Feral Jundi

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

Industry Talk: Triple Canopy Awarded $159.9 Million For Afghanistan Security Services

Congrats to TC, but I have to say that I am not too interested in promoting their job for this. For the simple reason that the pay is too low and the leave schedule sucks. As it stands now, you have to work 344 days in order to get the bonus. That’s if the contract is still in place after a year. Who knows what will happen in Afghanistan a year out?

The other thing is burn out. Work is nice, but if you are working 12 hour days for 344 days out of the year, then that is a horrible schedule. For that reason, I think TC is going to have a tough time keeping this thing staffed. What I could see happening with this  is that guys use this contract as a ‘stepping stone’ contract in order to get into a better paying/better leave schedule job. Especially for those guys that have families.

In my opinion, I think this is a poorly constructed contract if these are the terms. The industry standard (in my opinion) for pay in a war zone like Afghanistan or Iraq should be more in the neighborhood $400 to $600 a day for static, to reflect the various management positions and seniority of contractors within the company. I should also note that such contracts like WPS is an excellent model for an ‘industry standard’ for pay. That is what this contract should have been modeled after, and DoS’s WPS program get’s it right in that department.

The industry standard for leave should be more around 2 to 3 months on, and about 1 month off. That is a great leave schedule, and the contract should allow some flexibility within that leave schedule to allow for emergencies and contractor personal choice. Requiring a contractor to work 344 days in a war zone is a recipe for disaster. Guys will burn out and their families will hate them for being away that long. I doubt that you will even see guys complete the contract to get the bonus, just because they will jump on the first gig that comes up with better pay and a better leave schedule. I know that is what I would do.

Even the hours worked is dumb. In my personal opinion, an 8 hour shift, working 6 days a week with one day ‘off’, is far better than a 12 hour shift 6 days a week. (especially if you are wearing kit all day long and working 344 days a year) I will also say that if this contract does lose guys because they burn out, that those left on the contract will be working a lot of hours without any days off. Just ask the AGNA guys what that is like when contractors bail ship because the company sucks or there are better gigs elsewhere. The guys that are left are the ones having to make up for a lack of manpower.

It is also a threat to the security readiness of a base, and could lead to a default on contract if there is a high attrition rate. Staffing a contract is serious business, and if folks are jumping ship because it sucks, then that has all sorts of consequence. Now imagine low staffing and low morale throughout a guard force because of being over worked, mixed with a high enemy threat or even enemy attacks?  We are not talking about security at some mall in Sandusky Ohio, we are talking about the protection of FOB’s filled with military and civilians in an active war zone, all depending upon that contracted guard force and it’s abilities.

In other words, this contract will have issues. That’s too bad, because I thought the Marines would have been smarter about this, and especially when they had more choice in the formation of this ‘best value’ contract. They should have asked this community what an appropriate contract would look like, and it just seems to me like they created another TWISS-like contract. Too bad…

The other thing I was curious about is if Triple Canopy gets paid for every guy they train?  Meaning when they train a contractor for this gig, they bill the government all the relevant costs. Why this matters is if the contract sucks and is set up to be a revolving door contract for guys, then TC will have to train up more contractors to keep it staffed. So what is TC’s incentive for training these guys and keeping them on the contract in Afghanistan? If anything, they benefit from a contract where contractors ‘don’t’ stick around so they can keep charging the government for training.

Which brings up another crucial point. When you set up a revolving door contract like this, then you lose something that is absolutely vital to organizations and security in war zones. Unit cohesion. Imagine being on a contract where no one sticks around? Where a new contractor shows up every week, or the management jumps ship every other week? Talk about instability. lol So basically you will have a contract where folks are constantly adjusting to new people, and all along you will have the security of a FOB to focus on. How can you trust the guy to the left and right of you, if A. you don’t know who they are and B.you don’t know if they will be there from week to week.

