Feral Jundi

Friday, September 25, 2009

Saudi Arabia: Fears Over ‘Internal’ Terror Bomb

   This is interesting.  I could see this adding a whole new level of complexities in this war.  If an x-ray machine couldn’t pick this up, and there is nothing on the outside of the body to indicate a bomb, then this is not cool.  Guys could just board a plane and time the detonation over populated cities.  They could also do much more targeted killings like in the case of this attempted assault. The possibilities are only limited by the imaginations of these miscreants, and we will see if this becomes a trend. –Matt

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Fears over ‘internal’ terror bomb

Saturday, 26 September 2009

By Frank Gardner

Security and intelligence experts are deeply worried by a new development in suicide bombing, the BBC has learned.

It has emerged that an al-Qaeda bomber who died last month while trying to blow up a Saudi prince in Jeddah had hidden the explosives inside his body.

Only the attacker died, but it is feared that the new development could be copied by others.

Experts say it could have implications for airport security, rendering traditional metal detectors “useless”.

Last month’s bombing left people wondering how one of the most wanted al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia could get so close to the prince in charge of counter-terrorism that he was able to blow himself up in the same room.

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Monday, August 31, 2009

Disaster Response: The Security Officer and Incident Command

    I read this story below, and it reminded me of how little respect folks have for the security officer of a facility, all the way up until something awful happens.  Something like a terrorist attack or natural disasters or a response to a influenza virus outbreak like Novel Influenza A (Swine Flu). It usually takes a really bad deal to remind everyone how important an initial response and attack is, in order to combat these type of things.

   But what this story missed, and was ‘oh so close’ to mentioning, was the importance of Incident Command to the initial response to an incident like a pandemic.  Incident Command is the answer, and it is also something that has been federally mandated by DHS.  But what does that really mean, you might ask?

   It means that the US government has recognized the power and efficiency of such a system, based on it’s usage during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the hurricane responses the last couple of years and the fires that ravage the west every summer.  It is a simple command language and structure, that all units involved can rally around and understand.  That is a powerful thing, because the emergency response that is most organized and most flexible to answer the rapid pace of an evolving incident, will win.  It has been proven time and time again, hence why it is the preferred command structure for emergency response in the US.

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Saturday, March 28, 2009

Building Snowmobiles: Using Letters of Marque to Battle Drug Cartels and Terrorists

   First off, this post is not an endorsement of Ron Paul, and I purposely try to keep it apolitical here.  My goal with this post was to present the ideas of the Letter of Marque, and it’s possible use in the wars dealing with drugs or terrorism. This is a tool of government, that has been used for a long time in the history of this world.  It’s only in modern times that we have drifted away from these tools.  In some cases, countries have made the Letter of Marque illegal, and that is too bad.  But with Mexico and the US, it is still on the books and we purposely did not sign the Declaration of Paris because we wanted to retain our right to use privateers.  Interesting stuff I thought, and applying this old tool to today’s problems is to me, building a steam powered snowmobile. lol And also to clarify, I am applying the concept of privateering and the Letter of Marque to land operations, as well as sea.

   I also found out that the last time the US used privateers was at the beginning of World War II. The United States Navy issued a Letter of Marque to the Airship Resolute on the West Coast of the United States making it the first time the US Navy commissioned a privateer since the War of 1812. So privateers is not necessarily that old of an idea in the history of the US.  Throughout the world, it is especially an old idea.  Of course I have also pointed out the use of privateers during my country’s young history, and how important they were, and in this post I wanted to bring the idea up again for today’s problems.

   Imagine if you would, if we issued Letters of Marque to PMC’s, with the express interest in destroying the enemies of the state and allow those PMC’s to profit from that action.  That means if there is a Drug Cartel or Terrorist(s) out there that we want dead or even captured, we issue out these letters and lay out the specific terms of what that PMC could get out of the deal.  Let’s say for a Drug Cartel, that PMC could capture Drug Cartel members and their property, a Prize Court could determine if they were lawfully captured and how much the PMC could take (based on the Letter of Marque), and then issue the award.  That means the PMC could sell the planes, the mansions, the cars, or divvy up any cash.  As for the capture of drugs, the Letter could also state exactly what is to be done with that stuff, in order for a PMC to retain the award.  The draft of the Letter of Marque is extremely important, but not impossible to make.  Best of all, the Letter of Marque is backed up by the US Constitution.

   How about all of these bounties we issue for terrorists and drug cartels? We are trying to insert a financial incentive to the equation of capturing enemies.  The next step is to just issue these letters, and I just don’t see the reasoning for not doing this?  Perhaps a lawyer or any experts in Constitutional Law could explain why Letters of Marque could not be used to deal with some of our modern day issues? What is the resistance to this?  

