Feral Jundi

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

Industry Talk: DoS Faces Skyrocketing Costs As It Prepares To Expand Role In Iraq

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:07 PM

     Officials in Washington said that the Defense and State cuts were interconnected in several ways, including the expectation that the Iraqi military could assist in providing security for an increased American civilian presence as the U.S. military relinquishes that task.

     But while Iraqis are providing some help, officials said they were not yet comfortable depending on them. “We want to work with both the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police in bolstering our security,” a senior administration official said. “That has to be worked out in terms of the availability of trained personnel, and it will take time to achieve it.

“I’m not saying it’s never going to happen. I’m just saying it’s not going to happen tomorrow.” 

*****

     You guys think? lol What is interesting about what is going on now, is everyone on the hill is looking at things they can cut. And if defense is getting cut, all those congressmen who will lose jobs for constituents back in their districts because of these defense cuts, will certainly lash out to make sure others feel the pain. So of course they will attack budgeting for other programs that are not as protected as defense.

     But reality dictates.  The quote up top is the one thing that I keep thinking about. Can we depend upon the Iraqis to protect the DoS in Iraq?  Or better yet, why have the DoS in Iraq in the first place, if they will not have the funding to move off the bases (which would require ‘dependable’ security).  Obviously these requests for security related programs and equipment is necessary in DoS’s view, because they do not feel they could depend upon the Iraqis. The cheapest option would be to depend upon the Iraqis, but in this case, the Best Value option would be to take all things into consideration, and get their own capability.

     The question is, can they sell this to congress?  Because instead of going cheap on security, it sounds to me like they are cutting bases and programs.  The only place they are going cheap for security, is cutting the fortification process for some Iraqi police stations. So yeah, the smart thing to do is not even open up a base if you cannot afford proper security for it.  That also cuts into the overall mission in Iraq that DoS had in mind, which is essential to getting Iraq to a point of stability and good governance. Either way congress goes with this, State will always have to default to ensuring security is at it’s optimum.  Especially if congress will not assign more troops to Iraq for DoS protection duties. –Matt

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State Dept. faces skyrocketing costs as it prepares to expand role in Iraq

By Karen DeYoung and Ernesto LondoñoAugust 11, 2010

As the last U.S. combat troops prepare to leave Iraq this month, the State Department is struggling to implement an expanded mission that it has belatedly realized it might not be able to afford.

Beginning in September, the State Department will take over all police training in Iraq from coalition military forces, and it has proposed replacing its current 16 provincial reconstruction teams spread across the country with five consular offices outside Baghdad.

But since planning for the transition began more than two years ago, costs have skyrocketed and the money to pay for them has become increasingly tight. Congress cut the State Department’s Iraq request in the 2010 supplemental appropriation that President Obama signed late last month; the Senate Appropriations Committee and a House subcommittee have already slashed the administration’s $1.8 billion request for fiscal 2011 operations in Iraq.

Gen. Ray Odierno, the outgoing commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and other U.S. officials are urging lawmakers to reconsider their plans, citing concerns that waning resources could jeopardize tenuous security gains.

“We can’t spread ourselves so thin that we don’t have the capacity to do the job in the places where we put people,” said Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew, who has told Congress that State will not deploy civilians where it cannot protect them. “If we don’t put people in a place where they have mobility, where they can go out and meet with the people and implement their programs,” he said, “there’s very little argument for being in the place we send them.”

The State Department has signaled in recent weeks that it will need up to $400 million more than initially requested to cover mushrooming security costs, but lawmakers seem in no mood to acquiesce.

(more…)

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

Call To Action: Vehicle Decals And Licenses In Iraq

Filed under: Call To Action,Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 10:26 PM

     Hey folks, get the word out on this.  If you are having problems getting your vehicles credentialed for work in Iraq, then tell your company that traveling outside the wire is a no go.  The reason for that is if you are pulled over by the Iraqis and you do not have that stuff, you could get in some trouble.  The kind of trouble that could get you arrested or heavily fined by the Iraqis.  This is especially important now that Iraq is kind of in limbo with the government crap right now, and the police and military might not feel like playing nice with contractors.

     Hopefully in the case of DynCorp, they will get this squared away before they force their teams to travel without those credentials.  If any other contractors are running into the same issues with their company, or have any input, I am all ears. Bravo to this contractor who contacted Marc Ambinder and got the word out about this.  As the war winds down, and the military pulls out, these types of things will be more common and very important to hash out.  Definitely demand that your company does the right thing out there.

