Feral Jundi

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Afghanistan: Petraeus Gives His Assessment On Progress To The Senate Armed Services Committee

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 6:06 PM

 

What I did here is to read through the good General’s report and statements, and bring out some of the quotes of stuff I thought was cool. The first quote came from a question that Petraeus answered in regards to private security contractors in Afghanistan. This quote only reconfirms the idea that contractors will continue to be used in the same way, and until Afghanistan can square away their project. The statement hints to this concept of an ‘Afghan public protection force’ through the Ministry of Interior. We will see how that goes?

The other quotes speak for themselves. The bottom line assessment basically states that the Taliban momentum has been halted in Afghanistan. That is awesome, but it also mentions how fragile this is–which is a common theme with many of Petraeus’ assessments during war time. Always giving a cautionary thumbs up…

I was also intrigued by the Afghan Local Police Initiative, and it seems like this is an area that Petraeus is really enthused about.  It would make sense that this is working, just as long as it was being done correctly.  If villages have the ability to protect themselves, then the Taliban is limited in using their default mechanism of control–and that is fear and intimidation.  We just have to make sure that we are not giving up any moral or mental ground, strategically speaking, when it comes to this battle over the local populations. Thats fine that we arm them, but we still need to be working on keeping them on our side.  Good stuff though.

And along those lines, the Taliban reconciliation efforts sound promising. With ‘turned enemy combatants’, we have the ability to possibly create some pseudo-operators?  I would have to think that out of the 700 or so turned Taliban, that there would be a few that we could use to penetrate into Pakistan and get bigger fish? Progress in Afghanistan is great, but I say use these guys to go after the big prize called Osama Bin Laden and his irhabist scum bag friends.

Under the purchases quote, the thing that I clued in on were the blimps and aerostat towers.  Lots of eyes in the sky, to include the drones, really help in our decision making loops or OODA. (the observe portion) With blimps and tower systems, you don’t have to depend upon fuel or electricity to keep it constantly flying.  You just put it up in the air or raise it, and put eyes on the areas of importance. This observation capability is a night and day operation, and that is a huge advantage on the battlefield.

I also liked the mention of the CERP or Commander’s Emergency Response Program.  This was used to great advantage by commanders in Iraq, and it is great to see that it is useful in Afghanistan.  It is simply using money as a strategic asset to local operations. A commander could pay for a ditch to be dug, or pay some blood money to the parents of a lost child.  They can do all sorts of interesting things with this money to positively impact relations between the locals and that military unit.  The Taliban uses money to impact relations with the locals as well, and this is just one area a commander can compete in and even dominate in, to deny the Taliban any advantage.

The way I see it, is that this is a ‘all politics is local‘ issue, and you could frame this as the foreigner versus the local thug (with emphasis on local). CERP at least allows a commander to be competitive, and help to make him a better idea than the other guy. –Matt

Private Security Contractors

(In regards to a recent agreement that would allow the Afghan government to continue to use private contractors for a specified period.)

“My deputy commander e-mailed me this morning right before this and said there had been an agreement on the ability to continue the use of private security contractors for a specified period, as a bridge to achieving what, I think, President Karzai understandably wants to do – which is to bring these kinds of forces underneath the oversight of the Afghan public protection force, an element of the Ministry of Interior, so that they are not in a sense armed elements that may be working for a former warlord or another,” he said.

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Monday, September 27, 2010

Leadership: The Next Petraeus–What Makes A Visionary Commander?

Filed under: Building Snowmobiles,Jundism,Leadership,Military News,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:43 AM

“One day you will take a fork in the road, and you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go one way, you can be somebody. You will have to make your compromises and … turn your back on your friends, but you will be a member of the club, and you will get promoted and get good assignments. Or you can go the other way, and you can do something, something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. … You may not get promoted, and you may not get good assignments, and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors, but you won’t have to compromise yourself. … In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you have to make a decision: to be or to do.”

-Col. John Boyd

*****

     As I read through this I was thinking ‘What makes a visionary PMC/PSC CEO?’ You really don’t hear much about that kind of thing in our industry.  Although there is plenty of good stuff to learn from the military community, and that is why I wanted to post this.

     I also had that famous quote running through my head ‘to be, or to do…’ from the mighty Col. John Boyd. One of the points of this article is that the military has a hard time producing leaders that are there ‘to do’ the job, primarily because the system really doesn’t lend itself for that.  It is more restrained and not very flexible.  Everyone has a specific career track, with boxes that must be checked off. God help you if you draw outside the lines in this world, or dare to take a different path.

