Feral Jundi

Saturday, November 24, 2012

Quotes: Eric Nordstrom On Dealing And Fighting With The Bureaucracy Within

Filed under: Quotes — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 11:08 PM

I had to put this quote up. It rings true with both the public realm and in private industry, and it is this kind of resistance towards supporting the efforts out in the field that just makes you shake your head in disbelief.

These folks put their lives on the line defending the embassies and consulates throughout the world. The main office tasked with support, should be bending over backwards to provide that support to those security efforts and leadership out in the field–and not fighting them. If that type of relationship is not in place, then that is when accidents or attacks seem to happen–as per the law’s of Murphy…. –Matt

 

 

“I said, ‘Jim, you know what makes it most frustrating about this assignment? It’s not the hardships. It’s not the gunfire. It’s not the threats. It’s dealing and fighting against the people, programs, and personnel who are supposed to be supporting me,” Nordstrom said.
He also told the State Department officer, “‘For me, the Taliban is on the inside of the building.”

-Eric Nordstrom, the one-time regional security officer, told the House Oversight Committee that he had a disheartening conversation with the regional director of the agency’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs when he requested additional manpower for the facility. (source)

 

Monday, May 14, 2012

Iraq: Iraq Police Development Program–Will It Be Scrapped Or Just Reduced In Size?

The trainers are mostly retired state troopers and other law enforcement personnel on leave from their jobs back home, and a number of officials who criticized the program questioned what those trainers have to offer Iraqi police officials who have been operating in a war zone for years.
Mr. Perito said that the State Department never developed a suitable curriculum and that instead, advisers often “end up talking about their own experiences or tell war stories and it’s not relevant.”
Retired Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, now a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, who oversaw the training of Iraqi security forces from 2007 to 2008, said, “The evidence suggests that the State Department never really engaged the Iraqis to find out what they need and what they want.”

In an effort to ‘right size’ the US mission in Iraq, and adjust to Iraq’s desire to enforce their sovereignty, we are seeing an adjustment happening.  Which makes sense and is totally reasonable. It is the Iraqi’s show now, and it will be very difficult to sell them on a massive program that they think they do not need or even want.

Or, like the quote up top and what SIGIR identified in the report, that DoS should work a little harder at creating a curriculum or program that the Iraqis actually like and want more of. And that would take talking with them, and using some kind of metrics to determine what is working with the course, and what is not.(as SIGIR recommends)

Also, more work needs to be done to convince the police commanders and leaders of Iraq that courses like this actually do increase the effectiveness of their police. But that takes action, not words, and the service out in the field must be evaluated and surveys taken in order to get a feel for what is effective. That old Jundism of ‘get feedback’ comes to mind.

Another point was brought up in the article below that was interesting. And that is security for these police advisers in Iraq. With the military gone, the security these days for operations are contractors.

The Iraqis have also insisted that the training sessions be held at their own facilities, rather than American ones. But reflecting the mistrust that remains between Iraqi and American officials, the State Department’s security guards will not allow the trainers to establish set meeting times at Iraqi facilities, so as not to set a pattern for insurgents, who still sometimes infiltrate Iraq’s military and police.

So as Iraq hassles contractors, or as the Iraqis do a terrible job of securing places that these advisers might visit or the people they might train, that operations in this environment becomes very complex and dangerous. But it isn’t impossible, and security contractor will make it happen–just as long as DoS is working hard about the issue of how Iraqis treat security contractors.