     This also goes to the US government and their relationship with Iraq.  This is some basic diplomatic stuff here.  I realize that we are trying to get the Iraqis to take charge of their country and get responsible, but we also have a responsibility to our contractor force. To do all we can to protect them from these Iraqi growing pains is in our best interest.  After all, contractors are putting their lives on the line in defense of government property and personnel–I would think that would count for something?-Matt

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Contractors Pressured to Perform in Iraq Without Valid Credentials

August 4, 2010

By Marc Ambinder

The United States is rapidly drawing down troops in Iraq, and contractors are picking up the slack. DynCorp International, in particular, employs hundreds of ex-soldiers and cops to act as bodyguards and shepherds for State Department personnel across the country. The company also trains Iraqi police forces.

DynCorp is under intense pressure to perform without blemish. Private security companies and their employees are under scrutiny from both the U.S. and Iraqi governments more than ever before because of a string of incidents. Within the military, soldiers who quit to join these companies are derided as “mercs.” The culture among DynCorp’s ranks is similar to that of elite military units — what happens out there stays out there. It’s dangerous. Contractors get killed and injured with regularity. The pay is OK — it starts at $90,000 a year — and the working conditions — living in tents, eating MREs — are harsh. State Department officials have told me that the U.S. is generally pleased with DynCorp’s performance so far … but DynCorp is pretty much the only company that can do what State needs it to do.

But one member of an elite unit, a former Army Ranger who asked not to be identified, is concerned that DynCorp and the U.S. government are cutting corners unnecessarily.

(more…)

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Industry Talk: BLISS Could Be State’s New LOGCAP, And More Clarification About WPPS

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:02 AM

     Thanks to David Isenberg for posting this on his blog and bringing it to everyone’s attention.  I think this is some interesting information that came out of this letter between Richard Verma and Sen. Claire McCaskill. If in fact BLISS becomes the new LOGCAP for DoS, this could be a pretty sizable contract.  That’s ‘if’ they cannot bring State under the current LOGCAP.  We will see how it goes.

     But what I thought was most interesting in this letter was the clarification as to the fact that contractors will be operating this war equipment that DoD will be loaning to State. That is great, and it will be cool to see Blackhawks and MRAPs rolling out into the skies and roads of Iraq under the control of contractors.  I wonder if they will paint this equipment a different color? Like DoS blue/white/yellow? lol

    Also, will these MRAPS or Blackhawks be stripped of all the life saving electronics and communications stuff that our troops were able to use for the survival of their units?  Probably not, but who knows.  Today’s military hardware has a lot of useful stuff in it that could really come in handy for the contractors that have to operate it.

     One thing that is missing in this letter, is a question and response about the 14 security related functions that State identified, that might have to be done by contractors.  Stuff like EOD or counter mortar/rocket team operations. Or QRF/rescue stuff or other military type activities.  I say this because I have yet to see any answers as to how the DoS will treat contractors if they actually had to fire their weapons and kill enemy combatants while doing any of these 14 security related functions.  Or worse yet, what about firefights that unintentionally ended up in the deaths of civilians? Because the enemy loves to attack from population centers with the hopes of creating such an incident.

     Like I have said before, we might want the war to be over in Iraq, but the enemy could care less about our wishes. If anything, with a limited military presence and an Iraqi government and security forces still trying to establish itself, a lot can happen during the transition and drawdown. DoS must understand that the enemy has learned much from the propaganda value of such incidents like the Nisour Square incident. If they can recreate such an incident again they will gain much, and DoS and the US mission in Iraq will suffer yet again from the consequences.

     There are still many questions that come to mind, and that is will DoS support their contractors if involved in a firefight that accidently resulted in civilian deaths, or will they treat the contractor as if they were criminals?  Worse yet, will they hand these individuals over to the Iraqis, or will they insure these men are afforded the same protections and rights that the military or even diplomats would have received in similar situations? Will DoS implement rules for the use of force that are realistic and give contractors the best chance of success for the defense of personnel and property? Or will DoS even allow the proper weapons and tactics required for an effective defense (that could include borderline offensive operations), or even rescues? Stuff to think about and it will be interesting to see how this turns out. –Matt

Edit: 08/02/2011- Hat tip to Ms. Sparky on this news. Supposedly KBR was chosen for this. Check the comment below for the entire post.

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On July 9, 2010 this letter was sent to Sen. Claire McCaskill, from Richard D. Verma, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at DoS. (I posed the first question and answer, and the 5th question and answer. Follow the link to read the rest)

*****

1. Will private security contractors, including contractors under the State Department’s Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract, be operating the requested equipment, vehicles, and aircraft?

     The Department of State (DOS) does not presently maintain a cadre of qualified drivers/operators for some requested equipment, such as MRAPS, and, as such, would need to supplement current skill sets within its WPPS contract to ensure operational capability. If/when DoD provides the requested equipment, the Department will modify the relevant contracts to require that the equipment be operated and maintained by contractor personnel in accordance with manufacturer, DoD, or other applicable standards. Contract modifications will also require that contractor personnel possess the necessary qualifications and complete the requisite training to properly operate and maintain the equipment. An aircraft provided to the Department will be incorporated into an existing Department aviation support contract.

