Feral Jundi

Monday, June 28, 2010

Publications: GAO Report On DoD’s Progress And Challenges For Logistics In Afghanistan

Filed under: Afghanistan,Aviation,Logistics,Pakistan,Paracargo,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 3:33 PM

     Thanks to David Isenberg for identifying this report and pointing out all the goodies. What was interesting to me was how absolutely vital contractors are to the logistics of the war in Afghanistan.  Especially for the routes coming out of Pakistan, because US military forces are not allowed to escort that stuff.  Nothing new, but as you go through this report, you get the idea of how essential we really are.  It also signifies how important it is that we get a handle on how to manage it all, because logistics is going to be big…. really big.

   Some of the things that jumped up at me as obvious fixes for some of the problems, is to stop depending on Fedex type tracking measures and gadgets, and start depending on humans as the tracking mechanism of this stuff. Because Afghan and Pakistani companies will do all they can to get rid of those GPS trackers, or not even care about these tracking mechanisms.  What matters to them is money and their ability to pilfer the cargo and blame it on a combat loss or whatever. No one is there to stop them or witness them doing this, and they will do whatever they want.  I say put competent expat companies in charge of these deliveries, with expat convoy leaders and teams, and use local Pakistani or Afghani drivers and guards as the manpower/interpreters.  This is the optimum set up if you cannot use the military to escort this stuff, and especially on the Pakistan side.

     The point is, is that you need a human that you can trust on these convoys, because gadgets can be defeated. But you also need something else that is lacking for these convoys.  And that is communications, appropriate fire power and support.  In order to have communications, appropriate fire power and support, you need folks who can help facilitate that.  Because without these basic tools for the defense of convoys, you will continue to see them get attacked and pilfered.

     As more troops pour into Afghanistan, the stability of logistics will be crucial and the current set up is unacceptable. I say put expat companies in charge, set up Pakistani QRFs and air support on their side, and US military QRF and air support on the Afghan side, and call it a day.  These forces are purely dedicated to protecting the contractor led convoys in Pakistan, and if we want, we attach military escorts as they cross into Afghanistan. Hell, we might actually kill a few bad guys along the way, and use these convoys as decoys. If the enemy wants them that bad, they will have to pay a price to get them.

     Or we can allow our logistics to be torn apart by the enemy, and we can allow untrained, mismanaged, corrupt and undisciplined Afghani or Pakistani companies to do whatever they want with that stuff. They will continue to pilfer, they will continue to shoot wildly into towns and villages as they protect convoys, and they will continue to pay off the enemy for safe transport.  That is unacceptable to me, and there is a better way.

     Might I also add that we put expat companies in charge of convoys in Iraq, and that arrangement works far better for any kind of unity of effort between civilian and military forces sharing the roads. Companies like Armorgroup definitely bet their lives on the delivery of goods and people, and they did an outstanding job(they also lost a lot of guys due to their brave work). Our lessons learned from Iraq were also built on this concept of expats being in charge, and not the other way around with Afghanis or Pakistani companies in charge of this stuff.

     Hell, in Iraq, you would see military convoys join in the protection of a expat convoy operations.  But when it came to all Iraqi security companies, military convoys or patrols would have nothing to do with them because they had no way of communicating and they really didn’t trust them. It pays to have expats in charge of operations, and it really pays when those expats have all the tools and support necessary to be successful for those convoy operations.

    I also mentioned in an earlier post about the aviation side of logistics.  The report further emphasized the difficulties that come with aviation logistics in Afghanistan.  It seems we do not have enough space on runways to handle these large transport aircraft. It will take a massive effort to construct more landing strips that can handle the large aircraft, because unfortunately, that stuff requires modern and durable runways.  In Iraq, this wasn’t an issue, but in Afghanistan this is definitely an issue. That is why I thought the STOL aircraft/paracargo contract was interesting. That is the kind of capability that can answer the call for immediate cargo or transport needs, when the troops are in trouble and things are locked up at one of the big air bases. Small and many versus the few and large for logistics. Well, check out the report and let me know what you think. –Matt

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GAO: Preliminary Observations On DoD’s Progress And Challenges In Distributing Supplies And Equipment To Afghanistan

June 25, 2010

Within Afghanistan, cargo is moved to forward operating bases primarily by means of contractor-operated trucks, though military trucking assets are used in some instances.

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Because no U.S. military transportation units operate in Pakistan, DOD must rely solely on private contractors to transport supplies and equipment along ground routes through the country and to provide security of the cargo while in transit. Privately contracted trucks can transport cargo through Pakistan via two routes: the northern, which crosses into Afghanistan at the border town of Torkham, and the southern, which crosses at the border town of Chaman.

