Feral Jundi

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Afghanistan: So As NATO Falters Or Members Leave, Will Contractors Pick Up The Slack?

   So here is one that you won’t hear discussed out there.  What happens when NATO falters or members leave unexpectedly, as the war drags on?  Each country in NATO has it’s own set of politics back home, and like most countries, they can get into a position where support for operations overseas just diminishes.  Call it the economy, or media/activist groups, unexpected rise in war deaths, natural disasters, Black Swan events, etc.  An example would be the Dutch, and their sudden switch-a-roo/’I am out of here’ move in Afghanistan.  I didn’t see that one coming, but that is exactly what I am talking about.  So who is next in NATO?  And most of all, who will take up their slack, if the war effort depends upon those troops?

   Well for one, my pick is contractors. Mostly because we are the fastest means of filling that vacuum, and we do the least at disrupting the mechanics of the war machine.  Especially if the Dutch were tasked with training or menial/defensive operations.  Or the coalition can play the game where they rob Peter, to pay Paul, and shift forces from one vital mission, to fill another vital mission.  Kind of like with the Georgian conflict with Russia, and how those Georgian troops had to leave Iraq immediately to respond to a crisis in their homeland.  The US military had to scramble to backfill, and problems like this cause vacuums in all sorts of places in the war machine. Especially if contractors are already doing the menial jobs out there–meaning troops are already filling vital positions in the war.  So you take troops from one effort, and move them to another– it has an impact on the machine.

   I also say contractors are a good choice for this ‘vacuum plug’ when it comes to non-offensive operations.  If that member nation was tasked with training, convoy operations, PSD or static security, then contractors could easily be called upon to fill that vacuum so the rest of the war machine continues to function properly.  Hell, I could put a call out on this blog for a small army, have them vetted, tell them to bring their own kit, secure weapons/vehicles/living quarters/ID cards/licenses and deploy them into Afghanistan to fill those PSD/convoy/static positions quicker than you can say ‘Eric Cartman’.  People would be amazed at how quickly security contractors could be spun up, and especially if a company has the resources to do a quick spin up. (and most companies do)

   Of course it would be ideal to use military forces to fill these instant voids, and in most cases they do. But my question is how could they possible act as fast as a private company, or how could this not impact another vital mission they are performing?  Now the military can do stuff like divert troops from one country, to the other, or do an early deployment for a incoming unit, but yet again, this is taking from one vital mission, to fill another.  To me, it makes more sense to not disrupt that harmony of planning, and just contract a company to step in. Especially for the defensive operational stuff. (military replacement is the only option for offensive related ops at this time)

   Using contractors can even buy military planners some time to actually assemble a military team to fill in that hole.  Another way to look at it, is that we are the 50 mph tape for a hole in the fuel line, so that we can get the car back home.  Then at home, we can replace the fuel line.  It does not make sense, to disable the brakes and use a chunk of brake line to repair the fuel line.  Or you could use a vacuum line to repair the fuel line, but yet again, the engine will not run correctly– if at all.

   Now to wrap this up.(pun intended-lol)  The point of it all is that when I hear guys like Senator Levin slam private contractors in one hearing, and then in another quote, he whines about NATO not having enough troops to do the training in Afghanistan, I have to think that politically speaking he is saying one thing, but realistically speaking he has to know that contractors are vital to the war effort.  Because as more NATO folks leave, do to political turmoil, the economy, or some Black Swan event back home, contractors are gonna be as vital to the war machine tool box, as a roll of 50mph tape. –Matt

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50 mph tape

The ever handy roll of 50mph tape. 

More Military Trainers Needed in Afghanistan

Coalition forces pressed to fill gap in trainers needed to help growing Afghan Army and Police forces

Al Pessin

09 March 2010

The U.S. Navy admiral who commands all NATO forces worldwide says he and the alliance secretary general are pressing each member to fulfill a specific part of the shortfall in military trainers in Afghanistan.  The admiral spoke at a U.S. Senate hearing, where senior members from both parties criticized NATO allies for the shortage.Admiral James Stavridis gave the Senate Armed Services Committee specific numbers.  He said the NATO-run command in Afghanistan needed 1,278 trainers for the growing Afghan Army and Police forces, but it has so far received only 541 – a shortfall of 737.”It is absolutely correct to say that NATO has fallen short in providing these vital trainers.  What we are doing about it is taking further steps in terms of contacting each of the nations individually and going one-by-one through the precise requirement for each of the nations in terms of where they could most effectively fill in the trainer mix,” Stavridis said.The shortage of trainers comes at a time when Afghan Army recruiting is sharply up, due in part to a significant salary increase the Kabul government implemented late last year.The committee chairman, Democrat Carl Levin, said the training commander in Afghanistan told him some of the Afghan recruits cannot enter the army immediately due to the lack of trainers.”That is totally unacceptable, almost unbelievable to me, that we can not get NATO allies to carry out that kind of commitment, which is not the most dangerous.  There is obviously danger anywhere, but compared to being in combat it falls well short of that,” Levin said.

