Feral Jundi

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Legal News: DoS Statement On The Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act Of 2012

This is cool. Patrick Kennedy is commenting on this reform act, which will certainly have an impact on contracts with the government for future and current contingency operations. There is also a video of his testimony.

What is of interest is State’s concern of how this law would negatively impact the flexibility they require in order to deal with today’s problems. The Arab Spring is just one example of how quickly things can change out there. Here is the quote:

With regard to the automatic suspension provisions set out in proposed Section 113, we believe that the current, long-standing policy requiring a reasoned decision from the SDO based on a totality of information remains a sound approach, and would have concerns with a provision that imposes automatic suspension and debarment which will likely lead to due process challenges by the affected contractor community and potential court action that could delay necessary action in crisis situations.
Reorganization of Contracting Function (Sec. 131)
We respectfully do not concur with the re-organization of our contracting function proposed in Sec. 131. Defining the acquisition organization of the Department of State in statute would reduce our flexibility and codify the structure, making future adjustments to support new 21st century challenges cumbersome and time consuming. Future legislation would have to be drafted and passed to allow the Department to adjust to the fast changing world of diplomacy, rendering the Department less agile and thereby potentially handicapping the Department’s ability to respond to contingencies. Also, the proposed re-organization would constitute a bureau with not only the contracting function but logistics, motor vehicles, diplomatic pouch, household effects, shipping and storage. If a bureau were to be formed with only the contracting program, it would not be of sufficient size to warrant bureau-level status.

Probably the most relevant section of the statement to the readers of this blog was point about PSC’s and command and control. Here is the quote:

Private Security Contractors (Sec. 202)
The Department has a long history of using contract guards for protection of facilities and personnel stretching back to the 1970s, with enhanced capabilities in the 1990s. Private security contractors (PSCs) are critical to our readiness and capability to carry out American foreign policy under dangerous and uncertain security conditions. Maintaining this capability is particularly important when the Department is taking on expanding missions in contingency operations environments or areas that are transitioning from periods of intense conflict, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
That said, we appreciate the intent of section 202. We have sought to reduce risks associated with using contractors through robust oversight of our PSCs, as in CWC Recommendation 4. Contractors are operationally overseen and contractually managed by direct hire Department of State personnel, and we have instituted cultural training requirements, and contractor behavioral standards of conduct to ensure the professionalism of PSC personnel. The Department is staffed to properly oversee PSC compliance with these contractual requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
State strongly disagrees with the language of paragraph Sec. 202 (b)(1), which has the combatant commander determining whether performance of security functions by contractor personnel for the Department of State in overseas contingency areas is appropriate and necessary. This language is too open-ended and is not acceptable as it infringes upon the Secretary of State’s primary role in leading and carrying out foreign policy. The Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission have statutory responsibility for the safety and security of personnel under Chief of Mission authority. We routinely discuss the security situation in-country with DoD and other agencies present at post; and in situations where U.S. military forces are present, that coordination is intensified and ongoing. We fully comply with OFPP’s new Policy Letter on inherently governmental and critical functions, and our PSCs never engage in combat operations. We hope to work with you and your staff to find mutually acceptable language in this section.

What is interesting here is that 202 (b) (1) is a challenge to State’s control over their security force. It also causes confusion over who is really in charge of that force, which is not good in contingency operations.

If anything, the two groups should work together to ensure State’s security force is on the same sheet of music with the mission. Unity of effort is what should be the focus. But the language of this section is vague as to who is really in control of those forces. So I think State has a point here, but that is my personal opinion. Either way, check it out. –Matt

 

The Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012
Testimony
Patrick F. Kennedy
Under Secretary for Management
Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight
Washington, DC
April 17, 2012
Good morning Chairman McCaskill, Senator Portman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation to appear here today to discuss Senate bill 2139, the Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012.
We share the Committee’s desire to ensure that efforts continue to strengthen contingency contracting. S. 2139 raises a number of important issues. While our review of the bill is ongoing, we welcome the opportunity to discuss our initial views on the bill’s provisions.
We understand that this legislation builds on the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan – an independent, bipartisan panel that you, Senator McCaskill, created along with Senator Webb in 2007. The State Department worked continuously with the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) from when it was formed in early 2008 until it sunset last August, and gained valuable insight from the Commission’s efforts. We have taken many steps to improve our contingency contracting over the past several years, based on the CWC’s reports, recommendations from other oversight entities, and our own lessons learned.
The Department’s participation in CWC’s study was headed by the Office of the Under Secretary for Management and the Bureau of Administration. In addition to numerous meetings with the CWC, senior Department officials testified at seven formal CWC hearings.

