OIG MERO Kabul Embassy Security Force Performance Evaluation, Sept 2010
Sunday, October 31, 2010
Industry Talk: AGNA Report News–Sloppy Reporting And Range Violations By The IG In Afghanistan
A senior level review of the misconduct allegations against AGNA personnel, combined with AGNA’s history of contract compliance de?ciencies, led DS, AQM, and Embassy Kabul to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Government to compete a new contract. In light of recent legislation, the KESF contract has been combined with the Baghdad Embassy Security Force and Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS II) contracts into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. The new WPS contract is a multi-award, inde?nite delivery, inde?nite quantity (IDIQ) contract that will be awarded on a best value basis. Individual requirements, such as the KESF, will be awarded as task orders under the base WPS contract. The current KESF contract with AGNA expired on June 30, 2010, but performance has been extended until the end of December 2010 to allow for the completion of the acquisition process for the new WPS contract and KESF task order and to provide for an orderly transition to the next provider. -From the Bureau of DS Comments in Report
What I wanted to do here is give the former contractors and managers of Armorgroup North America a chance to voice their opinion of the latest report. My inbox is filled with numerous emails from former employees and managers of AGNA, all wanting to tell their side of story. Partly because Congress, State or the IG really could care less about the little guy on the ground, and partly because the report is sloppy. So call this a rebuttal from the little guy.
This particular email was from a former manager at AGNA, whose identity I will refer to as ‘former manager’. I would hope that this would have some significance to those that are reading this, and that what he has to say pretty much conflicts with what the IG is reporting. Specifically that the weapons issue pointed out in the report was lacking some key points, and that the IG violated the range rules during their inspection.
I might also add that there is nothing in the report that discusses how AGNA came to be contracted in the first place. The Commission on Wartime Contracting came out with an excellent and damning report about how Lowest Priced, Technically Acceptable contracting is what created the environment that forced State to contract with the lowest bidder.
It is also interesting to me that Danielle Brian of POGO still asserts that LPTA is a legitimate contracting mechanism for security contracting in war zones, when there has been several reports presented that have identified the horrific secondary affects of this type of contracting in war-zones.
Best Value contracting would have given State more choice and flexibility in the matter, and they could have gone with the best company for the job and not with the cheapest or technically acceptable. It would not have been a race to the bottom, but a race to the best value company for the job.
Furthermore, why is POGO so silent about the TWISS program, another example of the failure of LPTA? (did I mention that companies are now considering Sierra Leone contractors as guards because they are cheaper than Ugandans?) I know POGO reads the blog and I have directed everyone that has complained to me, to go to POGO and voice their concern. I would like to think that POGO would actually listen to what the guys on the ground have to say about such things?
Or why is the Army using LPTA for FOB security in Afghanistan, when the CWC is so opposed to it? I posted a ton of contracts flying that were all LPTA, and here we are trying to convince Karzai to not ban PSC companies. With LPTA, we are giving him more ammunition by putting our lowest bidders, ‘junior varsity squads’ out there. Pffft.
The other thing that pisses me off about LPTA, is that the troops see the direct result of this on the FOBs. How would you feel if you were being protected by the lowest bidder? It is a simple question, that pisses off most when they come to the conclusion that they don’t like it. Especially if their base has been attacked, like what has happened frequently in Afghanistan.
LPTA doesn’t work for picking a doctor to cure your sick mother, and it doesn’t work for picking a company to protect your people in a war zone. LPTA is great for picking a company to rake your leaves though. lol You get what you pay for, and that is the lesson I got out of the reports.
Thats not to say that State or AGNA doesn’t share any fault here, but Congress must take more blame, and all because they insisted on lowballing the security for Embassy protection in the first place.
Finally, this post is about the guys on the ground who were contracted to operate in this environment. They are the ones that take on the task of trying to make this mess work. No one signs on to a contract to do bad. They sign on so they can be employed and pay their bills/feed their family at home. They sign on because they care about participating in the war. They are also sacrificing by being away from family, or facing death and injury in war-zones–and all for their country and for the war effort. We should support them, not hate them.
Most guys whom have done the contracting thing for awhile have also worked for numerous companies. A contractor could have worked for Xe, Custer Battles, Erinys, Aegis, AGNA etc., and that is not abnormal nor does that mean the contractor is a bad guy. They are going where the work is so they can continue to earn a living and serve in the war. I am sure when EODT takes over this contract in Kabul, AGNA guys will be ‘switching t-shirts’ and transition under the management of this new company.
I want to make sure that Congress, State, AGNA, and now EODT knows that these men need leaders who can manage a ‘properly funded, staffed, and equipped’ contract at all levels. These men are not the bad guys, and they deserve the best management we can give them.
