Feral Jundi

Monday, May 10, 2010

Iraq: The Forgotten Four–South Africans Kidnapped In 2006 But Families Still Wait

     Pierre Durant, her brother-in-law, believes that he is the only person still actively looking for the men, who were seized at a rogue police checkpoint in the north east of the Iraqi capital on December 10, 2006. He has travelled to Iraq eight times to hunt for clues and to attempt to put pressure on the authorities to investigate the case. At one point in the past year he managed to speak to his brother on a mobile phone, raising hopes of a resolution, but the trail has since run cold.

    Mr Durant, 42, and other close relatives of the four hostages contacted by The Times, appealed to the kidnappers to show mercy. “We as a family are not looking for justice or retribution,” Mr Durant said. “If these guys are alive then we want to negotiate for their release. If they’ve been killed then I just want their bodies back so we can try to get on with our lives.”

*****

   I was working as a security contractor with a different company back then when this happened, and at the time there were numerous kidnappings of contractors going on. Crescent Security was another company that was impacted by this type of assault.  The one thing that all of us thought about while running the roads back then was ‘Don’t trust anyone (Iraqi police officers or soldiers)’. Because at the time, the enemy was playing like they were cops or soldiers and doing all sorts of things under that cover. I still don’t trust any of these guys, and that is the reality of war zone work.

    The same thing is playing out in Afghanistan, with the Taliban or extremists dressing up like cops or soldiers and using that as a cover to get in close to their targets or use it like camouflage in a forest of chaos they create during the assault. Nothing new in the history of warfare, and today’s enemies are carrying on the tradition. It is the enemy’s version of pseudo operations, and it works.

   My other point I wanted to make is the good work and sacrifice that South Africans have given in this war.  I should certainly hope that if any leaders in the DoS or DoD is reading this, that your involvement in trying to secure the release of these men, would be much appreciated.  Contractors are the ones that put their lives on the line for you and your equipment, the least you can do is show some humanity and compassion and use some resources to find these guys and secure their release.

    Bravo to Pierre for keeping up the search and not giving up. My heart goes out to the family and friends, and I certainly hope this ends well and these men get released. –Matt

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South Africans who were kidnapped.

Three years on, and no ransom demands have been made for Hardus Greef, left, Johann Enslin and their colleagues.

The forgotten four: kidnapped in 2006 but families still wait

May 7, 2010

Deborah Haynes

No one knows whether they are dead or alive. The families of four South African men kidnapped in Baghdad in 2006 are desperate for news of their loved ones — but fear that their plight has been forgotten, at home and in Iraq.

Unlike the case of the recently freed British hostage Peter Moore and his four guards — three died and one is missing — no one has claimed responsibility for the South African hostage taking.

No video has emerged and no ransom or political demands have been made. Instead, the families of Andre Durant, Johann Enslin, Callie Scheepers and Hardus Greef, all security guards, have endured 3½ years of unanswered questions and silence.

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Thursday, April 29, 2010

Strategy: Van Creveld, Nagl, Bacevich, Hammes, Echevarria–All Star Strategy Conference

Filed under: Cool Stuff,Strategy,Video — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:26 AM

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Law Enforcement: Broken Window Theory, By George L. Kelling

    Consider a building with a few broken windows. If the windows are not repaired, the tendency is for vandals to break a few more windows. Eventually, they may even break into the building, and if it’s unoccupied, perhaps become squatters or light fires inside.

    Or consider a sidewalk. Some litter accumulates. Soon, more litter accumulates. Eventually, people even start leaving bags of trash from take-out restaurants there or breaking into cars.

    A successful strategy for preventing vandalism, say the book’s authors, is to fix the problems when they are small. Repair the broken windows within a short time, say, a day or a week, and the tendency is that vandals are much less likely to break more windows or do further damage. Clean up the sidewalk every day, and the tendency is for litter not to accumulate (or for the rate of littering to be much less). Problems do not escalate and thus respectable residents do not flee a neighborhood.

    The theory thus makes two major claims: that further petty crime and low-level anti-social behavior will be deterred, and that major crime will, as a result, be prevented. Criticism of the theory has tended to focus only on the latter claim. 

****

   If you ever hear the whole ‘broken windows theory‘ being thrown around in discussions about law enforcement and reducing crime, this is the origins of the idea.  George Kelling wrote this article below, and also has a book that further expands upon the ideas called Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities. So I wanted to put this out there for the readership, because I believe that parts of this theory, if not the general idea of it, could definitely be applied to our industry.