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Friday, August 13, 2010

Industry Talk: NATO Slack Forces US To Send More Soldier And Contractor Trainers To Afghanistan

     This story is interesting for a couple of reasons.  Awhile back I wrote a post that dealt with this type of problem specifically, and how contractors are the ones who will be taking up the ‘slack’.  Matter of fact, that is part of the title of the post. Afghanistan: So As NATO Falters Or Members Leave, Will Contractors Pick Up The Slack?

     One thing that struck me was the numbers mentioned in this story about how many contractor trainers are over there now.  I think that number is much larger than the 2,000 that is mentioned.  I could be wrong, and I only say this because DoD really hasn’t been that accurate with their contractor accounting.  Still, 2,000 contractor trainers is pretty significant.

     The other part that I wanted to mention, was the idea that it takes NATO so long to spin up the required amount of manpower, and yet there was no mention on how fast it takes contractors to be spun up and sent over.  Of course NPR did not want to minimize the capability of the US military, but in all honesty, private industry is the winner for speed of deployment and quantity needed when it comes to training stuff.  Hell, the only thing that slows down contractor deployments, is the lack of government CORs needed to manage the whole contract to ensure it is properly carried out. lol But in this race, we excel.

     The three month training deployment that the 82nd Airborne finished was pretty cool too.  Three month deployments are nice, and private industry is the king of utilizing short deployment contracts like this.  Could we see the military do more of these types of deployments?  I know the troops would probably dig it.

     I also wanted to give a big thanks and pat on the back to all of those contractors out there who are a part of this massive training effort in the war.  You are an essential part of today’s strategy, and today’s war planners and strategists might not appreciate what you do, but I certainly appreciate the hard work you are doing.

     My guess is that there will be more work coming too, so definitely keep up an eye on all the forums and job boards if you are planning to get into the training side of the business. –Matt

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NATO Slack Forces U.S. To Send Afghanistan Trainers

by Tom Bowman

August 13, 2010

American soldiers — and even private contractors — are spearheading the effort to build an Afghan army and police force, so American and NATO troops can one day leave. But Pentagon officials and military officers say NATO nations still aren’t doing enough.

A few weeks ago, hundreds of artillery troops and air defense artillery soldiers from Fort Sill in Oklahoma and Fort Campbell in Kentucky started heading over to Afghanistan. They weren’t part of the so-called surge in combat troops. Instead, Defense Secretary Robert Gates signed orders for them to work as trainers because European nations were too slow in helping out.

“We’re still not getting NATO able to force-generate and deploy forces in the numbers that we need,” says Army Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, who leads the training effort in Afghanistan. “So Gates said, ‘OK then, I’m going to give you another unit.’ “

It was the second time this year Gates said OK to more American trainers because NATO wasn’t picking up the slack. An 800-soldier battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division just got back from Afghanistan on a three-month training mission, designed to serve as a “bridge” to more NATO troops.

But with the NATO troops still not arriving, the troops from Oklahoma and Kentucky were sent — for a year.

That’s annoying some members of Congress.

“NATO members who for whatever reason do not send additional combat troops or who intend to reduce their combat troop presence in the near future should at least be willing to provide trainers who operate away from the heavy fighting,” Sen. Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who heads the Armed Services Committee, said at a recent hearing.

NATO is willing — to a point. It has sent about 900 trainers to work with Afghan soldiers and police. The U.S. has sent more than twice that number. American private contractors have sent 2,000.

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Friday, December 17, 2010

Industry Talk: Army To Award 1.6 Billion Dollar Training Contract For Afghanistan Before New Year

     Wow, this contract is a big one. Also, thanks to Danger Room for posting an update on this contract. In the past I posted a deal about the transition of this contract from CIVPOL to CNTPO, and how DynCorp got edged out of the party when they were excluded under the new program. Then they protested and won the right to be a vendor, and this is where we are at now. It is a battle of the titans for a huge training contract.

     This is also important to the war effort because as I have reported in the past, NATO tends to make promises it cannot keep.  There are 900 training positions still open because of this lack of commitment. That is not good, and especially if the war strategy is highly dependent on getting the Afghan forces to a size and level of competency where they can take over the security of their country. Yet again, it will be contractors picking up the slack as NATO falters. –Matt

Edit: 12/21/2010- Here is the latest with this contract.  DynCorp just got hooked up. Here is the quote:

“Danger Room has confirmed that DynCorp, one of the leading private-security firms, has held on to a contract with the Army worth up to $1 billion for training Afghanistan’s police over the next three years. With corruption, incompetence and illiteracy within the police force a persistent obstacle to turning over security responsibilities to the cops by 2014, NATO has revamped much of its training efforts — except, apparently, the contractors paid lavishly to help them out.

