Feral Jundi

Thursday, March 4, 2010

Publications: GAO Concludes That Contractors Are More Cost Effective Than Employees!

    Well duh. lol You guys don’t have to pay the pensions of contractors when their contract is done and the war is over. Of course the government loves to use this ‘disposable workforce’ called contractors.

     Thanks to David Isenberg who brought this to everyone’s attention through his blog, and you can read his assessment here.

     I do have an issue with the way GAO reworded the one instance that federal employees were more cost effective.  Why training, vetting and recruiting costs were not included in this last one, is interesting.  Is this because politically speaking, they are wanting to promote phasing out security contractors, and the GAO was pressured to write it that way? So instead of adding 240 million with the 162 million dollars to make the ‘grand total cost’ to the government for federal employee security specialists of 402 million dollars, they instead decided to stick with just the 240 million dollar figure? So in order to support their statement that security was not cost effective, they decided to split up the figure…(raised eyebrow) So with my simple math here, I show that private industry is more cost effective than the government for security work.

   Also, I wonder if legal fees and lawsuits were tacked into the costs, because private industry is definitely eating that bill with this war.  Just ask companies like Xe or DynCorp.  And as more legislation is passed, which allows more people to easily sue private industry, and/or makes it more difficult to sue the government, I think this is another area that needs some attention in the accounting process here. A company has to have it’s own costly legal apparatus. The government has a massive legal apparatus already and oodles of laws to protect itself from litigation.

     Just look at the dismal example of how many ‘few successful’ whistleblower cases there have been against government?  Office of Special Counsel should be changed to the Office of Protect the Government. Not to mention all the lawyers assigned to protect the various agencies and departments out there.  The government has a legal shield around it like you can’t believe, and all of it is funded by the tax payer.

   Overall, this is a good publication to show folks as proof that we are more cost effective and we do make sense to the government. So if you are ever in an argument with some dork about the nuts and bolts of contractor efficiency, just pull this sucker up and let the GAO do your talking. –Matt

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Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus Contractors for Security Services in Iraq

GAO-10-266R March 4, 2010

Full Report (PDF, 20 pages)

Summary

In Process

Our comparison of likely State Department costs versus contractor costs for four task orders and one contract awarded by the State Department for security services in Iraq showed that for three of the task orders and the contract, the cost of using State Department employees would be greater than using contractors, while the State Department’s estimated cost to use federal employees was less for the other task order. For example, using State Department employees to provide static security for the embassy in Baghdad would have cost the department approximately $858 million for 1 year compared to the approximately $78 million charged by the contractor for the same time period. In contrast, our cost comparison of the task order for providing personal security for State Department employees while in the Baghdad region–which required personnel that have security clearances–showed that for this task order, the State Department’s estimated annual cost would have been about $240 million, whereas the contractor charged approximately $380 million for 1 year. However, because the State Department does not currently have a sufficient number of trained personnel to provide security in Iraq, the department would need to recruit, hire, and train additional employees at an additional cost of $162 million. Contract requirements are a major factor in determining whether contractors or government personnel are less expensive–especially factors such as whether personnel need security clearances. However, there are other factors that may play a role in the decision of whether to perform security services with federal employees or enough federal employees than to acquire contractors. Additionally, the government could potentially be faced with incurring some administrative costs from having to take actions to reduce government personnel if they are no longer needed. When using contractors, the department also incurs administrative costs for awarding the task orders and contract and providing oversight; however, the State Department was unable to estimate these costs. Finally, some costs associated with providing Iraq security services using federal employees–such as developing new career fields, providing additional overhead, and building new housing–are difficult to quantify.

Link to publication here.

Sunday, February 21, 2010

Law Enforcement: Officers Lose 243 Homeland Security Guns

   Interesting report, and I thought private industry was bad.  These guys are government and the report only covers two years! I wonder how many weapons were lost in all the other years not covered in the report? –Matt

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Report: Officers lose 243 Homeland Security guns

February 18, 2010

Washington (CNN) — Nearly 180 Department of Homeland Security weapons were lost — some falling into the hands of criminals — after officers left them in restrooms, vehicles and other public places, according to an inspector general report.

