Feral Jundi

Friday, June 11, 2010

Publications: ISW–Consolidating Private Security Companies In Southern Afghanistan, By Kimberly Kagan And Carl Forsberg

Filed under: Afghanistan,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:19 PM

   One of the problems I have with this paper is that a government should embrace the power of private enterprise and the free markets, and find ways of using these security companies to only help in their war time strategy.  This paper operates on the assumption that the state has to have a monopoly on force in the first place, and I don’t think this is correct.  It seems that CNAS has recognized that we shouldn’t assume this either, and I think the ISW should reconsider this point of the paper. The state should not be afraid to use private security, and instead should be thankful that a company would even serve in this capacity for the state.

     Now how they serve the state is dependent upon the contract/war strategy and how much effort the government puts into ensuring they get a good deal.  You have to care if you want a good service, and caring means monitoring, regulating, and enforcing, or what I like to refer to as a ‘trust, but verify’ attitude. It is a lesson that the US must learn(or any country for that matter), and it is a lesson that the Afghan government must learn, if in fact they want to take advantage of the strengths of private industry(wealth building, innovation, employment, etc.) and be a player on the world stage.

     Check out the paper and let me know what you think. –Matt

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Consolidating Private Security Companies in Southern Afghanistan

May 28, 2010

By Kimberly Kagan and Carl Forsberg

This backgrounder outlines the complex relationship between private security companies and ISAF in southern Afghanistan.

Introduction

Dozens of Private Security Companies (PSCs) operate in Kandahar city and province, frequently doubling as the militias of local powerbrokers. These armed groups also operate on a contractual basis to provide security for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and private, Afghan companies. Because PSCs are under the control of powerful individuals, rather than the Afghan National Security Forces, they compete with state security forces and interfere with a government monopoly on the use of force. There is growing pressure from ISAF and within the Afghan government to reform and regulate these companies. Major General Nick Carter, the commander of Regional Command-South (RC-S), recently briefed that ISAF was developing a strategy to regulate PSCs as part of the Kandahar Operations unfolding in summer 2010.1

If not properly structured, however, the regulation of these PSCs in Kandahar may reinforce the existing power structures, strengthen the hand of local powerbrokers such as Ahmed Wali Karzai, and further weaken the ANSF. An initiative underway to consolidate the security companies in southern Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate the problems caused by PSCs, rather than reducing their influence.

Download the publication here.

Link to webpage here.

Tuesday, June 8, 2010

Publications: Contracting In Conflicts–The Path To Reform, By John Nagl And Richard Fontaine

Filed under: Afghanistan,Iraq,Letter Of Marque,Publications,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:12 PM

     Now this is a better product and I can tell they actually listened to their contributors.  So bravo to CNAS for putting together a great report.  If you look at the cast of contributors, you will also see that they took advice from guys like Doug Brooks, David Isenberg and a whole bunch of private military companies and military professionals. For the record, I was not a direct contributor, but I know some of the ideas of FJ made it out there in one way or another.

     For one, they actually brought in Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution as a counter to Max Weber’s definition of the state. (the Second Amendment could also be looked at as a counter as well) I was beside myself when I read this in their ‘inherently governmental’ section, and I had to read it a couple of times to make sure they actually went there.  They did and bravo to them for having the courage to challenge this sacred cow of thought.

     This kind of sets the pace for the entire publication, because CNAS and all of it’s contributors were actually making the argument for the use of contractors in war time.  It is an acknowledgement of that ‘elephant in the room’ called contractors, and it is an excellent first step towards combining private industry and government for the good of the nation and the wars it fights. To me, it has always been about unity of effort and command, and ensure private industry only helps government, not hurt it.  If we can figure out how to achieve that unity of effort and command, I think the next step is what will really be radical.

     I have argued on this blog that today’s war planners, leaders and strategists should make an effort to at least acknowledge that elephant in the room called contractors or private industry.  We are getting there and I am enthused about the process.  But to me, the next level of discourse about private industry is how do you turn that animal into a war elephant?

