Feral Jundi

Thursday, October 9, 2008

Industry Talk: Logistics And Building the AK-47 of Facilities

Filed under: Industry Talk — Tags: , , , — Matt @ 1:15 PM

     This was a great little article about a topic we hear little of.  When Iraq finishes up, what are we going to do with all that stuff over there?  Personally, I would like to see us re-use most of that equipment, and take it into our other theaters of operation.  Unfortunately, cost will dictate what we do with these items.  The question to ask, is it more beneficial to scrap or sell that stuff locally, or pay the costs in fuel and shipping to get it to another location and reuse it?  My thoughts are that we should be reusing this stuff, but the fact of the matter is is that a lot of stuff was built by the lowest bidder and is just crap.  The parts on these facilities are substandard and are not universally used on all equipment, and the facilities themselves are not really quality products that could be used long term.  Which brings me to my next point.

      Equipment we use in the war zones should be built to last, and built to be reusable and interchangeable with other equipment.  I like the Southwest Airlines concept of one plane, one set of parts, and universal maintenance and knowledge about that plane.  We should be applying the same concept to logistics in today’s wars.  If we are using ten different types of tents, then that requires ten different types of parts, and a repair facility that knows how to repair all ten.  Same thing with trailer facilities over in Iraq.

     The shower trailers, for example, should all be constructed to the same standard and design specifications.  The intent is that a repair specialist(military or civilian)in Al Asad Air Base should be able to check out a Balad Air Base shower trailer and say this is familiar and I can repair this.  That they have the parts available, because the parts are universally used throughout the world.  The designs should be simple, durable, dependable, transportable, and have parts that are interchangeable with other units.  We should be making shower trailers and other facilities more like the AK-47 Assault Rifle.  It would cost less in the long run, it would free up the time of the military or civilians tasked with repairing these things, and this equipment could follow us where ever we go out there.  And I don’t see this war ending anytime soon. The concept of the Forward Operating Base(FOB) or mini-camp will continue to be a common theme, and especially if our generals continue pounding on the theme of not commuting to your office.  Small camps are essential to fighting in today’s 4th and 5th generation type wars.

    I like the concept of making a shower trailer out of a shipping container but I do not like the concept of making shower trailers on site that are cheaply made by some contractor that could care less about the quality, and builds it to their discretion and not to some Mil-spec standard.  Worse yet, I hate the fact that faulty wiring in some of these poorly constructed facilities have actually killed people through electrocution.  That is despicable and unacceptable in my view. 

     The other reason why I like shipping container facilities is transportation cost.  It is easy to throw these on a semi-truck or throw it on a ship to transport.  But yet again, when these things get set up in Iraq, they cut into the containers to modify them.  They add air conditioners or windows and doors, which is nice, but I am sure the shipping industry isn’t too cool with that.  So really, if we want to be serious about this stuff, we need to design facilities that are more transport friendly and require no local modifications.  I also think that these containers should be more armored, and there are various companies that do this to these things.  But really, we need to find one design for one type of facility, and built with durable parts that are safe for the occupants. 

     The other thing about the facilities that is important to look at, are power issues.  For example, a shower trailer requires lots of power to heat water, power lights, power pumps for water pressure.  The power requirements can be high, and I say adding solar panels and wind generators to these things, as well as solar heaters on the roof, can be really good things to do to making a FOB more self sufficient.  And it will save lives by lessening fuel transport missions for that FOB.  Imagine if we were to make more efficient facilities, and bring down fuel use to maybe one convoy a month, as opposed to several fuel convoys a week?

    Water use is another big one.  If we were to build trailer-like facilities that were more efficient in the use of water, then we can do a lot to minimize water related convoys.  Maybe we should look at recycling grey water, if we can safely convert it back to purified water.  It would seem to me that distillers in the desert regions out there would go a long way towards converting grey water back to a usable resource in a camp.  I use a distiller at home that is is electrically powered, but a solar heated distiller(if designed correctly) could help to reuse a lot of water that is just thrown out.  Or just bring in well drillers, which would be cool for the local populations once you leave.  But back to these facilities, why not put the filtration units on the trailers themselves?  We need to standardize and workout these issues, and all with the focus on durability, efficiency, and safety, yet still have the ability to transport it easily.

    Overall, I know today’s military and civilian industry have been looking at these issues, and that it is a constant dance they play with money.  Do you build it cheap and just throw it away, or do you build it to last and use it over and over again.  The bean counters are constantly doing the math on this, which is great, but I personally think we can do better.   In my belief, we need to get back to quality, and I think it is in our best interest to do so.   

    So back to the main point.  If we spend the money now, and take a more logical approach towards constructing these facilities that the troops and contractors use overseas, then we will save way more money in the future.  I say build it right the first time, so the facility is dependable and durable and is not a threat to those that are using it.  To me, the choice is simple. Build a quality product and use it for a life time, or build a crappy product and continue paying for it in blood and treasure over and over again. And the more efficient that facility is, the less resources it requires, and that equates to minimizing risk for the troops by cutting down on convoys.

