Feral Jundi

Saturday, December 11, 2010

Cool Stuff: Principal-Agent Theory

     I wanted to do a quick post on a little bit of knowledge that everyone would be wise to study.  If you want to know why contractors are paid as much as they are paid then definitely wrap your brain around the concept of Principal-Agent Theory and what it all means. It all boils down to ‘ensuring the provision of appropriate incentives so agents act in the way principals wish’.

    By the way, I picked up on this thing while reading a paper that David Isenberg commented on in a blog post. The paper was about Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the author mentioned Principal-Agent Theory towards the end of it. The author did a study on DynCorp/PAE’s SSR mission for DoS in Liberia, and it was an interesting read. Check it out. –Matt

     In political science and economics, the problem of motivating a party to act on behalf of another is known as ‘the principal–agent problem’. The principal–agent problem arises when a principal compensates an agent for performing certain acts that are useful to the principal and costly to the agent, and where there are elements of the performance that are costly to observe. This is the case to some extent for all contracts that are written in a world of information asymmetry, uncertainty and risk.

     Here, principals do not know enough about whether (or to what extent) a contract has been satisfied. The solution to this information problem — closely related to the moral hazard problem — is to ensure the provision of appropriate incentives so agents act in the way principals wish.

     In terms of game theory, it involves changing the rules of the game so that the self-interested rational choices of the agent coincide with what the principal desires. Even in the limited arena of employment contracts, the difficulty of doing this in practice is reflected in a multitude of compensation mechanisms (‘the carrot’) and supervisory schemes (‘the stick’), as well as in critique of such mechanisms as e.g., Deming (1986) expresses in his Seven Deadly Diseases of management. A distinct and relatively new meaning of the principal–agent problem describes the landlord-tenant relationship as a barrier to energy savings.

     This use of the term is described below in the section on the principal–agent problem in energy efficiency. The problem is also discussed in terms of “agency theory”.

Wikipedia for Principal-Agent Theory here.

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Publications: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance

     Here it is.  Feel free to pass this around or go to the links below, and pass that around.  Lots of good commonsense stuff in there.  My only point to make with this publication is that prime contractors should definitely use this document as well, just so that we are all playing off the same sheet of music. –Matt

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COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A

For the Commanders, Contracting Personnel, Military Personnel, and Civilians of NATO ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan

SUBJECT: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting GuidanceDownload Official Release

The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represents both an opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government’s and ISAF’s campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.

In view of these points, contracting has to be “Commander’s business.” Indeed, I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract spending and understand who benefits from it. We must use intelligence to inform our contracting and ensure those with whom we contract work for the best interests of the Afghan people. We must be better buyers and buy from better people. Consistent with NATO and national contracting laws and regulations, we must:

Understand the role of contracting in COIN. Purchases we make for construction, goods, and services can bolster economic growth, stability, and Afghan goodwill toward their government and ISAF. Contracts with Afghan firms that procure Afghan goods and services generate employment and assist in the development of a sustainable economy. However, if we contract with powerbrokers who exclude those outside their narrow patronage networks or are perceived as funneling resources to one community at the expense of another, the effect on Afghan perceptions and our mission will be negative. Thus, we must incorporate COIN Contracting topics into training for Commanders.

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Monday, September 13, 2010

Afghanistan: Petraeus Issues Guidance For Afghan Contracting

     Nothing too radical or exciting about this one.  I mean all of these issues have been talked about and mulled over for quite awhile now, and I am quite frankly pretty tired of discussing it. The problems have been identified and now all that is needed is leadership and action.

     What is more important is for Petraeus to actually punish those within his command that do not deliver.  We are going into nine years of contracting in this war zone, and it is pretty pathetic that it has taken this long for today’s war time leaders to finally recognize how important it is to square away this aspect of the war. That’s government for you.

     As for tips on how to insure you are getting the best bang for the buck, I would implement as many mentorship programs as possible.  Just as long as there is a responsible and trustworthy partner that is attached to all of these contracts, then at least you will have someone you can deal with and give guidance too. Either assign a military unit with these local companies, or find a company with expats that can watch over this stuff. In either case, you must have an eye on the project so you can control it or shut it down if it hurts the war effort.

    Another thing to think about is the Mystery Shopper concept I have talked about in the past.  It is such a simple method of checking up on projects, and I still don’t know why we don’t implement more of this kind of thing?  It is especially important if you do not have eyes on the project at all times due to manpower issues or whatever.  A simple visit by someone that no one knows is an inspector or observer, will give you a good dose of feedback and shared reality as to what is really going on with that project.

    The other thing that will help for accounting purposes is to use payment systems for contracting that make it easy for transparency.  Things like mobile cash can really help out in this department. This area requires innovation and a dedication to continuos improvement or Kaizen.

