Feral Jundi

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Afghanistan: The Largest US Embassy In The World, Just Got Bigger–511 Million Dollars Bigger!

     Not to mention the 40 million dollars being spent to build two Consulates, one in Mazar-I-Sharif and the other in Herat. So technically, it would be 551 million dollars. No doubt there will also be cost overruns, so this price will go higher.

     A couple of points about this contract worth noting. During the Iraq Embassy debate, there was much heartache about the size and cost of that thing. Of course this was one more dig for the opponents of the war and of the Bush administration. Now fast forward to this Embassy in Kabul, and it’s size and cost, and there was nothing really mentioned about it?  Politically speaking, it was barely a whimper in the news and I heard no bashing of the Obama administration over this move. Hell, I just found out about it today, and I track this stuff. lol

    And yet the expansion and due date of it being built, completely conflicts with the idea that we are wanting to pull out of Afghanistan any time soon. If anything, it just indicates a continuation of our commitment there. That kind of thing is the stuff that pisses off the Taliban big time.  Although I certainly hope that Crazy Karzai will get the picture that he needs to stop making deals with the Taliban, and put a little faith in the process under the new command of Petraeus.

    This Embassy expansion also signifies a certain future that the security contracting community will be a big part of. That would be the WPS program and all of it’s security requirements. These Consulates and Embassy will be packed with civilian specialists and diplomats, all tasked with going out into the hinterlands of Afghanistan to do their business. Private security contractors in the form of PSD teams will be the guys to get them out there and back in one piece. PSC’s will also be the guys protecting these Consulates and Embassy, and as the military draws down in the future, these folks will be very important to the static security mission there.

     Iraq will also be the one to watch as this progresses. There will be many lessons learned in Iraq that can be applied to Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world. The WPS program will certainly be an intriguing wartime venture between private industry and government to watch as this unfolds. –Matt

US to spend 500 million dollars on embassy in Afghanistan

Nov 3, 2010

KABUL — The United States is bolstering its presence in Afghanistan with a 500 million dollar expansion of its Kabul embassy and the construction of two consulates, it announced Wednesday.

Washington’s Kabul embassy is already its biggest in the world, with about 1,100 employees, projected to rise to 1,200 by the end of the year, officials said.

Hundreds have arrived over the course of this year as part of a “civilian surge” bringing development experts into the country to compliment the military effort already in its 10th year.

The United States and NATO have 150,000 troops in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban-led insurgency, following a military surge aimed at speeding an end to the war.

The embassy expansion contract was worth 511 million dollars and had been awarded under US law to an American company, Caddell Construction Inc., ambassador Karl Eikenberry said.

Another two contracts, worth 20 million dollars each, have been awarded for the construction of consulates in Herat, the main city in western Afghanistan, and Mazar-I-Sharif in the north, he said.

(more…)

Sunday, November 14, 2010

History: The Gunner And The U-Boat, By Hugh Perkins

     To the victor the spoils. There was an immediate cash gratuity to be shared among Inverlyon’s reservist crew members. All hands were also eligible for Admiralty bounty money, but that would not be forthcoming until April 1923*. Gunner Jehan was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, a well-deserved accolade for a surprisingly successful action in which a lot of nerve, nine rounds of 3-pounder and a few dozen rounds of small arms ammunition sank a U-boat. The Admiralty also singled out the actions and steadiness of the gun’s crew and Skipper Philip’s attempt to rescue the German submariner.

     This is a great little story about a Q-ship versus a U-boat during World War One. It would take a lot of nerve for the captain of a scamp (see below) to take on a submarine. Especially the type that had sunk so many British and Allied vessels during that war.

    The concept of the Q-ship was developed during this war and it was referenced here on the blog as a possible strategy to use against today’s pirates. Imagine a bunch of modern day yachts, cruising around the gulf with some Barrett’s and RPG’s just looking for trouble? lol

    I also wanted to highlight how this Q-ship crew was used for warfare. They were all brought into the Royal Navy auxiliary as volunteers, and they were paid with ‘immediate cash gratuity’ and with Admiralty (Navy command) bounties for every German U-boat crew member killed. (£5 per crewman on a submarine) Hmmm, paying bounties for killing the enemy–now that doesn’t get much attention for that war.

    The really funny part about this story was the fact that after this little sailboat sank the U-boat, the submarine actually got hung up in the fishing net they had been pulling behind them. Talk about a big fish? lol

     Boy, if any movie folks out there are looking for a cool story, this would make for a great short film. It truly is a modern day version of David and Goliath and high seas bounty hunting. –Matt

 

This is what a ‘smack’ would have looked like during that time.