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Monday, April 16, 2012

Iraq: No Iraq Visas Issued to USG Security Personnel Since December 2011?

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 1:23 PM

I recently came across a blog post by Diplopundit that was very interesting. They are reporting that no Iraqi Visas have been issued to USG security personnel since December of last year. This is not surprising and I posted about guys getting arrested and hassled last year and this year because of visa/paper work issues. Here is the quote and DoS has yet to refute this or comment over at Diplopundit.

“No visas have been issued to security personnel since December and there is no straight answer coming from the Department of State or the Ministry of Interior.”

What is funny is that the DoS stated this in their travel warning for Iraq.

“The U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. government personnel in Iraq to be serious enough to require them to live and work under strict security guidelines. All U.S. government employees under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador must follow strict safety procedures when traveling outside the Embassy. State Department guidance to U.S. businesses in Iraq advises the use of protective security details.

We also know what the Oil Ministry thinks about private security in Iraq. lol

So how is it that anyone can legally provide this security throughout Iraq if they don’t have visas? So I take it that folks are just sitting at the embassy and not traveling throughout Iraq because their security is without a visa? Or I wonder if any other countries have been denied visas and the US is the only one? (There are various oil interests in Iraq, to include China’s, and I wonder how they are being treated?) Let me know what you think or if you have any updates? –Matt

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Bounties: US Offers $10 Million Bounty For 2008 Mumbai Terrorist– Haviz Mohammad Saeed

In Washington, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters Tuesday the bounty on Saeed is about “justice being done” and that there should be no impunity for those who kill Americans overseas. She emphasized that the reward was not just for information leading to Saeed’s arrest, but also for information leading to his conviction.

Man, let’s get this guy. This is also a great way to snub Pakistan (again, because they deserve it for hiding Bin Laden all of these years and supporting the Taliban) and show some support for India (who does deserve our support and would tick off Pakistan), by helping to nab this guy.  He has been pretty open in Pakistan and so he shouldn’t be hard to find.

What is key with this bounty though, is that the US wants information that will lead to his location and arrest/conviction. So you might be able to locate him, but in order to get the full amount, I think we want a little bit more. I would say information leading to arrest and conviction would be far more valuable in this deal and would probably give that tipster the full amount.

But of course this whole bounty program is a contradiction in terms. By all intents and purposes, this is a bounty.  According to the Rewards for Justice FAQ, bounty hunting is not prohibited with this deal though. So could a company find the guy and get all of the juice on him, and then find some random person to be the ‘lone individual’ to report the whole thing?  I don’t get that.

By offering a reward, aren’t you encouraging bounty hunters?

We strongly discourage bounty hunters and other non-government individuals from pursuing the capture of terrorists; instead, RFJ provides rewards for information that will enable appropriate government authorities to locate and apprehend such individuals.

To me, the DoS should be up front and purposeful about promoting bounty hunting. It is a form of offense industry that if properly constructed, will definitely produce results. At this time, their Rewards For Justice program is terribly inefficient and poorly set up.

They should be reaching out to all and any parties/groups/individuals/companies, and providing a set of rules and licenses in order for them to do what they need to do to find these folks. Issue a Letter of Marque and Reprisal–with an emphasis on ‘reprisal’ and tell these folks to get bonded, and then let them hunt. Matter of fact, let hundreds of groups go hunting, all being innovative and motivated, and turn ol’ Haviz Mohammad Saeed and others like him into a prize. But that would first require the DoS and governments to stop demonizing bounty hunters and utility….. –Matt

 

Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the leader of a banned Islamic group Jamaat-ud-Dawa is seen during an anti-Indian rally to show solidarity with Indian Kashmiris, in Lahore, Pakistan, February 5, 2010.