    Well written contracts and having plenty of manpower to watch over these contracts is also a basic one that really needs good leadership to ensure it happens.  Now that Petraeus has issued guidance, perhaps he will do what is necessary to assign sufficient manpower to these contracts.  And not just soldiers without a clue, but individuals that will take everything into account, and actually look at the secondary and third effects of each and every contract they sign.  They should be applying OODA to every contract, and win the war of contracting.

    Finally, I wonder if the Taliban have issues with managing their contractors?  They have to pay for bounties, mercenaries, equipment, weapons, explosives and everything else an insurgency requires.  I tend to view their operations and logistics as one that is simpler, smaller and more flexible–kind of like business, and less like government. There is also the fear of pissing off their command and fellow Taliban if you steal from the organization, so that probably keeps the organization in check.  I could be wrong and I am just thinking out loud here. It would be extremely interesting to read a report on the Taliban and their contracting issues. I certainly have plenty of information about our own contracting practices, or lack there of. pffft –Matt

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Petraeus issues guidance for Afghan contracting

By DEB RIECHMANN

Sep 12, 2010

The NATO command has issued new guidelines for awarding billions of dollars worth of international contracts in Afghanistan, saying that without proper oversight the money could end up in the hands of insurgents and criminals, deepen corruption and undermine efforts to win the loyalty of the Afghan people at a critical juncture in the war.

The guidance, issued last week by Gen. David Petraeus and obtained Sunday by The Associated Press, was issued in response to concern that the military’s own contracting procedures could be, in some cases, running counter to efforts on the battlefield.

The changes are aimed, in large part, at addressing complaints that ordinary Afghans have seen little change in their daily lives despite billions poured into their country since 2001.

“With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government and NATO’s campaign objectives,” Petraeus wrote in a two-page memorandum. “If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.”

(more…)

Thursday, April 29, 2010

Industry Talk: Best Value Versus Lowest Price Technically Acceptable

Brooks further noted that IPOA believes it is unwise to require cost to be considered the ultimate driver in federal procurement, for doing so simply creates a “race to the bottom” where other qualifications are not given due consideration. “We believe that the proposed amendment will result in more contract defaults, poor performance and an overall decrease in the quality of goods and services provided to the services.”

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Interesting debate. Doug took the side of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, and POGO is doing their own thing. My thoughts on it all is who wants the lowest bidder protecting them in a war zone? I mean if you were to look at what happened with AGNA in Kabul, or what I call the Kabul Fiasco, that is a prime example of how lowest bidder contracting does not work. In that ‘race to the bottom’, AGNA sure did win that contract, but they also created an impossible environment for their guard force to operate in.( I will spare you the party photos)

I also put in this post, what POGO thought about best value, and why they support the LPTAO(Lowest-Price Technically Acceptable Offer). They think that if the government would have specified what they thought was technically acceptable in the contract, that the Kabul Fiasco could have been avoided in the first place. I think they make an excellent point as well, but yet again, I refer to the common saying ‘you get what you pay for’. I would ask Danielle over at POGO if she would like to be protected by the lowest bidder in a war zone? Would you want the best protecting you, or would you want what was technically acceptable? Do you want the best doctor for the money, or do you want a doctor who is cheap and barely got through medical school-but can still practice medicine?

Plus, when you put the responsibility of deciding what is technically acceptable in the hands of individuals who are being pressured by their management or politics, to reduce cost, what is the limit to what is technically acceptable in their view? Of course you don’t want to overspend for a task, but when there is an environment/culture in government to only seek the cheapest price for a task and not consider other factors, I think that could lead to some serious problems.

Another example of how LPTAO sucks, is the TWISS contracts. Someone in the chain of contracting command, determined what is technically acceptable in regards to the guard force protecting troops under TWISS. What that process has produced is Ugandans or Kenyans standing guard at the gates of FOBs, who are getting paid peanuts and receive minimum training or vetting. All because the government has deemed that the companies supplying these troops are authorized to do so. If you talk to contractors who have worked this contract, they will tell you how incredibly screwed up it is.(the management will tell you it is a glowing success, go figure. lol) But it is all technically acceptable to the powers that be to allow the companies to run the TWISS stuff that way, and the companies keep ‘racing to the bottom’ to win that contract. (I get more emails from guys and gals who are just pissed off about how poor of a contract TWISS is–more than the Kabul embassy contract)

Overall, we should contract these services with a number of factors in mind. Past performance should count, as does cost. Experience in protecting people, and having the technical ability to do so is another. We should pick the best value companies for dangerous war zone duty, much like a patient would pick a doctor for their life saving diagnosis and care. I do think lowest bidder works for some contracts, like leaf raking or sweeping up a garage–stuff where lives are not on the line. But for protecting people in highly complex and dangerous war zones, where lives and government reputation is on the line, you probably want a system of contracting in place in which the government gets the best forces they can get for the money. That’s if they care about the protection of their reputation and people out there?