   A really basic way to apply this theory to our industry, is the management of your person and your position/post at whatever contract you are at.  Will others have less respect for your post and your job, if they see that your post or even you is in complete disarray(broken window)? First impressions make lasting impressions, and if your post or you looks sloppy or looks unorganized, then will others feel more inclined to disrespect your post or ‘break another window’?  It is an interesting idea that I often come back to when I think about the defense or crime.

   Take it a step further.  If a town or city in a war zone, was organized and sharp looking, complete with defenses that actually look impressive, will an enemy or even bandits be less inclined to attack it?  If a ‘jundi’ in Iraq is manning a position at a site, and the sand bags are all leaking out and the gun is covered in rust and dirt, and trash is all over the post, would insurgents be more inclined to pick that post to focus a coordinated assault with? (you could also use this to your advantage for a ‘counter’ strategy–hidden surprises anyone?)

   How about for minimizing crime in war zones?  Obviously law enforcement is weakened in war zones, because these officers are busy with a lot of stuff. (like not getting killed).  If there is not an effort to clean up the bullet holes, or fix the windows, or repair the homes that are damaged by war, will criminals naturally feel like they can get away with anything?  That no one in the community cares about their community, and that they could easily be manipulated by criminals imposing their will?  Interesting stuff, and I would like to hear what you think about Broken Window Theory, as it applies to CONUS or OCONUS? –Matt

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Broken Windows

March 1982

The police and neighborhood safety

By George L. Kelling

In the mid-l970s The State of New Jersey announced a “Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program,” designed to improve the quality of community life in twenty-eight cities. As part of that program, the state provided money to help cities take police officers out of their patrol cars and assign them to walking beats. The governor and other state officials were enthusiastic about using foot patrol as a way of cutting crime, but many police chiefs were skeptical. Foot patrol, in their eyes, had been pretty much discredited. It reduced the mobility of the police, who thus had difficulty responding to citizen calls for service, and it weakened headquarters control over patrol officers.

Many police officers also disliked foot patrol, but for different reasons: it was hard work, it kept them outside on cold, rainy nights, and it reduced their chances for making a “good pinch.” In some departments, assigning officers to foot patrol had been used as a form of punishment. And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates; it was, in the opinion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along.

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Monday, April 26, 2010

Strategy: The Defense Of Farms And Ranches

Filed under: Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 4:10 AM

   This is a good little post on a subject you don’t hear much about, yet is pretty important to today’s ranchers and farmers along the border with Mexico, or to farmers who are caught in the middle of conflicts throughout the world.  If you look at farms and ranches as a strategic asset of a nation, as do many nations throughout the world do, then defending such places becomes pretty important.  The food of a country comes from these farms, as does the vitality of the economy of some countries.  If an enemy is attacking farms, or soldiers from other wars are crossing a border and raiding farms in order to survive or smuggle weapons or drugs, then that is a direct threat to a nation’s vital resource and citizens. It must be addressed, if a country cares about protecting this economic asset.

   One of the big problems with defending farms and ranches, is the size of the operation.  Ideally a government would help in the defense of these businesses, but for some nations, it just isn’t feasible.  Cost might be a factor, or a lack of manpower might be another factor.  Even politics can limit how much help these farmers and ranchers can get (like with the Mexico/U.S. immigration problem, and the politics that surround that)

   All of that aside, the farmer or rancher still has to protect their land and business (and their lives), and that task becomes increasingly more challenging when that farm is located in a war zone.  Think of the farmers in Iraq or Afghanistan whom have had to deal with the war, and grow food or raise animals at the same time?  Or think about what the Rhodesian farmers had to deal with when it came to cattle thieves and ‘terrs’ attacking farms for food or loot? They implemented Bright Light operations, along with using range detectives, as part of their farm defense strategies. Their solutions to the problems were very interesting to say the least.

    The Israelis had a similar problem when trying to defend their farms, and the Haganah was their answer. I even talked about US ranchers and farmers dealing with thieves, indians and competitors during the Range Wars in the US back in the 1800’s.  All of these historical incidents required protecting farms and ranches, and there just isn’t a lot out there for farmers and ranchers to refer to for the defense.