The officers, with Customs and Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “did not always sufficiently safeguard their firearms and, as a result, lost a significant number of firearms” between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2008, the report said.

In all, 243 firearms were lost in both agencies during that period, according to the January report from Inspector General Richard Skinner. Of those, 36 were lost because of circumstances beyond officers’ control — for instance, ICE lost a firearm during an assault on an officer. Another 28 were lost even though officers had stored them in lockboxes or safes.

But 74 percent, or 179 guns, were lost “because officers did not properly secure them,” the report said.

Following a review of the draft report in December, Homeland Security took steps to implement its recommendations and overhaul its property management policy, according to a response in the report. A department spokeswoman did not immediately return a call from CNN Thursday seeking comment.

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Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Publications: Report From GAO On Nuclear Private Security Forces

     Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. 

*****

     So why is it that we federalize airport security, yet privatize nuclear security?  I think this GAO report pretty much answers that question as to what direction they think security should go for nuclear facilities.  The folks at DoE and GAO probably had visions of TSA style security as soon as someone brought up the federalization of nuclear facilities, and that probably shut down the idea right then and there. lol

   Any way, I thought they had some interesting conclusions in the report.  Harden up the forces and make them more like the military (training and such), provide one set of standards and pay for all the sites (no brainer there), and insure the contractors are getting taken care of for retirement stuff (so they have incentive to do well, and stay with the program). Sounds good, and I hope this is implemented. –Matt

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Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues

GAO-10-275 January 29, 2010

Summary

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy’s (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. DOE also has considered whether the current system of separate contracts for protective forces at each site provides sufficiently uniform, high-quality performance across its sites. Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to review protective forces at DOE sites that possess Category I SNM. Among other things, GAO (1) analyzed information on the management and compensation of protective forces, (2) examined the implementation of TRF, and (3) assessed DOE’s two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces.

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Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Letter Of Marque: CATO–Privateering And The Private Production Of Naval Power

     Another great hidden gem of a paper about one of my favorite topics.  I also really perked up on the conclusions of the paper.  That privateering did not go away because the concept sucked. Nope.  It went away, because of competition with government owned Navies who wanted to do it all. It kind of reminds me of the ridiculous fears that popped up when privatized mail and shipping companies came on to the scene.

     The post office (government) folks actually had to compete with private industry for the business of the citizenry, and despite the early fears of those folks thinking they will lose their good deal government job, that competition only helped invigorate the innovation and business processes of both groups.  And best of all, the PO and private industry are still around and still slinging it out for that business.  If you also look at the PO, they are continuing to look more and more like UPS and  Fedex all the time.

    I also like the lighthouse example listed below as well. I think private naval and military companies can exist along side the militaries and navies they are serving just fine.  Hell, we are seeing that right now with the war, with thousands of contractors being used. So to take that one step further with issuing LoM’s to companies, to help even further in the war effort, would not be a bridge too far.  It would also provide a pretty nice cost savings for the government, and the military and navies of those governments would now have competition.

     That competition would be healthy in my opinion, and with carefully constructed LoM’s and today’s technological advances, it would not be a problem at all to keep tabs on companies issued LoM’s. And like Matt Armstrong mentioned, issuing LoM’s to today’s PMC’s would be a quick fix for keeping them in line.  Either abide by the wishes of a congress and their issued contract (LoM), or instantly be turned into a criminal organization for crossing the line. That would be some serious legal control if you know what I mean. It would also cut out inefficient contracting offices and weak laws that fall short of keeping companies under control. Just some thoughts on a different way of doing business.-Matt

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Privateering and the Private Production of Naval Power

Gary M. Anderson and Adam Gifford, Jr.

     The early history shows that, contrary to the belief of many economists, a lighthouse service can be provided by private enterprise. The lighthouses were built, operated, financed, and owned by private individuals. … We may conclude that economists should not use the lighthouse as an example of a service which could only be provided by the government. —Ronald Coase (1974) 

*****

Introduction

     Privatization and the “contracting-out” of services traditionally provided by means of governmental monopoly continue to attract increasing interest from both politicians and scholars. Many studies have found that private provision of certain goods and services tends to be more efficient than comparable arrangements provided directly by the government.