*****

Limitations on what items can be transported through Pakistan and the amount of damage sustained by cargo transiting through Pakistan also can delay the delivery of necessary supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Private trucking contractors do not transport sensitive equipment on the Pakistani ground routes. Instead, such equipment must be flown into Afghanistan and then be installed onto the vehicles in Regional Command-East.

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Thursday, May 6, 2010

Publications: GAO Report On Afghanistan Security Environment

Filed under: Afghanistan,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 8:45 AM

   Let me summarize this thing for you, because this is the message I got.  We sent all of these government folks over to Afghanistan, but we don’t have enough military escorts to take them around the country to implement their projects.  In other words, there is a high demand for security. Where is the surge of security contractors needed to get this stuff done?

   They also talk about an increase in attacks and casualties, but that is largely contributed to the idea that there are more targets for the Taliban to go after and we are now in the fighting season (spring, summer).

   Now for my suggestion. If you want security and there are not enough military folks to do the job, then contract it out. Obviously security forces are at a premium there, and soldiers are kind of busy taking the fight to the enemy.  If you want to get more security in that country in order to cover down on all of these projects, and do it quickly, then contract it out.  I know security contractors are not the most favored choice of government these days, but honestly, they don’t have much choice in the matter if they want to do what they gotta do in Afghanistan.  It’s either that, or just send all of these government employees back home because they are waste of space.

   I would also recommend using expats, as opposed to using corrupt local security companies.  Or combine expat companies with local security companies for security operations.  Where there is a will, there is a way. Hell, you could contract out the security of an entire town if you wanted, and contractors could actually be a huge contributor to the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ portion of the COIN strategy.  Leave the ‘clear’ portion of the strategy to the military, and assign what you can to the ‘hold’ forces.

   One last thing, and I hate to beat a dead horse.  There are plenty of reports, lessons learned, SOPs, experienced contractors, expert input, blah blah blah out there to get this done properly.(man is it tiring to continue to read about how poor government is at learning anything. pfffft)  Either way, there should be no excuses for mismanagement of this ‘surge of security contractors’ into Afghanistan that I am talking about. Or we can continue to read about these people who are sitting around and doing nothing because of a lack of security for their operation. –Matt

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GAO Report On Afghanistan Security Environment

May 5, 2010

(one portion of the report below, follow link to read the rest)

Agencies Cite Security Challenges to Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan 

   State’s January 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy cites reconstruction and development as key elements of the overall effort to stabilize Afghanistan and reduce the strength of the insurgency. However, the strategy acknowledges that the success of such civilian programs in Afghanistan is contingent on improved security. In November 2009, we reported that while U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan had made some progress, deteriorating security complicated such efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country.

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Thursday, March 4, 2010

Publications: GAO Concludes That Contractors Are More Cost Effective Than Employees!

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:40 PM

    Well duh. lol You guys don’t have to pay the pensions of contractors when their contract is done and the war is over. Of course the government loves to use this ‘disposable workforce’ called contractors.

     Thanks to David Isenberg who brought this to everyone’s attention through his blog, and you can read his assessment here.

     I do have an issue with the way GAO reworded the one instance that federal employees were more cost effective.  Why training, vetting and recruiting costs were not included in this last one, is interesting.  Is this because politically speaking, they are wanting to promote phasing out security contractors, and the GAO was pressured to write it that way? So instead of adding 240 million with the 162 million dollars to make the ‘grand total cost’ to the government for federal employee security specialists of 402 million dollars, they instead decided to stick with just the 240 million dollar figure? So in order to support their statement that security was not cost effective, they decided to split up the figure…(raised eyebrow) So with my simple math here, I show that private industry is more cost effective than the government for security work.

   Also, I wonder if legal fees and lawsuits were tacked into the costs, because private industry is definitely eating that bill with this war.  Just ask companies like Xe or DynCorp.  And as more legislation is passed, which allows more people to easily sue private industry, and/or makes it more difficult to sue the government, I think this is another area that needs some attention in the accounting process here. A company has to have it’s own costly legal apparatus. The government has a massive legal apparatus already and oodles of laws to protect itself from litigation.

     Just look at the dismal example of how many ‘few successful’ whistleblower cases there have been against government?  Office of Special Counsel should be changed to the Office of Protect the Government. Not to mention all the lawyers assigned to protect the various agencies and departments out there.  The government has a legal shield around it like you can’t believe, and all of it is funded by the tax payer.

