Thus, the APPF acts as a monopoly service provider. Although contracted security costs for the majority of projects decreased, the average rate for armed local guard services increased as much as 47 percent for projects under the APPF. These costs could increase even more over time and implementing partners—left with no other options for local armed guard services—would have no choice but to pay the higher prices.
Pretty damning. Basically clients are using RMC’s as standard security providers, all because the APPF is so ineffective. That, and this ineffective force will have a monopoly soon, and will be able to charge whatever they want.
But here is the really bad part of this story. The loss of life because of this poor security force. Check out this quote:
Traders have informed the Wolesi Jirga about the onslaughts on the Kabul-Kandahar highway that have resulted in the death of 6 drivers and burning of 250 trucks with commercial goods over the past 6 months.
According to the Pajhwok Afghan News PAN), businessman Abdul Wali Wardak said their problems had increased after the responsibility of providing security for logistics vehicles was transferred to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).
Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries Chief Mohammad Qurban Haqjo confirmed the losses and said the APPF has failed to provide the needed security for logistics vehicles and prevent the attacks caused by the insurgents.
Pathetic…. Read the report below if you want to check out SIGAR’s recommendations. –Matt
WHAT SIGAR FOUND
The effect of the transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) has been minimal on projects in SIGAR’s sample, but only because implementing partners hired risk management companies (RMCs) to fill APPF capacity gaps and perform critical functions. Without RMCs, the APPF would be unable to provide the full range of security services needed by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implementing partners. Contracts with implementing partners require the APPF to provide an appropriate number of capable and trained guards, as determined by the APPF in conjunction with the implementing partner, and a sufficient number of properly trained officers and non-commissioned officers to oversee the guards. However, for five projects that use APPF services, RMCs perform critical functions and fill gaps in APPF capabilities in recruiting, training, and supervision. Further, implementing partners reported that APPF officers and non-commissioned officers provided little benefit and were unable to perform required duties.
Although contracted security costs decreased for more than half of the projects in our sample following the transition to the APPF, those decreases occurred largely as a result of implementing partners reassessing security needs and renegotiating expatriate labor rates or contracts. The ease with which implementing partners revised their security postures and renegotiated expatriate labor rates to decrease costs raises the concern that previous security requirements and costs billed to USAID by implementing partners were unnecessarily high.
Ultimately, relying on the APPF as the sole provider of security services raises concerns for future unrestrained cost increases. As it currently stands, the APPF can unilaterally establish its rates without fear of competition, and USAID does not have mechanisms in place to ensure that the APPF only charges implementing partners for the services it provides. For example, SIGAR found that the APPF billed each implementing partner for some services and items actually provided by the RMCs and implementing partners that require armed security have no choice but to pay the APPF’s often inconsistent and inappropriate fees. Thus, the APPF acts as a monopoly service provider. Although contracted security costs for the majority of projects decreased, the average rate for armed local guard services increased as much as 47 percent for projects under the APPF. These costs could increase even more over time and implementing partners—left with no other options for local armed guard services—would have no choice but to pay the higher prices.
Finally, USAID’s continuing inability to ensure that its implementing partners adhere to Afghan government regulations for the proper use of RMCs may result in Afghan government intervention to disband RMCs without a valid RMC license. Should the Afghan government intervene in this way, USAID’s implementing partners would be left without the security services required to continue operations.
Read the report here.