Unit cohesion is so hard to create in a company anyways, but if the contract itself does not lend itself towards making contractors happy and keeping them on the gig, then you can kiss any kind of unit cohesion good bye. And actually, that will be a cause of internal problems. I dare any military unit to try the same thing in a war zone, and see what the end result becomes. And this is what you want protecting these bases?

I sometimes wonder if the military should be setting up these contracts in the first place. How is it that the federal government understands how to set up these things (like WPS), but the military does not?  Could it be that the military purposely constructs poor contracts because contractors are the competition? What incentive do the Marines have in constructing a contract where a company that comes in to replace their Marine force, does a better job than that Marine force– because the contract lends itself to success?  Why would they want that company to be successful, and ‘show them up’?  Food for thought when it comes to the public versus private discussion about this industry, and when it comes to the principal-agent problem.

Finally, it is very simple to understand the game here. You find the industry standard within that war zone, and you stick to that standard. If you want to lose people and could care less about the quality of the contract/services, then by all means set up your contract below that industry standard. Go cheap, pay peanuts, and get your monkey’s.

On the other hand, if you want to attract the best of the best within an industry, then you need to offer incentives that are ‘better’ than the industry standard. And if you want a best value contract that has some degree of stability, then match what the industry standard is, choose a good reputable company, and manage it well. That is my thoughts on the matter. –Matt

 

Triple Canopy Awarded $159.9m for Afghanistan Security Services
By DOD
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
Triple Canopy, Reston, Va., was awarded a $159,972,048 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the security services in Afghanistan. Work will be performed in Afghanistan, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 26, 2017. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with eight bids received.  The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (W560MY-12-C-0002).
Link to news here.
—————————————————————
From thread at SOCNET Forum
@camp leatherneck
$200 daily
6-12 hr days a week with the possibility for more hours
(1) 21 day leave period
12k bonus for contract completion
2 week train up on TC site followed by deployment @camp lejune
—————————————————————
From Triple Canopy’s Career section–Afghan Guard, Afghanistan
Position Responsibilities
-Act as armed security officer
-Responsible for internal security shift
-Perform unarmed screener duties by searching visitors, their vehicles and their belongings. Screeners will be proficient utilizing hand-held metal detectors, walk-through metal detectors and High throughput personnel inspection systems.
-Possess the capacity to acquire a good working knowledge of all aspects of contract security
-Must satisfactorily complete all Government required (and supplied) training and certifications prior to employment
Essential Skills and Experience
-US Citizen
-Must have a valid US Driver’s License and US Tourist Passport
-Honorable discharge from the military (if applicable)
-Able and willing to DEPLOY for one (1) year with one (1) 21-day R&R rotation
-Posses or be able to obtain a DOD Secret Level Clearance.
-Be at least 25 years of age
-Posses one (1) year of Military/ Police experience to include the use of personnel and vehicle security screening devices.
-Preferred security experience in the Middle East region.
-Possess a certificate of successful completion of a basic or advanced security guard training and certification program administered or recognized by the Government or professional organizations
-Must have no felony or domestic violence conviction. Record of recent recurring misdemeanors may adversely impact candidate’s suitability rating
-Employment with Triple Canopy is contingent upon a favorable background check to Include no serious financial problems in the past seven (7) years
Physical Demands and Work Environment
Able to perform internal security guard services, at any potential internal security posting, for 12 hours, while donning all required personal protective gear.

Friday, February 10, 2012

Afghanistan: Private Security Transition To The APPF Looking Messy…. And Dangerous

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 6:22 AM

Companies have long hired private guards precisely because they don’t trust the Afghan police to protect them in a crisis. The United Nations used Afghan police to guard its staff housing until an 2009 attack on a residential hotel in which Taliban assailants quickly made it past police guards and killed five U.N. staffers. The U.N. has since increased its security to include foreign guards.
Afghans working with APPF have gone so far as to urge the business licensing agency to “stop stalling the process,” according to a letter sent to U.S. government officials by a development company and obtained by the AP.

