Feral Jundi

Friday, January 14, 2011

Israel: The Dubai Job, By Ronen Bergman

     According to the official police report, the killers first injected Al-Mabhouh with a poison, then smothered him with a pillow. Saeed Hamiri, M.D., of the Dubai forensic lab, said the crime-scene investigators found a trickle of blood on Al-Mabhouh’s pillow, bruises on his nose, face, and neck, and an injection mark on his right hip. Along with signs of struggle in the room—a damaged headboard, for example—these details would seem to suggest that the target was smothered to death. But one has to wonder about the plausibility of these conclusions. (The Dubai chief of police did not respond to several requests from GQ for an interview.)

 

     Why did the Mossad permit things to go so wrong in Dubai? In a word, the answer is leadership. Because Dagan refashioned the Mossad in his own image, and because he drove out anyone who was willing to question his decisions, there was no one in the agency to tell him that the Dubai operation was badly conceived and badly planned. They simply did not believe that a minnow in the world of intelligence services such as Dubai would be any match for Israel’s Caesarea fighters.

     Wow, what a cool article and it really shed some light on this assassination performed by the Mossad’s Caesarea.  I posted a deal about this incident when it first came out and it was very interesting to see how this played out on the world stage.

    Of course some folks called it an embarrassment for the Israelis, because the operatives and operation were revealed by the Dubai police.  And others called it a success and that maybe the Israelis wanted to show the world that the finest security out there could not stop them from doing what they had to do. Either way, the Hamas jackass they targeted is dead.

     Now that some time has passed and folks have been able to put the pieces together, we are now getting a better picture on how this went down.  I didn’t know back then if they used poison or a stun gun to incapacitate Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, so that they could smother him with a pillow. I guess it was poison and toxicology boiled it down to succinylcholine. *

     But with this stuff, the drug itself could have killed him. The pillow could have been used to muffle the target’s voice while waiting for the drug to do it’s thing. The big benefit of this drug is that it is one of the fastest acting muscle relaxants out there, so the struggle would have been minimal.

     The other part of this story that was interesting, was the commentary on Dagan–Mossad’s director.  If it is true that he is not seeking feedback or other people’s opinions then that is not good. Ultimately, an organization must be a learning organization if it wants to continuously improve. And because Dagan has forced out or shut down anyone that disagrees with him, now he is at the mercy of what Irving Janis calls groupthink. Not good. –Matt

The Dubai Job

One year ago, an elite Mossad hit squad traveled to Dubai to kill a high-ranking member of Hamas. They completed the mission, but their covers were blown, and Israel was humiliated by the twenty-seven-minute video of their movements that was posted online for all the world to see. Ronen Bergman reveals the intricate, chilling details of the mission and investigates how Israel’s vaunted spy agency did things so spectacularly wrong

By Ronen Bergman

January 2011

Monday, January 18, 2010. MorningAt 6:45 a.m., the first members of an Israeli hit squad land at Dubai International Airport and fan out through the city to await further instructions. Over the next nineteen hours, the rest of the team—at least twenty-seven members—will arrive on flights from Zurich, Rome, Paris, and Frankfurt. They have come to kill a man named Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, a Hamas leader whose code name within the Mossad—the Israeli intelligence agency—is Plasma Screen.

Most of the operatives here are members of a secretive unit within the Mossad known as Caesarea, a self-contained organization that is responsible for the agency’s most dangerous and critical missions: assassinations, sabotage, penetration of high-security installations. Caesarea’s “fighters,” as they are known, are the elite of the Mossad. They rarely interact with other operatives and stay away from Mossad headquarters north of Tel Aviv, instead undergoing intensive training at a separate facility to which no one else in the agency has access. They are forbidden from ever using their real names, even in private conversation, and—with the exception of their spouses—their families and closest friends are unaware of what they do. As one longtime Caesarea fighter recently told me, “If the Mossad is the temple of Israel’s intelligence community, then Caesarea is its holy of holies.”

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Wednesday, November 24, 2010

Industry Talk: The Israelification And Privatization Of US Airport Security….Again

     “Israelis, unlike Canadians and Americans, don’t take s— from anybody. When the security agency in Israel (the ISA) started to tighten security and we had to wait in line for — not for hours — but 30 or 40 minutes, all hell broke loose here. We said, ‘We’re not going to do this. You’re going to find a way that will take care of security without touching the efficiency of the airport.”

     That, in a nutshell is “Israelification” – a system that protects life and limb without annoying you to death. 

