Thanks to David Isenberg for identifying this report and pointing out all the goodies. What was interesting to me was how absolutely vital contractors are to the logistics of the war in Afghanistan. Especially for the routes coming out of Pakistan, because US military forces are not allowed to escort that stuff. Nothing new, but as you go through this report, you get the idea of how essential we really are. It also signifies how important it is that we get a handle on how to manage it all, because logistics is going to be big…. really big.
Some of the things that jumped up at me as obvious fixes for some of the problems, is to stop depending on Fedex type tracking measures and gadgets, and start depending on humans as the tracking mechanism of this stuff. Because Afghan and Pakistani companies will do all they can to get rid of those GPS trackers, or not even care about these tracking mechanisms. What matters to them is money and their ability to pilfer the cargo and blame it on a combat loss or whatever. No one is there to stop them or witness them doing this, and they will do whatever they want. I say put competent expat companies in charge of these deliveries, with expat convoy leaders and teams, and use local Pakistani or Afghani drivers and guards as the manpower/interpreters. This is the optimum set up if you cannot use the military to escort this stuff, and especially on the Pakistan side.
The point is, is that you need a human that you can trust on these convoys, because gadgets can be defeated. But you also need something else that is lacking for these convoys. And that is communications, appropriate fire power and support. In order to have communications, appropriate fire power and support, you need folks who can help facilitate that. Because without these basic tools for the defense of convoys, you will continue to see them get attacked and pilfered.
As more troops pour into Afghanistan, the stability of logistics will be crucial and the current set up is unacceptable. I say put expat companies in charge, set up Pakistani QRFs and air support on their side, and US military QRF and air support on the Afghan side, and call it a day. These forces are purely dedicated to protecting the contractor led convoys in Pakistan, and if we want, we attach military escorts as they cross into Afghanistan. Hell, we might actually kill a few bad guys along the way, and use these convoys as decoys. If the enemy wants them that bad, they will have to pay a price to get them.
Or we can allow our logistics to be torn apart by the enemy, and we can allow untrained, mismanaged, corrupt and undisciplined Afghani or Pakistani companies to do whatever they want with that stuff. They will continue to pilfer, they will continue to shoot wildly into towns and villages as they protect convoys, and they will continue to pay off the enemy for safe transport. That is unacceptable to me, and there is a better way.
Might I also add that we put expat companies in charge of convoys in Iraq, and that arrangement works far better for any kind of unity of effort between civilian and military forces sharing the roads. Companies like Armorgroup definitely bet their lives on the delivery of goods and people, and they did an outstanding job(they also lost a lot of guys due to their brave work). Our lessons learned from Iraq were also built on this concept of expats being in charge, and not the other way around with Afghanis or Pakistani companies in charge of this stuff.
Hell, in Iraq, you would see military convoys join in the protection of a expat convoy operations. But when it came to all Iraqi security companies, military convoys or patrols would have nothing to do with them because they had no way of communicating and they really didn’t trust them. It pays to have expats in charge of operations, and it really pays when those expats have all the tools and support necessary to be successful for those convoy operations.
I also mentioned in an earlier post about the aviation side of logistics. The report further emphasized the difficulties that come with aviation logistics in Afghanistan. It seems we do not have enough space on runways to handle these large transport aircraft. It will take a massive effort to construct more landing strips that can handle the large aircraft, because unfortunately, that stuff requires modern and durable runways. In Iraq, this wasn’t an issue, but in Afghanistan this is definitely an issue. That is why I thought the STOL aircraft/paracargo contract was interesting. That is the kind of capability that can answer the call for immediate cargo or transport needs, when the troops are in trouble and things are locked up at one of the big air bases. Small and many versus the few and large for logistics. Well, check out the report and let me know what you think. –Matt
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June 25, 2010
Within Afghanistan, cargo is moved to forward operating bases primarily by means of contractor-operated trucks, though military trucking assets are used in some instances.
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Because no U.S. military transportation units operate in Pakistan, DOD must rely solely on private contractors to transport supplies and equipment along ground routes through the country and to provide security of the cargo while in transit. Privately contracted trucks can transport cargo through Pakistan via two routes: the northern, which crosses into Afghanistan at the border town of Torkham, and the southern, which crosses at the border town of Chaman.
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Limitations on what items can be transported through Pakistan and the amount of damage sustained by cargo transiting through Pakistan also can delay the delivery of necessary supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Private trucking contractors do not transport sensitive equipment on the Pakistani ground routes. Instead, such equipment must be flown into Afghanistan and then be installed onto the vehicles in Regional Command-East.