     The other point made was that of life experiences and preparation for the real world of being in the high command. That these guys are having to not only be masters of the combat arms and strategy, but must also be the ultimate ‘everyman’.  They could be working with civilians, talking with Rolling Stone reporters, hanging out with Presidents that could care less about winning wars and more about politics, working with disaster relief organizations in disaster zones, trying to manage a massive civilian contractor force and ‘building snowmobiles’ on a daily basis just to win the numerous political wars, as well as the real wars. Being a general these days is no joke.

     I would also apply the same standard to today’s CEO of PMC’s and PSC’s.  This is an incredibly fast paced and technological world we live in. In order to stay competitive, a company and it’s leaders must always stay ahead of the game and their competitors. At least in our industry, CEO’s either do well and keep the company profitable, or fail miserably and be kicked to the road.  The free market is what produces our ‘visionary commanders’.

     Good article and check it out. –Matt

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The next Petraeus

What makes a visionary commander, and why the military isn’t producing more of them

By Renny McPherson

September 26, 2010

President Obama recently demoted General David Petraeus, the man who led the turnaround in Iraq and is widely acknowledged to be the most effective military officer of his generation.

In June, the president needed a new commander to lead the war effort in Afghanistan, after General Stanley McChrystal spoke too openly with a Rolling Stone reporter and was forced to resign. And, while few may realize this, when Petraeus was appointed to take over in Afghanistan, he was replacing a subordinate. Petraeus may yet be hailed for saving the day. But he also got a new boss and moved one step down the chain of command.

How does this happen to the best our military has to offer? Why was there no other general to take the job?

The short answer is that the US military has failed to produce enough leaders like Petraeus–the kind of broad-minded, flexible strategic thinkers needed to lead today’s most difficult missions. And a large contributor to this failure is the military’s inflexible system of promotion, which can actively discourage young officers from getting the mind-expanding, challenging experiences that could turn them into potent generals.

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Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Publications: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:34 AM

     Here it is.  Feel free to pass this around or go to the links below, and pass that around.  Lots of good commonsense stuff in there.  My only point to make with this publication is that prime contractors should definitely use this document as well, just so that we are all playing off the same sheet of music. –Matt

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COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A

For the Commanders, Contracting Personnel, Military Personnel, and Civilians of NATO ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan

SUBJECT: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting GuidanceDownload Official Release

The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represents both an opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government’s and ISAF’s campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.

In view of these points, contracting has to be “Commander’s business.” Indeed, I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract spending and understand who benefits from it. We must use intelligence to inform our contracting and ensure those with whom we contract work for the best interests of the Afghan people. We must be better buyers and buy from better people. Consistent with NATO and national contracting laws and regulations, we must:

Understand the role of contracting in COIN. Purchases we make for construction, goods, and services can bolster economic growth, stability, and Afghan goodwill toward their government and ISAF. Contracts with Afghan firms that procure Afghan goods and services generate employment and assist in the development of a sustainable economy. However, if we contract with powerbrokers who exclude those outside their narrow patronage networks or are perceived as funneling resources to one community at the expense of another, the effect on Afghan perceptions and our mission will be negative. Thus, we must incorporate COIN Contracting topics into training for Commanders.

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Monday, September 13, 2010

Afghanistan: Petraeus Issues Guidance For Afghan Contracting

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Military News — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:32 AM

     Nothing too radical or exciting about this one.  I mean all of these issues have been talked about and mulled over for quite awhile now, and I am quite frankly pretty tired of discussing it. The problems have been identified and now all that is needed is leadership and action.

     What is more important is for Petraeus to actually punish those within his command that do not deliver.  We are going into nine years of contracting in this war zone, and it is pretty pathetic that it has taken this long for today’s war time leaders to finally recognize how important it is to square away this aspect of the war. That’s government for you.

     As for tips on how to insure you are getting the best bang for the buck, I would implement as many mentorship programs as possible.  Just as long as there is a responsible and trustworthy partner that is attached to all of these contracts, then at least you will have someone you can deal with and give guidance too. Either assign a military unit with these local companies, or find a company with expats that can watch over this stuff. In either case, you must have an eye on the project so you can control it or shut it down if it hurts the war effort.

    Another thing to think about is the Mystery Shopper concept I have talked about in the past.  It is such a simple method of checking up on projects, and I still don’t know why we don’t implement more of this kind of thing?  It is especially important if you do not have eyes on the project at all times due to manpower issues or whatever.  A simple visit by someone that no one knows is an inspector or observer, will give you a good dose of feedback and shared reality as to what is really going on with that project.

    The other thing that will help for accounting purposes is to use payment systems for contracting that make it easy for transparency.  Things like mobile cash can really help out in this department. This area requires innovation and a dedication to continuos improvement or Kaizen.