I posted two relevant stories below about Afghanistan and contractors. The first is this joke of a plan about replacing all PSC’s with the government force called the APPF.  Although according to the article below, it doesn’t look like it will happen on time, that the forces are not being properly trained and prepared, that the various clients they serve will have very little to say about the quality or conduct, and the best part, it will be more expensive. So some deal this APPF will be for those clients in Afghanistan that have to use them. lol

And as budgets for aid projects are decreasing, the APPF program is likely to increase security costs substantially.
An APPF guard will cost at least $770 a month, according to an AP analysis of official government figures, while private security providers contacted for this story say they usually charge $510-$630 a month per guard.
To avoid pay cuts for guards, individual companies will have to supplement salaries. And any costs for RMC managers will be on top of this. Once these expenses are figured in, security costs could easily double under the APPF.

The second article below is about all of the incidents over the years of Afghan troops, police or PSC’s that were either mentally insane or the enemy, and killed their western partners. The quote up top is from the first article, and the proof of how many incidents is in the second article.

Supposedly friendly Afghan security forces have attacked U.S. and coalition troops 45 times since May 2007, U.S. officials say, for the first time laying out details and analysis of attacks that have killed 70 and wounded 110.

Oh yeah, that is an assuring statistic. And this second article really didn’t get into all the attacks against contractors, but hey, I guess we don’t count?

All I know is that the APPF is going to be one hell of a money making machine for Karzai, and one hell of a headache for those clients being forced to use them. –Matt

 

Afghan private security handover looking messy
By HEIDI VOGT
February 10, 2012
The push by Afghanistan’s president to nationalize legions of private security guards before the end of March is encouraging corruption and jeopardizing multibillion-dollar aid projects, according to companies trying to make the switch.
President Hamid Karzai has railed for years against the large number of guns-for-hire in Afghanistan, saying private security companies skirt the law and risk becoming militias. He ordered them abolished in 2009 and eventually set March 20 of this year as the deadline for everyone except NATO and diplomatic missions to switch to government-provided security.
Afghan officials are rushing to meet the cutoff with the help of NATO advisers. But with fewer than six weeks to go, it’s likely that many components will still be missing on March 20. And even once everything falls into place, higher costs and issues of authority over the government guards will remain.
The change imperils billions of dollars of aid flowing into Afghanistan, particularly from the United States. In a country beset by insurgent attacks and suicide bombings, the private development companies that implement most of the U.S. aid agency’s programs employ private guards to protect compounds, serve as armed escorts and guard construction sites.
On March 21, approximately 11,000 guards now working for private security firms will become government employees as members of the Afghan Public Protection Force, or APPF. They will still be working in the same place with the same job. Except now they’ll answer to the Interior Ministry.
“We don’t want to have security gaps. This is really important to our customers and to us,” said the head of the APPF, Deputy Minister Jamal Abdul Naser Sidiqi. It will happen, he says, because the presidential order says it has to.

(more…)

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Iraq: US Embassy Staff Might Be Reduced, And Iraq Continues To Hassle PSC’s

Approved movements have been subject to stops, detentions and confiscation of equipment without justification, impacting delivery of equipment, supplies, and materials to the US embassy, bases and offices throughout the country,” said the letter, a copy of which was obtained by AFP.
The Congressional Research Service said last May that the State Department estimated the number of security contractors working for it in Iraq would reach 5,500, “with some 1,500 providing personal security for diplomatic movements and an additional 4,000 providing perimeter security.”
Brooks said “our hope is that the US government will be a bit more proactive,” as the government and embassy, in “our impression, has not been very active in trying to help the Iraqis address this problem.

This first story below is from the New York Times, so take it with a grain of salt. lol And of course as soon as it came out, an edit was made that showed that the NYT jumped the gun a little on this. With that said, it is wise that if you are in WPS (mobile or static security), or one of the numerous contractors assigned to do convoy operations for logistics, then it pays to pay attention to this stuff.

