Publications « Feral Jundi

Saturday, April 24, 2010

Publications: RAND–How Insurgencies End, By Ben Connable

Filed under: Afghanistan,Publications,Strategy — Tags: Afghanistan, Ben Connable, insurgencies, Publications, RAND, Strategy — Matt @ 4:10 AM

The RAND study found:

• Modern insurgencies last approximately 10 years and the government’s chances of winning increase slightly over time.

• Withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat, while inconsistent or impartial support to either side generally presages defeat.

• Pseudo-democracies do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing.

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This first story and introduction from RAND is a run down of the conclusions of the study. What I like about studies like this, is that they draw upon a wide array of past insurgencies, and it tries to find patterns and consensus. That is good, and we should be learning from these insurgencies.

The last point up top in the quote, is the one I am concerned with. Can we do this with a weak government? Or can we do business with the tribes and local leadership of cities and towns until we get a good government in place? The article below points out that it is possible to do this without a strong government, but it certainly does not help the effort. Check it out. –Matt

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Study highlights problems for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan

Ben Arnoldy

April 23, 2010

NEW DELHI — While current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan broadly conforms to historical best practices, the Taliban have a number of advantages that have produced insurgent success in the past, according to a new study of 89 past and ongoing insurgencies worldwide.

The factors that favor the Taliban include receiving sanctuary and support in another country, learning to be more discriminating in their attacks and fighting a government that’s weak and reliant on direct external support.

The historical trends suggest that the Taliban’s Achilles heel would be the loss of their Pakistani sanctuary, while the principal American vulnerability is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s weak pseudo democracy.

The study, said the author, cannot be predictive, but it can help the U.S. address or exploit these vulnerabilities.

“A lot of the things being done in the current (U.S. military) plan are along the lines of successful things we’ve seen in the study,” said Ben Connable, the lead author of “How Insurgencies End,” published by the RAND Corp. in Washington.

(more…)

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Thursday, April 22, 2010

Publications: Pseudo-Operations To Neutralize Extremist Networks, Insurgents, And Terrorists

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Publications — Tags: Al Qaeda, anwar al-awlaki, Ft. Hood, Maj. hasan, pseudo operations, seth wheeler, small wars journal, underwear bomber — Matt @ 12:54 AM

I found this gem of a paper over at Small Wars Journal and wanted to get it out to the FJ readership to consume as well. If you follow the link to SWJ, you can actually talk with the author in the comments section of their post.

Basically, Mr. Wheeler was reinforcing the ideas that Mr. Cline talked about, and tried to convey how important these types of operations would be to the US goal in the GWOT. I agree, and to me, we should be trying to turn every captured Taliban and Al Qaeda operative we can. Or they can sit in that resort called Gitmo and rot away.

As to any new thoughts on pseudo operations? I think for today’s enemy, the Ft. Hood Shooting and the Underwear Bomber attack should be closely examined with the lens of pseudo operations trade craft development. This was some radical stuff, and the guy that turned these two into human weapons was the cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. He is using religion and the internet in order to reach out to folks that he could potentially convert, and he is succeeding. That is powerful, and to replicate that and find out the method, would be very valuable. –Matt

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Pseudo-Operations to Neutralize Extremist Networks, Insurgents, and Terrorists

by Major Seth Wheeler

Terrorism is a threat to the stability and national security of many countries, and has undermined countless governments. However, technological improvements within the last century have allowed greater, more spectacular attacks and broadened the means by which terrorists may broadcast their message. Although previous terrorist attacks against United States citizens have drawn a measure of global attention, the world became acutely aware of the effects of terrorism on 11 September 2001 during the World Trade Center attack orchestrated by Osama Bin Laden and his terror group al Qaeda. The psychological impact of such a devastating attack—conducted so efficiently at such little cost to the attacker—jumpstarted a global level of effort to defeat terrorism and extremism. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified terrorism as a Global National Defense priority in his 2008 National Defense Strategy, and discussed terrorism on 15 occasions throughout his 23-page report. Degrading terrorism requires full-spectrum deterrence and counter strategies: the incorporation of effective foreign policy measures against state-sponsors of terrorism; international security forces assistance programs to ensure competent counter-terror skill-sets within our allies’ ranks; military or police action to kinetically defeat armed resistance or restore sovereignty; and other internal defense and development programs to deny terrorists sanctuary or resources and political advantage.

