Feral Jundi

Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Industry Talk: Contractors And IDEA-NEW, A Successful Combination For Foreign Aid Work In Afghanistan

    “My team can go places and do things soldiers can’t,” he went on. They “operate low profile” and can move freely “because the communities invite them in and support them.” They work to “rebuild irrigation systems, plant fruit and forest trees, build walls around girls schools, drinking water schemes, microhydro power for villages” and more, he continued. Of his 370 in-country staff, only two are expatriates – the rest are Afghans.-Greenham

*****

     I thought about Tim and his gang with this story, and I wanted to highlight the good work of  a company that was doing some good things out there. Bravo to USAID for putting together a program that works and is built off of the input of those out in the field, and bravo to Development Alternatives Inc. for doing the job.

    Most importantly, this is the kind of stuff that puts the fear of allah in the Taliban, because it cuts into their poppy crops, it cuts into their market share of public support, and it makes the US and the Afghan government look like the good guys.  It also employs young men in jobs that help the community, and keeps them from working for the Taliban as soldiers. Intelligence benefits from this as well, because now people might be more apt to say something to help us out, or even protect their good deal going on with IDEA-NEW by dropping some tips that out some bad guys.

     Now you know why I like talking about this stuff, and why the Taliban have been attacking contractors lately.  They fear contractors, because we are a direct threat to their shadow governments.  Look at it like this.  If we are competing over the affections and respect of the people, then these contractors and USAID are giving the home team a run for their money. –Matt

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Worldview: Successful model for foreign aid is IDEA-NEW

Sun, May. 2, 2010

By Trudy Rubin

JALALABAD, Afghanistan – You’ve all heard horror stories of U.S. aid funds misused by big contractors on failed projects with high overhead in war zones.

The U.S. military insists the war can’t be won by guns, yet our civilian-aid programs have floundered. They’ve been undercut by shifting goals and the fact that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has shrunk to little more than a contracting agency.

So I was looking for U.S. civilian-aid programs in Afghanistan that actually work, and offer Afghans the help they need to improve their lives. On this trip, I found such a program in eastern Afghanistan, called IDEA-NEW, which runs agricultural projects. The program is funded by USAID and led by a Washington contractor (Development Alternatives Inc.). Sounds like the same old, but it isn’t.

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Friday, April 30, 2010

Afghanistan: Taliban Shadow Government Benefits From Reckless Afghan Private Security

     Local power brokers in Kandahar have worked to maintain this revenue stream by keeping the police force weak, forcing coalition forces to rely on private security companies for protection, the Institute of the Study of War report said.

     That is precisely the type of behavior by local officials that has alienated residents and provided an opening for the Taliban to establish effective control over much of the province.

     Abrahams said he has tried to tell locals that he understands their plight, but he is consistently undermined by the wild shooting.

     “Actions speak louder than words, and the locals see these drugged-out thugs with guns and trucks with ‘The United States’ painted on the side,” said Abrahams. 

*****

   That is how I would have wrote this title for the story below.  It’s kind of funny how the Afghan government was soooo adamant about pulling all the security companies under their control, complete with only issuing licenses to Afghan companies, yet at the same time, these private security companies they control are doing a lot of harm to their government and to the war effort.

   It is also doing a lot of harm to the US and Coalition strategy for the war, all because the Afghans don’t have control over something they said they wanted to control. I guess making money off of the licenses and taxes is all they really cared about?  Meanwhile, we have Afghan companies running through communities and using poor fire discipline, thus causing civilian casualties.

   The final point I want to make, is the ‘shadow government’ that the Taliban are running in places like Kandahar, are totally benefiting from reckless Afghan security companies.  If the government pays the cops crap wages, they moonlight as security contractors. Then they go out with the companies, and when their convoys receive a little fire from a Taliban shooter, and the convoys fire up entire communities with everything they got, that cop is now attached to that incident. Or that convoy forces people off of roads or robs other people or contractors on the roads, and now the Shadow Government has succeeded in making the police and government look weak because they can’t control the companies.   And because the goods on the trucks of the convoys all say ‘Made In The USA’, well then that ties in the actions of these companies to the coalition.

   My advice to General McChrystal and company is to get a handle on this quick. Because the enemy will only continue to exploit this angle.(they have actually been doing this for awhile)  They will also conduct pseudo operations, and pretend to be Afghan police or army, and further attack the people, all with the idea of pinning it on the real government.  This tactic is nothing new, but now that there is such a huge demand for logistics in country to support the surge of troops and contractors, it would be kind of important to take care of this now.