 

Wanted : Information leading to the arrest and conviction of Hafiz Mohammad Saeed –Up to $10 Million
Place of Birth : Sargodha, Punjab Province, Pakistan
Date of Birth : 06/05/1950
Sex : Male
Hair : Red
Eyes : Brown
Nationality : Pakistani
Citizenship : Pakistan
Hafiz Mohammad Saeed is a former professor of Arabic and Engineering, as well as the founding member of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a radical Deobandi Islamist organization dedicated to installing Islamist rule over parts of India and Pakistan, and its military branch, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Saeed is suspected of masterminding numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 166 people, including six American citizens.
The Republic of India has issued an Interpol Red Corner Notice against Saeed for his role in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Additionally, the United States Department of the Treasury has designated Saeed as a Specially Designated National under Executive Order 13224.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2001. In April 2008, the United States designated Jamaat-ud-Dawa as a Foreign Terrorist Organization; similarly, the United Nations declared Jamaat-ud-Dawa a terrorist organization in December 2008.
Link to Rewards for Justice bounty here.
—————————————————————-
US Offers $10 Million Bounty for 2008 Mumbai Terror Suspect
April 03, 2012
The United States is offering a bounty of up to $10 million for the Pakistani man accused of masterminding the deadly 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.?The State Department’s “Rewards for Justice” website on late Monday announced the reward for information leading to Hafiz Mohammad Saeed’s capture and conviction. The reward is the second highest bounty offered by the U.S.

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Thursday, February 9, 2012

Iraq: US Embassy Staff Might Be Reduced, And Iraq Continues To Hassle PSC’s

Approved movements have been subject to stops, detentions and confiscation of equipment without justification, impacting delivery of equipment, supplies, and materials to the US embassy, bases and offices throughout the country,” said the letter, a copy of which was obtained by AFP.
The Congressional Research Service said last May that the State Department estimated the number of security contractors working for it in Iraq would reach 5,500, “with some 1,500 providing personal security for diplomatic movements and an additional 4,000 providing perimeter security.”
Brooks said “our hope is that the US government will be a bit more proactive,” as the government and embassy, in “our impression, has not been very active in trying to help the Iraqis address this problem.

This first story below is from the New York Times, so take it with a grain of salt. lol And of course as soon as it came out, an edit was made that showed that the NYT jumped the gun a little on this. With that said, it is wise that if you are in WPS (mobile or static security), or one of the numerous contractors assigned to do convoy operations for logistics, then it pays to pay attention to this stuff.

The second story just emphasizes what Iraq is doing to security companies as they try to operate there. If the Embassy can’t get supplies, then point the finger at Iraq for holding up those convoys at the border or for hassling security contractors about paper work/visas/licenses that Iraq has failed provide or update.

In short, things in Iraq are getting a little dicey now that the troops are gone, and the US mission there is having to adjust to this new environment. This was to be expected and there will be many hiccups along the way. The US is also experiencing economic issues and an upcoming election. So cost savings will be a factor, and reducing waste in our overseas operations will be necessary if the current administration wants to show it is serious about saving money (and getting re-elected as a result).

But this administration does not want a failed Iraq mission under it’s belt. They have already cut the troops from Iraq earlier than expected, which is not the smartest thing strategically, but it makes sense politically. But cutting security will only add one more planet into alignment for a really bad situation or situations that could truly stain a political campaign. Security should be the last thing you mess with, and especially in that chaotic and extremely dangerous environment.

There is also politics and corruption in Iraq that is impacting operations. A visa or license or whatever is required for the companies to operate can be a simple and fair process if Iraq wants these companies there. Or it can be a complex and unfair process if these officials have other things in mind. Maybe they are looking for kickbacks, and purposely targeting foreign companies so that Iraq companies are able to secure all of this work. Especially for supplying the embassy, or for oil related security contracts. (Strategy Page is echoing the same thing in their post about PSC’s in Iraq and the Embassy)

Perhaps this was a concession when the Sunni-bloc came back in to join parliament? Perhaps there is a focus on attacking logistics using government and political mechanisms, so that the Embassy is forced to reduce in size so it can be weaker for an attack. Or get more Iraqis involved with working at the Embassy, so as to get more spies or even attackers on the inside?

Who knows? All I know is that there is a reason why Iraq is doing this, and that reason often revolves around money or extortion of some sort. Meaning ‘if you do this, maybe we will do this’. We see the same thing happening in Afghanistan, and maybe Iraq is taking notes from the Afghans on how to play the US. It is ironic to me that we have the largest Embassies in the world in both countries, have expended much American/Coalition blood and treasure in both countries, and yet simple matters like visas, licenses or even a MOU or SOFA cannot be worked out? That corruption in these countries is trumping our so-called ‘diplomatic’ missions there. Certainly we can do better and get better for what has been invested.