5. If the State Department’s request to use LOGCAP is denied, how does the Department plan to ensure that the next contract for life support services is as transparent, competitive, and accountable as possible?

     Should the LOGCAP [Logistics Civil Augmentation Program] be unavailable, the Department will follow Federal Acquisition Regulation competitive procedures in any separate procurement action. Due to long-acquisition lead-time involved, the Department has already initiated action to develop a competitive solicitation for the base life support requirements should it be unable to remain under the LOGCAP program. This solicitation is referred to as the Baghdad Life Support Services acquisition, or BLISS contract. If necessary, the Department could issue a Request for Proposals for the BLISS contract in a very short time.

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Baghdad Life Support Services

Solicitation Number: SAQMMA10I0009

Agency: U.S. Department of State

Office: Office of Logistics Management

Location: Acquisition Management

(more…)

Friday, July 23, 2010

Industry Talk: The DoS Army, And Their List Of 14 Security Tasks That Must Be Filled As DoD Leaves Iraq

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:13 AM

     State addressed some implications of the lost-functionality issue in Ambassador Kennedy’s April 7, 2010, letter to DoD: After the departure of U.S. Forces [from Iraq], we will continue to have a critical need for logistical and life support of a magnitude and scale of complexity that is unprecedented in the history of the Department of State. … And to keep our people secure, Diplomatic Security requires certain items of equipment that are only available from the military.

*****

     Ambassador Kennedy wrote, State would “essentially have to duplicate the capabilities of the U.S. military” using less effective gear, so “As a result, the security of [State] personnel in Iraq will be degraded significantly and we can expect increased casualties.”

*****

     I wanted to get this one out there as a reminder as to how significant this really is.  We are talking about a major effort here, and contractors will be front and center of all of it.  And because of the terms of the SOFA that outlines how many troops can be in Iraq, DoS and other civilian groups will increasingly have to look at new ways of replacing ‘lost functionality’.

     This post is also important in terms of cost in blood for this endeavor.  I just posted three Triple Canopy deaths in the Green Zone who were part of the Embassy protection force, and I wanted to make it very clear that the lives of these men tasked with protecting civilians in Iraq, are precious resources.  We must give these contractors the tools necessary to effectively do their job in Iraq and elsewhere, and if big brother military isn’t going to be around to back up these security forces, then some planning and new thinking about security needs to take place.  Hence why the DoS request for hardware and manpower and this Commission on Wartime Contracting report is so important.

     Definitely check out the entire report that the CWC put out about this matter, because they do bring up some interesting potential problems with this.  The point I got with the whole thing is that DoS definitely needs to get their stuff together if they want to effectively organize and manage this massive contractor effort.  From the logistics to the security, to everything involved with maintaining the Enduring Presence Posts-DoS will need to be organized and on top of this stuff.  State is also wanting to jump on the LOGCAP train, just so they can get some help in the logistics area.  Hopefully they can keep up and effectively manage all of this during the transition period, but like I mentioned in my other article, the enemy has their own agenda during this time period.

     The 14 security-related tasks were very interesting to me.  As was the questions asked about all the what-ifs?  The bottom line is that if DoS is going to have this massive security contractor army, and they are going to be asked to do some security functions that could put them in some legal trouble with the Iraqis, will DoS step in and protect their people?  I mean if you read through the 14 tasks, and you have that many guys with guns out there doing these kinds of tasks, the odds of engagements with the enemy will increase.  The odds of possible civilian casualties increase as well.  What protections will DoS offer to their ‘much needed’ security contractor force?  Because as it stands, the SOFA is not very kind to contractors and I know the enemy doesn’t care about that SOFA.

     I guess my point is, if you are going to use contractors for jobs that used to be done by the military, then you must give them the same protections that the military had.  I cannot see it done any other way.  And like the quote up top said, if DoS cannot have the same military hardware as the troops had, then their ability to protect their people diminishes.  If you look at a military infantry platoon, they have all sorts of weapons and support at their fingertips.  From tanks to mortars and artillery, to close air support and a whole myriad of lethal weapons.  Will this security contractor force have the same tools at their disposal?  No.  Will they have enough to adequately protect their DoS principles? That is the question that goes through my mind as the military packs up and leaves.