If you are on this program and disagree with what was said in this NYT’s article or what was said in the SIGIR, definitely come up in the comments section and speak up. Also, if anyone at DoS wants to come up and speak about the program on this blog, by all means feel free to do so. Although DoS did make a public statement in regards to this article, and I posted that below along with the SIGIR report done last year about this program. –Matt 

 

U.S. May Scrap Costly Efforts to Train Iraqi Police
By TIM ARANGO
May 13, 2012
In the face of spiraling costs and Iraqi officials who say they never wanted it in the first place, the State Department has slashed — and may jettison entirely by the end of the year — a multibillion-dollar police training program that was to have been the centerpiece of a hugely expanded civilian mission here.
What was originally envisioned as a training cadre of about 350 American law enforcement officers was quickly scaled back to 190 and then to 100. The latest restructuring calls for 50 advisers, but most experts and even some State Department officials say even they may be withdrawn by the end of this year.
The training effort, which began in October and has already cost $500 million, was conceived of as the largest component of a mission billed as the most ambitious American aid effort since the Marshall Plan. Instead, it has emerged as the latest high-profile example of the waning American influence here following the military withdrawal, and it reflects a costly miscalculation on the part of American officials, who did not count on the Iraqi government to assert its sovereignty so aggressively.
“I think that with the departure of the military, the Iraqis decided to say, ‘O.K., how large is the American presence here?’ ” said James F. Jeffrey, the American ambassador to Iraq, in an interview. “How large should it be? How does this equate with our sovereignty? In various areas they obviously expressed some concerns.”

(more…)

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Iraq: US Embassy Staff Might Be Reduced, And Iraq Continues To Hassle PSC’s

Approved movements have been subject to stops, detentions and confiscation of equipment without justification, impacting delivery of equipment, supplies, and materials to the US embassy, bases and offices throughout the country,” said the letter, a copy of which was obtained by AFP.
The Congressional Research Service said last May that the State Department estimated the number of security contractors working for it in Iraq would reach 5,500, “with some 1,500 providing personal security for diplomatic movements and an additional 4,000 providing perimeter security.”
Brooks said “our hope is that the US government will be a bit more proactive,” as the government and embassy, in “our impression, has not been very active in trying to help the Iraqis address this problem.

This first story below is from the New York Times, so take it with a grain of salt. lol And of course as soon as it came out, an edit was made that showed that the NYT jumped the gun a little on this. With that said, it is wise that if you are in WPS (mobile or static security), or one of the numerous contractors assigned to do convoy operations for logistics, then it pays to pay attention to this stuff.

The second story just emphasizes what Iraq is doing to security companies as they try to operate there. If the Embassy can’t get supplies, then point the finger at Iraq for holding up those convoys at the border or for hassling security contractors about paper work/visas/licenses that Iraq has failed provide or update.

In short, things in Iraq are getting a little dicey now that the troops are gone, and the US mission there is having to adjust to this new environment. This was to be expected and there will be many hiccups along the way. The US is also experiencing economic issues and an upcoming election. So cost savings will be a factor, and reducing waste in our overseas operations will be necessary if the current administration wants to show it is serious about saving money (and getting re-elected as a result).

But this administration does not want a failed Iraq mission under it’s belt. They have already cut the troops from Iraq earlier than expected, which is not the smartest thing strategically, but it makes sense politically. But cutting security will only add one more planet into alignment for a really bad situation or situations that could truly stain a political campaign. Security should be the last thing you mess with, and especially in that chaotic and extremely dangerous environment.

There is also politics and corruption in Iraq that is impacting operations. A visa or license or whatever is required for the companies to operate can be a simple and fair process if Iraq wants these companies there. Or it can be a complex and unfair process if these officials have other things in mind. Maybe they are looking for kickbacks, and purposely targeting foreign companies so that Iraq companies are able to secure all of this work. Especially for supplying the embassy, or for oil related security contracts. (Strategy Page is echoing the same thing in their post about PSC’s in Iraq and the Embassy)

Perhaps this was a concession when the Sunni-bloc came back in to join parliament? Perhaps there is a focus on attacking logistics using government and political mechanisms, so that the Embassy is forced to reduce in size so it can be weaker for an attack. Or get more Iraqis involved with working at the Embassy, so as to get more spies or even attackers on the inside?