The other thing I wanted to mention is that there is a third party that has a say so in this matter. That would be the insurgents and jihadists in Iraq who are in the shadows and doing all they can to attack Iraq and the US mission there. You also have Iran doing what they can to exert influence. You can slash the staff at the Embassy, but the security requirement to protect that Embassy does not change. That’s unless the grounds of the Embassy are slashed as well and given back to the Iraqis.

But as you give up more ground, then that gives more ground to the enemy so they can maneuver closer for attacks. If patrols in the area decrease, then that means the enemy can launch more mortars/rockets, drive more VBIED’s, or use more suicide assaulters. So security is still essential and will be even more important as you give up more territory.

I could see the mobile side of WPS decreasing a little, but not by much. If there is still going to be 1,000 diplomats as opposed to 2,000 diplomats (if they are halved according to the article), then those 1,000 will still have to do their missions in Iraq. Or does state plan on never leaving their Embassy?

We could also have an extremely small footprint in Iraq, and bring it on par with the size of other Embassies in the world. But there are a couple of issues that are front and center for the US, which to me justifies a presence there. Oil, Iran, Jihadists and the continuing collapse of regimes in the Middle East because of the Arab Spring (Syria comes to mind). If we can keep Iraq functioning and focused on their oil goals, and goals for their nation’s well being, then that is a good thing. How many diplomats that takes and how we do that is out of my lane. But these are considerations when we think about why we are there.

Now the one thing that looked like it was getting a look for cuts was the police training contract, and that would also include all the logistics required for that. So that might be a big savings and reduction right there.

One State Department program that is likely to be scrutinized is an ambitious program to train the Iraqi police, which is costing about $500 million this year — far less than the nearly $1 billion that the embassy originally intended to spend. The program has generated considerable skepticism within the State Department — one of the officials interviewed predicted that the program could be scrapped later this year — because of the high cost of the support staff, the inability of police advisers to leave their bases because of the volatile security situation and a lack of support by the Iraqi government.

Interesting stuff and I would like to hear what you guys think? Either way, I will keep my eye on this as it develops. –Matt

Edit: 02/10/2012- It looks like State is trying to clarify a little more as to what they plan on doing. Here is a quote below. Also be sure to follow Diplopundit’s take on the whole thing, because they are also questioning the security cuts (if made), and who would step in as replacements (maybe Iraqi security?). I doubt they would go this path and DoS is not about to put the lives of it’s diplomats at the hands of Iraqi security forces….quite yet.

The State Department has asked each component of the massive U.S. diplomatic mission in Baghdad to analyze how a 25 percent cut would affect operations, part of a rapidly moving attempt to save money and establish what a top official on Wednesday called “a more normalized embassy presence.”
“We’re going to be looking at how we’re going to do that over the next year,” said Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides. “What we’re not going to do is make knee-jerk decisions” that could jeopardize the security of the thousands of U.S. citizens working in Iraq, he said.

 

US Embassy in Iraq.

 

U.S. Planning to Slash Iraq Embassy Staff by as Much as Half
By TIM ARANGO
February 7, 2012
Less than two months after American troops left, the State Department is preparing to slash by as much as half the enormous diplomatic presence it had planned for Iraq, a sharp sign of declining American influence in the country.
Officials in Baghdad and Washington said that Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and other senior State Department officials were reconsidering the size and scope of the embassy, where the staff has swelled to nearly 16,000 people, mostly contractors.
The expansive diplomatic operation and the $750 million embassy building, the largest of its kind in the world, were billed as necessary to nurture a postwar Iraq on its shaky path to democracy and establish normal relations between two countries linked by blood and mutual suspicion. But the Americans have been frustrated by what they see as Iraqi obstructionism and are now largely confined to the embassy because of security concerns, unable to interact enough with ordinary Iraqis to justify the $6 billion annual price tag.

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Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Quotes: My Security Colleagues Would Call It ‘Getting Off The X’–Patrick Kennedy

Filed under: Iraq,Quotes — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 8:16 AM

So I wonder if Mr. Kennedy has talked with the enemy in Iraq about this whole ‘getting off the X’ thing? lol Because somehow I don’t think they plan on playing by the rules.-Matt

 

“My security colleagues would call it ‘getting off the X’,” Kennedy said. “We run. We go. We do not stand and fight. We will execute a high-speed J-turn and we will get as far away from the attackers as we possibly can.” –Patrick Kennedy, US State Department’s Under Secretary of State For Management on DoS Iraq security contractors.

 

 

 

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