Ok, this is a good one, I promise. What I have done is to present the point of views of four bloggers/journalists, break down the essence of their posts, and try to find some middle ground with their points of view. Then I will end it with my views about what the UN could do to create an ‘army of conscience and practicality’.
The first article written by Gideon Rachman describes the necessity of creating a more professional and permanent UN Army.
“Over the longer term, the growing demand for international peacekeeping forces means that it is time finally to bite the bullet and give the UN a permanent, standing military capacity”
This is Gideon’s solution for making that happen.
“All of this points to the need to create a proper UN force on permanent stand-by. Such a force need not be a conventional army, with its own barracks and personnel. It would be better to get countries to give the UN first call on a certain number of their troops, for a specific period of time. National sovereignty could still be respected by allowing countries to opt out of missions, if they inflame national sensitivities.”
Gideon then mentions that conservatives in America would show horror at the idea of a UN standing army. This is where he brings in the Reagan quote about the UN.
“They might be surprised and enlightened to learn that the hero of the conservative movement, Ronald Reagan, once spoke approvingly of the idea of “a standing UN force – an army of conscience – that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries through force”.
The second article is by Max Boot and he makes the argument that conservatives on the far right might be a little miffed with a UN standing army, but that is only because the UN has a terrible track record of handling armies. Max does agree with Gideon about creating a more professional UN force, but they both disagree on the how.
“I actually think it is in our own interest to create a more robust UN peacekeeping capacity — assuming that some accountability can be imposed on blue helmets who have a disturbing propensity to commit sex crimes and other offenses for which they are currently not punished. That is why I think Gideon’s approach is not the right one.”
Then Max mentions why Gideon’s idea is flawed in the how part.
“But under his proposal, the countries contributing troops would be the same ones as today — Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc. In other words, the bottom of the barrel in terms of military capacity. And as long as UN forces are made up of national contingents, the idea of imposing unity of action or accountability on them will remain a distant dream.”
Here is Max’s so called “Mercenary” solution.
“Approach the problem the way DynCorp or Xe (nee Blackwater) do, by hiring veterans of Western militaries. If they are willing to work for military contractors, surely they would be willing to work for the UN.
The third article is written by John Boonstra, and John gives his opinion that hiring veterans of Western militaries is a bad idea. That, and we would be too expensive.
“Boot would fix the problem by adopting a Blackwater-esque (gulp, no issues of war crimes there…) approach, suggesting that the UN hire veterans from Western militaries. But beyond the issue of legitimacy (how would this differ from a Western intervention?), Boot again does not consider that of cost. Who is to pay for these UN mercenaries? To attract talent willing to go to the most dangerous places on Earth, you need to have a source of funding, and unless he’s in favor of providing more money for the UN, which I feel safe in assuming that conservatives generally oppose, then he’ll have to come up with a more realistic alternative.”
Finally, and I saved the best for last, because all of these guys need a little shared reality if they are going to discuss the terms UN, PMC’s, standing army, cost, etc. His name is Eeben Barlow and he founded the Private Military Company called Executive Outcomes. He wrote a current article that all of these authors need to read before talking about this subject, as well as past treatments about the subject.
I saved Eeben’s post for last, because has presented the best ideas about the subject, and really cuts to the heart of the matter. He starts off with this in regards to the UN and their so called “peace keeping” missions:
“But a question no one has ever answered is “how can you keep peace when there is no peace?”
His solution to the question is this:
“When an internationally recognised government comes under the attack of so-called rebels, guerrillas or a dissatisfied political opponent and the antagonists resort to murder, terrorism, destruction, crime and chaos, what purpose do those who rush to “keep the peace” really serve? Would their noble mission not be better served if they hunted down those who committed the atrocities and brought them to book? If the peacekeeping forces are too useless to do their jobs, then perhaps the UN and those who claim to wish for peace should rather contract PMCs that have a desire – and a track record – to end the conflicts. Besides, elections, democracy and peace remain a pipe-dream as long as there is instability.
