Feral Jundi

Monday, April 26, 2010

Strategy: The Defense Of Farms And Ranches

Filed under: Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 4:10 AM

   This is a good little post on a subject you don’t hear much about, yet is pretty important to today’s ranchers and farmers along the border with Mexico, or to farmers who are caught in the middle of conflicts throughout the world.  If you look at farms and ranches as a strategic asset of a nation, as do many nations throughout the world do, then defending such places becomes pretty important.  The food of a country comes from these farms, as does the vitality of the economy of some countries.  If an enemy is attacking farms, or soldiers from other wars are crossing a border and raiding farms in order to survive or smuggle weapons or drugs, then that is a direct threat to a nation’s vital resource and citizens. It must be addressed, if a country cares about protecting this economic asset.

   One of the big problems with defending farms and ranches, is the size of the operation.  Ideally a government would help in the defense of these businesses, but for some nations, it just isn’t feasible.  Cost might be a factor, or a lack of manpower might be another factor.  Even politics can limit how much help these farmers and ranchers can get (like with the Mexico/U.S. immigration problem, and the politics that surround that)

   All of that aside, the farmer or rancher still has to protect their land and business (and their lives), and that task becomes increasingly more challenging when that farm is located in a war zone.  Think of the farmers in Iraq or Afghanistan whom have had to deal with the war, and grow food or raise animals at the same time?  Or think about what the Rhodesian farmers had to deal with when it came to cattle thieves and ‘terrs’ attacking farms for food or loot? They implemented Bright Light operations, along with using range detectives, as part of their farm defense strategies. Their solutions to the problems were very interesting to say the least.

    The Israelis had a similar problem when trying to defend their farms, and the Haganah was their answer. I even talked about US ranchers and farmers dealing with thieves, indians and competitors during the Range Wars in the US back in the 1800’s.  All of these historical incidents required protecting farms and ranches, and there just isn’t a lot out there for farmers and ranchers to refer to for the defense.

   The latest drug war in Mexico spilling over the border and impacting farms and ranches in the US is also another reason why we should talk about this.  When ranchers are getting killed by armed thugs along the border, and the US is not providing enough man power or resources to protect these farms and ranches, well then discussions about the defense of farms becomes pretty relevant.

   Farms and Ranches are also a target for terrorism, and biowarfare attacks against food and livestock is a concern.  It takes planning and resources to ensure these vital national assets are getting the protection they need.  There are also problems with drugs on farms, with individuals trying to grow marijuana on crop and range lands, with the hopes that the farmer will not notice or worse yet, turn a blind eye because they fear the growers/criminals.

   So with that said, let me start off the conversation with a fascinating post at the Small Wars Council about the subject.  I provided a link, so if you would like to further research or contact the author of the original post, you can do so.  Also I would like to thank Cannoneer #4 for bringing this stuff up to my attention, and he has an excellent blog post about such things.

    I know one thing, having tracking skills along with some kind of combat arms background, would be a big help in the defense of these farms and ranches. Especially if farmers start contracting range detectives for such a thing. If the readership has any more resources for the defense of farms and ranches, go ahead and post that in the comments section or I will add it as an edit. –Matt

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A Farmer At War

By Trevor Grundy and Bernard Miller

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Rhodesian Farmers Defensive Arrangements

(from the Small Wars Council forum)

 I knew many Rhodesian farmers and have visited many farmsteads over the years. At every farm, defensive arrangements were made up to suit their particular situation and infrastructure. The following would be a general overview:

 1. Most farmers fitted hand-grenade grills to the outside of all windows. Doors leading outside were likewise security grilled.

 2. Many farmers built thick walls about a meter in front of bedroom windows to stop bullets, but particularly to deal with RPG 7`s. Beds were never placed against the outside walls of a farmhouse.

 3. It was usual to have a designated safe room within the farmhouse that could be defended until support arrived. Sometimes this was a central corridor that allowed the farmer to move into other rooms to attack those outside through the windows. In the loft or ceiling over the safe room, some farmers laid sand bags to deal with possible mortar attack.

4. Every farmhouse in a given area was linked by a radio system called “Agric Alert”. This allowed radio contact with other farmers who formed their own defence units, usually under the umbrella of PATU (Police Anti-Terrorist Unit), which would react to a call from one of their neighbours for assistance. Another means of alarm raising was the use of a signal rocket – The Agric-Alert system was not done away with after the war, such was the lack of trust in Mugabe`s promises. It performed admirably as well when dealing with criminal activity such as stock theft. The alert system arranged for all farmers to check in with each other at a given time in the morning and evening as a means of monitoring their status.

