq, the narrative was ‘get out now’ versus ‘leave based on success and results’. The latter is what we went with, and that is what worked.

     A withdrawal should only be based on victory, a retreat is what happens when you lose.  I personally think this article was McChrystal saying ‘if you want me in charge of this war effort, you must give me time and the flexibility to win’. Because as it stands now, to seal any kind of a victory in Afghanistan by July of next year is impossible. I think most observers would say so as well, and this article symbolizes the very battle between all parties who have a stake in this war and the pressing issue of time. Each player in this game looks at time as a leverage for their specific goals in this game. Each player is also looking at their place in the history books and their political survival.

     There are plenty of angles to this war, and I am sure I am missing a few in this discussion. Below I posted a few pieces of the article that were interesting to me. Anyway, check out the entire article and  let me know what you think. Things are changing pretty quickly and it will be interesting to see how this unfolds over the days and weeks. –Matt

Edit: 6/23/2010 – And he is replaced by General Petraeus.  Wow, and all because of an article from Rolling Stone. He played his cards, he lost, and now there is a new player at the table.

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The Runaway General

By Michael Hastings

July 2010

(Pieces of the article are posted below–all curse words edited)

Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.

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