The government should also focus on getting plenty of competent contracting officers who can managing these contracts, to ensure that the government continues to get a good deal. Unfortunately, the government has been applying lowest bidder mindset to their contracting officer corps, in the form of not paying enough for that job, and not doing the things necessary to build up and strengthen that essential tool of government contracting. –Matt

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IPOA Opposes IMPROVE Act Amendment to End Best Value Competitions

Stability Operations Trade Association Advocates For Use of “Best Value” in Defense Procurement

WASHINGTON-On April 27, 2010, IPOA, the Association of the Stability Operations Industry, sent a letter to the Chairman and Ranking Members of the House Armed Services Committee urging them to oppose a proposed amendment to H.R. 5013 – Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act of 2010 (IMPROVE Act of 2010). The association asked the congressional leaders to reject an amendment entitled “Requirement that Cost or Price to the Federal Government Be Given at Least Equal Importance as Technical or Other Criteria in Evaluating Competitive Proposals for Defense Contracts.” IPOA fully supports the IMPROVE Act’s goal of more efficiently procuring services to support the Department of Defense. However, the amendment would effectively hamstring the ability of contracting officers to use discretion in awarding contracts and sets the stage for compulsory acceptance of the cheapest offer, minimizing other factors such as experience, quality or past performance.

“Lowest-price security not good enough for war-zone embassies”

IPOA cited an October 1, 2009 report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting entitled “Lowest-price security not good enough for war-zone embassies,” in which the Commission noted the dangers of focusing on price as the determinative factor when selecting contractors for the Department of State. The Commission noted that statutory requirements to select the lowest price can do more harm than good. In fact, the Commission recommended that the provision be eliminated and that the Department of State be given the flexibility to use a best value award process. The House amendment currently under consideration would move the Department of Defense closer to a statutory “low price” award scheme and would go against the clear recommendation of the Commission.

“Forcing the government to contract essential services on the cheap is not a recipe for success,” said Doug Brooks, IPOA President, “if we’ve learned anything over the past nine years it is that cutting corners on oversight or quality in contracting can have dire consequences.” Brooks noted that IPOA supports the concept of “best value” in federal procurements and believes the amendment’s “one size fits all” approach is ill advised.

Brooks further noted that IPOA believes it is unwise to require cost to be considered the ultimate driver in federal procurement, for doing so simply creates a “race to the bottom” where other qualifications are not given due consideration. “We believe that the proposed amendment will result in more contract defaults, poor performance and an overall decrease in the quality of goods and services provided to the services.”

IPOA was founded in 2001 to reflect a clear recognition that the private sector can play a larger, more cost-effective role in fundamentally improving peace and stability operations worldwide. With more than 60 members, IPOA is the leading voice of the stability operations industry.

Story here.

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CWC Findings on Embassy Guards Fiasco Amount to “Blame Shifting”

Oct 06, 2009

On October 1st, the Commission on War Time Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) issued a Special Report. Entitled “Lowest-priced security not good enough for war-zone embassies,” the report places most of the blame for the recent fiasco involving the work of ArmorGroup North America at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, on the use of a negotiated procurement source selection technique known as “lowest-price technically acceptable offer” (LPTAO).

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Industry Talk: Pentagon Planning More Oversight Of War Zone Contractors

Filed under: Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 4:15 AM

   Man, I am getting kind of sick of these stories.  How many panels, commissions,  reports and news articles does it take to get these folks off their ass and manage this stuff? How long have we been using contractors in this war, and the Pentagon/government is still trying to figure it out?

   Which leads me to believe that if they can’t even manage contractors, then what does that say about their ability to manage federal workers?  Wait, I already know the answer to that.  I spent plenty of years working for the federal government, and believe me, it does not surprise me that they would be so horrible at managing anything. lol

   Either way, I fully support as I always do, any effort what so ever to get a handle on the whole contracting thing.  Hire more contracting specialists, raise their pay, give them the necessary training, and get them out of the office and into the field to manage this stuff.  If anything, we are all sick of you guys talking about it.  Action speaks louder than words, and we will believe you when we see that action.  So get it done. Pfffft.-Matt

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Pentagon planning more oversight of war-zone contractors

By Dana HedgpethTuesday, April 20, 2010

The Defense Department said Monday that it plans to improve oversight of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq by hiring more contracting specialists and providing additional training to government employees who supervise work performed by outside firms.

Pentagon officials told a congressionally appointed panel monitoring federal spending on contracts in the two war zones that years of attrition in the department’s acquisition workforce have hampered oversight, particularly as defense budgets have skyrocketed. The Army’s contracting workforce, for example, is only 55 percent of what it was in the mid-1990s, while the dollar value of contracts overseen has jumped from $11 billion to $165 billion, officials said.

“The Army is reversing this 15-year steady decline in its workforce,” said Lt. Gen. William N. Phillips, principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology. “We project recovery will take at least 10 years.”

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