The second story just emphasizes what Iraq is doing to security companies as they try to operate there. If the Embassy can’t get supplies, then point the finger at Iraq for holding up those convoys at the border or for hassling security contractors about paper work/visas/licenses that Iraq has failed provide or update.

In short, things in Iraq are getting a little dicey now that the troops are gone, and the US mission there is having to adjust to this new environment. This was to be expected and there will be many hiccups along the way. The US is also experiencing economic issues and an upcoming election. So cost savings will be a factor, and reducing waste in our overseas operations will be necessary if the current administration wants to show it is serious about saving money (and getting re-elected as a result).

But this administration does not want a failed Iraq mission under it’s belt. They have already cut the troops from Iraq earlier than expected, which is not the smartest thing strategically, but it makes sense politically. But cutting security will only add one more planet into alignment for a really bad situation or situations that could truly stain a political campaign. Security should be the last thing you mess with, and especially in that chaotic and extremely dangerous environment.

There is also politics and corruption in Iraq that is impacting operations. A visa or license or whatever is required for the companies to operate can be a simple and fair process if Iraq wants these companies there. Or it can be a complex and unfair process if these officials have other things in mind. Maybe they are looking for kickbacks, and purposely targeting foreign companies so that Iraq companies are able to secure all of this work. Especially for supplying the embassy, or for oil related security contracts. (Strategy Page is echoing the same thing in their post about PSC’s in Iraq and the Embassy)

Perhaps this was a concession when the Sunni-bloc came back in to join parliament? Perhaps there is a focus on attacking logistics using government and political mechanisms, so that the Embassy is forced to reduce in size so it can be weaker for an attack. Or get more Iraqis involved with working at the Embassy, so as to get more spies or even attackers on the inside?

Who knows? All I know is that there is a reason why Iraq is doing this, and that reason often revolves around money or extortion of some sort. Meaning ‘if you do this, maybe we will do this’. We see the same thing happening in Afghanistan, and maybe Iraq is taking notes from the Afghans on how to play the US. It is ironic to me that we have the largest Embassies in the world in both countries, have expended much American/Coalition blood and treasure in both countries, and yet simple matters like visas, licenses or even a MOU or SOFA cannot be worked out? That corruption in these countries is trumping our so-called ‘diplomatic’ missions there. Certainly we can do better and get better for what has been invested.

The other thing I wanted to mention is that there is a third party that has a say so in this matter. That would be the insurgents and jihadists in Iraq who are in the shadows and doing all they can to attack Iraq and the US mission there. You also have Iran doing what they can to exert influence. You can slash the staff at the Embassy, but the security requirement to protect that Embassy does not change. That’s unless the grounds of the Embassy are slashed as well and given back to the Iraqis.

But as you give up more ground, then that gives more ground to the enemy so they can maneuver closer for attacks. If patrols in the area decrease, then that means the enemy can launch more mortars/rockets, drive more VBIED’s, or use more suicide assaulters. So security is still essential and will be even more important as you give up more territory.

I could see the mobile side of WPS decreasing a little, but not by much. If there is still going to be 1,000 diplomats as opposed to 2,000 diplomats (if they are halved according to the article), then those 1,000 will still have to do their missions in Iraq. Or does state plan on never leaving their Embassy?

We could also have an extremely small footprint in Iraq, and bring it on par with the size of other Embassies in the world. But there are a couple of issues that are front and center for the US, which to me justifies a presence there. Oil, Iran, Jihadists and the continuing collapse of regimes in the Middle East because of the Arab Spring (Syria comes to mind). If we can keep Iraq functioning and focused on their oil goals, and goals for their nation’s well being, then that is a good thing. How many diplomats that takes and how we do that is out of my lane. But these are considerations when we think about why we are there.

Now the one thing that looked like it was getting a look for cuts was the police training contract, and that would also include all the logistics required for that. So that might be a big savings and reduction right there.