That stated, terrorists’ geographic or political sanctuaries that the United States cannot directly or indirectly influence through foreign policy initiatives will remain in certain pockets of the world, such as the remaining insurgent-terror organization FARC controlled areas of Colombia or Somalia. Assuming that some terrorists will remain irreconcilable for a variety of reasons not discussed here, and that comprehensive deterrence strategies or counter-terror efforts may prove ineffective, then how does the United States influence or neutralize irreconcilable terrorists protected by a foreign population? What tools can be implemented to eradicate, deflect, isolate, or neutralize typically suicidal extremists employing terror as a weapon? One consideration is pseudo-operations. Penetration of terrorist and insurgent groups by foreign services is inherently difficult, due to the existing mistrust within the organization and extensive vetting required for membership. Pseudo-operations may overcome these challenges and create conditions congruent with the interests of the United States, as several case studies will demonstrate in a later section. However, an overview of what pseudo-operations are and what they can do is first necessary.

Download the full article: Pseudo-Operations to Neutralize Extremist Networks, Insurgents, and Terrorists

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Major Seth Wheeler, U.S. Army, graduated with a M.S. in Defense Analysis – Irregular Warfare from the Naval Postgraduate School in December, 2009. He is currently attending CGSC ILE at Fort Belvoir, VA, and will join the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in June, 2010.The views expressed above are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Link to post here.

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Wednesday, April 14, 2010

Publications: RAND–Military Capabilities For Hybrid War: Insights From The IDF In Lebanon And Gaza

Filed under: Israel,Publications,Strategy — Matt @ 12:55 AM

Furthermore, the introduction of sophisticated weapons (e.g., ATGMs, MANPADS) could radically escalate the challenges faced by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as it did for the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

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That quote up top is the one part I really clued in on, and I have talked about this in the New Rules of War posts, as well as the Toyota Horde post. Of course Israel thinks they have a counter to these types of munitions and tactics, and it will be interesting if they can truly stop this stuff. But I am skeptical.

The thing with anti-armor is that small teams armed with smart munitions, could also be armed with the knowledge on how to properly deploy that stuff. The brain is the weapon here.

Think of it this way. For one Javelin ‘fire and forget’ missile, you could have ten distraction troops all slinging RPG’s at the vehicle. Worse yet, think of ten troops firing .50 call long guns at the anti-missile system on the tank to destroy it, and then go for the kill with the big gun. I don’t care how bad ass a counter missile system mounted on a tank is, you cannot defend against a swarm attack like this. And this is nothing new. If anyone ever cared to read all the numerous books and manuals on the various ways of using anti-armor munitions, they would know this.

Also, look at the use of Stinger missiles by mujahideen during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. ‘Small and many’ teams armed with smart munitions were able to destroy many helicopters and cause all sorts of problems for the Soviets.

What limits smart munitions use amongst today’s enemies, is probably a number of factors. A better accounting of who makes it, and who they are selling the stuff too. Cost is another factor. Counter-terror operations are another factor. Training is definitely a factor, and an enemy force would either need a state sponsor to bring in these kinds of resources, or hunt around for some veterans of some military who know these new systems or knows anti-armor strategy at the small unit level.

I also think EFP’s are game changers. They are cheap to make and very difficult to defeat. An enemy who knows how to properly use these things and was a student of maneuver warfare, could very well do some damage to an advancing armored column. Especially if they were able to prep the battlefield. Or get this, how about suicide EFP bombers. Guys who run up to tanks at the perfect distance and direction, and trigger the munitions themselves. Of course they would be martyred, but they would also take out a tank or APC. If you think like today’s enemies, a tactic like this is not that far fetched. Below, I posted the conclusion of the paper, but I highly recommend reading the entire thing. Enjoy. –Matt

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Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza

By David E. Johnson

Relevance of the IDF Experience for the U.S. Army

Although the U.S. security situation is much different from that of Israel, similarities do exist.