All conflicts involve players with their own aims and objectives. If an under-siege government asks for foreign forces to assist it in ending the conflict, isn’t that exactly what should be done? If foreign forces are despatched to help a government achieve some stability, isn’t the logical step to first end the conflict and then to maintain the peace?
Shouldn’t the peacekeeping forces only arrive once there has been a cessation of hostilities and a declaration of peace? Trying to do this about-face is somewhat senseless as one cannot enter a conflict zone and simply claim to be “keeping peace” thinking that it will suddenly end the conflict. ”
The final quote is the best though, because it really brings it all together.
“If the UN is so concerned at keeping peace, why doesn’t it dispatch its “peacekeeping forces” to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the countless other conflicts and bring with them the peace they boast about? I never saw them rush off to Georgia to “keep peace” during the brief conflict that took place there. Or are these conflicts too dangerous for them?
Unless drastic action is taken to end conflicts, they will simply continue – and “peacekeeping” will continue to remain the profitable farce it is.”
Now absorb that into your brain, and lets get this going. It is my turn to speak.
Gideon wants a standing army, ready to deploy. Max wants a standing army ready to deploy. Both disagree where those forces should come from. Gideon wants countries like the US to contribute quality troops, Max thinks the UN should hire Western military veterans. And John just hates the idea of using Western military veterans, or what he calls “Blackwater-esque” or “UN Mercenaries”. Decisions, decisions, decisions….
But then Eeben comes from left field with a point of view that ending the conflict using professional forces is essential first, before you even commit peace keeping forces, regardless of where they come from (UN Mercenaries or Indian/Bangladesh/African Union/ Pakistani etc.)
Even more importantly, Eeben points to how poorly these forces are used by the UN in the first place. And as a former Marine, and a current security contractor, I would have to agree with Eeben on this point of view.
The question I have, is that if I was a Marine today, would I want to serve under the management structure of the UN? Do I have the confidence in this organization, to put my life in their hands? More importantly, would my death under UN control in some far off country, count for something? So I guess what I am getting at is if the strategy being used by the UN for these operations is sound? I would have to say no, and Eeben made that point beautifully in his article. The only thing the UN really has, is maybe the moral authority to intervene, just as long as the member countries all agree. But still, most would agree that service in a UN force would give a person some pause, if you simply looked at the track record of the UN.
So really, before the said authors below can even go into the territory of ‘standing UN army’, they need to first hammer out the strategies that the UN must utilize, to fully use the forces that they get for these missions. Because if it is a crap strategy, then how dare they commit someone else’s son or daughter for such a venture?
But back to Reagan’s quote. Is the UN ‘fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries through force’? Well if the correct strategy is developed first for that specific country, meaning they have come up with a plan that would end the conflict first, then bring in peace keeping forces to stabilize the country so that the government can get on it’s feet, then and only then should we talk about what kind of Armies the UN should have.
Like Eeben said, the UN could definitely contract with companies like Executive Outcomes to end hostilities first, then use that same company to arrange for the peace keeping. There is no reason to bring in separate forces for such a thing. EO could subcontract that process as well, if they needed to. Either way, if it was on that company to develop what was required for each phase, then the UN would actually see some progress in these missions.
I also believe the UN would see some cost savings. The amount of money wasted on the current ineffectual missions is probably way more than the 12 cents to the dollar figure being thrown around in the article, because the costs do not figure in the refugee crisis caused by the poor performance of those troops in the conflict. Nor does it factor in the long term deployments, or the health care for the victims of war, because that war was prolonged do to a terrible performance of the force. It is my opinion that you get what you pay for, and that usually you end up paying more in the long run because you did not commit to quality in the first place.
Now I would love to see the UN get more member nations to commit professional troops, but it is not going to happen right now. America is involved with two wars that are currently taking everything we got (to include over 246,000 contractors). Other nations involved with those wars are contributing troops to the same conflicts, so troops are a little thin these days. In my opinion, it would be very difficult, if not impossible to get those kind of forces.