   Contractors can be very capable and be trained to a proficient level, but they are not supermen and they cannot make the enemy magically disappear if they decide to attack these EPP’s.  They must have the same rules of engagement, same legal protections and same tools that the military has right now in order to cover those 14 security-related tasks. That’s if they are asked to perform these tasks. It’s either that, or trust the Iraqis to do it?….(yikes)

    With that said, Ambassador Kennedy is partly correct in stating that the DoS will “essentially have to duplicate the capabilities of the U.S. military” using less effective gear. They will also have less legal protections, and less effective rules for the use of force.  I strongly suggest to State that if they do plan on going down this path, that they square away all of these loose ends and put at ease the minds of this contractor army. In other words, give them everything they need to be successful in their mission to protect you. –Matt

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Better planning for Defense-to-State transitions in Iraq needed to avoid mistakes and waste

July 12, 2010

‘LOST FUNCTIONALITIES’

The Departments of Defense and State have listed more than 1,000 tasks and functions that must be addressed in the DoD-to-State transition in Iraq. They range from real-estate management and portable toilets, to fire prevention

and environmental clean-up. To complicate the transition further, most of the functions rely on long-standing DoD relationships with the Government of Iraq that currently have few parallels at State. Of special concern is State’s “lost functionality” list—presented in a briefing to the Commission—of 14 security-related tasks now performed by DoD that

State must provide as the military drawdown in Iraq proceeds:

Recovering killed and wounded personnel

Recovering damaged vehicles

Recovering downed aircraft

Clearing travel routes

Operations-center monitoring of private security contractors (PSCs)

PSC inspection and accountability services

Convoy security

Explosive-ordnance disposal

Counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar notification

Counter-battery neutralization response

Communications support

Tactical-operations center dispatch of armed response teams

Policing Baghdad’s International Zone

Maintaining electronic counter-measures, threat intelligence, and technology capabilities

(more…)

Monday, July 19, 2010

Publications: CRS-DoD Contractors In Iraq And Afghanistan: Background And Analysis, July 2010

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Iraq,Letter Of Marque,Publications,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:41 AM

     The 2010 QDR, which runs almost 130 pages, contains little discussion on the role contractors play in military operations. The QDR has a seven page section on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, including a list of ten priorities for improvement. However, the word “contractor” does not appear once in the discussion, despite the fact that contractors make up more that 50% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, including more than 13,000 armed contractors. Some analysts argue that DOD missed an opportunity to address the issue in the most recent QDR.

*****  

     I like posting these, just because they are running records of where contractors stand in this war.  But what I really like about this publication is that Mr. Schwartz has taken aim at the folks who wrote up the QDR.

     The reason why I like that, is because I have been screaming on this blog as long as I can remember that contractors must be included into the discussion on strategy for these wars.  Especially when we account for over half of the manpower in these conflicts (and probably for future conflicts).

     It still amazes me that today’s strategists and war planners do not adequately cover this stuff.  If you read the QDR, it’s like we don’t even exist.  And yet we have thousands of expats, third country nationals, and local nationals, all interacting with today’s populations and militaries in today’s wars. We are also dying and paying our toll in blood for this war–yet nothing is really mentioned about us when it comes to strategy.

     Mr. Schwartz also took the time to cut and paste some key components of today’s COIN strategy out of some manuals, and how contractors should and could intermix with that strategy.  The bottom line is that if contractors are interacting with the populations of these war zones, then they ‘must’ be aligned within the strategies of COIN. We must be on the same sheet of music as the militaries are, or we will continue to inadvertently cause problems.

     Now for a couple of critiques.  In the beginning of this publication, Mr. Schwartz actually mentioned the use of contractors during the Revolutionary War, but he made no mention of the use of privateers or of Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the US Constitution.

     It’s odd to me that he wouldn’t, because our use of privateers is actually a fantastic example of using contractors during times of war to achieve a strategic goal.  Our privateer industry is what we had as a continental navy at that time. The damage they inflicted onto the enemy’s logistics, as well as the capture of enemy weapons and munitions were very significant components of that war. Not to mention the massive infusion of wealth into our young country from all of the commerce raiding done by this government licensed privateer force. And the Letter of Marque in the US Constitution is proof of that existence between private industry and government for ‘offensive’ operations against an enemy.  How’s that for ‘inherently governmental’? lol

     The only other critique that is missing is a combination of DoS’s and other’s numbers into a report like this. I know the DoD doesn’t want to mix with those ‘others’, but it gets kind of old for us to continue to see separate reports all the time. I say combine all of them to save a little money and time, and let’s see every last contractor be counted.  I would also like to see the deaths and injuries of all, and get that stuff on one nice (and complete) report for everyone to analyze and reference. Something to think about for all of you analysts out there who keep throwing this stuff together. –Matt

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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis 

Moshe Schwartz

Specialist in Defense Acquisition

July 2, 2010

Summary

The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies upon contractors to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD workforce that has 19% more contractor personnel (207,600) than uniformed personnel (175,000). Contractors make up 54% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan. The critical role contractors play in supporting such military operations and the billions of dollars spent by DOD on these services requires operational forces to effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believethat poor contract management has also played a role in abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(more…)

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