   Overall, this is a good publication to show folks as proof that we are more cost effective and we do make sense to the government. So if you are ever in an argument with some dork about the nuts and bolts of contractor efficiency, just pull this sucker up and let the GAO do your talking. –Matt

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Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus Contractors for Security Services in Iraq

GAO-10-266R March 4, 2010

Full Report (PDF, 20 pages)

Summary

In Process

Our comparison of likely State Department costs versus contractor costs for four task orders and one contract awarded by the State Department for security services in Iraq showed that for three of the task orders and the contract, the cost of using State Department employees would be greater than using contractors, while the State Department’s estimated cost to use federal employees was less for the other task order. For example, using State Department employees to provide static security for the embassy in Baghdad would have cost the department approximately $858 million for 1 year compared to the approximately $78 million charged by the contractor for the same time period. In contrast, our cost comparison of the task order for providing personal security for State Department employees while in the Baghdad region–which required personnel that have security clearances–showed that for this task order, the State Department’s estimated annual cost would have been about $240 million, whereas the contractor charged approximately $380 million for 1 year. However, because the State Department does not currently have a sufficient number of trained personnel to provide security in Iraq, the department would need to recruit, hire, and train additional employees at an additional cost of $162 million. Contract requirements are a major factor in determining whether contractors or government personnel are less expensive–especially factors such as whether personnel need security clearances. However, there are other factors that may play a role in the decision of whether to perform security services with federal employees or enough federal employees than to acquire contractors. Additionally, the government could potentially be faced with incurring some administrative costs from having to take actions to reduce government personnel if they are no longer needed. When using contractors, the department also incurs administrative costs for awarding the task orders and contract and providing oversight; however, the State Department was unable to estimate these costs. Finally, some costs associated with providing Iraq security services using federal employees–such as developing new career fields, providing additional overhead, and building new housing–are difficult to quantify.

Link to publication here.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Publications: Report From GAO On Nuclear Private Security Forces

Filed under: Estate Security,Industry Talk,Publications — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 12:28 AM

     Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. 

*****

     So why is it that we federalize airport security, yet privatize nuclear security?  I think this GAO report pretty much answers that question as to what direction they think security should go for nuclear facilities.  The folks at DoE and GAO probably had visions of TSA style security as soon as someone brought up the federalization of nuclear facilities, and that probably shut down the idea right then and there. lol

   Any way, I thought they had some interesting conclusions in the report.  Harden up the forces and make them more like the military (training and such), provide one set of standards and pay for all the sites (no brainer there), and insure the contractors are getting taken care of for retirement stuff (so they have incentive to do well, and stay with the program). Sounds good, and I hope this is implemented. –Matt

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Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues

GAO-10-275 January 29, 2010

Summary

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy’s (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. DOE also has considered whether the current system of separate contracts for protective forces at each site provides sufficiently uniform, high-quality performance across its sites. Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to review protective forces at DOE sites that possess Category I SNM. Among other things, GAO (1) analyzed information on the management and compensation of protective forces, (2) examined the implementation of TRF, and (3) assessed DOE’s two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces.

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Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Industry Talk: GAO Report Critical of State Department’s Diplomatic Security Bureau

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 8:20 AM

     FP is right.  The surge is happening, and the civilian surge will be coming right along with it.  All of those folks are gonna need security, and DoS needs to prepare for that big time. I didn’t know that DoS was this bad off, and you would think that there would have been plenty of lessons learned to guide them and prepare them for future needs.  WPPS will be big in Afghanistan, and how anyone could have missed the planning and preparation for this, is beyond me. –Matt

Edit: 12/09/09 Check out Danger Room’s post on the same thing here.

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Exclusive: GAO report rips State Department’s Diplomatic Security Bureau

From Foreign Policy

Mon, 12/07/2009

The State Department is tripling its civilian presence in Afghanistan, which will require a huge increase in the amount of security needed to look after those civilians. But State’s bureau in charge of protecting its personnel is already stretched thin and the Afghanistan surge could only exacerbate its administrative and strategic shortfalls, according to a soon-to-be-released GAO report, obtained exclusively by The Cable.

It’s a fact of life that operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are a now a huge part of the mission for the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which protects diplomats all over the world. That’s somewhat a legacy of Condoleezza Rice’s “Transformational Diplomacy” initiative, which was meant to expand the U.S. diplomatic presence to include more robust efforts in more dangerous places. Outposts that might have been closed have been kept open, such as in Lahore, Pakistan, putting added burdens on the diplomatic security infrastructure, the report states.

Success in Afghanistan depends on improving the Afghan government and “that makes civilian efforts as vital as military operations and of longer duration,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said just before last Tuesday’s announcement by the president. “We have begun to elevate diplomacy and development alongside defense in our national security strategy, and we are certainly engaged in doing so in Afghanistan.”

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