I got a chance to read through this book at Barnes and Noble the other day. I am not a Revolutionary War history buff or anything, but as a security contractor, I was certainly intrigued. If Max Weber was to read this book, he would have ‘crapped nickels’. LOL
Bottom line, thanks to these privateers or private naval companies, we were able to fight the British on the high seas. And guess what, we made fighting the British a profitable venture for these PNC’s through ‘legalized piracy’. Crazy. Can you imagine if the US gave a company like Blackwater a ‘letter of marque‘ and said ‘we can’t pay you, but if you attack Somali pirates for us, you can keep all the plundered goods’?
The one thing this book brings up, that has some parallels to today’s private contractors, is the concept of profitable patriotism. Patriotism in itself is a good thing, but who says you cannot be a patriot, and make some good money in the process? It’s the American way, as this book has so blatantly pointed out. Although I think privateering might not be that popular of an idea in today’s politically correct world. But combining patriotism and profitability can and should be a concept we should not frown upon, and it is a combination that can be incredibly effective if regulated by the state properly. World War 2 and the military industry, pulled us out of the depths of despair after the Great Depression–don’t tell me some factories did not make some profit off of that war? Or the massive reconstruction contracts after that war? KBR eat your heart out.
And by regulation, I mean making sure that the laws are followed, as well as the contracts, yet still allowing for the free market to dictate the ebb and flow of the industry. And with globalization, regulation amongst the companies for this war, is increasingly difficult. As America puts more regulation on it’s own industry, and yet is unable to impact the global industry with the same regulations, then that is where we hinder our free market efficiency for this war. It is a problem that impacts most industry out there, and ours is not immune to this. –Head Jundi
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From Publishers Weekly
Patton (The Pattons: A Personal History of an American Family) turns his attention to an often overlooked aspect of the Revolutionary War: maritime privateering, or legalized piracy. Patton is careful to distinguish the mixed motives of these patriot pirates, for often there was less patriotism than simple greed. Nevertheless, their work fulfilled George Washington’s strategic aim to win the war by exhausting Britain into giving up the struggle. In what Patton terms a massive seaborne insurgency that dwarfed the efforts of the colonists’ small navy, thousands of privateers nettled British shipping, sometimes gaining vast fortunes. Privateering also turned into a handy political issue when Benjamin Franklin, the American representative in France, succeeded in persuading his hosts to allow Yankee skippers to sell their booty in French ports—a breach of the country’s neutrality that aggravated diplomatic tensions, as Franklin knew it would, and helped cement Paris’s commitment to American independence. Patton gives an absorbing exhumation of an undersung subject that will be of particular interest to Revolution buffs. (May 20)
Buy the Book Here
I am reading your blog with considerable interest. What is your thoughts on our ability to mobilize Afghan "pirates" on our behalf? Is this analogous to starting a civil war considering cultural concepts like Pashtunwali?
Thoughts revolve around similar activities in Iraq that were meant to thwart the desert pirates that were essentially assisting the AQ types until it became unprofitable and the AQ types had tried to take over these criminal enterprises that were essentially tribal undertakings.
Comment by Kat-Missouri — Sunday, November 23, 2008 @ 9:36 AM
Hello, and I am glad you are enjoying the blog. I got a chance to check yours out, and I liked the article about Afghanistan.
To answer your questions, I will just go down the list. For the record, I have never worked in Afghanistan, and all of my opinion would be based on what I have read about the situation there.
What is your thoughts on our ability to mobilize Afghan “pirates” on our behalf?
From what I gather, we have been doing this for awhile now. We hired the services of warlords in the very beginning of this war with mixed results. Just read Kill Bin Laden, if you would like a primer on that. I think now we are little more culturally aware as to how to contract with warlords, but the practice still comes with mixed results.
What I would like to see, is instead of mobilizing pirates or whatever with money, let's take that money and build roads first and foremost. We have been promising the mountain people for a long time that we would build roads for them, if they helped us or supported us. We have done a crappy job of this, and we need to build roads.
There are so many positive things that can come from just building roads. Jobs, commerce, security- all of those things, and you mentioned that in your article on your blog. Nagle mentioned the concept too, and so did Tim over at his blog called Free Range International. )
It is such a simple concept, but it is one where we are totally screwing the pooch on. Build roads, and the local populations can become more connected with main population centers, via commerce and interaction.