The Gunner and the U-Boat

September 2008

By Hugh Perkins

A lone gunner on a small trawler dueled a German U-boat to the finish in a David and Goliath-type contest

The story of the U-boat war against Allied merchant shipping during The Great War is one of enormous tragedy, incredible human suffering, sacrifice and bravery, Destruction of lives and ships on such a massive scale and by such an unusual means had never before happened in the history of the seafaring world. Once the potential inherent in the U-boats had been tested, the German Admiral staff did its utmost to isolate Great Britain from outside support, first with a U-boat blockade of the British Isles and later, through the wholesale destruction of her sea-borne trade on the high seas far from war-torn Europe. The German objective was to bring Britannia to her knees through starvation thus putting an end to the war on German terms. They came alarmingly close to succeeding.

During 1915, when the U-boat force began its first concerted campaign and shipping losses started to rise, the Royal Navy found itself completely unprepared to deal with the submersible marauders. Both the Admiralty and the mercantile community cast about for solutions to the problem.

Convoy, a defensive tactic that had been employed with success in sailing ship days, was not favored by either group. The Admiralty did not have the escort ships and the steamship captains did not want to give up their independence. Other means of protecting the merchant fleet were sought.

The first countermeasure to be tried was the containment of the U-boats using mine fields, nets and patrols. This was continued throughout the course of the war and ultimately mines destroyed more U-boats than any other single means. Another idea, and that best liked by the mercantile community, was to arm merchant ships so that by a combination of speed, maneuvering and gunfire they could fight it out with their adversaries.

This worked fairly well for the large, fast, modern ships when the U-boat cooperated by surfacing first, and many a steamer was actually saved by these tactics. Mounting a gun on a merchantman, however, had its drawbacks for it gave the U-boat captain the excuse he needed to sink the ship without warning. For the multitude of slow steamers, older ships and sailing vessels there was no real safety and they paid heavily. The best that could be done was to provide them with wireless sets so that ships in distress could at least call for help within the limited range of the early instruments.

Another solution was the creation of the now-famous Q-ships, an assortment of converted merchant vessels and small warships built to resemble merchant ships, manned by Naval crews and armed with concealed guns, depth charges and even torpedo tubes. These ships plied the trade routes like any other innocent merchantmen, sometimes under neutral colors, in the hopes of being challenged by German submarines, much like bait in a mobile trap. When a U-boat’s periscope was sighted, or one surfaced nearby and ordered them to heave-to, a “panic party” dressed as merchant seamen would tumble into the lifeboats and abandon ship while the gun crews stayed under cover at their hidden guns. Once the U-boat came within easy range, the white ensign was run up, the shields were dropped and the guns opened fire to destroy the submarine before it could dive out of danger.

At least, that was the idea. Sometimes it worked very well, sometimes not. Occasionally the Uboat would torpedo the Q-ship without ever revealing herself. On a number of occasions, better armed German submarines stood-off and shelled the Q-ship either forcing her to open fire prematurely to save herself or reducing the “trapship” to a sinking condition before she could bring her guns into action. There were some very lively actions between decoy ships and submarines with casualties aplenty on both sides.

Q-ships came in all shapes and sizes but one of the earliest, and most humble, must have been the converted fishing vessel known as His Majesty’s Armed Smack Inverlyon. She was based at Lowestoft on the Suffolk coast. Like dozens of her ilk, Inverlyon was a bluff-bowed, flushdecked, two-masted, fore-and-aft rigged, little vessel sporting a stubby bowsprit. She had no engine and relied entirely on a suit of patched, broom, canvas sails and the skill of her crew for mobility. For armament, Inverlyon was fitted with a single 3pounder (47mm) quick-firer, a popgun by anybody’s standards but about all that could be carried in such a small vessel.

(more…)

Friday, November 12, 2010

Building Snowmobiles: Corporate Insurgency, By Professor David James

     So I thought I would put this up as a ‘building snowmobiles’ post, because A. it mentions the OODA loop as applied to business and B. they are copying some of the strategies that work for today’s insurgents or pirates, and applying it to business as well.

     I really wish I could find a copy of Corporate Insurgency though, or get the professor onto the blog here to discuss the concept a little more. This story was also taken from the Economist.

     The main theme here is to leverage the power of small forces against larger forces, or for larger forces to act like smaller forces to compete with them in business.  Insurgents will not take on armies directly, and will try to attack the bigger foe’s weakest parts. Professor James talks about how businesses can do the same thing in the market place.

     He also talks about the decision making cycle of large companies versus small companies. That in order for large companies to compete with smaller ones, they cannot be micro-managers of the brand. The professor derives examples of this de-centralized type command structure from today’s insurgents in places like Afghanistan. Imagine that, learning business lessons from how the enemy does it’s thing in the war?