     To me, it is not enough to just acknowledge our existence and say ‘oh well, private industry is that big dumb animal that we all have to get used to’. That is like using a pistol to hammer nails.  I would make the argument that instead, private industry should be looked at from a strategic point of view and the question should be asked is ‘how do we use private industry to help win our wars and maintain a position of strength in the world today’?  That is the next level of discourse about this subject, and that is the kind of thinking that could possibly lead to victory in our current wars. I say this, because there is a tremendous effort taking place to actually figure out how to regulate and utilize private industry during times of war, and this paper and current legislative action is proof of that process. So once we figure out how to shoot the pistol, as opposed to using it to hammer nails, we can then start discussing how to use that pistol in warfare.

     Now on to the paper.  Below I have listed some of the issues that popped up as I was reading it. Just little things that came to mind, that could help refine the product.  Ideas are cheap, and I throw them around freely here. I have also listed some interesting portions of the paper to give the reader a taste. Be sure to check out all of the contributors, to include Allison Stanger (she provided the forward). Enjoy and let me know what you think.-Matt

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Contracting In Conflicts: The Path To Reform

By John Nagl and Richard Fontaine

06/07/2010

CNAS

In both Iraq and Afghanistan today there are more private contractors than U.S. troops on the ground. This exploding reliance on contractors costs U.S. taxpayers tens of billions of dollars and has grown with inadequate government oversight.   This report – authored by Richard Fontaine and John Nagl – details the urgent need for comprehensive reform. The United States must embark on a path of ambitious reform that will require: new laws and regulations; an expansion of the government’s contracting workforce; a coordination mechanism within the executive branch; greater scrutiny, more transparency and clearer standards for private contractors; a strategic view of the roles contractors play in American operations; and a change in culture within the government.

Download the paper here.

Link to website here.

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Sunday, June 6, 2010

Publications: Tribal Engagement–The Jirga And The Shura, By Major Jim Gant And William ‘Mac’ McCallister

Filed under: Afghanistan,Iraq,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:58 PM

     Excellent little paper on the nuances of calling for and attending a Jirga or Shura.  I put this up on the blog because contractors attend these meetings all the time, as well as the military.  That means we can hurt the war effort or help the war effort, all based on how we conduct ourselves at these kinds of meetings. Do you want to be the guy or the company that completely pisses off a region or village because you did not know how these meetings worked?

     My intention here is to get individual contractors thinking about this stuff, and try to apply some of these lessons learned to their own processes out there.  That is Kaizen and that is what is required of any company or individual that claims to have a learning organization or claims to be a student of warfare. Check it out and let me know what you think.

     Also, if you go to this link at Small Wars Journal, you can follow along in the conversation and talk with the authors about the subject. Enjoy. –Matt

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Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shuraby Major Jim Gant and William “Mac” McCallister

According to NATO’s military chief of intelligence in Afghanistan, the Taliban now maintain shadow governors in thirty-three out of thirty-four provinces. While we like to see the world in black and white, the complexities of relationships and alliances in the village and valley make it anything but a straightforward contest between two parties. The U.S. strategy of stripping away Taliban loyalists is not easy in a very complex socio-political landscape. This landscape includes different types of traditional authority, local rivalries and the various configurations of social power in each village and valley.

The rubber of U.S. strategy meets the road in the village assembly. It is in the local assemblies where Coalition Forces speak directly with the local inhabitants and indirectly with the shadow governors of the Taliban. Identifying ahead of time the familial, sectarian, security, economic and political alliances represented in a given village or valley assembly will assist in identifying how these alliances might influence group decisions. We must also contemplate, identify and differentiate between two very different village assemblies: the jirga and shura.

*****

Major Jim Gant is currently assigned to the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (AFPAK Hands) Program as a Tribal Engagement Advisor. AFPAK Hands is designed to develop cadres of officers (and civilians) from each of the military’s services who agree to three to five year tours to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. He will be returning to Afghanistan in the near future.

William “Mac” McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror.

Download the paper here.

Link to Small Wars Journal post and discussion here.