But private security contractors, and the companies that hire them, are available and willing to work. Thanks to the wars we are in, there are plenty of them. And all of the top companies involved in the war are very experienced in putting together projects in war zones these days. It is a contracted service that if set up correctly, and properly managed, could certainly answer the call in a timely and professional matter. The market will answer the call, and has in the current war(over 246,000 contractors so far, did I mention that already?).
As for ending conflicts, you would have to default to those that have actually done that kind of thing. Eeben is one of those individuals, and his company was quite apt at doing such a thing before it was unjustly demonized and shut down. As for today’s PMC’s and PSC’s, there would definitely be a learning curve for such operations, but it would not totally be out of their scope of capability. Remember, if the strategy and contracts are set up correctly, and the companies and the UN have good battlefield intelligence, nothing is impossible. But that relationship between the UN and the contracted companies need to be carefully constructed, and carefully monitored in order to be effective.(learn from the use of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan) And the UN must know, that as soon as you release a company to do such a thing as end a conflict, that they actually need to allow that company to do the job they have been contracted to do. If the member states have voted for such a thing, and a PMC is willing, and the rightfully appointed government in that country is pleading for that assistance, then let that PMC do their thing–it’s that simple.
As for costs, I would like to remind the reader of the dialogue that Eeben had with the UN during the Rwandan Genocide crisis during the nineties. Here is the quote from a post I made about it awhile back. It begs repeating, over and over and over again until someone out there listens. This was from an interview Doug Brooks of IPOA did awhile back, and then Eeben later wrote to add a few corrections. It is powerful stuff in my view, because it is all shared reality.
“Mr Brooks Said: The UN contacted [Executive Outcomes] and said, “Could you end the genocide in Rwanda?” This was probably about two weeks into the genocide when nobody else in the world was willing to go in there, to deploy their military. And so EO is sort of between assignments… They said, “Yea, we could do that.” …They got the tickets and were about to head to New York and got another phone call saying the deal’s off.
Shortly afterwards Kofi Annan would famously say, “Maybe the world’s not ready to privatize human security.”
Eeben had this to say:
“Rwanda was a horrific UN failure where lives were equated to dollars. Doug’s comments aren’t entirely correct: EO wasn’t “between assignments” nor were we on our way to New York. The UN turned it down because we were “too expensive” – even though we were several hundred million dollars cheaper than they were.”
So we have covered cost and capability(and conscience if we get the first part right), and why PMC’s and PSC’s are a concept that should not be ‘thrown out with the bath water’. We have seen the arguments for professionalizing the UN’s military capability, but we have also pointed out what has to happen first before any kind of Army is professionalized. And then once the strategy is sound, then the UN should look at all sources for forces, and not just go with the cheapest and bottom of the barrel option that will sink a mission backed by a terrible strategy, and endanger a mission with an adequate strategy. Peace.-Matt
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Why the world needs a United Nations army
By Gideon Rachman
July 20 2009
Ronald Reagan once asked Mikhail Gorbachev to imagine that there was “suddenly a threat to this world from some other species, from another planet”. The late American president speculated that this would ensure “we would forget all the little local differences that we have between our countries”.
We are still waiting for the Martian invasion that will test Reagan’s theory. But, in the absence of little green men, it has fallen to Somali pirates to provide the common enemy that unites the nations of the world. An extraordinary international flotilla is patrolling the waters off Somalia, in an effort to stop attacks on the 30,000 ships that pass through the Gulf of Aden every year. Warships from countries as diverse and mutually suspicious as the US, China, Iran and Japan are policing this crucial international waterway. The largest of three international taskforces is run by the European Union and commanded by a British admiral operating from a headquarters in nearby north London. All the various navies, except the Iranians’, co-ordinate their operations at regular meetings.
But while there really is something like an “international community” at work in the seas off Somalia, the picture is a lot less impressive on dry land. In the capital, Mogadishu, a 4,600 strong African Union force is struggling to hold off Islamist insurgents who recently got within half a mile of the presidential palace.
Both the land and sea operations in Somalia show the need to do some urgent thinking about international peacekeeping. The naval operation is impressive, but also disjointed. The land operation is simply inadequate.
