Saturday, April 16, 2011
Publications: Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 2nd Quarter FY 2011
Monday, June 28, 2010
Publications: GAO Report On DoD’s Progress And Challenges For Logistics In Afghanistan
Thanks to David Isenberg for identifying this report and pointing out all the goodies. What was interesting to me was how absolutely vital contractors are to the logistics of the war in Afghanistan. Especially for the routes coming out of Pakistan, because US military forces are not allowed to escort that stuff. Nothing new, but as you go through this report, you get the idea of how essential we really are. It also signifies how important it is that we get a handle on how to manage it all, because logistics is going to be big…. really big.
Some of the things that jumped up at me as obvious fixes for some of the problems, is to stop depending on Fedex type tracking measures and gadgets, and start depending on humans as the tracking mechanism of this stuff. Because Afghan and Pakistani companies will do all they can to get rid of those GPS trackers, or not even care about these tracking mechanisms. What matters to them is money and their ability to pilfer the cargo and blame it on a combat loss or whatever. No one is there to stop them or witness them doing this, and they will do whatever they want. I say put competent expat companies in charge of these deliveries, with expat convoy leaders and teams, and use local Pakistani or Afghani drivers and guards as the manpower/interpreters. This is the optimum set up if you cannot use the military to escort this stuff, and especially on the Pakistan side.
The point is, is that you need a human that you can trust on these convoys, because gadgets can be defeated. But you also need something else that is lacking for these convoys. And that is communications, appropriate fire power and support. In order to have communications, appropriate fire power and support, you need folks who can help facilitate that. Because without these basic tools for the defense of convoys, you will continue to see them get attacked and pilfered.
As more troops pour into Afghanistan, the stability of logistics will be crucial and the current set up is unacceptable. I say put expat companies in charge, set up Pakistani QRFs and air support on their side, and US military QRF and air support on the Afghan side, and call it a day. These forces are purely dedicated to protecting the contractor led convoys in Pakistan, and if we want, we attach military escorts as they cross into Afghanistan. Hell, we might actually kill a few bad guys along the way, and use these convoys as decoys. If the enemy wants them that bad, they will have to pay a price to get them.
Or we can allow our logistics to be torn apart by the enemy, and we can allow untrained, mismanaged, corrupt and undisciplined Afghani or Pakistani companies to do whatever they want with that stuff. They will continue to pilfer, they will continue to shoot wildly into towns and villages as they protect convoys, and they will continue to pay off the enemy for safe transport. That is unacceptable to me, and there is a better way.
Might I also add that we put expat companies in charge of convoys in Iraq, and that arrangement works far better for any kind of unity of effort between civilian and military forces sharing the roads. Companies like Armorgroup definitely bet their lives on the delivery of goods and people, and they did an outstanding job(they also lost a lot of guys due to their brave work). Our lessons learned from Iraq were also built on this concept of expats being in charge, and not the other way around with Afghanis or Pakistani companies in charge of this stuff.
Hell, in Iraq, you would see military convoys join in the protection of a expat convoy operations. But when it came to all Iraqi security companies, military convoys or patrols would have nothing to do with them because they had no way of communicating and they really didn’t trust them. It pays to have expats in charge of operations, and it really pays when those expats have all the tools and support necessary to be successful for those convoy operations.
I also mentioned in an earlier post about the aviation side of logistics. The report further emphasized the difficulties that come with aviation logistics in Afghanistan. It seems we do not have enough space on runways to handle these large transport aircraft. It will take a massive effort to construct more landing strips that can handle the large aircraft, because unfortunately, that stuff requires modern and durable runways. In Iraq, this wasn’t an issue, but in Afghanistan this is definitely an issue. That is why I thought the STOL aircraft/paracargo contract was interesting. That is the kind of capability that can answer the call for immediate cargo or transport needs, when the troops are in trouble and things are locked up at one of the big air bases. Small and many versus the few and large for logistics. Well, check out the report and let me know what you think. –Matt
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June 25, 2010
Within Afghanistan, cargo is moved to forward operating bases primarily by means of contractor-operated trucks, though military trucking assets are used in some instances.
