Feral Jundi

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Strategy: Smart Power And The Defense Industry

   Boy, this is a long one and this will take you a little bit to read through all the speeches and various articles.  But hey, if you are a student of strategy and are wanting to take a look into the future of defense contracting, you have to figure out what the big boys are thinking and wanting to do.

   What is interesting about ‘Smart Power’, is that it is a concept that gained it’s start as a political buzz word to differentiate one party’s views on foreign policy versus another’s. Which is standard play in the world of politics. Although I would argue that every administration no matter what party, all strive to use smart power in their foreign policy strategies. But hey, I will let the political pundits play that game–I have more important things to talk about.

   With that said, with a new administration comes newly minted foreign policy goals. Smart power is the flag pole that they are rallying around and that is what we all must focus on in order to stay current.

   There are a number of places to research the definition and origins of the concept of smart power.  For this post, I wanted to stick with Matt Armstrong’s definition of smart power because his pays respect to the original strategists who promoted such concepts back in their day.  He built a ‘snow mobile’ out of it, and brought in Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to create four pieces to the definition.(see below)

   Now that we have perspective and reference for smart power, my intention in this post was to highlight what the defense industry thinks about smart power.  Just look at the latest moves of Cerberus, and you will see how important this smart power concept is.  DynCorp, along with other defense companies involved with contracting, are all trying to adapt to the goals of a new administration and their ‘smart power’ focus, and investors are taking notice.  So what does all this mean for security contractors like you and me?

   Training, training, and more training is going to be the wave of the smart power future.  In order to stop a state from failing, you need to get into nation building, and the defense industry is jumping all over that.  From training police and military forces to propping up government institutions, the defense industry is all about training and mentoring. Expect to see more contracts in really bad places in the world, all with a focus on strengthening the recognized government and stabilizing that country.  Those are the places that need expertise and all the help we can give them, and private industry will answer that call.

   We also can provide other necessities of the state.  We can build defenses, enforce borders, build government facilities, create ‘Green Zones’, guard dignitaries or investors (commerce is vital to failed states as well), build infrastructure and provide the necessary support to the U.S. military and federal government as they go around the world and implement ‘smart power’. We are the SysAdmin and the ‘hold and build’ portion of today’s strategies. Security contractors are essential for all of that, whether a local national guard or it being an expat guard.  Someone has to protect these folks as they rebuild a crumbling state.

   Smart power is very friendly to private industry in another way.  Using military for everything when it comes to nation building, is not smart.  If we want to put a civilian face to our diplomacy, as opposed to a menacing military face, then smart power requirements will need civilians.  Of course there will be federal employees providing that civilian face, but that only goes so far, and federal response is no where near as fast as private industry response.  In other words, private industry equals speed, flexibility and scalability.  In a fast paced and highly dangerous world, private military companies with nation building capabilities and built in security mechanisms will be necessary to implement smart power strategies.  Just look at today’s wars and projects throughout the world, and tell me private industry doesn’t have a role in that process?  (might I note that contracting has only increased under the current admin–too bad we get zero recognition for our contribution to smart power)

   Interesting stuff, and let me know what you think. –Matt

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Smart Power is “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently.”  Those familiar with Sun Tzu and Clausewitz will recognize the four elements of Smart Power:

• The target over which one seeks to exercise power—its internal nature and its broader global context. Power cannot be smart if those who wield it are ignorant of these attributes of the target populations and regions.

• Self-knowledge and understanding of one’s own goals and capacities. Smart power requires the wielder to know what his or her country or community seeks, as well as its will and capacity to achieve its goals.

• The broader regional and global context within which the action will be conducted.

• The tools to be employed, as well as how and when to deploy them individually and in combination.

From the Mountain Runner blog.

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What’s “Smart Power”? DynCorp’s Tony Smeraglinolo on six best practices

April 12th, 2010

by JD Kathuria

“Smart power” — ever since Defense Secretary Robert Gates outlined the policy in a 2008 speech, it’s become the emerging tenet for how the United States should approach global security initiatives. Through a mix of military strength and nation-building activities, the aim is to keep “fractured or failed states,” as Gates put it, from teetering on the brink of war — or from requiring the US military, already stretched thin in Iraq or Afghanistan, from having to intervene further.

The urgency for smart power has only grown with the Obama administration’s call for $39.4 billion in funding for civilian foreign operations in fiscal 2011. Now comes the hard part: Determining how smart power can be implemented effectively to address global challenges.