     One of the very few areas relatively untouched by the recent attempts at privatization, or contracting-out, of governmental services is the military. Although some economists have argued that the priva-tization of major elements of the provision of national defense would be both feasible and efficient, in modern times military forces are essentially a pure governmental monopoly. Not only are private military forces illegal, but the military force maintained by the govern-ment is invariably wholly owned and operated by the government. National defense, like lighthouses, frequently serves as a stylized illustration of the need for governmental provision of “public goods” in economics textbooks.

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Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Publications: Pseudo Operations And COIN: Lessons From Other Countries, By Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

   If you have the time, check out this excellent paper.  I loved it, because this is the kind of stuff that we need to be doing more of in this war. All it takes is one guy that we can use to deeply penetrate into Osama Bin Laden’s network or some drug cartel, and we could effectively dismantle those operations.

   Dr. Cline gave a big mention to the Selous Scouts in this treatment of the subject, and brought up numerous other groups that had conducted pseudo operations in their wars.

   Towards the end of the article, he builds a snowmobile out of all of this data from all of these other countries, and puts together a pretty good ‘lessons learned’ of how to do pseudo operations correctly:

1. Money counts.

2. The alternative to cooperation can be dire.

3. Coordination is critical.

4. Breaking guerrilla communications systems is a key tool.

5. Effectiveness of pseudo operations depends in large part on

the effectiveness of response forces.

6. The role of “turned” guerrillas is critical.

   The two big components of turning enemy combatants it seems, is money and leveraging the choice of harsh incarceration or execution. That, and treating the captives really well in the beginning and having a really well planned system of turning these folks. It is quite clear though, that pseudo operations can be effective, and they are not impossible to do. It ain’t easy either, because if it was, everyone would be doing it successfully.

   One of the things that is working against the US for pseudo operations, is that we detain terrorists with no chance of execution. There is nothing scary at all about our detention, despite what the media might have the public believe .  If anything, terrorists want to go to Gitmo, so they can conduct propaganda campaigns for their cause while in detention.  They love the idea that they can continue to live and wage jihad from a cell. The paradox though, is that they want to be martyred, so execution would be cool with them as well. So right there is one factor working against us for doing pseudo operations. Still, I think there are other incentives that we could use in order to turn these guys, and we should leave no stone unturned with a pseudo operation strategy.

   Finally, the one theme that repeated throughout the paper, is that pseudo forces should focus primarily on information collection.  When you involve them in more kinetic stuff, that tends to muck up everything.  So whatever turned guerrillas or terrorists you use, it would probably be best to use them just to collect information and have a very flexible and quick reaction force to work off of that information. And to figure out a means of not accidently killing good guys or screwing up the pseudo operator’s operation. Lot’s to think about, but I really think this is the kind of stuff we need to do more of.

   Now to put my industry hat on.  Could a PMC offer these type of services?  If a company was able to claim some kind of speciality in turning guerillas and terrorists, that is the kind of service that would really give states an advantage in their wars. Hell, I know non-states are already doing this kind of thing, and you see examples of it everywhere in this war. But if a company had a proprietary method for turning folks within the framework of international law, and within the laws of that host/contracting country, you could probably name your price. Especially if you were able to produce results. –Matt

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Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries

June 2005

Authored by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

SUMMARY

Pseudo operations, in which government forces and guerrilla defectors portray themselves as insurgent units, have been a very successful technique used in several counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo teams have provided critical human intelligence and other support to these operations.

These operations, although of considerable value, also have raised a number of concerns. Their use in offensive missions and psychological operations campaigns has, at times, been counterproductive. In general, their main value has been as human intelligence collectors, particularly for long-term background intelligence or for identifying guerrilla groups that then are assaulted by conventional forces. Care must be taken in running these operations both to avoid going too far in acting like guerrillas, and in resisting becoming involved in human rights abuses.

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