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Saturday, April 24, 2010

Publications: RAND–How Insurgencies End, By Ben Connable

The RAND study found:

Modern insurgencies last approximately 10 years and the government’s chances of winning increase slightly over time.

Withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat, while inconsistent or impartial support to either side generally presages defeat.

Pseudo-democracies do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing. 

*****

   This first story and introduction from RAND is a run down of the conclusions of the study.  What I like about studies like this, is that they draw upon a wide array of past insurgencies, and it tries to find patterns and consensus. That is good, and we should be learning from these insurgencies.

   The last point up top in the quote, is the one I am concerned with. Can we do this with a weak government?  Or can we do business with the tribes and local leadership of cities and towns until we get a good government in place?  The article below points out that it is possible to do this without a strong government, but it certainly does not help the effort.  Check it out. –Matt

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Study highlights problems for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan

Ben Arnoldy

April 23, 2010

NEW DELHI — While current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan broadly conforms to historical best practices, the Taliban have a number of advantages that have produced insurgent success in the past, according to a new study of 89 past and ongoing insurgencies worldwide.

The factors that favor the Taliban include receiving sanctuary and support in another country, learning to be more discriminating in their attacks and fighting a government that’s weak and reliant on direct external support.

The historical trends suggest that the Taliban’s Achilles heel would be the loss of their Pakistani sanctuary, while the principal American vulnerability is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s weak pseudo democracy.

The study, said the author, cannot be predictive, but it can help the U.S. address or exploit these vulnerabilities.

“A lot of the things being done in the current (U.S. military) plan are along the lines of successful things we’ve seen in the study,” said Ben Connable, the lead author of “How Insurgencies End,” published by the RAND Corp. in Washington.

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Afghanistan: The Taliban Fear Contractors

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:52 AM

    The attacks “are not about armed confrontation. They are about subversion of the government,” said Terrence K. Kelly, a senior researcher at the Washington-based RAND Corporation who has studied how rebuilding efforts work in war zones. America’s strategy counts on development work to increase the legitimacy and reach of the Karzai government. With these attacks the Taliban can “turn off the delivery of services — which makes the government look bad,” he said.

    USAID insists it will not scale back its work in Afghanistan because of the attacks, according to Rebecca Black, the agency’s deputy mission director for Afghanistan.

*****

    Break guerillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

     *If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides! -Page 108, Patterns of Conflict, Col. John Boyd

*****

   They must fear us, if they feel it is necessary to attack us. They know that we are out in the towns of Afghanistan, connecting with the people, and winning them over with jobs and support.  And when we say we are doing this in the name of the Afghan government, and people see the fruits of this labor, well then that makes the government look good.  Happy people, happy government, and sad sad sad Taliban. lol  It also makes the Taliban’s shadow government sad, because now they have to contend with the goodwill the contractors are spreading.

   So what does this mean?  From a strategist point of view, and from a COIN point of view, my people (contractors) are actually connecting with the Afghans and making an impact.  We are the civilian face of the war effort, and the Taliban fear us. They must, if they are purposely trying to attack us–I thought we didn’t matter?

   It also means that we should be doing more of it.  If the Taliban fear what we are doing, then I say increase the effort and further support the various programs that we are involved with out there. Focus on the programs that make the Afghan government look good, and makes the Taliban shadow government look frivolous and pathetic. Keep connecting with the people and providing them with jobs and purpose.

   Now on to another factor of these attacks.  Because the US and ISAF militaries are so hung up on living on the big box FOBs and commuting to work, the Taliban and their shadow government is pushing around the population and terrorizing them into doing what they want.  That is what shadow governments do–they undermine the current government with the idea of making them look illegitimate or ineffectual.  That shadow government will do everything it can to either win over the population, or impose their will on the population.  In order to stop that shadow government, you need to provide a ‘big stick’ in the area that will put the smack down on these guys. You also have to be better at influencing the people than the shadow government. It also helps that the current government is legitimate and not corrupt in the eyes of the people.

   And that is a big problem.  Crazy Karzai and his clown posse is not helping things at all, and in turn, the people have no respect for the government. It will also hurt the troops and police morale, both of the Afghans and of the Coalition.  No one likes working for a loser.

   Ideally, if you can’t change Karzai’s tune, then he should be voted out by the people. Unfortunately, Karzai is rigging the voting booths, and that simple act of screwing with the electoral process is to me the one area that needs to be fixed.  Why would people vote to change out a leader, if they cannot trust that their vote is being counted?  If we are in this war for the long haul, the goal should be to clamp down on election fraud and use every bit of muscle we can to ensure that it is fair. In fact, we should be planning for the next election, and learn from past efforts of worthless elections. We can also use a big stick to beat down this shadow government in the meantime.