Then when we have the road construction 'New Deal' program from hell, cranking out the pavement, then we can focus on the next purchase-phones.
We should be protecting cell towers, flooding the market with cheap phone cards, and getting these phones out to all the villages. Cellphones are big already, and the market keeps increasing for them over there, but I think we could do more there. Phones are the key to connecting the people of Afghanistan with one another. And the numbers speak for themselves. Mobil phones are extremely popular in Iraq as well.
Finally, protect the villages, and do what we can to win over villages that are on the fence. We must do a better job of this. I like the concept of mobile CAP platoons that the Marines used during the Vietnam war. Don't live in the villages, live on the outskirts of the villages, and assign a cluster of villages to a platoon of ANA/Marines. The Taliban should not have the kind of control and fear over the villages, that they do. Protect the villages from the Taliban, and win them over.
And heck, we might even be able to do some deals with the Taliban, to win some of them over too. Maybe. To me, the Taliban know they have a good strategy right now, and why would they want to deal with us? Only when they start feeling the heat will they want to start talking with us and make deals.
As for hiring soldiers to kill the enemy? At this time, I don't think many would want to get in on that action, because they probably don't think we can have any impact on the Taliban.
Although the private security industry is active in Afghanistan. The local nationals are fighting and dying all the time there, and I have posted a few stories about that. They are transporting for profit, and not necessarily because of patriotism. If we were to do more to help these local security companies, maybe they would feel more a part of the war effort, and less like bullet sponges. Although I am sure the whole honor and the love of a good fight is also fueling why these guys continue to transport on those extremely dangerous convoys.
Inversely, it would not surprise me if there was a little privateering going on with the warlords and the Taliban. Attack the convoys, take the loot, give us a percentage, business is great….. That is privateering to a degree, and that can attract some to the Taliban or Warlord side of things.
Is this analogous to starting a civil war considering cultural concepts like Pashtunwali?
These guys have been fighting in war for a long time. Making money off the war is certainly a universal theme, and there is nothing with this concept that would cause a civil war that I could see. We have been buying the loyalty of the various groups for awhile, like I mentioned before, and this is just business as usual in Afghanistan.
What I would like to see, is to actually reinforce the buying of loyalty of warlords, with proving to the local populations that we plan to make good on our promises. Let's use warlords to protect road construction operations, and the local populations near that road, to help construct. Throw in an aggressive road building crew from the government/Coalition, and now you have a collective effort. In essence, all money should go towards investing in Afghanistan's road systems. Connect these people to the construction projects, and give them the pride of building something like that. Make road building the business to be in, make it profitable, make a national focus.
As for CERP, I love that concept and it works for local commanders. I think we should allow that practice, but keep track of it, and insure the CERP also lends itself to an overall regional strategy. I do not think CERP funds should just be thrown around though, like it was welfare. It should be used sparingly and with much thought, and only to cause maximum impact for that relationship between the local population and the commanders using CERP.
As for AQ in Iraq and AQ in Afghanistan, and how money could be used to buy locals away from this group and to our side, sure. Why not. Any way we can, to win the local populations to our side, should be attempted. We should just be smart with that money, and monitor the results. This goes back to the concept of 'are we a learning organization'? Are we learning from our mistakes in Afghanistan, and are we constantly evaluating and taking advantage of every opportunity to win over the local populations. That is what our manpower, money, diplomacy, and reconstruction efforts should be geared towards. Right now, I think a lot of Afghanis look at us as the foreigner in their land, and not as a friend there to help. They might hate the Taliban, but at least the Taliban are not foreigners. We just have to work harder at being the friend and only making everyone's life better there, and not be the foreigner who continues to make promise we can't keep.
I hope that helps. I highly recommend you talk with Tim Lynch over at Free Range International for some ground truth. He is one of the few I know, who has a blog and is on the ground running the roads and mixing it up all over Afghanistan. He will give you a much better assessment, and he is good people. Or just read his blog, and you will see exactly what I am talking about. Cheers.
Comment by headjundi — Sunday, November 23, 2008 @ 1:03 PM