     What I really thought was interesting though was the creation of a business ‘commando’ unit for the larger companies. Something that can quickly react to the local situation and can make quick decisions outside the realm of the standard boardroom. This would be ideal for jumping on deals or business that requires speed of decision–something that smaller companies or individuals are more apt to do than lets say the larger companies.

     How I envision a business commando unit in the private military sector, is a group that would seek out business in all parts of the world, or deal with the fast paced nature of the PR world. This kind of group would be ideal for getting the word out about what is going on with a company, or communicating with folks like me for a company’s strategic communications. They could be the ones that provide more of a personal touch to these larger companies, and really explore ways of connecting with potential clients or employees. I am sure there are other areas that these types of units might actually benefit a large PMC or similar defense company, and the imagination is the only limitation.

     My final thought here, is what lessons could PMC’s learn from pirates or insurgents?  Well I have talked about the New Rules of War in the past, and the whole OODA thing, but I have really never explored how these strategies of war could be applied to business. By taking the advice of the professor, this might show the way for smaller defense companies to take market share from the bigger PMC’s by jumping on very niche oriented services. For you guys and gals out there with small businesses, hopefully these ideas will help you to focus your energies on the niches in the market place that will give you a higher chance of success. Do you want to compete directly with a company like DynCorp for the big contracts, or do you want to become successful by tackling the small and unique types of business that DynCorp is not quick enough to jump on? Food for thought. –Matt

Pirate copy

What managers can learn from Somali pirates

November 07, 2010

PURVEYORS of management-speak are fond of quoting cod insights from military strategists. According to David James, a professor at Henley Business School, they would do better studying the management styles of some of those the armed forces are fighting, such as Somali pirates. Alongside Paul Kearney, a lieutenant-colonel in the Royal Marines, Professor James has been studying the operations of the pirates, as well as insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, to see if they have anything to teach legitimate firms.

The threat to life and liberty aside, Somali pirates’ business model is impressive. According to the professor, each raid costs the pirates around $30,000. On average one raid in three is successful. The reward for a triumphant venture, however, can be in the millions.

The organisation behind the pirates would be familiar to many ordinary businesses. For a start, they have a similar backend—including the kind of streamlined logistics and operations controls that would be the envy of most companies. Their success has even prompted one village to open a pirate “stock exchange”, where locals can buy shares in up to 70 maritime companies planning raids.

But Professor James believes that the most important lesson firms can learn is one of strategy. He teaches his MBA class that one reason for the pirates’ success is that they avoid “symmetrical” conflict—challenging their targets head on by, for example, lining up against the Western navies patrolling the waters—battles they would surely lose. Instead, they use stealth and surprise, attacking targets at their weakest point. In this way, with only a dozen-or-so sailors, they wrest control of huge assets, in the form of oil tankers.

This is a lesson that serves smaller companies well as they look to take bites out of larger rivals. It might be foolish, for example, for a start-up to take on one of the traditional banks head-to-head—only another large bank could afford the pyrrhic battle that would ensue from it protecting its market. But by picking a small, localised fight a start-up can make an impression before a bank has had time to react. An example, says Professor James, is wonga.com. It has taken market share by attacking banks’ inflexible lending policies by offering loans for the exact amount and length of time the customer wants. It processes the loans extremely quickly and customers can even get immediate approval using an iPhone app.

(more…)

Maritime Security: Somali Piracy Getting Worse Despite The Efforts Of Worldwide Navies

     Man, this is not a very good report card about the effectiveness of the current strategy. It also shows to me that the pirates are getting better at what they are doing, and they are also increasing their reach.

     Not to mention the scalability of the whole thing. If an operation costs $ 30,000, and a pirate has fetched millions of dollars in ransom in the past, then with each ransom, they can dramatically scale up the amount of operations. This increases the odds of success. The numbers below speak for themselves.

     Now on to the solutions. There are two things that have to happen that the world community just does not have the will to do, or the spine to promote, in order to stop this. They have to effectively deal with the problems in Somalia on land, and shipping must have a viable means to protect itself on the high seas. In my book, ‘viable means’ is defined as armed security on every boat.

     Along with those armed security professionals, must also come the legal mechanism necessary to allow this force to do what it needs to do.  Here on the blog I continue to promote how countries could provide such a legal mechanism through the granting of the Letter of Marque (LoM). I have also posted numerous legal treatments on the subject here on the blog with the hopes that folks will start thinking about the concept.

     The other area of interest for me is that as pirates become more asset rich, the possibilities of seizing their assets on the high seas or somehow taking what they stole, increases. With a LoM system right now, there is nothing of value that the pirates have because they have such low operating costs.  So the LoM would only serve as a legal framework for PSC’s to protect vessels.

     But as ship owners continue to pay ransoms and pirates begin to upgrade to more valuable ships and hardware, I could see a day where a privateer might benefit from the seizure of a prize like this.