   One solution is to make it mandatory that Afghan companies are bonded.  Hell, nothing motivates a boss more to do things right, than the possibility of losing a lot of money because of poor performance or because of breaking the law/contract. And to ensure they are doing things right, I think there should be a  monitor attached to these convoys.  Be it expats or soldiers, it doesn’t matter.  Just some kind of adult supervision to say ‘yes, these guys are doing it right’ or ‘no, they violated the contract/law and they lose the bond’. That would be a quick down and dirty way of making sure these guys are not negatively impacting the war strategy, and ensuring they are doing a good job. –Matt

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Reckless private security companies anger Afghans

By SEBASTIAN ABBOT

April 30, 2010

HUTAL, Afghanistan — Private Afghan security guards protecting NATO supply convoys in southern Kandahar province regularly fire wildly into villages they pass, hindering coalition efforts to build local support ahead of this summer’s planned offensive in the area, U.S. and Afghan officials say.

The guards shoot into the villages to intimidate any potential militants, the officials say, but also cause the kind of civilian casualties that the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan has tried repeatedly to stop.

“Especially as they go through the populated areas, they tend to squeeze the trigger first and ask questions later,” said Capt. Matt Quiggle, a member of the U.S. Army’s 5th Stryker brigade tasked with patrolling Highway One, which connects Afghanistan’s major cities.

The troops say they have complained to senior coalition officials and have even detained some guards to lecture them about their conduct, but the problem has continued.

(more…)

Saturday, April 24, 2010

Publications: RAND–How Insurgencies End, By Ben Connable

The RAND study found:

Modern insurgencies last approximately 10 years and the government’s chances of winning increase slightly over time.

Withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat, while inconsistent or impartial support to either side generally presages defeat.

Pseudo-democracies do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing. 

*****

   This first story and introduction from RAND is a run down of the conclusions of the study.  What I like about studies like this, is that they draw upon a wide array of past insurgencies, and it tries to find patterns and consensus. That is good, and we should be learning from these insurgencies.

   The last point up top in the quote, is the one I am concerned with. Can we do this with a weak government?  Or can we do business with the tribes and local leadership of cities and towns until we get a good government in place?  The article below points out that it is possible to do this without a strong government, but it certainly does not help the effort.  Check it out. –Matt

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Study highlights problems for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan

Ben Arnoldy

April 23, 2010

NEW DELHI — While current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan broadly conforms to historical best practices, the Taliban have a number of advantages that have produced insurgent success in the past, according to a new study of 89 past and ongoing insurgencies worldwide.

The factors that favor the Taliban include receiving sanctuary and support in another country, learning to be more discriminating in their attacks and fighting a government that’s weak and reliant on direct external support.

The historical trends suggest that the Taliban’s Achilles heel would be the loss of their Pakistani sanctuary, while the principal American vulnerability is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s weak pseudo democracy.

The study, said the author, cannot be predictive, but it can help the U.S. address or exploit these vulnerabilities.

“A lot of the things being done in the current (U.S. military) plan are along the lines of successful things we’ve seen in the study,” said Ben Connable, the lead author of “How Insurgencies End,” published by the RAND Corp. in Washington.

(more…)

Afghanistan: The Taliban Fear Contractors

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:52 AM

    The attacks “are not about armed confrontation. They are about subversion of the government,” said Terrence K. Kelly, a senior researcher at the Washington-based RAND Corporation who has studied how rebuilding efforts work in war zones. America’s strategy counts on development work to increase the legitimacy and reach of the Karzai government. With these attacks the Taliban can “turn off the delivery of services — which makes the government look bad,” he said.

    USAID insists it will not scale back its work in Afghanistan because of the attacks, according to Rebecca Black, the agency’s deputy mission director for Afghanistan.

*****

    Break guerillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

     *If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides! -Page 108, Patterns of Conflict, Col. John Boyd

*****

   They must fear us, if they feel it is necessary to attack us. They know that we are out in the towns of Afghanistan, connecting with the people, and winning them over with jobs and support.  And when we say we are doing this in the name of the Afghan government, and people see the fruits of this labor, well then that makes the government look good.  Happy people, happy government, and sad sad sad Taliban. lol  It also makes the Taliban’s shadow government sad, because now they have to contend with the goodwill the contractors are spreading.

   So what does this mean?  From a strategist point of view, and from a COIN point of view, my people (contractors) are actually connecting with the Afghans and making an impact.  We are the civilian face of the war effort, and the Taliban fear us. They must, if they are purposely trying to attack us–I thought we didn’t matter?

   It also means that we should be doing more of it.  If the Taliban fear what we are doing, then I say increase the effort and further support the various programs that we are involved with out there. Focus on the programs that make the Afghan government look good, and makes the Taliban shadow government look frivolous and pathetic. Keep connecting with the people and providing them with jobs and purpose.