One State Department program that is likely to be scrutinized is an ambitious program to train the Iraqi police, which is costing about $500 million this year — far less than the nearly $1 billion that the embassy originally intended to spend. The program has generated considerable skepticism within the State Department — one of the officials interviewed predicted that the program could be scrapped later this year — because of the high cost of the support staff, the inability of police advisers to leave their bases because of the volatile security situation and a lack of support by the Iraqi government.

Interesting stuff and I would like to hear what you guys think? Either way, I will keep my eye on this as it develops. –Matt

Edit: 02/10/2012- It looks like State is trying to clarify a little more as to what they plan on doing. Here is a quote below. Also be sure to follow Diplopundit’s take on the whole thing, because they are also questioning the security cuts (if made), and who would step in as replacements (maybe Iraqi security?). I doubt they would go this path and DoS is not about to put the lives of it’s diplomats at the hands of Iraqi security forces….quite yet.

The State Department has asked each component of the massive U.S. diplomatic mission in Baghdad to analyze how a 25 percent cut would affect operations, part of a rapidly moving attempt to save money and establish what a top official on Wednesday called “a more normalized embassy presence.”
“We’re going to be looking at how we’re going to do that over the next year,” said Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides. “What we’re not going to do is make knee-jerk decisions” that could jeopardize the security of the thousands of U.S. citizens working in Iraq, he said.

 

US Embassy in Iraq.

 

U.S. Planning to Slash Iraq Embassy Staff by as Much as Half
By TIM ARANGO
February 7, 2012
Less than two months after American troops left, the State Department is preparing to slash by as much as half the enormous diplomatic presence it had planned for Iraq, a sharp sign of declining American influence in the country.
Officials in Baghdad and Washington said that Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and other senior State Department officials were reconsidering the size and scope of the embassy, where the staff has swelled to nearly 16,000 people, mostly contractors.
The expansive diplomatic operation and the $750 million embassy building, the largest of its kind in the world, were billed as necessary to nurture a postwar Iraq on its shaky path to democracy and establish normal relations between two countries linked by blood and mutual suspicion. But the Americans have been frustrated by what they see as Iraqi obstructionism and are now largely confined to the embassy because of security concerns, unable to interact enough with ordinary Iraqis to justify the $6 billion annual price tag.

(more…)

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Publications: Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 1st Quarter FY 2012

Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 1st Quarter FY 2012

Friday, January 20, 2012

Industry Talk: Body Of UK Security Contractor Turned Over To Embassy In Iraq

The family can now get some closure and I am glad someone had the respect enough to finally hand over the body. It also looks like these captors killed him and his fellow guards as they were trying to escape. Back in those days, kidnapping usually turned into death by head cutting, and I am sure that is what was going through these guy’s minds at the time of escape. Rest in peace to the fallen and my heart goes out to the families and friends. –Matt

 

Alan McMenemy.

Body of UK hostage turned over to embassy in Iraq
January 20, 2012
The body of a British hostage kidnapped in Iraq in 2007 has been turned over to the U.K. Embassy in Baghdad, officials said Friday.
Alan McMenemy was one of five men kidnapped by Shiite militants in a daytime attack outside Baghdad’s Finance Ministry. McMenemy was part of a security detail guarding computer expert Peter Moore, who was released alive in 2010.
The bodies of the other bodyguards — Jason Swindlehurst, Jason Creswell and Alec MacLachlan — were returned in 2009.
British Prime Minister David Cameron said in a statement Friday that his thoughts were with McMenemy’s family and friends.
“They have waited so long for his return and I hope that this will allow them to find some peace after an ordeal that no family should ever have to suffer,” Cameron said.
The statement did not provide any detail as to how or under what circumstances McMenemy’s body was returned. He was long believed to be dead, and a second statement released on behalf of McMenemy’s widow Roseleen said that his body’s return “will allow us to properly grieve for him … we will draw some comfort from the fact that we have him home at last.”
Story here.

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