State addressed some implications of the lost-functionality issue in Ambassador Kennedy’s April 7, 2010, letter to DoD: After the departure of U.S. Forces [from Iraq], we will continue to have a critical need for logistical and life support of a magnitude and scale of complexity that is unprecedented in the history of the Department of State. … And to keep our people secure, Diplomatic Security requires certain items of equipment that are only available from the military.
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Ambassador Kennedy wrote, State would “essentially have to duplicate the capabilities of the U.S. military” using less effective gear, so “As a result, the security of [State] personnel in Iraq will be degraded significantly and we can expect increased casualties.”
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I wanted to get this one out there as a reminder as to how significant this really is. We are talking about a major effort here, and contractors will be front and center of all of it. And because of the terms of the SOFA that outlines how many troops can be in Iraq, DoS and other civilian groups will increasingly have to look at new ways of replacing ‘lost functionality’.
This post is also important in terms of cost in blood for this endeavor. I just posted three Triple Canopy deaths in the Green Zone who were part of the Embassy protection force, and I wanted to make it very clear that the lives of these men tasked with protecting civilians in Iraq, are precious resources. We must give these contractors the tools necessary to effectively do their job in Iraq and elsewhere, and if big brother military isn’t going to be around to back up these security forces, then some planning and new thinking about security needs to take place. Hence why the DoS request for hardware and manpower and this Commission on Wartime Contracting report is so important.
Definitely check out the entire report that the CWC put out about this matter, because they do bring up some interesting potential problems with this. The point I got with the whole thing is that DoS definitely needs to get their stuff together if they want to effectively organize and manage this massive contractor effort. From the logistics to the security, to everything involved with maintaining the Enduring Presence Posts-DoS will need to be organized and on top of this stuff. State is also wanting to jump on the LOGCAP train, just so they can get some help in the logistics area. Hopefully they can keep up and effectively manage all of this during the transition period, but like I mentioned in my other article, the enemy has their own agenda during this time period.
The 14 security-related tasks were very interesting to me. As was the questions asked about all the what-ifs? The bottom line is that if DoS is going to have this massive security contractor army, and they are going to be asked to do some security functions that could put them in some legal trouble with the Iraqis, will DoS step in and protect their people? I mean if you read through the 14 tasks, and you have that many guys with guns out there doing these kinds of tasks, the odds of engagements with the enemy will increase. The odds of possible civilian casualties increase as well. What protections will DoS offer to their ‘much needed’ security contractor force? Because as it stands, the SOFA is not very kind to contractors and I know the enemy doesn’t care about that SOFA.
I guess my point is, if you are going to use contractors for jobs that used to be done by the military, then you must give them the same protections that the military had. I cannot see it done any other way. And like the quote up top said, if DoS cannot have the same military hardware as the troops had, then their ability to protect their people diminishes. If you look at a military infantry platoon, they have all sorts of weapons and support at their fingertips. From tanks to mortars and artillery, to close air support and a whole myriad of lethal weapons. Will this security contractor force have the same tools at their disposal? No. Will they have enough to adequately protect their DoS principles? That is the question that goes through my mind as the military packs up and leaves.
Contractors can be very capable and be trained to a proficient level, but they are not supermen and they cannot make the enemy magically disappear if they decide to attack these EPP’s. They must have the same rules of engagement, same legal protections and same tools that the military has right now in order to cover those 14 security-related tasks. That’s if they are asked to perform these tasks. It’s either that, or trust the Iraqis to do it?….(yikes)
With that said, Ambassador Kennedy is partly correct in stating that the DoS will “essentially have to duplicate the capabilities of the U.S. military” using less effective gear. They will also have less legal protections, and less effective rules for the use of force. I strongly suggest to State that if they do plan on going down this path, that they square away all of these loose ends and put at ease the minds of this contractor army. In other words, give them everything they need to be successful in their mission to protect you. –Matt
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Better planning for Defense-to-State transitions in Iraq needed to avoid mistakes and waste
July 12, 2010
‘LOST FUNCTIONALITIES’
The Departments of Defense and State have listed more than 1,000 tasks and functions that must be addressed in the DoD-to-State transition in Iraq. They range from real-estate management and portable toilets, to fire prevention
and environmental clean-up. To complicate the transition further, most of the functions rely on long-standing DoD relationships with the Government of Iraq that currently have few parallels at State. Of special concern is State’s “lost functionality” list—presented in a briefing to the Commission—of 14 security-related tasks now performed by DoD that
State must provide as the military drawdown in Iraq proceeds:
Recovering killed and wounded personnel
Recovering damaged vehicles
Recovering downed aircraft
Clearing travel routes
Operations-center monitoring of private security contractors (PSCs)
PSC inspection and accountability services
Convoy security
Explosive-ordnance disposal
Counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar notification
Counter-battery neutralization response
Communications support
Tactical-operations center dispatch of armed response teams
Policing Baghdad’s International Zone
Maintaining electronic counter-measures, threat intelligence, and technology capabilities