   Now on to another factor of these attacks.  Because the US and ISAF militaries are so hung up on living on the big box FOBs and commuting to work, the Taliban and their shadow government is pushing around the population and terrorizing them into doing what they want.  That is what shadow governments do–they undermine the current government with the idea of making them look illegitimate or ineffectual.  That shadow government will do everything it can to either win over the population, or impose their will on the population.  In order to stop that shadow government, you need to provide a ‘big stick’ in the area that will put the smack down on these guys. You also have to be better at influencing the people than the shadow government. It also helps that the current government is legitimate and not corrupt in the eyes of the people.

   And that is a big problem.  Crazy Karzai and his clown posse is not helping things at all, and in turn, the people have no respect for the government. It will also hurt the troops and police morale, both of the Afghans and of the Coalition.  No one likes working for a loser.

   Ideally, if you can’t change Karzai’s tune, then he should be voted out by the people. Unfortunately, Karzai is rigging the voting booths, and that simple act of screwing with the electoral process is to me the one area that needs to be fixed.  Why would people vote to change out a leader, if they cannot trust that their vote is being counted?  If we are in this war for the long haul, the goal should be to clamp down on election fraud and use every bit of muscle we can to ensure that it is fair. In fact, we should be planning for the next election, and learn from past efforts of worthless elections. We can also use a big stick to beat down this shadow government in the meantime.

   We must get the troops out into the population centers. (FOBs equals few and large, COP’s equals many and small-New Rules of War)  Do it Ramadi style, and convoy right into the worst parts of these towns and cities, and move right on in with a well supported platoon or company. Pick a city block, pay the owners of the block and homes really well, and then walk the beat like a cop.  The image the people should have, is a troop presence, mixed with an Afghan police presence, all with the expressed desire of protecting the people and pushing out this shadow government and enemy forces.  This would be the big stick in these areas, and with this kind of presence, they could also protect the various contractors out there that are trying to get aid out to the people. Clear, hold, build.

    We must protect and serve the people, and to do that, we need to get out there and live where they live.  Or troops can continue to commute to their job site, and protect the people when it is convenient.  Meanwhile, the contractors outside the wire, will continue to be the focus of the Taliban, and the Taliban shadow government will continue to do what they want. Ideally, we must have sound leadership in the Afghan government as well or something the people can respect. Boyd made a point on emphasizing this as well. (see quote up top)

   I would also like to say that I am not alone in this thinking.  Tim from Free Range International has an excellent post on the same subject and I highly recommend his blog to further your research on the matter.-Matt

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Attacks against contractors surging in Afghanistan

By NOOR KHAN and TIM SULLIVAN

April 24, 2010

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The message, very often, is sent with bloodshed.

A suicide bombing last week on a fortified Kandahar guesthouse shared by Western contracting companies killed four Afghans and injured several Americans. An Afghan engineer was shot dead in March as he helped inspect a school not far from the Pakistan border. An Afghan woman who worked for a U.S.-based consulting firm was shot by motorbike-riding gunmen as she headed home in this southern city.

(more…)

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Industry Talk: Pentagon Planning More Oversight Of War Zone Contractors

Filed under: Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 4:15 AM

   Man, I am getting kind of sick of these stories.  How many panels, commissions,  reports and news articles does it take to get these folks off their ass and manage this stuff? How long have we been using contractors in this war, and the Pentagon/government is still trying to figure it out?

   Which leads me to believe that if they can’t even manage contractors, then what does that say about their ability to manage federal workers?  Wait, I already know the answer to that.  I spent plenty of years working for the federal government, and believe me, it does not surprise me that they would be so horrible at managing anything. lol

   Either way, I fully support as I always do, any effort what so ever to get a handle on the whole contracting thing.  Hire more contracting specialists, raise their pay, give them the necessary training, and get them out of the office and into the field to manage this stuff.  If anything, we are all sick of you guys talking about it.  Action speaks louder than words, and we will believe you when we see that action.  So get it done. Pfffft.-Matt

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Pentagon planning more oversight of war-zone contractors

By Dana HedgpethTuesday, April 20, 2010

The Defense Department said Monday that it plans to improve oversight of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq by hiring more contracting specialists and providing additional training to government employees who supervise work performed by outside firms.

Pentagon officials told a congressionally appointed panel monitoring federal spending on contracts in the two war zones that years of attrition in the department’s acquisition workforce have hampered oversight, particularly as defense budgets have skyrocketed. The Army’s contracting workforce, for example, is only 55 percent of what it was in the mid-1990s, while the dollar value of contracts overseen has jumped from $11 billion to $165 billion, officials said.

“The Army is reversing this 15-year steady decline in its workforce,” said Lt. Gen. William N. Phillips, principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology. “We project recovery will take at least 10 years.”

(more…)

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