Who knows? All I know is that there is a reason why Iraq is doing this, and that reason often revolves around money or extortion of some sort. Meaning ‘if you do this, maybe we will do this’. We see the same thing happening in Afghanistan, and maybe Iraq is taking notes from the Afghans on how to play the US. It is ironic to me that we have the largest Embassies in the world in both countries, have expended much American/Coalition blood and treasure in both countries, and yet simple matters like visas, licenses or even a MOU or SOFA cannot be worked out? That corruption in these countries is trumping our so-called ‘diplomatic’ missions there. Certainly we can do better and get better for what has been invested.

The other thing I wanted to mention is that there is a third party that has a say so in this matter. That would be the insurgents and jihadists in Iraq who are in the shadows and doing all they can to attack Iraq and the US mission there. You also have Iran doing what they can to exert influence. You can slash the staff at the Embassy, but the security requirement to protect that Embassy does not change. That’s unless the grounds of the Embassy are slashed as well and given back to the Iraqis.

But as you give up more ground, then that gives more ground to the enemy so they can maneuver closer for attacks. If patrols in the area decrease, then that means the enemy can launch more mortars/rockets, drive more VBIED’s, or use more suicide assaulters. So security is still essential and will be even more important as you give up more territory.

I could see the mobile side of WPS decreasing a little, but not by much. If there is still going to be 1,000 diplomats as opposed to 2,000 diplomats (if they are halved according to the article), then those 1,000 will still have to do their missions in Iraq. Or does state plan on never leaving their Embassy?

We could also have an extremely small footprint in Iraq, and bring it on par with the size of other Embassies in the world. But there are a couple of issues that are front and center for the US, which to me justifies a presence there. Oil, Iran, Jihadists and the continuing collapse of regimes in the Middle East because of the Arab Spring (Syria comes to mind). If we can keep Iraq functioning and focused on their oil goals, and goals for their nation’s well being, then that is a good thing. How many diplomats that takes and how we do that is out of my lane. But these are considerations when we think about why we are there.

Now the one thing that looked like it was getting a look for cuts was the police training contract, and that would also include all the logistics required for that. So that might be a big savings and reduction right there.

One State Department program that is likely to be scrutinized is an ambitious program to train the Iraqi police, which is costing about $500 million this year — far less than the nearly $1 billion that the embassy originally intended to spend. The program has generated considerable skepticism within the State Department — one of the officials interviewed predicted that the program could be scrapped later this year — because of the high cost of the support staff, the inability of police advisers to leave their bases because of the volatile security situation and a lack of support by the Iraqi government.

Interesting stuff and I would like to hear what you guys think? Either way, I will keep my eye on this as it develops. –Matt

Edit: 02/10/2012- It looks like State is trying to clarify a little more as to what they plan on doing. Here is a quote below. Also be sure to follow Diplopundit’s take on the whole thing, because they are also questioning the security cuts (if made), and who would step in as replacements (maybe Iraqi security?). I doubt they would go this path and DoS is not about to put the lives of it’s diplomats at the hands of Iraqi security forces….quite yet.

The State Department has asked each component of the massive U.S. diplomatic mission in Baghdad to analyze how a 25 percent cut would affect operations, part of a rapidly moving attempt to save money and establish what a top official on Wednesday called “a more normalized embassy presence.”
“We’re going to be looking at how we’re going to do that over the next year,” said Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides. “What we’re not going to do is make knee-jerk decisions” that could jeopardize the security of the thousands of U.S. citizens working in Iraq, he said.

 

US Embassy in Iraq.

 

U.S. Planning to Slash Iraq Embassy Staff by as Much as Half
By TIM ARANGO
February 7, 2012
Less than two months after American troops left, the State Department is preparing to slash by as much as half the enormous diplomatic presence it had planned for Iraq, a sharp sign of declining American influence in the country.
Officials in Baghdad and Washington said that Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and other senior State Department officials were reconsidering the size and scope of the embassy, where the staff has swelled to nearly 16,000 people, mostly contractors.
The expansive diplomatic operation and the $750 million embassy building, the largest of its kind in the world, were billed as necessary to nurture a postwar Iraq on its shaky path to democracy and establish normal relations between two countries linked by blood and mutual suspicion. But the Americans have been frustrated by what they see as Iraqi obstructionism and are now largely confined to the embassy because of security concerns, unable to interact enough with ordinary Iraqis to justify the $6 billion annual price tag.