   It bothers me that we will be throwing a lot of this stuff away over in Iraq. The Iraqis will use it all though, and that is great, but yet again, we paid for that stuff and it just seems like we should not be throwing away our camping equipment out into the woods, and buying new stuff for every trip.  In my view, we will save money in the long run if we take a more consolidated and efficient view towards our logistics tail.  And now with the looming global recession and US economic crisis, saving money in this department is essential.  –Head Jundi 

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Dogs of War: The last contractor

DAVID ISENBERG

Published: October 03, 2008

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 (UPI) — Just as private contractors were part of the buildup of forces in Iraq, from the very beginning of the war to today, they are also figuring to be a prominent part of the eventual withdrawal.

A recent report finds that the success of the eventual withdrawal from Iraq — or “reposturing effort,” as it is called — will depend on having clearer guidance and plans for reposturing of contractors from Iraq, and accountability and disposition of contractor-managed, government-owned property.

According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office report released last month, from late 2007 through July 2008 planning for the reposturing of U.S. forces in Iraq did not include a theater-wide plan for the reposturing of contractors.

This is a rather glaring omission, considering that as of April 26 there were approximately 149,400 Department of Defense contractors and as of July 1 approximately 147,400 U.S. troops deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thus, there are now more DoD contractors than regular active forces.

According to a May 2008 Multi-National Force-Iraq order, logistics planners were to coordinate with the Defense Contracting Management Agency to identify contractual issues associated with reposturing operations. But as of June 2008 DCMA officials stated they were not aware of a theater-wide plan for the reposturing of contractors. In fact, according to DoD officials, CENTCOM contracting planners did not begin participating in planning for reposturing operations until July 2008.

The news, however, may not be as bad as it seems. While there is no theater-wide plan, since May 2008 Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program officials have been participating in reposturing planning. As LOGCAP is the largest logistical support contract in Iraq, such planning is significant.

Examples include LOGCAP personnel attending a series of logistics conferences held at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, in May 2008, working with reposture planning teams in both MNF-I and Multi-National Corps-Iraq I, and participating in the Logistics Reposture Working Group.

Still, many challenges remain in the planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP contractor personnel. For example, according to the GAO report, decisions about reposturing of these contractors often are made before requirements have been clearly identified, and DoD officials do not receive timely and accurate information from the customers or units using these contracts.

Another big challenge is maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. government property under the control of contractors. According to DCMA officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of contractor-managed, government-owned property in Iraq.

Again, as one would expect, the largest portion of all contractor-managed property in Iraq, $3.37 billion, falls under LOGCAP. Examples include laundry and bath facilities, food service, sanitation, housing, maintenance, transportation, construction, and power generation and distribution.

Non-LOGCAP contractor-managed, government-owned property falls into four main categories. These are the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, selective programs under DoD’s Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, programs run by the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, and hundreds of smaller programs run by individual U.S. government agencies.

Fortunately, several DoD organizations already have begun planning for the disposition of excess contractor-managed, government-owned property from Iraq. In October 2007 the deputy undersecretary of defense for logistics and materiel readiness increased the donation threshold for all excess U.S.-owned personal property in Iraq from $5,000 to $10,000 and delegated this donation authority to MNF-I.

In June 2008 the deputy undersecretary increased the authority to transfer for all U.S.-owned excess personal property in Iraq from $10,000 to $15,000. In addition, in 2007 the Army published guidelines for the retrograde of contractor-acquired, government-owned property from the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility. The Army followed this up in December 2007 with a business-case analysis of the effective disposition of contractor-acquired, government-owned property. The Army’s analysis indicates that approximately 85 percent of all contractor-acquired, government-owned property in Iraq should be transferred, sold or scrapped in Iraq once it is declared excess, while the remaining 15 percent can be sold or reused elsewhere.

Yet problems remain. First is determining the original or fair-market value of contractor-managed, government-owned property and determining any security restrictions on its disposition. According to MNF-I, the failure to sort and identify U.S. government materiel in Iraq has already resulted in the retrograding of items that are unserviceable, are still needed in theater, or are uneconomical to retrograde.

Moreover, according to the Army’s business-case analysis, the LOGCAP property book kept by the prime contractor had numerous omissions, and many items were not properly listed, creating doubt about the inventory’s accuracy. Without accurate accountability, the U.S. government may fail to realize all possible financial and practical gains from this property.

Second is the time-consuming and labor-intensive task of accounting for and determining the disposition of contractor-managed, government-owned property. According to MNF-I, before contractor-managed property can be disposed of, it must be transferred from the contractor’s records to a military unit’s property book. However, officials from the DCMA stated that contractors and government officials must perform a joint inventory of all property before it is transferred.

Officials assert that completing this inventory will require planning, travel to storage locations and the physical staging of property for easier counting, all of which are time-consuming. Moreover, the same officials stated that security concerns previously have hindered their ability to travel to all inventory locations.

If the security situation inhibits contractors from moving equipment, the contractors can abandon the equipment to U.S. forces who then will be responsible for its disposition. DCMA officials stated that without adequate time and resources to plan and execute a thorough inventory of contractor-managed, government-owned property in Iraq, the risks of losing accountability over this property will increase.

The final challenge is that the Defense Logistics Agency may not have sufficient data to adequately plan capacity needs at the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices in theater. MNF-I policy states that contractor-managed property that is excess to government requirements, and is not donated to the Iraqi government, will be disposed of at DLA facilities.

(U.S. Navy veteran David Isenberg is a military affairs analyst. He is an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, a correspondent for Asia Times and the author of a forthcoming book, “Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq.” His “Dogs of War” column, analyzing developments in the private security and military sector, appears every Friday.)

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