Thursday, December 24, 2009
Weapons: M41-A Pulse Rifle From the Movie ‘Aliens’, Shoots Real Ammunition!
Jobs: Physical Security Officer, Afghanistan
This might make for a nice job for some folks out there, looking to do some work in Afghanistan. I am not the POC or recruiter for this, and please follow the links below in order to apply. Good luck. –Matt
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Requisition/Vacancy No.39405BR
Position Title Physical Security Officer (612) – Afghanistan (AGS)
Capability Government Services Office
Region Middle East
Office LocationUS – Afghanistan
Education Required Bachelors
Job Description
Essential Duties and Responsibilities
Administration and maintenance of the 3-401stAFSBn physical security program in accordance with AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, Appendix F, FM 19-30, Physical security and CENTCOM OPORD 05-01 within the 3/401st Eastern Regional Command area of responsibility (RC North / East). Conduct physical security inspections and surveys in accordance with AR 190-13, CENTCOM OPORD 05-01, and as required by the ACO or his/her designee. Prepare and update the 3-401st AFSBn physical security plan in accordance with AR 190-13.
Cool Stuff: Merry Christmas Feral Jundis!!!
Merry Christmas and happy holidays to all you hard charging Feral Jundis out there. May your next contract or current contract, be the best contract you have ever had, and that you make it home alive and in one piece to spend that hard earned money!
Here’s to those of you that do things right, when no one is looking. And here’s a really big thanks to those leaders out there that have applied Jundism to all that they do. I thank you, the industry thanks you, and whomever you are protecting thanks you for a job well done! –Matt
Industry Talk: Two Perspectives On Wartime Contractor Cost Effectiveness
What I did was put up two perspectives on contractor cost effectiveness with one article written by Doug Brooks and the other one by David Isenberg. Check it out and tell me what you guys think. Both Doug and David have a lot to say about the subject.
My take away on all of it, is that the true cost effectiveness should be determined by the ones that are actually paying for the product or service. Until then, folks on both sides of the debate of contractor cost effectiveness will continue to argue and debate over who is right or wrong. My take away on all of it, is that governments will do whatever serves them best both politically and militarily, and not necessarily what is most cost effective. –Matt
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Journal of International Peace Operations
Nov/Dec 2009
by Doug Brooks
The Benefits of Employing Local Nationals in Conflict And Post-Conflict Operations
LOCAL nationals make up the majority of the personnel on the ground in the stability operations industry, a fact too often overlooked by media and pundits. Not only do these locals offer enormous advantages to our industry in terms of costs, language capabilities, local knowledge and skills, but at the policy level they contribute to rebuilding the economy and vastly benefit larger stability policies. Nevertheless, some important concerns and caveats remain when hiring locals; and thus certain essential policies should be adopted by all companies setting up business in conflict and post-conflict operations.
Personnel working for the stability operations industry are generally divided into three categories:
* Local Nationals (LNs, also known as Host Country Nationals, or HCNs) who originate from the country of the operation.
* Third Country Nationals (TCNs) who come from a country not involved in the intervention or peace operation. Most TCNs are from developing countries, attracted by salaries far above what they could earn at home. Some, however, are drawn from developed countries as well.
* Finally, Western expatriates, who are usually hired for management, contractual compliance or oversight tasks; although for some contracts they may be engaged in work from security to truck driving.
LNs represent the bulk of this industry’s personnel. For example, as of June 30, 2009, LNs made up 69 percent of U.S. Department of Defense contractor personnel operating in Afghanistan – and 95 percent of security contractors in the operation. TCNs account for most of the remainder, with citizens of Western nations making up a relatively small minority. The LN proportion can be even higher for contractors supporting UN operations, and that number only increases with the duration of the operation as local hires learn new skills, gain the trust of companies and clients and earn management positions.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Industry Talk: US To Switch Afghan Police Training from DoS CIVPOL, to DoD CNTPO, DynCorp Protests
This is big news, because there is a lot of money riding on the current set up, and DynCorp was sitting all fat and happy on the CIVPOL contract as the incumbent. Now that DoD is taking it over and issued a new task order, only companies that are pre-qualified contractors for CNTPO get to participate. Those companies are Lockheed, NG, Raytheon, Xe, and ARINC.
The general feeling I am getting about this latest move, is that the DoD wants to have more control over the training of the Afghan police, and give them training that is more military-like. The reason for this, is so these poor guys can actually survive the war, so they can go on to be effective in their normal police work.
The Afghan police are already fighting more war, than doing police work, so it makes sense to harden them up a little. Not too mention that when you have cops teaching Afghan police forces to shoot PKMs or RPGs, then the realm of police work skills gets trumped by war fighting skills. So yeah, DoD would be a better choice.
The other one that was interesting, was the hearing at CSPAN about Afghan National Security Forces. Executives from Dyncorp, MPRI, and Xe all made a showing at this thing, and they all had something unique to say about their little chunk of the war. Which further emphasizes the CNAS report as to the importance of contractors in the war effort.
One thing that was mentioned by Xe, which I think is a great suggestion, is to integrate military trainers with Xe trainers, to insure a quality product. That way, there is no blaming Xe for a poor job, when in fact, there is direct military oversight and integration into the training. This makes sense for unity of effort, and totally makes sense about getting everyone on board with the strategy of the war. I say mix that chocolate with the peanut butter! lol
Probably the best part of military integration with programs like this, is security. It is big military that has the guns, the air support and the communications necessary to make any enemy’s day, a bad day. So for these sites that are located up in the hills, where training and security go hand in hand, having some military folks around with the big guns, would be a nice insurance policy for the defense.
Be sure to check out the thread on this subject at SOCNET, and I look forward to any input from the readership about this. –Matt
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Afghan National Security Forces Contract Training
Friday, December 18, 2009
The December 18, 2009, hearing of the Commission on Wartime Contracting reviewed the adequacy and oversight of contract training for Afghanistan’s national army, national police, and border police — organizations critical for stability as the United States moves toward its newly stated goal of beginning withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country in July 2011.
At the end of November 2009, Afghan National Army strength was about 96,000; it is expected to grow to 134,000 by the end of October 2010 (40% growth) and is targeted reach 240,000 by 2013 (80% growth). The Afghanistan National Police was near 94,000 and is expected to be almost 97,000 strong by the end of 2009. While there is no programmed end strength set for 2010, the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan has proposed growing the ANP to 160,000 by 2013 (65% growth).