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Because no U.S. military transportation units operate in Pakistan, DOD must rely solely on private contractors to transport supplies and equipment along ground routes through the country and to provide security of the cargo while in transit. Privately contracted trucks can transport cargo through Pakistan via two routes: the northern, which crosses into Afghanistan at the border town of Torkham, and the southern, which crosses at the border town of Chaman.
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Limitations on what items can be transported through Pakistan and the amount of damage sustained by cargo transiting through Pakistan also can delay the delivery of necessary supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Private trucking contractors do not transport sensitive equipment on the Pakistani ground routes. Instead, such equipment must be flown into Afghanistan and then be installed onto the vehicles in Regional Command-East.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Publications: GAO Report On Afghanistan Security Environment
Let me summarize this thing for you, because this is the message I got. We sent all of these government folks over to Afghanistan, but we don’t have enough military escorts to take them around the country to implement their projects. In other words, there is a high demand for security. Where is the surge of security contractors needed to get this stuff done?
They also talk about an increase in attacks and casualties, but that is largely contributed to the idea that there are more targets for the Taliban to go after and we are now in the fighting season (spring, summer).
Now for my suggestion. If you want security and there are not enough military folks to do the job, then contract it out. Obviously security forces are at a premium there, and soldiers are kind of busy taking the fight to the enemy. If you want to get more security in that country in order to cover down on all of these projects, and do it quickly, then contract it out. I know security contractors are not the most favored choice of government these days, but honestly, they don’t have much choice in the matter if they want to do what they gotta do in Afghanistan. It’s either that, or just send all of these government employees back home because they are waste of space.
I would also recommend using expats, as opposed to using corrupt local security companies. Or combine expat companies with local security companies for security operations. Where there is a will, there is a way. Hell, you could contract out the security of an entire town if you wanted, and contractors could actually be a huge contributor to the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ portion of the COIN strategy. Leave the ‘clear’ portion of the strategy to the military, and assign what you can to the ‘hold’ forces.
One last thing, and I hate to beat a dead horse. There are plenty of reports, lessons learned, SOPs, experienced contractors, expert input, blah blah blah out there to get this done properly.(man is it tiring to continue to read about how poor government is at learning anything. pfffft) Either way, there should be no excuses for mismanagement of this ‘surge of security contractors’ into Afghanistan that I am talking about. Or we can continue to read about these people who are sitting around and doing nothing because of a lack of security for their operation. –Matt
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GAO Report On Afghanistan Security Environment
May 5, 2010
(one portion of the report below, follow link to read the rest)
Agencies Cite Security Challenges to Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan
State’s January 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy cites reconstruction and development as key elements of the overall effort to stabilize Afghanistan and reduce the strength of the insurgency. However, the strategy acknowledges that the success of such civilian programs in Afghanistan is contingent on improved security. In November 2009, we reported that while U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan had made some progress, deteriorating security complicated such efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country.
Friday, June 12, 2009
Publications: At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, By the CWC
Interesting report and check it out. The things I thought were interesting was the discussion about the TWISS2 contracts, the RUF, and the fear of repeating the same mistakes in Afghanistan. You think? pfffffft.-Matt
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At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
By the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Let the commission know what you think, click here.
Monday, November 10, 2008
Industry Talk: Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting Report
Boy, where do I start with this thing. First of all, in their panel of experts and contributors to this report, I didn’t see any security contractors? What is up with that? You would think these guys would at least bring in a couple of actual guys that have done the job out there and could give some perspective about the industry. I was never contacted about this, nor have I seen them advertise on the forums. The only names I recognized were Robert Young Pelton and David Isenberg. Pelton is a travel author who writes books about traveling to war zones, that also wrote a book about security contractors. Isenberg has a column about the industry over at UPI, and that is it for input about the industry. The rest of the panel were experts in foreign policy and other related fields. I think they would have produced a better product if they would have actually included us ‘grunts’ that have some ground truth input about the industry.
The other one that killed me about this report, is they made the suggestion that security contractors should only be used for static security posts in the war. That PSD and Convoy operations should be done by the military. Where I disagree on this, is this completely limits operational capability for the companies over there that are operating on their own. And this also rips away the military to serve civilian supply efforts. So will these civilian companies pay the military to do these services. How about for transporting employees for leave or for medical situations? Will the military provide an on call shuttle service for us civilians operating at these camps?