     A privateer might also be able to benefit by retrieving that ransom money somehow. Either on the high seas right after the exchange, or if they were able to get on land and take it from the pirate. My thoughts on the matter is that if there is any mechanism at all for allowing companies to legally take from the pirates, then now you would have a competitive strategy to counter the current piracy business model. Pirates profit by taking from the weak, and privateers would profit by taking from the pirates.

     I estimate that a system such as this would eradicate piracy pretty effectively. Just think of the size and scope of such a thing? The entire world and all of it’s private naval industries, armed with licenses to take from pirates, versus a few hundred Somali pirates off the coast of Africa or where ever they want to exist. Out of that process we would see some really innovative and effective pirate hunters, and that is the kind of thing that would put the fear of god into these thugs. I would imagine that some of the best pirate hunters, would be former Somali pirates themselves. Or who knows who would rise to the top in such an environment?

     And if a value was assigned to Somali pirates in the form of bounties, then that would really create the profit motive needed to fuel such an anti-pirate industry. Call it a clash of industries or privateers versus pirates. And get this, today’s shipping companies are creating an asset rich pirate by continuing to pay these ransoms. Until then though, an LoM would probably be most effective as a legal mechanism used to help defend private shipping. –Matt

Somalia Pirates’ Success Rate Rises, Stunting East Africa Economies

By Bill Varner

Nov 2, 2010

The international naval presence off the coast of Somalia is failing to reduce the success rate of pirates whose attacks on commercial ships are stunting the economies of East Africa, the United Nations said.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported to the Security Council that 37 of 164 attacks on ships operating off the coast of Somalia succeeded in the first nine months of this year. That 22.6 percent rate of successful hijackings compares with 17.1 percent, of 193 attempts, for the same period in 2009.

“Piracy in the region has had an immense impact on the economies of East Africa and also the wider world,” Ban said in his report. “International trade routes are threatened and goods in the region as well as Somalia are becoming more expensive. This is made worst by the bleak state of the global economy.”

The pirates concentrate on the Gulf of Aden, a chokepoint leading to the Suez Canal that is used by 30,000 ships a year carrying about one-tenth of world trade. Attacks have spread to the Indian Ocean, as much as 1,000 miles from shore.

The rate of successful hijackings increased even with the presence of warships from the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 25 other nations including the U.S., China, India, Iran and Japan. Commercial ships are using defensive measures such as netting, wire, electric fences and fire hoses to prevent boarding.

More Sophisticated Weapons

Ban said the pirates have countered with more sophisticated weaponry and use of “action groups” consisting of a large command boat towing attack skiffs.

“I am afraid that the problem will not only be with us for a long time to come, but also has the potential to become worse unless both Somalis and the international community address its root causes,” Ban said. “There is an urgent need to combine vital sea-based and judicial counter-piracy initiatives.”

(more…)

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Afghanistan: Moving The Goal Post A Little Further For PSC Shutdown And Troop Withdrawal

     This is classic. In both of these stories below you can see a dramatic change from the original hardline stance of Obama and Karzai on this stuff.  I have mentioned in past blog posts on how both disbanding of PSC’s and troop withdrawals should not be based on some unrealistic timeline. Instead, they should be based on progress and reality on the ground. And guess what? The disbanding of PSC’s by December has changed now to ‘disbanding in stages’, and the July 2011 troop withdrawal date has switched to 2014 for a withdrawal. lol Talk about ‘moving the Goal Post’?-Matt

Afghan security companies to disband in stages

Obama officials moving away from 2011 Afghan date

Afghan security companies to disband in stages

By KATHARINE HOURELD

Wed Nov 10, 2010

KABUL, Afghanistan – After weeks of negotiations, Afghan officials and foreign diplomats have agreed that a shutdown of private security companies in Afghanistan will have to be carried out in several stages, two officials familiar with the talks said Wednesday.

The development indicates a possible compromise over the controversial issue, which has occupied top international diplomats and Afghan officials since President Hamid Karzai in August ordered the closure of private companies that provide security guards in the country.

At the time, Karzai said private security companies would be replaced by Afghan security forces.

But he later backed away from a Dec. 17 deadline for the shutdown, after diplomats said the move threatens billions of dollars worth of reconstruction projects. Up to 40,000 private guards work in Afghanistan, mostly guarding embassies, military convoys and development projects.

An Afghan and a foreign official familiar with the negotiations said Wednesday the two sides now agree the shutdown should be gradual. They said sticking points remain, such as who would be guarding military convoys.

The government must come up with a proposal in five days on the phased shutdown, they also said. Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the negotiations are still ongoing.

Many companies on contracts with the U.S. Agency for International Development have said they can’t insure their staff without private guards.

(more…)

« Newer PostsOlder Posts »

Powered by WordPress