   We must get the troops out into the population centers. (FOBs equals few and large, COP’s equals many and small-New Rules of War)  Do it Ramadi style, and convoy right into the worst parts of these towns and cities, and move right on in with a well supported platoon or company. Pick a city block, pay the owners of the block and homes really well, and then walk the beat like a cop.  The image the people should have, is a troop presence, mixed with an Afghan police presence, all with the expressed desire of protecting the people and pushing out this shadow government and enemy forces.  This would be the big stick in these areas, and with this kind of presence, they could also protect the various contractors out there that are trying to get aid out to the people. Clear, hold, build.

    We must protect and serve the people, and to do that, we need to get out there and live where they live.  Or troops can continue to commute to their job site, and protect the people when it is convenient.  Meanwhile, the contractors outside the wire, will continue to be the focus of the Taliban, and the Taliban shadow government will continue to do what they want. Ideally, we must have sound leadership in the Afghan government as well or something the people can respect. Boyd made a point on emphasizing this as well. (see quote up top)

   I would also like to say that I am not alone in this thinking.  Tim from Free Range International has an excellent post on the same subject and I highly recommend his blog to further your research on the matter.-Matt

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Attacks against contractors surging in Afghanistan

By NOOR KHAN and TIM SULLIVAN

April 24, 2010

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The message, very often, is sent with bloodshed.

A suicide bombing last week on a fortified Kandahar guesthouse shared by Western contracting companies killed four Afghans and injured several Americans. An Afghan engineer was shot dead in March as he helped inspect a school not far from the Pakistan border. An Afghan woman who worked for a U.S.-based consulting firm was shot by motorbike-riding gunmen as she headed home in this southern city.

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Wednesday, April 14, 2010

Publications: RAND–Military Capabilities For Hybrid War: Insights From The IDF In Lebanon And Gaza

Filed under: Israel,Publications,Strategy — Matt @ 12:55 AM

Furthermore, the introduction of sophisticated weapons (e.g., ATGMs, MANPADS) could radically escalate the challenges faced by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as it did for the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

*****

That quote up top is the one part I really clued in on, and I have talked about this in the New Rules of War posts, as well as the Toyota Horde post. Of course Israel thinks they have a counter to these types of munitions and tactics, and it will be interesting if they can truly stop this stuff. But I am skeptical.

The thing with anti-armor is that small teams armed with smart munitions, could also be armed with the knowledge on how to properly deploy that stuff. The brain is the weapon here.

Think of it this way. For one Javelin ‘fire and forget’ missile, you could have ten distraction troops all slinging RPG’s at the vehicle. Worse yet, think of ten troops firing .50 call long guns at the anti-missile system on the tank to destroy it, and then go for the kill with the big gun. I don’t care how bad ass a counter missile system mounted on a tank is, you cannot defend against a swarm attack like this. And this is nothing new. If anyone ever cared to read all the numerous books and manuals on the various ways of using anti-armor munitions, they would know this.

Also, look at the use of Stinger missiles by mujahideen during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. ‘Small and many’ teams armed with smart munitions were able to destroy many helicopters and cause all sorts of problems for the Soviets.

What limits smart munitions use amongst today’s enemies, is probably a number of factors. A better accounting of who makes it, and who they are selling the stuff too. Cost is another factor. Counter-terror operations are another factor. Training is definitely a factor, and an enemy force would either need a state sponsor to bring in these kinds of resources, or hunt around for some veterans of some military who know these new systems or knows anti-armor strategy at the small unit level.

I also think EFP’s are game changers. They are cheap to make and very difficult to defeat. An enemy who knows how to properly use these things and was a student of maneuver warfare, could very well do some damage to an advancing armored column. Especially if they were able to prep the battlefield. Or get this, how about suicide EFP bombers. Guys who run up to tanks at the perfect distance and direction, and trigger the munitions themselves. Of course they would be martyred, but they would also take out a tank or APC. If you think like today’s enemies, a tactic like this is not that far fetched. Below, I posted the conclusion of the paper, but I highly recommend reading the entire thing. Enjoy. –Matt

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Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza

By David E. Johnson

Relevance of the IDF Experience for the U.S. Army

Although the U.S. security situation is much different from that of Israel, similarities do exist.

Both nations believe they must prepare for challenges across the range of military operations.

Therefore, the following insights from recent Israeli experience have relevance for the U.S.

Army:

• The basics of combined arms fire and maneuver are necessary for successful operations

against opponents with capabilities like Hezbollah and Hamas. These hybrid opponents

create a qualitative challenge that demands combined arms fire and maneuver at lower

levels, despite their generally small-unit structures.