Both nations believe they must prepare for challenges across the range of military operations.

Therefore, the following insights from recent Israeli experience have relevance for the U.S.

Army:

• The basics of combined arms fire and maneuver are necessary for successful operations

against opponents with capabilities like Hezbollah and Hamas. These hybrid opponents

create a qualitative challenge that demands combined arms fire and maneuver at lower

levels, despite their generally small-unit structures.

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Thursday, April 8, 2010

Strategy: ‘The Toyota Horde’ And More Hybrid Warfare Stuff

Filed under: Iran,Israel,PMC 2.0,Publications,Strategy — Tags: hybrid warfare, IED's, PMC 2.0, private military companies, security contractors, small wars journal, Strategy, William Owen — Matt @ 1:40 AM

I love papers like this, because these are the kind of deals that ruffle the feathers of Tankers and Armor fans, as well as status quo military thinkers. Thanks to Small Wars Journal for publishing it. Basically, William has presented some excellent low cost hybrid warfare concepts that should be of great interest to the military and PMC’s. It’s a different way of looking at armor and maneuver warfare as it applies to small countries and armies, and today’s wars.

The concept revolves around using small pickups that are easily available throughout the world as a means to transport troops and really modern weaponry–like Javelins for example. He goes into how Hezbollah fought the Israelis in 2006, and used that war as an example of the kind of fight that would benefit from the Toyota Horde idea.

Especially if Hezbollah actually had better proficiency with their anti-tank weapons. If they had actually trained with those weapons and got proficient before that battle, they could have easily upped the numbers of kills. Javelins and other fire and forget weapons would have been a game changer and the Israelis would have really felt the sting. But just basic anti-tank gunnery skills would have really changed the dynamic.

The pickup can also be used for the hard work of fortifying a region or prepping the battlefield, much like what Hezbollah did. They planted IED’s all over the place, set up tank traps, built rocket hides, you name it. Cheap local trucks, that can quickly transport people, bombs and tools all over the place, are all you need for that endeavor. And with fortified regions, hybrid armies actually want to be attacked so they can suck in armored columns into their traps. Then attacks on the logistics can be set up, as well as attacks on individual tanks and APC’s, all using the stuff that was planted. Much like what Hezbollah did.

The trucks can also disappear into the population. Hell, you could use taxis as transports, and really blend into society. If the trucks are attacked, a group like Hezbollah could kill some civilians, throw them in those trucks, film it and put it all on youtube and say the attacking force killed these innocents. In essence, these local vehicle/military transports, are the ultimate tools for hybrid warfare and playing the propaganda game to your advantage.

Now to put on my PMC hat. Imagine contracting your services to a country, in order to build up regional fortifications and set up this Toyota Horde and Hezbollah style hybrid warfare concept? It would be cheap, quick to get off the ground, and pretty effective if done correctly. You could also use the country’s current weapon systems to add to those regional fortifications, much like what William was talking about in his paper. You could also use these ideas, if PMC’s ever had to fight other PMC’s in the coming future. (big if) Notice that the New Rules Of War fit nicely with this paper as well. Interesting stuff and maybe the ‘Somali technicals’ are the wave of the future? lol –Matt

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The classic Somali Technical…. Bring on the Toyota Horde!!

The Toyota Horde: Examining a Lost Cost Military Capability

by William F. Owen

Download the full article: The Toyota Horde

The subject of this article is a broad technical and operational examination of how almost any country on earth can currently gain a viable level of military power by building on the enduring elements of combined arms warfare. These elements are enduring and appeared in the first twenty years of the twentieth century. It is further suggested that skillfully applied this type of capability may enable its user to confront and possibly defeat NATO type expeditionary forces.

A number of popular opinions about the future nature of warfare have created a substantially misleading impression that the skills and equipment required for formation level combined arms capability, such as that possessed by NATO during the cold war is no longer needed, because few potential enemies possess similar peer capability. Thus the object of the article is to show just how simply a peer or near-peer capability can be acquired, and maintained.