    Well written contracts and having plenty of manpower to watch over these contracts is also a basic one that really needs good leadership to ensure it happens.  Now that Petraeus has issued guidance, perhaps he will do what is necessary to assign sufficient manpower to these contracts.  And not just soldiers without a clue, but individuals that will take everything into account, and actually look at the secondary and third effects of each and every contract they sign.  They should be applying OODA to every contract, and win the war of contracting.

    Finally, I wonder if the Taliban have issues with managing their contractors?  They have to pay for bounties, mercenaries, equipment, weapons, explosives and everything else an insurgency requires.  I tend to view their operations and logistics as one that is simpler, smaller and more flexible–kind of like business, and less like government. There is also the fear of pissing off their command and fellow Taliban if you steal from the organization, so that probably keeps the organization in check.  I could be wrong and I am just thinking out loud here. It would be extremely interesting to read a report on the Taliban and their contracting issues. I certainly have plenty of information about our own contracting practices, or lack there of. pffft –Matt

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Petraeus issues guidance for Afghan contracting

By DEB RIECHMANN

Sep 12, 2010

The NATO command has issued new guidelines for awarding billions of dollars worth of international contracts in Afghanistan, saying that without proper oversight the money could end up in the hands of insurgents and criminals, deepen corruption and undermine efforts to win the loyalty of the Afghan people at a critical juncture in the war.

The guidance, issued last week by Gen. David Petraeus and obtained Sunday by The Associated Press, was issued in response to concern that the military’s own contracting procedures could be, in some cases, running counter to efforts on the battlefield.

The changes are aimed, in large part, at addressing complaints that ordinary Afghans have seen little change in their daily lives despite billions poured into their country since 2001.

“With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government and NATO’s campaign objectives,” Petraeus wrote in a two-page memorandum. “If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.”

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Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Afghanistan: The Future Of Training–More Money, More Demand For Trainers

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Training — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:04 AM

The United States expects to spend about $6 billion a year training and supporting Afghan troops and police after it begins withdrawing its own combat troops in 2011.

The estimates of U.S. spending through 2015, detailed in a NATO training mission document, are an acknowledgment that Afghanistan will remain largely dependent on the United States for its security.

That reality could become problematic for the Obama administration as it continues to seek money for Afghanistan from Congress in a time of increasingly tight budgets.

In Brussels, a NATO official said Monday that alliance commander Gen. David Petraeus had asked for 2,000 more soldiers, with nearly half to be trainers for the rapidly expanding Afghan security forces. The NATO official requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the subject. 

*****

    A couple of things with these stories. Will Petraeus get these extra troops if NATO cannot scrape the bucket and get them on the scene?  Because politically and economically, sending more troops to Afghanistan is a hard sell in all the countries participating, and not just the US. How will this look during the coming elections in the US if more troops are asked for on top of the already thousands of troops requested for the surge?  Hell, some countries are backing out last minute (like the Dutch) and these actions always cause ripples in the planing and operations of the war effort.  So as I have said before, as NATO falters, contractors will be taking up the slack.

   I also continue to see plenty of training job ads, and according to the second article below, the money will be there for training in Afghanistan well into the future. The only thing though is politically, this administration and probably the next will continue to have problems with sending troops or getting congress to sign off on that training money.  As the troops get more limited in presence, and money becomes more scarce, contractors will continue to be an important tool to execute these training duties.

    The other thing I could see happening is more hybrid training programs popping up.  Where military folks mixed with contractors will be used to train the Afghans. We already see a little bit of this, and I think this combination works because the customer (US government) can ensure there is military oversight on these projects. It would also ensure that there is consistency in the training programs, and a metrics can be maintained by the military itself.

    All of this is just speculation, but given what is already on the ground, the military and contractor relationship will become even more important as time goes on. –Matt

NATO eyes 2,000 extra troops for Afghanistan: official

US expects to spend big in Afghanistan for years

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NATO eyes 2,000 extra troops for Afghanistan: official

By Laurent Thomet

09/08/2010

US General David Petraeus, the commander of the war in Afghanistan, has requested 2,000 extra troops to bolster a crucial mission to train Afghan security forces, a NATO official said Monday.

The mission would come on the heels of the deployment of tens of thousands of soldiers who were sent as part of a surge strategy aimed at crushing a resilient Taliban insurgency, the official said.

“There is now a discussion under way for additional resources, principally trainers, that could be sent to Afghanistan to bolster the mission,” said the official, who requested anonymity.

At least 750 of the new soldiers would focus on training Afghan forces, he said, refusing to give more details about the rest of the mission. He said it was premature to say when the 2,000 extra troops would be deployed.

Getting Afghan security forces trained so they can take over security responsibilities is a paramount condition for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the nation, worn down by war.

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