Feral Jundi

   Ok folks, this is cool.  Sometimes I stumble upon stuff that really gets the juices flowing, and this is one of those deals.  Matt has written a very interesting paper that basically talks about using the Letter of Marque as a mechanism to control and manage PMC’s.  That with our current system, there is not an efficient means of putting checks and balances on what PMC’s do in the name of the country, and that a direct link with congress, via the LoM, would be far more efficient. It would help to alleviate many of the problems that we are bumping up against now.

   This was written back in 2007, but I still think the ideas are spot on, and something to rally around. I also have Matt’s permission to post this. Be sure to check out Matt’s excellent blog called Mountain Runner.  It is a fascinating look at strategic communications with tons of conversations about power and influence.

   By the way, I have also started a Letter of Marque category, just to add another means of easily finding information about the concept. You can also use the Feral Jundi search box, or hit one of the tags. The search box would be the best to retrieve other past discussions about the LoM. –Matt

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Is The Privatization Of Force Organic To Western Liberal Democracy?

By Matthew C. Armstrong

Abstract:

     Popular wisdom maintains that the State holds a monopoly on the use of force and that private military forces are usurpers of this monopoly. Popular wisdom also suggests the use of private military forces is antithetical to the idea of liberal democracy. A review of history shows neither of these are true. By bringing history back into the discussion it is clear the use of private military forces results from decisions based on political economy independent of liberal democratic theories.

     This paper reviews the reality of private military forces and suggests the marginalization and disfavor of mercenaries on land and sea was the result of a political economy and not liberal democratic theories. Reaching back four millennia before Westphalia gives witness to much the same. Sealing off the present from the past leads to false assumptions of the factors that led to the marginalization, but not disappearance, of private force in the nineteenth century. This bracketing of historic events and processes blinds us and prevents seeing and understanding engines of change. Investigating history and it is apparent the history of mercenaries on land and sea begins with the history of war and was subject to changing infrastructural power of the state. The evolution and introduction of liberal democratic principles had little impact on the wholesale removal of mercenaries from the battlefield.

     The return of mercenaries today is marked by systemic changes similar to those of the nineteenth century that pushed private military forces out of mainstream use. However, the return is not complete as the institutional and theoritical structures of before have not been adopted, especially in the central example of the paper, the United States. Whereas the US Congress explicitly authorized and licensed private military force in the past it has implicitly done so now. Before, it explicitly controlled the contracts and monitoring. Today, it does nothing. Through public law and investigative powers, Congress has the power restrict the use of PMCs. These powers were exercised before in the interest of the state to protect the national execution of US foreign policy. The failure to act today is an abrogation of the responsibility intended through words and deeds of the Founding Fathers in striking parallel to the culpability at the root of Machiavelli’s misdirected warning. As war is a continuation of politics and military force is central to this, it is understandable private military companies are an increasingly important solution tool in the toolbox of US foreign policy in an era of accountability. However, unlike the past, oversight is absent and the agent may represent the principal in distasteful ways without repercussion or acknowledgement.

     The return to mercenaries has not been complete in that the rules governing their use by the employer have not been resurrected. This is not a failure of democracy, liberal or not, but a failure of the hiring client. In fact, in many ways private military companies today have re-democraticized war by allowing almost anyone to participate as they did in the past. It might also be said that instead of outsourcing, we have temporarily “in-sourced” war for the past one hundred and fifty years. Perhaps with that in mind, we can get beyond the hyperbole and discuss privatization in terms of real impact while acknowledging that many of the faults today are rooted in the use and not existence of private forces.

View paper here.

Link to Mountain Runner blog here.

From the author:

“Go ahead and post the paper, but please include the caveat that the author understands it is still a draft, at least in presentation. The arguments are sound but there are likely errors in grammar and punctuation. I do not have any updates nor do I plan to make any.”