The details: DynCorp will provide security personnel to train the Afghan cops at 14 different locations across the country. Those trainers will support the NATO training command run out of Kabul by Lt. Gen. William Caldwell in getting the police into an “independently functioning entity capable of providing for the national security of Afghanistan,” the Army’s Research Development and Engineering Command says in the award. The contract runs for two years and earns DynCorp $718.1 million, but an option to re-up for a third year brings the total price to $1.04 billion.”

Quote From Danger Room:

“Before the New Year, the Army will finally award a much-delayed $1.6 billion-with-a-b contract for a private security firm to supplement that NATO training command’s efforts to professionalize Afghan cops. That bid touched off a bureaucratic tempest between Blackwater/Xe Services and DynCorp, which held an old contract for the same job, as well as the State Department and the Army.

But not for much longer. The Army’s Contracting Command is in “the very final stages” of selecting the firm for the bid, Col. John Ferrari of the NATO training command tells Danger Room. “We’re expecting an announcement before the end of December, sometime in the next week or two.”

The contract is for “mentoring, training, and logistics services” to backstop Ferrari’s efforts, placing security contractors in embedded positions with the Afghan interior ministry and police units themselves, according to the terms of the bid. More than 80 firms have registered as “interested vendors” on the federal website announcing the contract. NATO is trying to build a 134,000-strong Afghan police force by October, and it’s short 900 trainers promised by U.S. allies.”

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R–NATO Training Mission Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI) & Afghan National Police (ANP) Support Requirement

Solicitation Number: W91CRB10R0059

Agency: Department of the Army

Office: Army Contracting Command

Location: RDECOM Contracting Center – Aberdeen (RDECOM-CC)

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Afghanistan: The Future Of Training–More Money, More Demand For Trainers

The United States expects to spend about $6 billion a year training and supporting Afghan troops and police after it begins withdrawing its own combat troops in 2011.

The estimates of U.S. spending through 2015, detailed in a NATO training mission document, are an acknowledgment that Afghanistan will remain largely dependent on the United States for its security.

That reality could become problematic for the Obama administration as it continues to seek money for Afghanistan from Congress in a time of increasingly tight budgets.

In Brussels, a NATO official said Monday that alliance commander Gen. David Petraeus had asked for 2,000 more soldiers, with nearly half to be trainers for the rapidly expanding Afghan security forces. The NATO official requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the subject. 

*****

    A couple of things with these stories. Will Petraeus get these extra troops if NATO cannot scrape the bucket and get them on the scene?  Because politically and economically, sending more troops to Afghanistan is a hard sell in all the countries participating, and not just the US. How will this look during the coming elections in the US if more troops are asked for on top of the already thousands of troops requested for the surge?  Hell, some countries are backing out last minute (like the Dutch) and these actions always cause ripples in the planing and operations of the war effort.  So as I have said before, as NATO falters, contractors will be taking up the slack.

   I also continue to see plenty of training job ads, and according to the second article below, the money will be there for training in Afghanistan well into the future. The only thing though is politically, this administration and probably the next will continue to have problems with sending troops or getting congress to sign off on that training money.  As the troops get more limited in presence, and money becomes more scarce, contractors will continue to be an important tool to execute these training duties.

    The other thing I could see happening is more hybrid training programs popping up.  Where military folks mixed with contractors will be used to train the Afghans. We already see a little bit of this, and I think this combination works because the customer (US government) can ensure there is military oversight on these projects. It would also ensure that there is consistency in the training programs, and a metrics can be maintained by the military itself.

    All of this is just speculation, but given what is already on the ground, the military and contractor relationship will become even more important as time goes on. –Matt

NATO eyes 2,000 extra troops for Afghanistan: official

US expects to spend big in Afghanistan for years

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NATO eyes 2,000 extra troops for Afghanistan: official

By Laurent Thomet

09/08/2010

US General David Petraeus, the commander of the war in Afghanistan, has requested 2,000 extra troops to bolster a crucial mission to train Afghan security forces, a NATO official said Monday.

The mission would come on the heels of the deployment of tens of thousands of soldiers who were sent as part of a surge strategy aimed at crushing a resilient Taliban insurgency, the official said.

“There is now a discussion under way for additional resources, principally trainers, that could be sent to Afghanistan to bolster the mission,” said the official, who requested anonymity.

At least 750 of the new soldiers would focus on training Afghan forces, he said, refusing to give more details about the rest of the mission. He said it was premature to say when the 2,000 extra troops would be deployed.