   The latest drug war in Mexico spilling over the border and impacting farms and ranches in the US is also another reason why we should talk about this.  When ranchers are getting killed by armed thugs along the border, and the US is not providing enough man power or resources to protect these farms and ranches, well then discussions about the defense of farms becomes pretty relevant.

   Farms and Ranches are also a target for terrorism, and biowarfare attacks against food and livestock is a concern.  It takes planning and resources to ensure these vital national assets are getting the protection they need.  There are also problems with drugs on farms, with individuals trying to grow marijuana on crop and range lands, with the hopes that the farmer will not notice or worse yet, turn a blind eye because they fear the growers/criminals.

   So with that said, let me start off the conversation with a fascinating post at the Small Wars Council about the subject.  I provided a link, so if you would like to further research or contact the author of the original post, you can do so.  Also I would like to thank Cannoneer #4 for bringing this stuff up to my attention, and he has an excellent blog post about such things.

    I know one thing, having tracking skills along with some kind of combat arms background, would be a big help in the defense of these farms and ranches. Especially if farmers start contracting range detectives for such a thing. If the readership has any more resources for the defense of farms and ranches, go ahead and post that in the comments section or I will add it as an edit. –Matt

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A Farmer At War

By Trevor Grundy and Bernard Miller

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Rhodesian Farmers Defensive Arrangements

(from the Small Wars Council forum)

 I knew many Rhodesian farmers and have visited many farmsteads over the years. At every farm, defensive arrangements were made up to suit their particular situation and infrastructure. The following would be a general overview:

 1. Most farmers fitted hand-grenade grills to the outside of all windows. Doors leading outside were likewise security grilled.

 2. Many farmers built thick walls about a meter in front of bedroom windows to stop bullets, but particularly to deal with RPG 7`s. Beds were never placed against the outside walls of a farmhouse.

 3. It was usual to have a designated safe room within the farmhouse that could be defended until support arrived. Sometimes this was a central corridor that allowed the farmer to move into other rooms to attack those outside through the windows. In the loft or ceiling over the safe room, some farmers laid sand bags to deal with possible mortar attack.

4. Every farmhouse in a given area was linked by a radio system called “Agric Alert”. This allowed radio contact with other farmers who formed their own defence units, usually under the umbrella of PATU (Police Anti-Terrorist Unit), which would react to a call from one of their neighbours for assistance. Another means of alarm raising was the use of a signal rocket – The Agric-Alert system was not done away with after the war, such was the lack of trust in Mugabe`s promises. It performed admirably as well when dealing with criminal activity such as stock theft. The alert system arranged for all farmers to check in with each other at a given time in the morning and evening as a means of monitoring their status.

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Saturday, April 24, 2010

Publications: RAND–How Insurgencies End, By Ben Connable

The RAND study found:

Modern insurgencies last approximately 10 years and the government’s chances of winning increase slightly over time.

Withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat, while inconsistent or impartial support to either side generally presages defeat.

Pseudo-democracies do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing. 

*****

   This first story and introduction from RAND is a run down of the conclusions of the study.  What I like about studies like this, is that they draw upon a wide array of past insurgencies, and it tries to find patterns and consensus. That is good, and we should be learning from these insurgencies.

   The last point up top in the quote, is the one I am concerned with. Can we do this with a weak government?  Or can we do business with the tribes and local leadership of cities and towns until we get a good government in place?  The article below points out that it is possible to do this without a strong government, but it certainly does not help the effort.  Check it out. –Matt

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Study highlights problems for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan

Ben Arnoldy

April 23, 2010

NEW DELHI — While current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan broadly conforms to historical best practices, the Taliban have a number of advantages that have produced insurgent success in the past, according to a new study of 89 past and ongoing insurgencies worldwide.

The factors that favor the Taliban include receiving sanctuary and support in another country, learning to be more discriminating in their attacks and fighting a government that’s weak and reliant on direct external support.

The historical trends suggest that the Taliban’s Achilles heel would be the loss of their Pakistani sanctuary, while the principal American vulnerability is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s weak pseudo democracy.

The study, said the author, cannot be predictive, but it can help the U.S. address or exploit these vulnerabilities.

“A lot of the things being done in the current (U.S. military) plan are along the lines of successful things we’ve seen in the study,” said Ben Connable, the lead author of “How Insurgencies End,” published by the RAND Corp. in Washington.

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