     First off, I will say that I can totally relate with what the TSA guys are going through. In this business, you will find yourself doing pat downs and screening folks on some contract at some point in your career. Believe me, it isn’t fun for the guys that have to do it and I am sure police and military folks can relate as well. The folks you are screening can get testy and annoyed as well. But that is our job, and our primary objective is to protect our people, and stop the bad guys from doing harm. We still think about alternatives though.

     So is there a system that protects life and limb without annoying people to death? That is the million dollar question, because even if this latest protest against TSA pat downs and revealing full body screenings actually causes more airports to choose the privatization route of security, the screening force will still be up against this very question.

     Or perhaps there is something else. Maybe private companies can better maintain customer service and satisfaction?  Maybe they can be as intrusive or as thorough as the TSA, and still not annoy travelers to death? Because at the end of the day, they still have the same job to do as the TSA, and that is screen out the bad guys and bad things.

     Now in the past, I have discussed the same issues that have been brought up currently, and it seems like every year travelers just get ticked off more by the new rules at airports. We are also experiencing record unemployment, foreclosures, and a recession and this has no doubt caused some folks to be angry and lash out at stuff like this.  Al Qaeda and company is not helping things out either by implementing their ‘system disruption’ attacks. All of these factors provide the perfect storm for outcry and protest, and I am wondering where it will all lead too?

     What will be interesting is if this outcry will translate into more privatization or even the ‘Israelification’ of airport security?  If this does happen, and private companies will be tasked with implementing this more mentally intrusive form of screening called ‘profiling’, then what will be the possible outcome there?  Will US travelers be alright with someone asking them twenty questions before boarding a plane, versus getting their ‘junk’ viewed or groped via full body scanners or pat downs?

    I have also had the opportunity to experience Israeli airport ‘profiling’ that everyone talks about, and I was impressed. For the most part, they just ask you a bunch of questions to see how you react to them. No one touched me, and no one put me through a full body scanner.  The big difference here is that I did not feel like I was mindlessly going through a screening system. I felt like there was a thinking security apparatus that really wanted to know what I was up to, and that they knew how to read me and all of my behavioral cues very well.

    If things do switch to behavioral profiling, or some form of profiling, and it is done by private security, then I think the training for such a technique would be pretty damn interesting. Who would teach the techniques, what legal mechanisms would be in place for protecting a screener/guard or the traveler, and how long would it take to achieve this proficiency are all questions I have.  Most important though, is it scalable and can we achieve the same quality of screening that the Israelis have?

    For that, I wanted to really emphasize the federal-private model below, because this is important. We have already witnessed the federal-private model as it applies to overseas contracting, and the issues have been identified as to how to properly regulate it.  But the problem for the overseas model has always been a lack of legal mechanisms and a lack of sufficient oversight and regulation (either due to poor funding, poor training or lack of manpower). Also, Best Value contracting would be the optimum way to contract companies for this, if any airport authorities are reading this.

     With that said, the TSA would have to switch to being more of a regulatory body than an actual security/screener provider. They will be up against the same scrutiny and issues that plague any of the other various government groups that deal with private industry, both domestically and abroad. The TSA has many lessons to learn from in order to get that federal-private model just right, and because they are still a relatively new agency of government, they still have time to get it right. –Matt

Opposing view on air security: Expand federal-private model

The ‘Israelification’ of airports: High security, little bother

National Opt-Out Day

Opposing view on air security: Expand federal-private model

By John Mica

When Congress established the Transportation Security Administration after 9/11, I helped craft airline passenger screening provisions.

Two models of screening were established. The principle model established an all-federal TSA screening force. The second model provided that TSA would certify, regulate and oversee private contractors to perform screening functions.

Initially five airports — one in each size category — were selected for the federal-private model. Those chosen and operating successfully since 2002 are San Francisco; Kansas City, Mo.; Rochester, N.Y.; Jackson Hole, Wyo.; and Tupelo, Miss.

The Government Accountability Office independently conducted performance evaluations of both models. GAO’s initial evaluations found that the federal-private model performed statistically significantly better than the all-federal model. Subsequent evaluations have shown the federal-private model performing consistently as well as the all-federal model.

Two years following the 2001 law’s enactment, all airports were permitted to apply to opt out of all-federal screening. Under this option, airports qualified by TSA can also take over screening functions, as Jackson Hole has done.

Sixteen airports currently operate successfully under the federal-private model. More airports have submitted applications, and others are considering opting out.

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Thursday, August 12, 2010

Jobs: Contingency Special Operations Team, OCONUS

     Blackice Security put this one out, and I figured I would get on the band wagon and put it out as well.  My guess is that there will be a huge requirement for bodies on this contract, and many companies are looking at those numbers and making their moves.