In both Somali operations, it would make obvious sense to give the United Nations a bigger role as the co-ordinator and mobiliser of peacekeeping efforts.
Over the longer term, the growing demand for international peacekeeping forces means that it is time finally to bite the bullet and give the UN a permanent, standing military capacity.
The idea of a “UN army” remains deeply controversial. Critics can point to some horrendous peacekeeping failures. In the 1990s UN forces failed to prevent the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre. More recently, UN-mandated troops were involved in sex crimes in the Congo. Like many international bureaucracies, the UN is often not a pretty sight when viewed from close quarters.
Many nations also have understandable qualms about a permanent, multinational military force, intervening all over the world. The Americans do not put their forces under UN commanders. It often falls to poorer countries, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia, to provide most of the troops for UN operations. But they worry that setting up a permanent force would mean that they would lose the ability to pick and choose which missions they take part in.
Yet the demand for UN peacekeeping forces keeps going up. There are currently 116,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world in 17 different operations – an eightfold increase since 1999. Only the US has more troops deployed around the world than the UN.
Alongside the well-publicised UN peacekeeping failures, there have been many quiet successes – Cambodia, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Nepal, to name a few. For the west’s over-stretched armies, international peacekeepers often look like a cheap and attractive option. Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, says that for every dollar the US spends on an equivalent military deployment, the UN spends 12 cents. The UN flag also brings a global legitimacy that a Nato or EU operation cannot muster.
But every time the Security Council votes to deploy peacekeepers, the UN has to appeal for troops and equipment from scratch. So it usually takes between three months and a year to deploy a UN force – far too slow, in an emergency such as Somalia.
All of this points to the need to create a proper UN force on permanent stand-by. Such a force need not be a conventional army, with its own barracks and personnel. It would be better to get countries to give the UN first call on a certain number of their troops, for a specific period of time. National sovereignty could still be respected by allowing countries to opt out of missions, if they inflame national sensitivities.
Creating a permanent UN capability would mean that the UN could intervene much more quickly. It would also make it more likely that forces assigned to the UN follow the same military doctrines. It would also help address chronic shortages of equipment. As things stand, UN forces often lack the kit they need. The peacekeeping operation in Darfur is hamstrung by its lack of helicopters, for example.
A shortage of helicopters is particularly ironic, given the chatter in the more paranoid bits of right-wing America about “black helicopters” from the UN, hovering with intent over the US. Even perfectly sane American conservatives regard the idea of a permanent UN force with horror. They might be surprised and enlightened to learn that the hero of the conservative movement, Ronald Reagan, once spoke approvingly of the idea of “a standing UN force – an army of conscience – that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries through force”. And, of course, to take on the Martians, whenever they finally invade.
Story here.
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By Max Boot
July 22, 2009
“Even perfectly sane American conservatives regard the idea of a permanent UN force with horror.” So writes Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times. He proposes to create just that — a permanent UN force that could deal with problems in places like Somalia. At the risk of throwing off-kilter his perception of American conservatives, I will say that I for one do not regard the idea with horror. (Gideon is right that most on the Right do.)
In fact, I’ve long been drawn to the notion myself because the current setup — ad hoc peacekeeping forces with lousy training and equipment and little capacity to impose their will — has led to one disaster after another in places like Congo and Rwanda, where the big boys (i.e., the U.S. and its allies) have no intention of directly intervening. We are seeing the results now in Somalia, where the Shahab Islamist movement is on the march — and has now started to destabilize neighboring countries like Kenya.
I actually think it is in our own interest to create a more robust UN peacekeeping capacity — assuming that some accountability can be imposed on blue helmets who have a disturbing propensity to commit sex crimes and other offenses for which they are currently not punished. That is why I think Gideon’s approach is not the right one. He writes:
All of this points to the need to create a proper UN force on permanent stand-by. Such a force need not be a conventional army, with its own barracks and personnel. It would be better to get countries to give the UN first call on a certain number of their troops, for a specific period of time. National sovereignty could still be respected by allowing countries to opt out of missions, if they inflame national sensitivities.