(more…)

Wednesday, November 23, 2011

Publications: State Department’s QDDR And Private Security Contractors

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) is a sweeping assessment of how the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) can become more efficient, accountable, and effective in a world in which rising powers, growing instability, and technological transformation create new threats, but also new opportunities. At its core the QDDR provides a blueprint for elevating American “civilian power” to better advance our national interests and to be a better partner to the U.S. military. Leading through civilian power means directing and coordinating the resources of all America’s civilian agencies to prevent and resolve conflicts; help countries lift themselves out of poverty into prosperous, stable, and democratic states; and build global coalitions to address global problems.

I just went through the QDDR and tried to find all the parts that talked about security contractors. They talk about contractors in general, and from what I gather there really isn’t anything new or radical about DoS’s position. They still want to use more federal civilians to do this work or to supervise contractors, and they want to increase and improve upon contractor oversight. And I think they are doing that. Hell, they have plenty of reports and lessons learned to go off of.

What is important to point out though is that State is wanting to do more forward looking and strategic planning, just so budgeting could reflect that. That is good, because companies can then plan accordingly for that kind of strategic planning. It adds more stability to the process, and it allows companies to better prepare for what State or USAID really need.

Along those lines, I posted a brief introduction to State’s new bureau below. It is called the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations or CSO. This is the group that will:

-Get ahead of change. While the scale and types of future crises cannot be predicted, the complex nature and cascading effects of 21st century challenges require a more forward-looking State Department. CSO will support the State Department’s ability to anticipate major security challenges by providing timely, operational solutions.

-Drive an integrated response. CSO will build integrated approaches to conflict prevention and stabilization by linking analysis, planning, resources, operational solutions, and active learning and training. The bureau will call on its civilian responders to deploy in a timely manner to areas of instability in order to bring the right mix of expertise to each unique situation.

-Leverage partnerships. CSO will work with a range of non-governmental and international partners to prevent conflict, address sources of violence, build on existing resiliencies, and promote burden-sharing. In particular, CSO will encourage greater involvement of local civil society – including women, youth, and the media – to prevent and respond to conflict.

State has also recognized that we are experiencing a very fast moving and complex world environment right now. The Arab Spring, the global economy, wars, and revolutions in the various countries of the middle east and world are opening new opportunities for the US government. It takes a flexible ‘smart power’ approach to take advantage of that. Contractors are a big part of that flexible smart power approach.

We are also crucial to filling vacuums of capability and security. Iraq is a prime example. Because of politics in Iraq and in the US, US troops are no longer welcome. But in order to insure our investment of blood and treasure in Iraq doesn’t go to waste, and for our strategic interest in the region to continue to be met, it is vital to maintain a presence and apply that smart power there. DoS used to rely on a combination of the military and their security contractors to provide the security necessary to perform their diplomatic missions outpost security. Now security contractors, with Diplomatic Security personnel managing that effort, will have to accomplish the task. And the insurgency in Iraq is still active, and Iran is still supplying weapons to opposition groups. In other words, the troops might be gone, but the danger of attacks are still there.

As to interesting points about private security contractors, I thought this one was interesting:

-Video recording systems and tracking systems installed in vehicles.

I just think it is very interesting that Erik Prince was pushing for video cameras in the vehicles, way before the Nisour Square incident, and State fought that. Now of course, video cameras in vehicles is policy. Which is great, because now there will be an official video record that can be presented in regards to the performance, good or bad, of a security contractor and their team. The video does not lie, and it will eliminate the ‘he said, she said’ game. Plus it will help in a court of law, much like how they are used in law enforcement.