   Another point I wanted to make is that Mexico has a history of using privateers as well, and they didn’t sign the Declaration of Paris either.  They could set up a similar deal in their country in regards to the Letter of Marque, and implement this tool against the Drug Cartels.  Or join with the US, and allow companies with this document to come in and do what they have to do. The best part about all of this, is if a company is out of control or the war is over, the issuing country could just null and void the document, or put a expiration date on it.  So it would benefit the PMC to follow the Letter of Marque and not violate the agreement–or in other words, from privateer to pirate.  

     I could see the same thing being done in Pakistan.  In both Mexico and Pakistan, you will never see US troops on the ground and that would make things really bad.  Instead, the US could issue these documents to companies operating in those countries who are willing to go after the enemies of the US. Or Pakistan could issue Letters.(I don’t know if they signed any agreements forbidding it) This could also be used in for dealing with actual pirates in the Gulf of Aden–go figure?  We have used this sucker before, we can use it again. 

     And going back to the profit of this activity, a Prize Court would have to be used to divvy up what assets these companies captured and if the actions of the company was held to the Letter.  In the Letter, things like the financial assets of that organization would be fair game.  Even the weapons could be sold off, or that government would pay for drugs captured as per agreement.  The key component of this concept, is to make it profitable to go after these unique, and stateless enemies, yet not declare war on entire countries to get it done. If done properly, this could work, and there is certainly historical proof that this model is feasible.  Actually, I owe the humble beginnings of my country to the concept.  –Matt 

Letter of Marque 

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Privateering eventually died out as nations increased the sizes of their regular navies.  In 1856, the maritime nations of the world signed the Declaration of Paris that outlawed privateering.  Three nations–Mexico, Spain, and the United States–did not sign.

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Thursday, January 1, 2009

Al Qaeda: Governance of the Wilderness and AQ’s Plan B

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Publications — Tags: , , , — Matt @ 1:30 PM

     I stumbled upon this book while reading through John Robb’s Global Guerillas, and thought it belonged here. Sheik Abu-Bakar al Naji (al Qaeda’s lead warfare theorist), wrote the book Governance of the Wilderness which discusses the thought process and theories for Al Qaeda’s war against the west.  I know this article is from last summer, but better late than never.

     Robb mentioned these three key points of the book, and here they are:

System disruption. “countless small operations” that “target oilfields, sea and airports, tourist facilities and especially banking and financial services” to weaken the state and create a “wilderness.” 

Temporary autonomous zones and primary loyalties “Islamists in the ‘wilderness’ must create parallel societies alongside existing ones.”

Avoid control of a state don’t “set up formal governments, which would be subject to economic pressure or military attack.”  

    Although I have heard that this book is just a re-hashing of their other manifesto, ‘The Management of Savagery’ , I would still like to read it. Unfortunately, Amazon does not sell this book, so I have to get bits and pieces of it from where I can. If any of the readers have a source, I will definitely post it here. –Matt  

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AL QAEDA’S PLAN B

By AMIR TAHERI

New York Post

July 1, 2008 —

No one should feel safe without submitting to Islam, and those who refuse to submit must pay a high price. The Islam ist movement must aim to turn the world into a series of “wildernesses” where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security.

These are some of the ideas developed by al Qaeda’s chief theoretician, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in his new book “Governance in the Wilderness” (Edarat al-Wahsh).

Middle East analysts think that the book may indicate a major change of strategy by the disparate groups that use al Qaeda as a brand name.

The Saudi police seized copies of the book last week as they arrested 700 alleged terrorists in overnight raids.

Naji’s book, written in pseudo-literary Arabic, is meant as a manifesto for jihad. He divides the jihadi movement into five circles – ranging from Sunni Salafi (traditionalist) Muslims (who, though not personally violent, are prepared to give moral and material support to militants) to Islamist groups with national rather than pan-Islamist agendas (such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Filipino Moro Liberation Front).

All five circles are at an impasse, says Naji. Some accept the status quo while hoping to reform it. Others have tried to set up governments in a world dominated by “infidel” powers, and have been forced to abandon Islamic values. Still others failed because they didn’t realize that the only way to win is through total war in which no one feels safe.

NAJI claims that the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 marked the start of “the most dangerous phase in history.” Those events put all Arab countries, the heartland of Islam, under domination by the “infidel”- who later continued to rule via native proxies.

In Naji’s eyes, it is impossible to create a proper Islamic state in a single country in a world dominated by “Crusaders.” He cites as example the Taliban – which, although a proper Islamic regime, didn’t survive “infidel” attacks and opposition by Afghan elements.

Instead, he says, the Islamic movement must be global – fighting everywhere, all the time, and on all fronts.

SINCE 9/11, Islamist terror movements have been debating grand strategy. Osama bin Laden had theorized that the “infidel,” led by the United States, would crumble after a series of spectacular attacks, just as the Meccan “infidel” government did when the Prophet Muhammad launched deadly raids against its trade routes. Yet the 9/11 attacks didn’t lead to an “infidel” retreat. On the contrary, the “Great Satan” hit back hard.