Getting Afghan security forces trained so they can take over security responsibilities is a paramount condition for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the nation, worn down by war.

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Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Legal News: DoS Statement On The Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act Of 2012

This is cool. Patrick Kennedy is commenting on this reform act, which will certainly have an impact on contracts with the government for future and current contingency operations. There is also a video of his testimony.

What is of interest is State’s concern of how this law would negatively impact the flexibility they require in order to deal with today’s problems. The Arab Spring is just one example of how quickly things can change out there. Here is the quote:

With regard to the automatic suspension provisions set out in proposed Section 113, we believe that the current, long-standing policy requiring a reasoned decision from the SDO based on a totality of information remains a sound approach, and would have concerns with a provision that imposes automatic suspension and debarment which will likely lead to due process challenges by the affected contractor community and potential court action that could delay necessary action in crisis situations.
Reorganization of Contracting Function (Sec. 131)
We respectfully do not concur with the re-organization of our contracting function proposed in Sec. 131. Defining the acquisition organization of the Department of State in statute would reduce our flexibility and codify the structure, making future adjustments to support new 21st century challenges cumbersome and time consuming. Future legislation would have to be drafted and passed to allow the Department to adjust to the fast changing world of diplomacy, rendering the Department less agile and thereby potentially handicapping the Department’s ability to respond to contingencies. Also, the proposed re-organization would constitute a bureau with not only the contracting function but logistics, motor vehicles, diplomatic pouch, household effects, shipping and storage. If a bureau were to be formed with only the contracting program, it would not be of sufficient size to warrant bureau-level status.

Probably the most relevant section of the statement to the readers of this blog was point about PSC’s and command and control. Here is the quote:

Private Security Contractors (Sec. 202)
The Department has a long history of using contract guards for protection of facilities and personnel stretching back to the 1970s, with enhanced capabilities in the 1990s. Private security contractors (PSCs) are critical to our readiness and capability to carry out American foreign policy under dangerous and uncertain security conditions. Maintaining this capability is particularly important when the Department is taking on expanding missions in contingency operations environments or areas that are transitioning from periods of intense conflict, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
That said, we appreciate the intent of section 202. We have sought to reduce risks associated with using contractors through robust oversight of our PSCs, as in CWC Recommendation 4. Contractors are operationally overseen and contractually managed by direct hire Department of State personnel, and we have instituted cultural training requirements, and contractor behavioral standards of conduct to ensure the professionalism of PSC personnel. The Department is staffed to properly oversee PSC compliance with these contractual requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
State strongly disagrees with the language of paragraph Sec. 202 (b)(1), which has the combatant commander determining whether performance of security functions by contractor personnel for the Department of State in overseas contingency areas is appropriate and necessary. This language is too open-ended and is not acceptable as it infringes upon the Secretary of State’s primary role in leading and carrying out foreign policy. The Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission have statutory responsibility for the safety and security of personnel under Chief of Mission authority. We routinely discuss the security situation in-country with DoD and other agencies present at post; and in situations where U.S. military forces are present, that coordination is intensified and ongoing. We fully comply with OFPP’s new Policy Letter on inherently governmental and critical functions, and our PSCs never engage in combat operations. We hope to work with you and your staff to find mutually acceptable language in this section.

What is interesting here is that 202 (b) (1) is a challenge to State’s control over their security force. It also causes confusion over who is really in charge of that force, which is not good in contingency operations.

If anything, the two groups should work together to ensure State’s security force is on the same sheet of music with the mission. Unity of effort is what should be the focus. But the language of this section is vague as to who is really in control of those forces. So I think State has a point here, but that is my personal opinion. Either way, check it out. –Matt

 

The Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012
Testimony
Patrick F. Kennedy
Under Secretary for Management
Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight
Washington, DC
April 17, 2012
Good morning Chairman McCaskill, Senator Portman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation to appear here today to discuss Senate bill 2139, the Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012.
We share the Committee’s desire to ensure that efforts continue to strengthen contingency contracting. S. 2139 raises a number of important issues. While our review of the bill is ongoing, we welcome the opportunity to discuss our initial views on the bill’s provisions.
We understand that this legislation builds on the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan – an independent, bipartisan panel that you, Senator McCaskill, created along with Senator Webb in 2007. The State Department worked continuously with the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) from when it was formed in early 2008 until it sunset last August, and gained valuable insight from the Commission’s efforts. We have taken many steps to improve our contingency contracting over the past several years, based on the CWC’s reports, recommendations from other oversight entities, and our own lessons learned.
The Department’s participation in CWC’s study was headed by the Office of the Under Secretary for Management and the Bureau of Administration. In addition to numerous meetings with the CWC, senior Department officials testified at seven formal CWC hearings.

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