This work force will move mountains for you, if you actually apply a little Jundism to your management principles as well. Know your stuff, have the courage to do what is right, and take care of your people. Trust, but verify. Lead by example. Lead from the front. Your people will support what they help to create. Obtain feedback gold. Create a learning organization and gain a shared reality. Continuous improvement and customer service and satisfaction. Have fun. All of this stuff is important, and all of it should be geared towards results and getting the job done. –Matt
From Former Manager at AGNA
“Sorry I cannot be more forthcoming with dates and witnesses, most have left. A number of the team in Kabul are upset as great progress has been made and this is rarely acknowledged, we just get the old issues regurgitated and inaccurate reporting. No organisation, or individual, is perfect and mistakes will be made, but, this report is poor and has an impact on individuals and corporations. How can organizations be expected to work with the IG if they produce sloppy reports, it is counter productive. Instead of working on ways to improve the contracting process and performance; it erodes it – people do not put things in writing, everyone tries to cover their backs all the time, every decision takes a long time/ or make poor ones, as people try to assess what an inspector or congressman (who has to be re-elected every two years) might say three years from now and with 20/20 hindsight.”
From IG Report In Regards To The Firing Range
AGNA does not adequately maintain training records. AGNA firearms instructors failed to sufficiently instruct guards to help correct firing errors. Instructors also qualified guards who did not achieve the minimum qualifying score at the firing range.
From Former Manager at AGNA
“There are other areas that need to be looked at – such as the statement that AGNA fails to conduct weapon training properly – how can they make this a key finding from a visit to one range? The same range the inspector is removed from the firing line by a former ranger chief instructor for moving in front of the firing line. The same inspector who, in front of the project manager, grabbed an M4 from a guard to check the serial number, not checking the weapon status/ clearing it and muzzle sweeping personnel in the process – we would be disciplined for handling a weapon in this way. How can they say AGNA put guards on post who failed the weapons qual, without checking the source documentation? (which they found difficult to navigate but did not ask the training staff to assist them in finding). Have you looked at the equation they used with regard to rifle quals? It makes no sense to me and I believe the two personnel they say failed actually had passed if you looked at the source document, not the spreadsheet where results are collated. They say guards were on post for 8 months without training, yet they interviewed some of these guards, I would imagine that they should have asked them if they had undergone training and when? If they were trained prior to standing post (which they were) then it is an issue of maintenance of records, which is still a problem to be highlighted and resolved, but does not effect the security of the Embassy.”
From IG Report In Regards To Weapons
AGNA’s current control of U.S. Government-furnished property is generally satisfactory, but AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished weapons that have been missing since 2007. Additionally, from July 2007 until September 2009, AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons to train guards when contractor-furnished weapons were required by its contract. OIG calculates that AGNA’s loss and misuse of these U.S. Government-furnished weapons cost the government $431,000.
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OIG found that AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished assault ri?es of a lot of 116 that was to be returned to the U.S. Government in July 2007 under a contract modi?cation. OIG found one missing assault ri?e of this lot under a desk in an AGNA of?ce. The photo on the right in Figure 3 shows the assault ri?e as found under the desk. DS was able to locate an addition 14 weapons that had been transferred to other State Department of?ces and US Government agencies. Neither AGNA nor DS could provide documentation verifying the return or location of the remaining 101 assault ri?es. OIG calculates this assault ri?e lot is worth approximately $50,000.
According to correspondence between the Department and AGNA management, from July 2007 until September 2009, AGNA did not provide a suf?cient number of contractor-furnished weapons to the KESF guards. Instead, AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons for training, although the contract required contractor-furnished weapons (U.S. Government-furnished weapons are to be used for guard duty). AGNA and the Department negotiated a ?nancial settlement in which AGNA was to reimburse the U.S. Government $381,000 for the use of these weapons. However, OIG reviewed invoices and found that AGNA has not yet reimbursed the Department. DS of? cials con?rmed that AGNA has yet to reimburse the Department.
From Former Manager at AGNA
“The original contract and mod 1 contained 116 soviet block weapons that were used on the previous contract, before the Govt supplied US weapons. As these weapons were not going to be used on the program DoS moved them to their own storage unit prior to 1 July 2007 (when AGNA took responsibility for the contract). Consequently these weapons were never part of the equipment handover and AGNA did not sign for them on handover. Because of this the contract was modified in mid July 2007 reflecting this. How can AGNA provide handover documentation for items they were never responsible for? It seems as if the IG assumed AGNA was responsible because the contract mod was mid July, but that is a poor assumption, and the IG was informed of the situation by DS.”