Friday, May 28, 2010

Publications: Contractor Support Of U.S. Operations In USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, And Afghanistan-As Of May 2010

Filed under: Afghanistan,Iraq,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:18 PM

   Boy, if these guys wanted to do something really smart, they would publish this stuff on Scribd.  Then guys like me could put the report up on the blog and folks can quickly scan through it here.  Or make your graphics into JPEGs or something. Help me, to help you get the word out is all.

   So with this report, there was really no surprises.  Increases of contractors in Afghanistan, and a slight decrease in contractors in Iraq. That and we are still at a quarter million strong overseas, and that is pretty impressive given all the talk about trying to get rid of us.(not to mention the contractors with other agencies/departments) It looks to me like we are still pretty important to the war effort, regardless of whatever party in control at the White House.

    One thing to point out is this number does not include contractors working for other agencies. That number is probably pretty big as well.  Now if they can only keep track of how many of us have died or have been wounded in the war. Because as it stands, that effort has been pathetic and entirely disrespectful to the those that gave all.

     Also, check out the rest of the publication by following the links below if you want.  They mention the typical stuff they have promised to do year after year, when it comes to regulating contractors. Talk is cheap, and I sometimes wonder if government purposely wants to do a poor job or purposely chooses not to do the very things they keep saying they need to do? You have plenty of reports, plenty of studies, plenty of expert testimony and recommendations as to what needs to happen.  Now do it and quit talking about it. Pffffft. –Matt

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Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan-as of May 2010

This update reports DoD contractor personnel numbers in theater and outlines DoD efforts to improve management of contractors accompanying U.S. forces.  It covers DoD contractor personnel deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

–Ending 2nd quarter FY 2010, USCENTCOM reported approximately 250,335 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR.

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Thursday, May 6, 2010

Publications: GAO Report On Afghanistan Security Environment

Filed under: Afghanistan,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 8:45 AM

   Let me summarize this thing for you, because this is the message I got.  We sent all of these government folks over to Afghanistan, but we don’t have enough military escorts to take them around the country to implement their projects.  In other words, there is a high demand for security. Where is the surge of security contractors needed to get this stuff done?

   They also talk about an increase in attacks and casualties, but that is largely contributed to the idea that there are more targets for the Taliban to go after and we are now in the fighting season (spring, summer).

   Now for my suggestion. If you want security and there are not enough military folks to do the job, then contract it out. Obviously security forces are at a premium there, and soldiers are kind of busy taking the fight to the enemy.  If you want to get more security in that country in order to cover down on all of these projects, and do it quickly, then contract it out.  I know security contractors are not the most favored choice of government these days, but honestly, they don’t have much choice in the matter if they want to do what they gotta do in Afghanistan.  It’s either that, or just send all of these government employees back home because they are waste of space.

   I would also recommend using expats, as opposed to using corrupt local security companies.  Or combine expat companies with local security companies for security operations.  Where there is a will, there is a way. Hell, you could contract out the security of an entire town if you wanted, and contractors could actually be a huge contributor to the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ portion of the COIN strategy.  Leave the ‘clear’ portion of the strategy to the military, and assign what you can to the ‘hold’ forces.

   One last thing, and I hate to beat a dead horse.  There are plenty of reports, lessons learned, SOPs, experienced contractors, expert input, blah blah blah out there to get this done properly.(man is it tiring to continue to read about how poor government is at learning anything. pfffft)  Either way, there should be no excuses for mismanagement of this ‘surge of security contractors’ into Afghanistan that I am talking about. Or we can continue to read about these people who are sitting around and doing nothing because of a lack of security for their operation. –Matt

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GAO Report On Afghanistan Security Environment

May 5, 2010

(one portion of the report below, follow link to read the rest)

Agencies Cite Security Challenges to Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan 

   State’s January 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy cites reconstruction and development as key elements of the overall effort to stabilize Afghanistan and reduce the strength of the insurgency. However, the strategy acknowledges that the success of such civilian programs in Afghanistan is contingent on improved security. In November 2009, we reported that while U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan had made some progress, deteriorating security complicated such efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country.

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