Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
Weapons Stuff: Rhodesian Cover Shooting or ‘Drake Shooting’
This is a great read, and I highly recommend checking it out. Ian has basically broken down the operations of his unit, and the use of this efficient and lethal shooting technique. –Matt
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RHODESIAN COVER SHOOTING
By “Ian Rhodes”, 2 Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry
Prelude
Also known as Drake Shooting, Rhodesian Cover Shooting may be defined as the shooting technique employed to quickly kill concealed insurgents through the various phases of close quarter combat in the African savanna and jesse bush. The method did not replace “fire and movement” procedures, but was rather the primary activity of them. Cover shooting has also been described as a “flushing” action, but this is not strictly accurate. While flushing terrorists from their concealment has obvious advantages, particularly when working with close helicopter support, the first objective of cover shooting was to kill the enemy without the need to see him or locate his exact position first. Likewise the method should not be confused with other foreign practises such as walking suppression fire directed “at the jungle.” Cover shooting was not a random spraying of bullets, but a deliberate and methodical routine designed to elicit maximum effect for the least expenditure of ammunition. After the declaration of U.D.I. in 1965, the Rhodesian war continued for another 15 years and tactics changed greatly as lessons were learned during that time. For this reason experiences may well disagree on opinion and detail. This discussion is also somewhat biased towards the practises of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) and the combat patrols of the Police Anti-Terrorist Unit (PATU). As such, it cannot be held up as either definitive, or complete. In 1964 the Rhodesian Light Infantry changed roles to that of a Commando Battalion. Deployed in rapid reaction “Fire Force” operations designed to vertically envelop insurgent groups, the cover shooting technique played a significant part in the Battalions overall success. In it`s 19 years of existence, most of those fighting at the very forefront of a bush war, the Rhodesian Light Infantry never lost a battle.
PDF for Rhodesian Cover Shooting or Drake Shooting here.
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
PMC 2.0: Bullets and Blogs–New Media and the Warfighter
Hear me now. All of you CEO’s and upper level management throughout all of the companies need to pay attention. If you do not have a new media strategy, then you are in the wrong. Just think of it this way. Companies invest in vehicles, armor, training, and weapons to protect their contractors, so they in turn can protect their client. So why are companies not investing in new media protocols in order to protect their clients from information warfare attacks?
If the enemy attacks your motorcade in a population center, then films the exchange of fire and then purposely shoots a few civilians and then films that, and then claims that they were shot by contractors. Then they post it on the internet immediately afterwards and spreads that poison throughout the new media battle space. Then all those journalists and contractor haters, along with the John Q public, all take it in and label your company as evil, and without question. Is your company set up to defend against that? Can you defend against a Nisour Square style propaganda attack?
How about journalists using new media to promote personal agendas, as opposed to being fair or balanced in their reportage? Guess what? That’s a threat to your client as well. Is your company set up to defend against that? It should be, because if you were fully involved with new media strategy and counter-attacks, then you would have the foresight to do what is necessary. It is called being prepared–one of the many tenets of Jundism.
The report below can be summed up in one main theme:
Recognize that the winning strategy is “information engagement,” not “information control;”
Embrace new media as a significant enabler of “that element of combat power called information;”
So is your company set up for ‘information engagement’? From the looks of it, most of the companies out there are doing a terrible job of information engagement. And believe me, I am a security contractor who also happens to be a new media practitioner, and I have yet to see any of the companies take the necessary measures to operate in the new media battle space. At least the military is talking about it, and bravo to them. –Matt
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Executive summary
Winning in the new media battlespace: Workshop top takeaways
For the U.S. military, new media and the Global Information Environment (GIE) present sustained challenges and opportunities. In recent years, new adversaries — armed with new media capabilities and an information-led warfighting strategy — have proven themselves capable of stopping the most powerful militaries in the world.
The current and future geo-strategic environment requires preparation for a battlespace in which symbolic informational wins may precipitate strategic effects equivalent to, or greater than, lethal operations. It demands a paradigm shift away from an emphasis on information control and towards information engagement. It will require cultural and organizational change within the Department of Defense (DOD) as it adapts to the world of digital natives – its own savvy Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines and their communicative expectations, proclivities, potential and risk; as well as its current and over-the-horizon opponents. Most of all, it will force the sustained adaptation and transformation of the way the U.S. military thinks and fights.
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Strategy: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy, By David Isenberg
Awesome. This is the kind of conversation we need to have out there, and I applaud David for his work on trying to start that conversation. And just a hint to the guys over at Small Wars Journal, or anyone else that claims to be students of this war and strategy. There are over 240,000 civilian contractors in this war, with 1,168 killed and over 37,000 injured. Why there is no mention of PMC’s/contractors and grand strategy in the same sentence, is beyond me. We are very much a part of this war, and we do have an impact on strategy for these wars and future wars. –Matt
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Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy
10/15/2009
The debate over whether and how to utilize private military contractors (PMC) often seems like childish name calling, e.g. “You’re a mercenary.” Such rhetoric is silly and prevents people from facing underlying realities.
What nobody wants to discuss is that the U.S. government’s huge and growing reliance on private contractors constitutes an attempt to circumvent or evade public skepticism about the United States’ self-appointed role as global policeman. The U.S. government has assumed the role of guarantor of global stability at a time when the American public is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to support this strategy. Private contractors fill the gap between geopolitical goals and public means.
As the United States relies more heavily upon military contractors it reinforces the tendency to approach global crises in a unilateral, as opposed to multilateral manner. U.S. use of PMCs is inevitable until people grasp the key point: contracting is both part of war and part of maintaining a global military hegemonic presence.
Such a policy is not without problems. As Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations about his experience of the corporations that were contracted to perform British government services — such as the East India Company, the Halliburton of its day, left him too skeptical to suggest privatization: “These companies… have in the long-run proved, universally, either burdensome or useless.”
ISBN : 978 82 7288 324 8 • Isenberg Private Military Contractors PRIO Report 1-2009.pdf
Monday, August 24, 2009
Publications: Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan-as of June 30, 2009
. There was a 19 % increase (from 10,743 to 13,232) of armed DoD PSCs in Iraq compared to the 2nd quarter FY 2009 census. This increase can be attributed to an increased need for PSCs to provide security as the military begins to drawdown forces and to our continued improved ability to account for subcontractors who are providing security services.
. There was a 20% increase (from 4,111 to 5,165) of armed DoD PSCs in Afghanistan compared to the 1st quarter FY 2009 census. The increase correlates to the build up of forces in that AOR.
As promised, here is the link and a quick summary of the latest Program Support report on DoD contractors. The most important statistic that you guys need to tell your friends, and enemies, is the one on security contractors up top. That and we now outnumber the troops in Afghanistan.
Now remember, this is an increase from the last report, and not some yearly report. So the numbers are skyrocketing, and as far as I can tell, we have a very important role in both wars.