Contrary to popular belief, there are many examples of where military action by irregular forces has inflicted battlefield defeats on regular forces. The most famous are the Boer defeats of the British Army during “Black Week” in December 1899 and the Hussite Wars of the 15th Century, where irregular forces, using improvised barricades made of ox wagons (wagenburgs) were able to stand against and defeat the armoured knights of the Holy Roman Empire. In both cases each irregular force was able to generate conventional military force from fairly meager resources. There is nothing novel, new or even complex, in this approach. It is common, enduring and proven.

Download the full article: The Toyota Horde

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William F Owen is British and was born in Singapore in 1963. Privately educated, he joined the Army in 1981, and served in both regular and territorial units until resigning in 1993 to work on defense and advisory projects in Kuwait, Taiwan, Algeria, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone. An accomplished glider, fixed wing and helicopter pilot, he works as a writer, broadcaster and defence analyst.

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Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Letter Of Marque: The Constitutional Law And Practice Of Privateering, By Assistant U.S. Attorney Theodore Cooperstein

Filed under: Legal News,Letter Of Marque,Publications — Tags: constitutional law, Legal News, Letter Of Marque, private military companies, privateering, Publications, security contracting, Theodore Cooperstein, war — Matt @ 11:42 PM

So this is interesting. Here is a guy that works for the US Attorneys Office, who is former special forces and a reserve Army Intel guy, that writes this fantastic paper on the subject of Letters of Marque and Reprisal. Does anyone else find that to be cool, or am I the only constitutional law geek that likes this stuff? lol

The thing about it folks, is that I like the LoM, and I think it is just one more tool that can be used in this long and costly war. It gives congress a means to connect with private industry in a way that will be cost effective, and certainly effective if done properly. The one caveat though, is that congress needs to understand the mechanisms at play with this concept, and they must have the tools on how to properly construct a LoM. It would take some modern day modifications to get it just right, but it is certainly not impossible, and all the pieces are there to put it together.

Which leads me to my next point. By far, Feral Jundi is the place with the most comprehensive collection and commentary about the subject of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal. I know, I search this stuff relentlessly, and have collected it all. I invite the readership to explore all of this good stuff, and ‘build a snowmobile’ out of it. Hell, write congress and let them know about the LoM and your thoughts about it. Remind them about Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution and let’s get the word out. –Matt

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Letters of Marque and Reprisal: The Constitutional Law and Practice of Privateering

Theodore M. Cooperstein, U.S. Attorneys Office (SDFL)

Abstract

The United States Constitution grants to the Congress the power, among others, to issue “Letters of Marque and Reprisal.” Although the practice seems to have fallen into disuse in this century, it was an important tool of national power for the federal government created by the Framers, who placed great import on the federal government’s role in protecting international commerce and in enforcing international law.

Privateering played a significant role before and during the Revolutionary War, and it persisted in American history as an economical way to augment naval forces against an enemy in wartime. A significant outgrowth of the practice of privateering was the body of law resulting from prize court adjudications. United States courts, in deciding title to ships and goods taken prize, determined issues both of domestic and customary international law. In this manner the federal courts significantly shaped the role of international law in the United States jurisprudence as well as assured the role of the United States in the ongoing development of customary international law. Case law concerning prizes and privateering is accordingly a useful vehicle to examine the interplay of U.S. constitutional law and customary international law as they both developed through the Nineteenth Century.

Changes in the methods of warfare during the Twentieth Century diminished the role of privateering. But the Congressional authority to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal remains. As a means to commission private actors to augment national forces in international crises, the Letter of Marque and Reprisal could yet have modern applications. It remains for innovative executive and legislative experiment to revive the ancient practice in a form befitting modern international problems.

Suggested Citation

Theodore M. Cooperstein, “Letters of Marque and Reprisal: The Constitutional Law and Practice of Privateering,” 40 J. Maritime L. & Comm. 221 (Apr. 2009)