The RAND study found:
• Modern insurgencies last approximately 10 years and the government’s chances of winning increase slightly over time.
• Withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat, while inconsistent or impartial support to either side generally presages defeat.
• Pseudo-democracies do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing.
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This first story and introduction from RAND is a run down of the conclusions of the study. What I like about studies like this, is that they draw upon a wide array of past insurgencies, and it tries to find patterns and consensus. That is good, and we should be learning from these insurgencies.
The last point up top in the quote, is the one I am concerned with. Can we do this with a weak government? Or can we do business with the tribes and local leadership of cities and towns until we get a good government in place? The article below points out that it is possible to do this without a strong government, but it certainly does not help the effort. Check it out. –Matt
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Study highlights problems for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan
Ben Arnoldy
April 23, 2010
NEW DELHI — While current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan broadly conforms to historical best practices, the Taliban have a number of advantages that have produced insurgent success in the past, according to a new study of 89 past and ongoing insurgencies worldwide.
The factors that favor the Taliban include receiving sanctuary and support in another country, learning to be more discriminating in their attacks and fighting a government that’s weak and reliant on direct external support.
The historical trends suggest that the Taliban’s Achilles heel would be the loss of their Pakistani sanctuary, while the principal American vulnerability is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s weak pseudo democracy.
The study, said the author, cannot be predictive, but it can help the U.S. address or exploit these vulnerabilities.
“A lot of the things being done in the current (U.S. military) plan are along the lines of successful things we’ve seen in the study,” said Ben Connable, the lead author of “How Insurgencies End,” published by the RAND Corp. in Washington.