And in a world where security contractors can easily be thrown under the bus based on politics or whatever, a tape of an incident could make all the difference in proving a security contractors actions were sound and based on a solid threat. Or to prove that ‘yes, the motorcade was fired upon first, and here is the video to prove it’. A tape can also help to get rid of poor contractors, or can add a better picture of the incident for an after action review. Although we will see how it is used, good or bad, and only time will tell.

Which brings me to my next point. I know how important these guys are, everyone in this industry knows how important security contractors are, and State/USAID knows just how important we are. Too bad the public doesn’t know this, because no one in State or USAID promotes how important we are to the press or public? A great example was the silence from DoS about the whole Kabul Embassy attack?  Contractors definitely saved the day there, but the public hasn’t a clue about that performance or effort.

I guess Secretary Clinton’s new policy on armed guards on boats is a start, but I definitely would like to see these agencies give more of an effort to recognize the good efforts and sacrifice of the men and women who put their lives on the line to defend them? Or at least acknowledge just how important we really are to their mission and strategic goals? – Matt

 

From the QDDR on Private Security Contractors
Enhance and improve private security contractor oversight and accountability.
State uses private security contractors to help meet the extraordinary security requirements in critical threat and non-permissive environments.  Through operational changes already implemented and an examination conducted as part of the QDDR, State is ensuring proper management, oversight, and operational control of the private security contractors we deploy overseas.  We institutionalized many of these changes through the new Worldwide Protective Services contract awarded in September 2010, which incorporates lessons learned to ensure that private security contractors perform their requirements in a professional, responsible, culturally sensitive, and cost effective manner.  Specific steps we have taken include:
Ensuring professionalism and responsibility through improved direct oversight of security contractor personnel:
-Direct hire Diplomatic Security personnel directly supervise protective motorcades;
-Diplomatic Security personnel reside at off-site residential camps in Afghanistan;
-Revised mission firearms policies strengthen rules on the use of force and new less-than-lethal equipment fielded to minimize the need for deadly force; and
-Video recording systems and tracking systems installed in vehicles.
Improving the image of the security footprint through enhanced cultural sensitivity:
-Mandatory cultural awareness training for all security contractors prior to deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan;
-Revised standards of conduct, including a ban on alcohol; and
-Interpreters included in protective security details.
Achieving greater efficiencies through new contract terms:
-One set of terms and conditions, enhancing the ability to provide appropriate and consistent oversight;
-Reduced acquisition timelines;
-Larger number of qualified base contract holders, thereby increasing competition and controlling costs;
-Timely options in the event a company fails to perform;
-More efficient program management compared to multiple, stand-alone contracts; and
-Computerized tracking of contractor personnel to aid in reviewing personnel rosters used to support labor invoices.
Page 183 and 184
—————————————————————-
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) advances U.S. national security by driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace.

(more…)

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Iraq: Command Post–What Will Iraq Be Like In 2012?

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 11:14 AM

This is a great discussion on what Iraq will be like in 2012. Of course this will be the ‘test year’ for the DoS and their massive contractor work force and security force in Iraq.

Also, this coincides with the Senate Armed Services committee about the exit from Iraq, and the security issues associated with that.  The exchange between Secretary Defense Panetta and Senator McCain was something else. But the big one with this hearing is that it helped to fill in some of the pieces about the contractor issue in Iraq, post US troops. It also brought up some of the same concerns issued in the past about this transition, and what the government’s official stance on it is. Here is a quote that I thought was interesting.

One consequence of the U.S. military withdrawal is that the U.S. State Department will require some 16,000 private contractors to provide security and other services, like transportation and medical evacuation, that had been provided by the Pentagon.
“No question there are risks involved here,” Panetta said about such a large, unprecedented reliance on contractors.
“Are there going to be risks associated with contractors? Yes,” Panetta said. “Do we have any other alternatives? No.”

If you would like to watch the entire hearing, here is a link for that. Check it out. –Matt

 

« Newer PostsOlder Posts »

Powered by WordPress