     As for VxL?  I have never heard of them, so job seekers beware.  They have provided a phone number and email, so feel free to contact them if you have questions.  I would also be curious if any of the readership have some input about the company?

     I am not the POC or recruiter for this company, and please follow the directions and links below to apply.  Good luck and let me know how it goes. –Matt

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Careers with VxL

VxL is always seeking highly qualified, experienced professionals who possess absolute dedication and the will to excel in everything they do.

Our review and screening process is intensive. All candidates are subjected to comprehensive investigations, psychological screenings, and drug tests. All candidates must additionally demonstrate proficiency in their area of expertise, and physical fitness. Certain standards, such as weapons qualifications and physical fitness, have a pass / fail score that must be met, other standards are less empirical. Candidates are not expected to be perfect – but our analysis of your capabilities will be uncompromising. For those candidates who successfully pass all screening requirements, you will find working with VxL to be an experience like no other.TO APPLY FOR ANY POSITION:To apply, you may click on the ‘APPLY NOW’ link following the job description. You may also email us at careers@vxlenterprises.com or call us at 202-449-3824. Be sure to reference the position title and code.

Current Opportunities

Professional Instructors and Operators wanted ISO the Department of State WPS Program:

All VxL operations are based on our ‘Contingency Special Operations Team’ (CSOT) support concept, which maximizes operational readiness and scaleability while promoting a sustainable ‘career path’ for our personnel. As such, our team members are not hired for specific programs – rather, they are hired based on the full scope of their capabilities and integrated into the CSOT program where they are able to support any number of requirements.

Currently, we are accepting applications from highly qualified personnel who, while assigned to a CSOT, have the capability and requirements needed to support various training and operational requirements of the WPS Program (formerly WPPS II). *The WPS program in particular is contingent upon award – however, the CSOT positions in general are NOT. Qualified candidates are encouraged to apply regardless of WPS award status.

For a more detailed position description, qualifications, and brochure, CLICK HERE.

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Wednesday, April 14, 2010

Publications: RAND–Military Capabilities For Hybrid War: Insights From The IDF In Lebanon And Gaza

Filed under: Israel,Publications,Strategy — Matt @ 12:55 AM

Furthermore, the introduction of sophisticated weapons (e.g., ATGMs, MANPADS) could radically escalate the challenges faced by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as it did for the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

*****

That quote up top is the one part I really clued in on, and I have talked about this in the New Rules of War posts, as well as the Toyota Horde post. Of course Israel thinks they have a counter to these types of munitions and tactics, and it will be interesting if they can truly stop this stuff. But I am skeptical.

The thing with anti-armor is that small teams armed with smart munitions, could also be armed with the knowledge on how to properly deploy that stuff. The brain is the weapon here.

Think of it this way. For one Javelin ‘fire and forget’ missile, you could have ten distraction troops all slinging RPG’s at the vehicle. Worse yet, think of ten troops firing .50 call long guns at the anti-missile system on the tank to destroy it, and then go for the kill with the big gun. I don’t care how bad ass a counter missile system mounted on a tank is, you cannot defend against a swarm attack like this. And this is nothing new. If anyone ever cared to read all the numerous books and manuals on the various ways of using anti-armor munitions, they would know this.

Also, look at the use of Stinger missiles by mujahideen during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. ‘Small and many’ teams armed with smart munitions were able to destroy many helicopters and cause all sorts of problems for the Soviets.

What limits smart munitions use amongst today’s enemies, is probably a number of factors. A better accounting of who makes it, and who they are selling the stuff too. Cost is another factor. Counter-terror operations are another factor. Training is definitely a factor, and an enemy force would either need a state sponsor to bring in these kinds of resources, or hunt around for some veterans of some military who know these new systems or knows anti-armor strategy at the small unit level.

I also think EFP’s are game changers. They are cheap to make and very difficult to defeat. An enemy who knows how to properly use these things and was a student of maneuver warfare, could very well do some damage to an advancing armored column. Especially if they were able to prep the battlefield. Or get this, how about suicide EFP bombers. Guys who run up to tanks at the perfect distance and direction, and trigger the munitions themselves. Of course they would be martyred, but they would also take out a tank or APC. If you think like today’s enemies, a tactic like this is not that far fetched. Below, I posted the conclusion of the paper, but I highly recommend reading the entire thing. Enjoy. –Matt

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Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza

By David E. Johnson

Relevance of the IDF Experience for the U.S. Army

Although the U.S. security situation is much different from that of Israel, similarities do exist.

Both nations believe they must prepare for challenges across the range of military operations.