“From what I understand DoS then gave AGNA some of the weapons (7 or so) to use for identification training (they were generally kept on the training/ briefing room in full view), but they were demilitarized (welded bolt, soldered and bent barrel etc). One of these weapons is the one seen in the photograph in the report. Other weapons were sent to the US for use at DS facilites and the rest were disposed of, although I do not know how. Most of the people involved in this are DoS personnel who oversaw the program handover. Those from AGNA have since left the company. However, with all the scrutiny on this program you would think that DoS would have mentioned AGNA ‘losing’ 100+ weapons before now…”
Comments from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Report
A senior level review of the misconduct allegations against AGNA personnel, combined with AGNA’s history of contract compliance de?ciencies, led DS, AQM, and Embassy Kabul to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Government to compete a new contract. In light of recent legislation, the KESF contract has been combined with the Baghdad Embassy Security Force and Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS II) contracts into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. The new WPS contract is a multi-award, inde?nite delivery, inde?nite quantity (IDIQ) contract that will be awarded on a best value basis. Individual requirements, such as the KESF, will be awarded as task orders under the base WPS contract. The current KESF contract with AGNA expired on June 30, 2010, but performance has been extended until the end of December 2010 to allow for the completion of the acquisition process for the new WPS contract and KESF task order and to provide for an orderly transition to the next provider.
Link to report here.
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Friday, October 8, 2010
Industry Talk: EODT And Wackenhut/AGNA/G4S Respond To SASC Report
Boy, the sharks of the media really went to town on this story. Funny how the Jim Jones thing will probably turn this report into a footnote. lol
What I wanted to do is actually provide a little balance here and get the word out as to what the companies have to say. If you read most of the stories out about this thing, they are all pretty one sided. The report does detail some shady practices, but I agree with the companies below that the military knew what they were doing the whole time.
One of the pieces of evidence that the investigators could have relied upon to establish this is to go into the BDOC of these bases and look up all of these guards that were used for base protection. Because if any Afghan was allowed to come on to a FOB or whatever for security, more than likely the ID nazis were all over them. Everyone has to have ID.
The other missing component is the mountains of negative reviews from the military that showed their disgust with these companies? Where are these performance evaluations or surveys that showed poor service? Where is the reprimands from the military, if in fact they wanted these companies to stop doing what they were doing? Or like the companies have stated, the military knew what was going on and even recommend some of these folks to the companies?
Finally, just to play devil’s advocate here. Doesn’t COIN also state to win over the support of the local population? So when companies go into a specific area to set up shop, and they are directed to hire ‘Afghan First‘ and hire locally, then you can see how limited a company can be? Worse yet, if a company doesn’t use these locals, the locals get mad and the security situation gets worse because they are unemployed and look at the company as just a threat. It is like going into a town that is pro-union, and if you don’t hire union, you will face the wrath of the union. Try bringing in the ‘scabs’ in a warzone? lol
On the flip side, I am not going to necessarily condone what these companies did, but on the flip side, the military and the pentagon both should receive equal criticism in this matter. I agree with report about bringing in more auditors and CORS, but this is not new. I also agree that money should be used wisely in a war like this, and ensure that where that money goes does not fund the opposition. Commonsense stuff really, and Petraeus has already addressed this.
Now it is time to put action to words and get the job done. It takes leadership and a ‘trust but verify’ focus–as if you guys are spending your own money on this, and not just the tax payer’s money. I am still waiting to see this in the military and government, and I don’t think we need any more reports to make that point any more clear. Less talk, more action.
One more thing. EODT did a great job getting this press release out there the day the report came out. Wackenhut/AGNA/G4S has did a terrible job of getting the word out. I checked the G4S press releases and nothing. No one from that company has forwarded anything to me and I have yet to see a press release floating around. So basically I had to scrounge up a quote from an AP report. –Matt
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Statement of EOD Technology Regarding the Senate Armed Services Committee Report Dated Sept. 28, 2010
LENOIR CITY, TN (October 7, 2010) – EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT) has only had the opportunity to preliminarily review the Report issued by the Senate Arms Services Committee (SASC). EODT cooperated fully in the SASC investigation. It is our understanding that this Report, discusses a contract that EODT was performing in Afghanistan at the Adraskan National Training Center and more specifically, EODT’s utilizing and hiring Afghan nationals.
In response to these statements EODT would first make clear that its contract required EODT to utilize Afghan personnel and specifically those from the area surrounding the contract location. The local leaders which EODT sought out to assist in hiring personnel were persons made known to EODT by the U.S. military or were commonly known leaders within that area. In any event all leaders which EODT utilized were made known to the U.S. military at every stage of mobilization.
As for Afghan citizens hired by EODT, all names were provided to the appropriate person or persons designated by our contract in order to gain approval for the hire. However, above and beyond its contract requirements, EODT sought out representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) operating in that area in order to provide names for screening and resulting feedback.
