Let me summarize this thing for you, because this is the message I got. We sent all of these government folks over to Afghanistan, but we don’t have enough military escorts to take them around the country to implement their projects. In other words, there is a high demand for security. Where is the surge of security contractors needed to get this stuff done?
They also talk about an increase in attacks and casualties, but that is largely contributed to the idea that there are more targets for the Taliban to go after and we are now in the fighting season (spring, summer).
Now for my suggestion. If you want security and there are not enough military folks to do the job, then contract it out. Obviously security forces are at a premium there, and soldiers are kind of busy taking the fight to the enemy. If you want to get more security in that country in order to cover down on all of these projects, and do it quickly, then contract it out. I know security contractors are not the most favored choice of government these days, but honestly, they don’t have much choice in the matter if they want to do what they gotta do in Afghanistan. It’s either that, or just send all of these government employees back home because they are waste of space.
I would also recommend using expats, as opposed to using corrupt local security companies. Or combine expat companies with local security companies for security operations. Where there is a will, there is a way. Hell, you could contract out the security of an entire town if you wanted, and contractors could actually be a huge contributor to the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ portion of the COIN strategy. Leave the ‘clear’ portion of the strategy to the military, and assign what you can to the ‘hold’ forces.
One last thing, and I hate to beat a dead horse. There are plenty of reports, lessons learned, SOPs, experienced contractors, expert input, blah blah blah out there to get this done properly.(man is it tiring to continue to read about how poor government is at learning anything. pfffft) Either way, there should be no excuses for mismanagement of this ‘surge of security contractors’ into Afghanistan that I am talking about. Or we can continue to read about these people who are sitting around and doing nothing because of a lack of security for their operation. –Matt
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GAO Report On Afghanistan Security Environment
May 5, 2010
(one portion of the report below, follow link to read the rest)
Agencies Cite Security Challenges to Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan
State’s January 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy cites reconstruction and development as key elements of the overall effort to stabilize Afghanistan and reduce the strength of the insurgency. However, the strategy acknowledges that the success of such civilian programs in Afghanistan is contingent on improved security. In November 2009, we reported that while U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan had made some progress, deteriorating security complicated such efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country.
Since that time, the lack of a secure environment has continued to challenge
reconstruction and development efforts. For example, according to a March 2010
United Nations report, direct attacks against the aid community have limited the
accessibility of development program activities in 94 districts considered very high
risk and 81 districts assessed as high risk. The following list provides some specific
effects of these security challenges as cited by U.S. agencies:
• Delayed programs and increased costs. According to USAID, security constraints
in Afghanistan have led to longer implementation times and higher costs for
projects in nonsecure areas. For example, USAID noted that militant activity has
increased the cost of efforts to supply power generators to the Kandahar
Industrial Park. Specifically, the August 2009 bombing of a warehouse facility
resulted in $250,000 in damage to the generators, which, as of March 2010, had yet
to be installed. Similarly, USAID cited difficulty in accessing villages in nonsecure
areas that are participating in an approximately $40 million literacy program,
leading to months of delay in the ability of the participating villages to complete
the program. According to USAID, the implementing partner for the literacy
program has requested more than $600,000 in additional funding from USAID to
upgrade security for the program.
• Hampered progress of some counternarcotics operations. As we reported in
March 2010, opium poppy eradication and public information efforts in
Afghanistan have been constrained by poor security, particularly in insurgency-
dominated provinces. According to State, as opium poppy cultivation becomes
more concentrated in areas of poor security, opportunities for eradication have
become more limited. In particular, U.S. officials note that adequate force
protection is essential for eradication in the south. Similarly, security concerns
largely dictate how often and how far Counternarcotics Advisory Teams can
travel outside of their bases of operations. For example, in less secure southern
areas, such as Kandahar, some advisory teams’ movements have been limited,
while other teams have been compelled to retreat to military bases for protection.
The advisory team in the western Farah province reported that its main problem
is the lack of security, which restricts it to daylight operations in the provincial
capital.
Limited ability to conduct oversight of ongoing programs. USAID has cited the
security environment in Afghanistan as a severe impediment to its ability to
monitor projects. For example, USAID noted that solely traveling by road to visit
alternative development, food assistance, and environmental projects in rural
areas of northern and eastern Afghanistan is normally not allowed due to security
constraints, and must consequently be combined with some air travel. However,
air service in much of the north and east is limited during the winter months,
which has complicated oversight efforts. Similarly, USAID officials are required to
travel with armored vehicles and armed escorts to visit projects in much of the
country. Consequently, as USAID officials stated, their ability to arrange project
visits can become restricted if military forces cannot provide the necessary
vehicles or escorts because of heightened fighting or other priorities. According to
USAID, limited monitoring due to security concerns has heightened the risk of
fraud, waste, and mismanagement of its resources.
Link to report here.