That persuaded some al Qaeda leaders that a new strategy of smaller, slower but steadier attacks was needed. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s No. 2, has advocated such a strategy since 2003, arguing that the jihad should first target Muslim countries where it has a chance of toppling the incumbent regimes.

Now Naji takes that analysis a step further – suggesting that low-intensity war be extended to anywhere in the world with a significant Muslim presence.

Islamists in the “wilderness” must create parallel societies alongside existing ones, Naji says – but not set up formal governments, which would be subject to economic pressure or military attack.

These parallel societies could resemble “liberated zones” set up by Marxist guerrillas in parts of Latin America in the last century. But they could also exist within cities, under the very noses of the authorities – operating as secret societies with their own rules, values and enforcement.

But they could also take shape in Western countries with large Muslim minorities: The jihadis are to begin by giving areas where Muslims live a distinctly Islamic appearance, by imposing special styles of dress for women and beards for men. Then they start imposing the shariah. In the final phase, they create a parallel system of taxation and law enforcement, effectively taking the areas out of government control.

The “wilderness” will provide the cover for bases for jihad operations. Jihad would be everywhere, rather than in just one or two countries that the “infidel” could hit with superior firepower.

IN a notable departure from past al Qaeda strategy, Naji recommends “countless small operations” that render daily life unbearable, rather than a few spectacular attacks such as 9/11: The “infidel,” leaving his home every morning, should be unsure whether he’ll return in the evening.

Naji recommends kidnappings, the holding of hostages, the use of women and children as human shields, exhibition killings to terrorize the enemy, suicide bombings and countless gestures that make normal life impossible for the “infidel” and Muslim collaborators.

Once parallel societies are established throughout the world, they would exert pressure on non-Muslims to submit. Naji believes that, subjected to constant intimidation and fear of death, most non-Muslims (especially in the West) would submit: “The West has no stomach for a long fight.”

The only Western power still capable of resisting is the United States, he believes. But that, too, will change once President Bush is gone.

NAJI makes it clear that the United States is the chief, if not the exclusive target, of jihad at this time. He mentions Israel only once, as “America’s little female idol.” His only reference to Palestine is in a historical context.

Naji asks jihadis to target oilfields, sea and airports, tourist facilities and especially banking and financial services. He envisages “a very long war,” at the end of which the whole world is brought under the banner of Islam.

He identifies several Muslim countries as promising for establishing “the governance of the wilderness”: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. The implication is that “wilderness” units already exist in nations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Somalia and Algeria.

Naji’s theory is built on the concept of terror as the main organizing principle of the mini-states he hopes to set up everywhere in preparation for the coming Caliphate. He claims that the Prophet himself practiced the tactic by making his enemies in Medina, where he ran his version of the “wilderness,” pay “the maximum price” for any deviance, and through constant raids on trade caravans belonging to his enemies in Mecca.

IN a simple language, Naji of fers a synthesis of the themes that appeal to different jihadi groups. With anti-imperialist sentiments, missionary dreams, ethnic and class grievances and puritanical obsessions, he mixes a deadly cocktail.

Naji’s message is stark: Western civilization is doomed. Its last bastion, America, lacks the will for a long war. The “infidel” loves life and treats it as an endless feast. Jihadis have to ruin that feast and persuade the “infidel” to abandon this world in exchange for greater rewards in the next.

Amir Taheri’s next book, “The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution,” is due out this fall.

Story Here

Wednesday, November 26, 2008

News: Mumbai Shootings, Grenade Attacks Kill at Least 78, Western Hostages Taken

Filed under: India,News — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 12:51 PM

    The hostages taken part was something I just found out through other news.  This is ongoing, and the story is evolving. It sounds a lot like last summer’s attack, and they are saying this Indian Mujahadeen.  The attacks are focused on Westerners. Some reports are even saying 40 are dead, and there are several attacks going on simultaneously. –Head Jundi

Edit:  At least 78 dead according to Indian media, Decan Mujahadeen are claiming responsibility.  

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Mumbai Shootings, Grenade Attacks Kill at Least 16 (Update1)

By Stephen Foxwell and Sumit Sharma

Nov. 27 (Bloomberg) — Grenade and gun attacks erupted today across Mumbai, India’s financial capital, killing 16 and injuring at least 25, television broadcasts said. Shots were reported near luxury hotels and one of the city’s main rail stations.

Police ringed the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower, Trident and Oberoi hotels and the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus in the south of the city, NDTV reported. Two terrorists were said to be inside the Trident Hotel, in the financial district of Nariman Point, Times TV said.

“Some terrorist incidents are happening, some grenades were lobbed,” A.N. Roy, director general of police for Maharashtra state, said in a telephone interview. “Give us some time to get a clearer picture.”

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