While the SASC Report may present certain criticisms of EODT’s hiring practices, EODT has never been advised by the U.S military that problems of this nature exist. However, just as EODT has cooperated fully with the SASC investigation, EODT stands ready to engage the U.S. military or other stakeholders about these issues in order to improve our internal processes and contract performance.
EODT was asked to perform the Adraskan contract after the prior contractor failed to mobilize. The dangerous region and work presented significant challenges which EODT believes it successfully overcame. EODT underwent a successful Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) audit for this contract in 2008 as well as earning subsequent positive past performance on this contract.
Link to press release here.
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Susan Pitcher, a spokeswoman for Wackenhut Services, ArmorGroup’s parent company, said the company only engaged workers from local villages upon the “recommendation and encouragement” of U.S. special operations troops.
Pitcher said that ArmorGroup stayed in “close contact” with the military personnel “to ensure that the company was constantly acting in harmony with, and in support of, U.S. military interests and desires.”
Link to article here.
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Senate report blasts Pentagon for handling of security contractors
By Charley Keyes
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
• Senate report: Failure to keep track of private security contractors puts troops at risk
• Sen. Carl Levin: “We must shut off the spigot of U.S. dollars” to Afghan warlords
• Committee staff: 125 security contracts cost the U.S. more than $100 million
• Report cites nonexistent training, violent incidents, warlord affiliations
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Thursday, March 4, 2010
Publications: GAO Concludes That Contractors Are More Cost Effective Than Employees!
Well duh. lol You guys don’t have to pay the pensions of contractors when their contract is done and the war is over. Of course the government loves to use this ‘disposable workforce’ called contractors.
Thanks to David Isenberg who brought this to everyone’s attention through his blog, and you can read his assessment here.
I do have an issue with the way GAO reworded the one instance that federal employees were more cost effective. Why training, vetting and recruiting costs were not included in this last one, is interesting. Is this because politically speaking, they are wanting to promote phasing out security contractors, and the GAO was pressured to write it that way? So instead of adding 240 million with the 162 million dollars to make the ‘grand total cost’ to the government for federal employee security specialists of 402 million dollars, they instead decided to stick with just the 240 million dollar figure? So in order to support their statement that security was not cost effective, they decided to split up the figure…(raised eyebrow) So with my simple math here, I show that private industry is more cost effective than the government for security work.
Also, I wonder if legal fees and lawsuits were tacked into the costs, because private industry is definitely eating that bill with this war. Just ask companies like Xe or DynCorp. And as more legislation is passed, which allows more people to easily sue private industry, and/or makes it more difficult to sue the government, I think this is another area that needs some attention in the accounting process here. A company has to have it’s own costly legal apparatus. The government has a massive legal apparatus already and oodles of laws to protect itself from litigation.
Just look at the dismal example of how many ‘few successful’ whistleblower cases there have been against government? Office of Special Counsel should be changed to the Office of Protect the Government. Not to mention all the lawyers assigned to protect the various agencies and departments out there. The government has a legal shield around it like you can’t believe, and all of it is funded by the tax payer.
Overall, this is a good publication to show folks as proof that we are more cost effective and we do make sense to the government. So if you are ever in an argument with some dork about the nuts and bolts of contractor efficiency, just pull this sucker up and let the GAO do your talking. –Matt
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GAO-10-266R March 4, 2010
Full Report (PDF, 20 pages)
Summary
In Process
Our comparison of likely State Department costs versus contractor costs for four task orders and one contract awarded by the State Department for security services in Iraq showed that for three of the task orders and the contract, the cost of using State Department employees would be greater than using contractors, while the State Department’s estimated cost to use federal employees was less for the other task order. For example, using State Department employees to provide static security for the embassy in Baghdad would have cost the department approximately $858 million for 1 year compared to the approximately $78 million charged by the contractor for the same time period. In contrast, our cost comparison of the task order for providing personal security for State Department employees while in the Baghdad region–which required personnel that have security clearances–showed that for this task order, the State Department’s estimated annual cost would have been about $240 million, whereas the contractor charged approximately $380 million for 1 year. However, because the State Department does not currently have a sufficient number of trained personnel to provide security in Iraq, the department would need to recruit, hire, and train additional employees at an additional cost of $162 million. Contract requirements are a major factor in determining whether contractors or government personnel are less expensive–especially factors such as whether personnel need security clearances. However, there are other factors that may play a role in the decision of whether to perform security services with federal employees or enough federal employees than to acquire contractors. Additionally, the government could potentially be faced with incurring some administrative costs from having to take actions to reduce government personnel if they are no longer needed. When using contractors, the department also incurs administrative costs for awarding the task orders and contract and providing oversight; however, the State Department was unable to estimate these costs. Finally, some costs associated with providing Iraq security services using federal employees–such as developing new career fields, providing additional overhead, and building new housing–are difficult to quantify.
Link to publication here.