Tony Smeraglinolo is working to cut through that uncertainty. As president of Global Stabilization and Development Solutions for DynCorp International, Smeraglinolo offers up this succinct definition: Smart power requires the application of three D’s — Defense, Diplomacy, and Development.  Since assuming his role in April 2009, Smeraglinolo has helped structure his division at DynCorp to provide all three core competencies.

(more…)

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Publications: Is The Privatization Of Force Organic To Western Liberal Democracy?, By Matthew C. Armstrong

   Ok folks, this is cool.  Sometimes I stumble upon stuff that really gets the juices flowing, and this is one of those deals.  Matt has written a very interesting paper that basically talks about using the Letter of Marque as a mechanism to control and manage PMC’s.  That with our current system, there is not an efficient means of putting checks and balances on what PMC’s do in the name of the country, and that a direct link with congress, via the LoM, would be far more efficient. It would help to alleviate many of the problems that we are bumping up against now.

   This was written back in 2007, but I still think the ideas are spot on, and something to rally around. I also have Matt’s permission to post this. Be sure to check out Matt’s excellent blog called Mountain Runner.  It is a fascinating look at strategic communications with tons of conversations about power and influence.

   By the way, I have also started a Letter of Marque category, just to add another means of easily finding information about the concept. You can also use the Feral Jundi search box, or hit one of the tags. The search box would be the best to retrieve other past discussions about the LoM. –Matt

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Is The Privatization Of Force Organic To Western Liberal Democracy?

By Matthew C. Armstrong

Abstract:

     Popular wisdom maintains that the State holds a monopoly on the use of force and that private military forces are usurpers of this monopoly. Popular wisdom also suggests the use of private military forces is antithetical to the idea of liberal democracy. A review of history shows neither of these are true. By bringing history back into the discussion it is clear the use of private military forces results from decisions based on political economy independent of liberal democratic theories.

     This paper reviews the reality of private military forces and suggests the marginalization and disfavor of mercenaries on land and sea was the result of a political economy and not liberal democratic theories. Reaching back four millennia before Westphalia gives witness to much the same. Sealing off the present from the past leads to false assumptions of the factors that led to the marginalization, but not disappearance, of private force in the nineteenth century. This bracketing of historic events and processes blinds us and prevents seeing and understanding engines of change. Investigating history and it is apparent the history of mercenaries on land and sea begins with the history of war and was subject to changing infrastructural power of the state. The evolution and introduction of liberal democratic principles had little impact on the wholesale removal of mercenaries from the battlefield.

     The return of mercenaries today is marked by systemic changes similar to those of the nineteenth century that pushed private military forces out of mainstream use. However, the return is not complete as the institutional and theoritical structures of before have not been adopted, especially in the central example of the paper, the United States. Whereas the US Congress explicitly authorized and licensed private military force in the past it has implicitly done so now. Before, it explicitly controlled the contracts and monitoring. Today, it does nothing. Through public law and investigative powers, Congress has the power restrict the use of PMCs. These powers were exercised before in the interest of the state to protect the national execution of US foreign policy. The failure to act today is an abrogation of the responsibility intended through words and deeds of the Founding Fathers in striking parallel to the culpability at the root of Machiavelli’s misdirected warning. As war is a continuation of politics and military force is central to this, it is understandable private military companies are an increasingly important solution tool in the toolbox of US foreign policy in an era of accountability. However, unlike the past, oversight is absent and the agent may represent the principal in distasteful ways without repercussion or acknowledgement.

     The return to mercenaries has not been complete in that the rules governing their use by the employer have not been resurrected. This is not a failure of democracy, liberal or not, but a failure of the hiring client. In fact, in many ways private military companies today have re-democraticized war by allowing almost anyone to participate as they did in the past. It might also be said that instead of outsourcing, we have temporarily “in-sourced” war for the past one hundred and fifty years. Perhaps with that in mind, we can get beyond the hyperbole and discuss privatization in terms of real impact while acknowledging that many of the faults today are rooted in the use and not existence of private forces.

View paper here.

Link to Mountain Runner blog here.

From the author:

“Go ahead and post the paper, but please include the caveat that the author understands it is still a draft, at least in presentation. The arguments are sound but there are likely errors in grammar and punctuation. I do not have any updates nor do I plan to make any.”

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