But under his proposal, the countries contributing troops would be the same ones as today — Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc. In other words, the bottom of the barrel in terms of military capacity. And as long as UN forces are made up of national contingents, the idea of imposing unity of action or accountability on them will remain a distant dream.
I think there is a better way: Approach the problem the way DynCorp or Xe (nee Blackwater) do, by hiring veterans of Western militaries. If they are willing to work for military contractors, surely they would be willing to work for the UN. Procure for them vital assets such as aircraft and helicopters and set them loose with a mandate to recruit local forces to help them. It would not take many British SAS or U.S. Special Forces veterans to impose order in chaotic situations in Africa, as long as they have plentiful firepower on call as well as the ability to train and lead indigenous forces. Military contractors like the now-defunct Sandline have proven that. To help them, create a robust command-and-control capacity within the UN. Oh, and make them sign contracts that would make them accountable for their actions before the International Criminal Court or some other body.
All this would probably cost a lot less than the current peacekeeping setup and achieve better results. To those who are congenitally suspicious of the UN (and I don’t blame you — the UN has done much to earn such suspicion): Keep in mind that the U.S. will still retain a veto over how these forces are used. So there is no serious prospect of a UN army being sent to drive the Israelis out of East Jerusalem.
Story here.
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Max Boot’s UN mercenaries
By John Boonstra
July 23, 2009
Max Boot takes issue with Gideon Rachman’s assumption that conservatives are reflexively opposed to the very idea of the “UN army” that Rachman raised in his FT column the other day. Boot avers that he — unlike, he admits, most conservatives — is not in fact is not opposed to the concept, only Rachman’s specific proposal.
Rachman suggested that troop contributing countries “give the UN first call” on some of their military personnel. Boot objects to this model, but before doing so he laments that UN peacekeepers “have a disturbing propensity to commit sex crimes and other offenses for which they are currently not punished.” He even says “that’s why” he doesn’t agree with Rachman.
First of all, the insistence that blue helmets are more likely to commit sex crimes than other military personnel is greatly exaggerated. Abuse by UN peacekeepers is reprehensible, but, since it has been built up into a meme by conservative hysteria, it shadows the equally reprehensible abuse committed by men in militaries all over the world — including, yes, the United States’ own.
But Boot’s real gripe with Rachman’s plan is that his UN army would still be composed of troops from countries like “Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc.,” which Boot calls “the bottom of the barrel.” It’s hard not to read into the juxtaposition of his words an assumption that soldiers from these developing countries are more likely to commit sexual abuse than those from Western countries.
Even giving Boot the benefit of the doubt — that his argument bespeaks not ethnic prejudices, but a somewhat legitimate comment on differing accountability standards among more and less well-trained militaries — his counter-proposal makes little sense. He fails to acknowledge that the reason that UN peacekeepers are drawn from “the bottom of the barrel” is because top military nations like the United States do not offer troops to UN missions.
Boot would fix the problem by adopting a Blackwater-esque (gulp, no issues of war crimes there…) approach, suggesting that the UN hire veterans from Western militaries. But beyond the issue of legitimacy (how would this differ from a Western intervention?), Boot again does not consider that of cost. Who is to pay for these UN mercenaries? To attract talent willing to go to the most dangerous places on Earth, you need to have a source of funding, and unless he’s in favor of providing more money for the UN, which I feel safe in assuming that conservatives generally oppose, then he’ll have to come up with a more realistic alternative.
Story here.
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By Eeben Barlow
July 12, 2009
I continue to be amazed at the amount of time, energy and money expended on the theory and practice of “peacekeeping” in conflict zones on the African continent. Conferences are held to debate the value and role of peacekeeping operations. Academic papers are penned extolling the virtues and successes of peacekeeping operations – truth be told there aren’t any to boast about. Committees are formed to monitor the players in the peacekeeping process. New NGOs spring up to play their new-found role in this on-going, lucrative farce.