Therefore, the following insights from recent Israeli experience have relevance for the U.S.

Army:

• The basics of combined arms fire and maneuver are necessary for successful operations

against opponents with capabilities like Hezbollah and Hamas. These hybrid opponents

create a qualitative challenge that demands combined arms fire and maneuver at lower

levels, despite their generally small-unit structures.

Thursday, April 8, 2010

Strategy: ‘The Toyota Horde’ And More Hybrid Warfare Stuff

   I love papers like this, because these are the kind of deals that ruffle the feathers of Tankers and Armor fans, as well as status quo military thinkers. Thanks to Small Wars Journal for publishing it. Basically, William has presented some excellent low cost hybrid warfare concepts that should be of great interest to the military and PMC’s. It’s a different way of looking at armor and maneuver warfare as it applies to small countries and armies, and today’s wars.

   The concept revolves around using small pickups that are easily available throughout the world as a means to transport troops and really modern weaponry–like Javelins for example.  He goes into how Hezbollah fought the Israelis in 2006, and used that war as an example of the kind of fight that would benefit from the Toyota Horde idea.

   Especially if Hezbollah actually had better proficiency with their anti-tank weapons.  If they had actually trained with those weapons and got proficient before that battle, they could have easily upped the numbers of kills.  Javelins and other fire and forget weapons would have been a game changer and the Israelis would have really felt the sting. But just basic anti-tank gunnery skills would have really changed the dynamic.

   The pickup can also be used for the hard work of fortifying a region or prepping the battlefield, much like what Hezbollah did.  They planted IED’s all over the place, set up tank traps, built rocket hides, you name it.  Cheap local trucks, that can quickly transport people, bombs and tools all over the place, are all you need for that endeavor.  And with fortified regions, hybrid armies actually want to be attacked so they can suck in armored columns into their traps.  Then attacks on the logistics can be set up, as well as attacks on individual tanks and APC’s, all using the stuff that was planted.  Much like what Hezbollah did.

   The trucks can also disappear into the population.  Hell, you could use taxis as transports, and really blend into society.  If the trucks are attacked, a group like Hezbollah could kill some civilians, throw them in those trucks, film it and put it all on youtube and say the attacking force killed these innocents.  In essence, these local vehicle/military transports, are the ultimate tools for hybrid warfare and playing the propaganda game to your advantage.

   Now to put on my PMC hat.  Imagine contracting your services to a country, in order to build up regional fortifications and set up this Toyota Horde and Hezbollah style hybrid warfare concept?  It would be cheap, quick to get off the ground, and pretty effective if done correctly. You could also use the country’s current weapon systems to add to those regional fortifications, much like what William was talking about in his paper.  You could also use these ideas, if PMC’s ever had to fight other PMC’s in the coming future. (big if) Notice that the New Rules Of War fit nicely with this paper as well. Interesting stuff and maybe the ‘Somali technicals’ are the wave of the future? lol –Matt

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The classic Somali Technical…. Bring on the Toyota Horde!!

The Toyota Horde: Examining a Lost Cost Military Capability

by William F. Owen

Download the full article: The Toyota Horde

The subject of this article is a broad technical and operational examination of how almost any country on earth can currently gain a viable level of military power by building on the enduring elements of combined arms warfare. These elements are enduring and appeared in the first twenty years of the twentieth century. It is further suggested that skillfully applied this type of capability may enable its user to confront and possibly defeat NATO type expeditionary forces.

A number of popular opinions about the future nature of warfare have created a substantially misleading impression that the skills and equipment required for formation level combined arms capability, such as that possessed by NATO during the cold war is no longer needed, because few potential enemies possess similar peer capability. Thus the object of the article is to show just how simply a peer or near-peer capability can be acquired, and maintained.

Contrary to popular belief, there are many examples of where military action by irregular forces has inflicted battlefield defeats on regular forces. The most famous are the Boer defeats of the British Army during “Black Week” in December 1899 and the Hussite Wars of the 15th Century, where irregular forces, using improvised barricades made of ox wagons (wagenburgs) were able to stand against and defeat the armoured knights of the Holy Roman Empire. In both cases each irregular force was able to generate conventional military force from fairly meager resources. There is nothing novel, new or even complex, in this approach. It is common, enduring and proven.

Download the full article: The Toyota Horde

*****

William F Owen is British and was born in Singapore in 1963. Privately educated, he joined the Army in 1981, and served in both regular and territorial units until resigning in 1993 to work on defense and advisory projects in Kuwait, Taiwan, Algeria, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone. An accomplished glider, fixed wing and helicopter pilot, he works as a writer, broadcaster and defence analyst.

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