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Strategy: Smart Power And The Defense Industry

   Boy, this is a long one and this will take you a little bit to read through all the speeches and various articles.  But hey, if you are a student of strategy and are wanting to take a look into the future of defense contracting, you have to figure out what the big boys are thinking and wanting to do.

   What is interesting about ‘Smart Power’, is that it is a concept that gained it’s start as a political buzz word to differentiate one party’s views on foreign policy versus another’s. Which is standard play in the world of politics. Although I would argue that every administration no matter what party, all strive to use smart power in their foreign policy strategies. But hey, I will let the political pundits play that game–I have more important things to talk about.

   With that said, with a new administration comes newly minted foreign policy goals. Smart power is the flag pole that they are rallying around and that is what we all must focus on in order to stay current.

   There are a number of places to research the definition and origins of the concept of smart power.  For this post, I wanted to stick with Matt Armstrong’s definition of smart power because his pays respect to the original strategists who promoted such concepts back in their day.  He built a ‘snow mobile’ out of it, and brought in Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to create four pieces to the definition.(see below)

   Now that we have perspective and reference for smart power, my intention in this post was to highlight what the defense industry thinks about smart power.  Just look at the latest moves of Cerberus, and you will see how important this smart power concept is.  DynCorp, along with other defense companies involved with contracting, are all trying to adapt to the goals of a new administration and their ‘smart power’ focus, and investors are taking notice.  So what does all this mean for security contractors like you and me?

   Training, training, and more training is going to be the wave of the smart power future.  In order to stop a state from failing, you need to get into nation building, and the defense industry is jumping all over that.  From training police and military forces to propping up government institutions, the defense industry is all about training and mentoring. Expect to see more contracts in really bad places in the world, all with a focus on strengthening the recognized government and stabilizing that country.  Those are the places that need expertise and all the help we can give them, and private industry will answer that call.

   We also can provide other necessities of the state.  We can build defenses, enforce borders, build government facilities, create ‘Green Zones’, guard dignitaries or investors (commerce is vital to failed states as well), build infrastructure and provide the necessary support to the U.S. military and federal government as they go around the world and implement ‘smart power’. We are the SysAdmin and the ‘hold and build’ portion of today’s strategies. Security contractors are essential for all of that, whether a local national guard or it being an expat guard.  Someone has to protect these folks as they rebuild a crumbling state.

   Smart power is very friendly to private industry in another way.  Using military for everything when it comes to nation building, is not smart.  If we want to put a civilian face to our diplomacy, as opposed to a menacing military face, then smart power requirements will need civilians.  Of course there will be federal employees providing that civilian face, but that only goes so far, and federal response is no where near as fast as private industry response.  In other words, private industry equals speed, flexibility and scalability.  In a fast paced and highly dangerous world, private military companies with nation building capabilities and built in security mechanisms will be necessary to implement smart power strategies.  Just look at today’s wars and projects throughout the world, and tell me private industry doesn’t have a role in that process?  (might I note that contracting has only increased under the current admin–too bad we get zero recognition for our contribution to smart power)

   Interesting stuff, and let me know what you think. –Matt

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Smart Power is “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently.”  Those familiar with Sun Tzu and Clausewitz will recognize the four elements of Smart Power:

• The target over which one seeks to exercise power—its internal nature and its broader global context. Power cannot be smart if those who wield it are ignorant of these attributes of the target populations and regions.

• Self-knowledge and understanding of one’s own goals and capacities. Smart power requires the wielder to know what his or her country or community seeks, as well as its will and capacity to achieve its goals.

• The broader regional and global context within which the action will be conducted.

• The tools to be employed, as well as how and when to deploy them individually and in combination.

From the Mountain Runner blog.

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What’s “Smart Power”? DynCorp’s Tony Smeraglinolo on six best practices

April 12th, 2010

by JD Kathuria

“Smart power” — ever since Defense Secretary Robert Gates outlined the policy in a 2008 speech, it’s become the emerging tenet for how the United States should approach global security initiatives. Through a mix of military strength and nation-building activities, the aim is to keep “fractured or failed states,” as Gates put it, from teetering on the brink of war — or from requiring the US military, already stretched thin in Iraq or Afghanistan, from having to intervene further.

The urgency for smart power has only grown with the Obama administration’s call for $39.4 billion in funding for civilian foreign operations in fiscal 2011. Now comes the hard part: Determining how smart power can be implemented effectively to address global challenges.

Tony Smeraglinolo is working to cut through that uncertainty. As president of Global Stabilization and Development Solutions for DynCorp International, Smeraglinolo offers up this succinct definition: Smart power requires the application of three D’s — Defense, Diplomacy, and Development.  Since assuming his role in April 2009, Smeraglinolo has helped structure his division at DynCorp to provide all three core competencies.

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