Whereas keeping the peace is a very noble idea, does it really work in practise? Do those innocent people who are caught up in the conflict gain anything from the peacekeeping operations? Does fleeing their homes in terror in the middle of the night and becoming refugees something they must supposedly look forward to? Does having their hands and ears hacked off, their wives and daughters raped, their families murdered and so on give them hope? Does watching their crops and meagre possessions being destroyed while the peacekeeping forces look on helplessly, continually switch sides or turn away something they should be happy about? I doubt it.
It appears that the true winners are those who partake in these so-called peacekeeping operations and judging by their results, they really couldn’t care less about “peace” and the civilians they are supposedly there to protect. Poorly-trained and inadequately-led peacekeeping troops lead to more instability. Continued instability and conflict equates to continued income for the peacekeepers and those followers of peacekeeping missions that exploit the conflict situation.
Africa is a dangerous place and it is kept that way by wars, coups, crime and violence – often purposely – and often by very powerful behind-the-scenes players. Some of the players are foreign governments and others are multi-national corporations. But conflicts fuel the arms trade and make resources cheaper to buy. Other avenues for business are also opened up. But, the roles of these behind-the-scenes players are seldom if ever investigated. Instead, their political influence and profit margins continue to grow – as does their influence.
I have made my thoughts known on the utter and dismal failures of the UN’s so-called “peacekeeping” missions in Africa and the misery these missions have brought – and still bring – with them. Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Somalia are but some of the missions that have simply prolonged the state of conflict. True, at times a stalemate is achieved – but what then? However, more often than not, the rebels or terrorists (as that is what they usually are) continue to maintain the initiative.
But a question no one has ever answered is “how can you keep peace when there is no peace?”
Surely, that is a pretty simple question to answer?
When an internationally recognised government comes under the attack of so-called rebels, guerrillas or a dissatisfied political opponent and the antagonists resort to murder, terrorism, destruction, crime and chaos, what purpose do those who rush to “keep the peace” really serve? Would their noble mission not be better served if they hunted down those who committed the atrocities and brought them to book? If the peacekeeping forces are too useless to do their jobs, then perhaps the UN and those who claim to wish for peace should rather contract PMCs that have a desire – and a track record – to end the conflicts. Besides, elections, democracy and peace remain a pipe-dream as long as there is instability.
All conflicts involve players with their own aims and objectives. If an under-siege government asks for foreign forces to assist it in ending the conflict, isn’t that exactly what should be done? If foreign forces are despatched to help a government achieve some stability, isn’t the logical step to first end the conflict and then to maintain the peace?
Shouldn’t the peacekeeping forces only arrive once there has been a cessation of hostilities and a declaration of peace? Trying to do this about-face is somewhat senseless as one cannot enter a conflict zone and simply claim to be “keeping peace” thinking that it will suddenly end the conflict.
Peacekeeping missions seem to be driven by achieving a “ceasefire”, a method for rebels to simply gain time, re-arm and continue with the conflict. There is nothing noble or humanitarian about this apart from allowing the civilians caught up in the conflict a few days or months respite – and often in total misery.
If the UN is so concerned at keeping peace, why doesn’t it dispatch its “peacekeeping forces” to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the countless other conflicts and bring with them the peace they boast about? I never saw them rush off to Georgia to “keep peace” during the brief conflict that took place there. Or are these conflicts too dangerous for them?
Unless drastic action is taken to end conflicts, they will simply continue – and “peacekeeping” will continue to remain the profitable farce it is.
Story here.
*****
Mr Brooks: The UN contacted [Executive Outcomes] and said, “Could you end the genocide in Rwanda?” This was probably about two weeks into the genocide when nobody else in the world was willing to go in there, to deploy their military. And so EO is sort of between assignments… They said, “Yea, we could do that.” …They got the tickets and were about to head to New York and got another phone call saying the deal’s off.
Shortly afterwards Kofi Annan would famously say, “Maybe the world’s not ready to privatize human security.”
Eeben had this to say:
“Rwanda was a horrific UN failure where lives were equated to dollars. Doug’s comments aren’t entirely correct: EO wasn’t “between assignments” nor were we on our way to New York. The UN turned it down because we were “too expensive” – even though we were several hundred million dollars cheaper than they were.”