Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues.
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So why is it that we federalize airport security, yet privatize nuclear security? I think this GAO report pretty much answers that question as to what direction they think security should go for nuclear facilities. The folks at DoE and GAO probably had visions of TSA style security as soon as someone brought up the federalization of nuclear facilities, and that probably shut down the idea right then and there. lol
Any way, I thought they had some interesting conclusions in the report. Harden up the forces and make them more like the military (training and such), provide one set of standards and pay for all the sites (no brainer there), and insure the contractors are getting taken care of for retirement stuff (so they have incentive to do well, and stay with the program). Sounds good, and I hope this is implemented. –Matt
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Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues
GAO-10-275 January 29, 2010
Summary
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy’s (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. DOE also has considered whether the current system of separate contracts for protective forces at each site provides sufficiently uniform, high-quality performance across its sites. Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to review protective forces at DOE sites that possess Category I SNM. Among other things, GAO (1) analyzed information on the management and compensation of protective forces, (2) examined the implementation of TRF, and (3) assessed DOE’s two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces.
Over 2000 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites that have long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE protective forces at each of these sites are covered under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements between contractors and protective force unions. As a result, the management and compensation–in terms of pay and benefits–of protective forces vary. Sites vary in implementing important TRF requirements such as increasing the tactical skills of protective forces so that they can better “move, shoot, and communicate” as a unit. While one site has focused on implementing TRF requirements since 2004, other sites do not plan to complete TRF implementation until the end of fiscal year 2011. In addition, broader DOE efforts to manage postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors have raised concerns about a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces. Specifically, protective force contractors, unions, and DOE security officials are concerned that the implementation of TRF’s more rigorous requirements and the current protective forces’ personnel systems threaten the ability of protective forces–especially older members–to continue their careers until retirement age. Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a standardization initiative to centralize procurement of equipment, uniforms, and weapons to achieve cost savings. Under a separate initiative, a DOE study group developed a number of recommendations to enhance protective forces’ career longevity and retirement options, but DOE has made limited progress to date in implementing these recommendations.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from “In process” to “Open,” “Closed – implemented,” or “Closed – not implemented” based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Eugene E. Aloise
Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment
(202) 512-6870
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: To better align protective force personnel policies and systems with DOE’s security requirements for Category I SNM sites, the Secretary of Energy should promptly develop implementation plans and, where needed, undertake additional research for the DOE study group’s 2009 recommendations to improve career longevity and retirement options for protective force personnel. Specifically, for actions such as reviewing the appropriateness of training that the study group identified as low or no cost, unless DOE can state compelling reasons for reconsideration, it should develop and execute implementation plans.
Agency Affected: Department of Energy
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Read report here.
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By Rob Pavey
Wednesday, Feb. 10, 2010
The U.S. Energy Department faces pressing personnel issues within private security forces that guard nuclear weapons material at six locations, including Savannah River Site, according to a new Government Accountability Office report.
The problems involve policies, salaries and equipment — including weapons — that can vary widely from site to site, in addition to concerns that increasingly rigorous training requirements could make it harder for employees of private companies to work until retirement age.
One option involves “federalization,” or replacing the private firms with U.S. military. It was most recently explored in a 2009 study but subsequently rejected.
“Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues,” the GAO concluded.
The private work force includes 2,339 unionized officers and 376 supervisors who “are not uniformly managed, organized, staffed, trained, equipped, or compensated across the six DOE sites,” the report said.
The SRS contractor, Florida-based Wackenhut Services Inc., has a local work force of 823 and is in the process of downsizing to 756.
Other sites that handle “special nuclear material” are Los Alamos National Laboratory, N.M.; the Y-12 National Security Complex, in Oak Ridge, Tenn.; the Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, Texas; the Nevada Test Site; and Idaho National Laboratory, near Idaho Falls. Differences among the sites often result from separate contracts and collective-bargaining agreements between contractors and unions, the report said.
“As a result, the management and compensation — in terms of pay and benefits — of protective forces vary.”
Story here.